Wallace-  Greater 
Italy  (Luaiied  1;^ 
DrtKllngtierg) 


LOS  ANGELES 

STATE  NORMAL  SCHOOL 

LIBRARY 


GREATER  ITALY 


GREATER   ITALY 


BY 

WILLIAM  KAY  WALLACE,  M.A. 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 

1917 


COPTBIQHT,  1917,  BT 

CHARLES  SCRIBNERS  SONS 


stack 
Annex 


PREFACE 

I  WOULD  attempt  to  trace  in  this  volume  the  rise 
of  the  Kingdom  of  Italy  among  nations,  with  more 
particular  emphasis  on  the  part  played  by  the  people 
of  Italy  in  the  affairs  of  the  world  during  the  past 
three  decades. 

The  share  which  Italy  has  had  in  shaping  the  his- 
tory of  Europe  during  this  period  is  a  great  one. 
Careful  analysis  would  lead  one  to  conclude  that 
the  policy  which  Italy  has  pursued  has  been  one  of 
the  chief  final  determinants  in  world  affairs.  Italy's 
open  acknowledgment  of  her  partnership  in  the  Triple 
Alhance  brought  about  the  re-grouping  of  the  Eu- 
ropean Powers  which  soon  crystalhsed  into  the  two 
groups  of  the  Triple  Alhance  and  the  Triple  Entente, 
facing  each  other  across  the  chessboard  of  international 
affairs.  It  was  only  when  Germany,  vnth.  overweening 
self-confidence,  trumpeted  loudly  her  defiant  cry  of 
Weltmacht  oder  Niedergang,  that  the  people  of  Italy, 
perceiving  the  subservience  of  the  position  into  which 
they  had  fallen,  with  indomitable  courage  set  about  to 
free  themselves  from  German  control. 

In  deahng  wdth  Italian  affairs,  I  have  sought  to 
lay  particular  stress  on  the  relations  of  Italy  with 
the  Central  Powers,  to  trace  the  course  of  Itahan 
pohcy  in  its  deahngs  wdth  Vienna  and  Berhn,  and  to 
show  how  the  "manage  force"  of  Rome  and  Vienna, 
brought  about  by  the  arbitrariness  of  Berhn,  could 


vi  PREFACE 

not  fail  to  end  in  disaster.  However,  it  would  be  very- 
short-sighted  to  disregard  the  immense  material  ad- 
vantages and  benefits  which  Italy  received  as  a  result 
of  her  intimate  relations  with  Germany.  It  is  only  by 
a  clear  understanding  of  this  intimacy,  which,  for  a 
generation,  existed  between  Rome  and  Berhn  that  we 
can  gauge  truthfully  the  present  realist  temper  of  the 
ItaUan  people. 

No  history  of  present-day  Italy  would  be  complete 
without  a  mention  of  the  occupant  of  the  throne  of 
St.  Peter.  I  have  endeavoured  to  recount  briefly, 
though  carefully,  the  relations  between  the  Vatican 
and  the  Quirinal.  In  so  doing  I  have  concerned  myself 
solely  with  the  political  aspect  of  the  Papacy.  The 
Papacy,  viewed  as  a  political  organism,  is  a  problem 
of  immediate  and  vital  importance  to  the  Kingdom  of 
Italy,  which  must  be  the  object  of  concern  to  every 
student  of  history.  Since  the  chapter  on  this  subject 
was  written  news  reaches  me  from  Rome  that  during 
the  past  month  there  has  been  a  decided  change  in 
Papal  pohcy;  that  the  Vatican  is  making  serious  efforts 
to  concihate  the  Allies;  that  the  Pope  has  addressed 
severe  remonstrances  to  the  Central  Powers  regarding 
their  pohcy  of  deportations  and  bombardment  of  open 
towns;  that  he  has  rid  himself  of  certain  pro-German 
personages  of  his  entourage,  and  is  endeavouring  to 
show  himself  docile  and  concihatory  towards  France. 

Of  all  the  Powers  engaged  in  the  European  War 
none  has  more  pressing  problems,  difficult  of  solu- 
tion, confronting  it,  than  Italy.  The  people  of  Italy 
believe  that  they  have  pre-eminent  interests  in  the 
Trentino  and  the  Eastern  Adriatic,  in  the  ^Egean  and 
Asia  Minor,  as  well  as  in  certain  regions  of  northern 


PREFACE  vii 

and  eastern  Africa.  A  stable  peace  in  Europe  can- 
not be  guaranteed  without  the  just  satisfaction  of 
the  essential  legitimate  Italian  aspirations.  To  in- 
siu'e  a  better  understanding  of  these  aspirations  I 
have  endeavoured  to  give  to  contemporary  problems 
something  of  their  historical  setting. 

I  have  had  the  privilege  of  being  at  and  near  the 
front  with  the  Italian  armies  at  different  periods 
during  this  war.  I  was  present  on  the  field  of  battle 
during  the  stirring  days  when  the  Austrians  launched 
their  great  invasion  of  Italy  last  May.  I  was  there 
able  to  learn  something  of  the  intrepid  valour  of  those 
brave  sons  of  United  Italy  w^ho  marched  to  their 
death  in  the  highlands  with  flowers  garlanded  about 
their  dust-covered  helmets,  a  smile  on  their  lips, 
a  song  in  their  hearts.  The  precise  efficiency,  the  calm 
demeanour,  the  stern  restraint  of  officers  and  men 
alike,  in  the  face  of  so  grave  a  danger,  gave  me  an 
insight  into  the  new  Italy;  the  Italy  of  dynamic, 
resourceful  energy,  of  deep  courage,  of  buoyant,  op- 
timistic vitality.  It  is  to  this  Italy  that  I  would 
direct  your  attention. 

January,  1917 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.    The  Achievement  of  Unity      ...        1 

Napoleon  III  and  Cavour.  The  Rise  of 
Piedmont.    Struggles  for  Independence. 

II.    Formative  Forces 20 

Nationalism.    Irredentism,    Futurism. 

III.  The  Triple  Alliance 39 

The  Rule  of  Crispi.  Colonial  Expansion. 
The  Abyssinian  War. 

IV.  The  Period  of  Retrenchment  ...       68 

1896-1903.  Internal  Difficulties.  The 
House  of  Savoy. 

V.    The  Dictatorship  of  Giolitti  ...       92 

Political  Corruption.  The  Erosion  of 
Parties.    Algeciras  and  Agadir. 

VI.    The  Libyan  War 114 

Aims  and  Aspirations.  Account  of  the  Con- 
flict.   The  War  and  After. 

VII.    Economic  Development 141 

Social  and  Vital  Statistics.  Industrial 
AND  Commercial  Expansion.  Colonial 
Dominions. 

VIII.     The  Vatican  and  the  Quirinal     .     .     159 

Rome  the  Capital  of  the  Kingdom  of  Italy. 
The  Law  of  Guarantees.  The  Roman 
Question. 

ix 


X  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  FAGB 

IX.    Italy  and  Germany 184 

German  Peaceful  Penetration.    Industrial 
Servitude.     The  Breaking  from  Bondage. 

X.    The  Problem  of  the  Adriatic  .     .     .     207 

Relations    with    Austria.      The    Need    of 
HEGEMOfnr.    Italians  and  Slavs. 

XL    The  Days  of  Neutrality     ....     238 

The   Trend   of  Policy.     Neutralists  and 
Interventionists.    The  May  Revolution. 

XII.     Italy  at  War 268 

Period  of  Aloofness.    Military  and  Polit- 
ical Crises.    Unity. 

Index 303 


MAPS 

I.    Italy  before  Unity   .     ,     .     .    to  face  p.  6 

II.    The  Italian  War  Zone  .     .      to  face  p.  272 

III.    Greater  Italy at  end 


GREATER  ITALY 


GREATER  ITALY 

CHAPTER  I 
THE  ACHIEVEMENT  OF  UNITY 

Napoleon  III  and  Cavour.     The  Rise  op  Piedmont. 
Struggles  for  Independence 

It  was  in  July,  1858,  that  Cavour,  at  the  personal 
invitation  of  Napoleon  III,  came  to  Plombieres,  where 
the  Emperor  was  at  that  time  taking  the  baths.  Here, 
between  other  diversions,  feeling  himself  strong  and 
vigorous  as  a  result  of  his  stay  in  the  bracing  air  of 
the  Vosges,  Napoleon  readily  entered  upon  a  secret 
understanding  with  the  Italian  Minister  to  assist  the 
Piedmontese  in  driving  out  the  Austrians  from  north- 
ern Italy,  and  agreed  to  the  hegemony  of  the  House  of 
Savoy,  of  this  new  and  much  enlarged  ItaUan  King- 
dom. 

The  meetings  between  Napoleon  and  Cavour  lasted 
two  days.  Finally,  after  a  long  interview,  Napoleon 
took  Cavour  for  a  drive  into  the  country,  he  himself 
driving  the  light,  high-wheeled  gig.  No  one  was  pres- 
ent at  this  excursion,  which  lasted  over  three  hours. 
It  was  while  Napoleon  was  busied  driving  his  horses 
along  the  mountain  roads  that  Cavour  poured  forth 
his  most  astute  and  incisive  arguments.  This  hour 
was  to  prove  momentous  in  the  history  of  modern 
Italy,  for  with  foreign  aid,  of  both  men  and  money, 

1 


2  GREATER  ITALY 

the  plan  of  Cavour  ''for  the  self-government  of  all 
Italy  by  Italians"  seemed  assured. 

It  is  impossible  to  conceive  that  Napoleon  III  had 
any  idea  of  bringing  about  Italian  unity  in  a  broad 
sense,  or  that  he  took  a  very  lively  interest  in  Italian 
affairs.  But  circumstances  had  rendered  him  the 
arbiter  of  Europe,  and  he  believed  the  moment  oppor- 
tune to  freshen  the  lustre  of  the  miUtary  laurels  of 
France.  Events  proved  that  he  was  more  interested 
in  filling  up  the  empty  niches  of  the  Invalides  with  new 
trophies  than  he  was  with  Italian  national  aspira- 
tions. 

However,  Cavour  returned  well  content  to  Italy 
and  reported  to  his  sovereign,  Victor  Emmanuel  II, 
at  Turin  the  results  of  his  interview. 

The  terms  of  the  agreement  w^ere  vague.  France  was 
to  furnish  200,000  men;  Piedmont  was  to  raise  100,000. 
The  joint  forces  were  to  drive  the  Austrians  from 
Lombardy  and  Venetia,  which,  together  with  the 
Legations  and  the  Marches  of  Ancona,  were  to  be  an- 
nexed to  the  States  already  under  the  sovereignty  of 
Victor  Emmanuel  II.  France  was  to  receive  the 
Duchy  of  Savoy  in  return  for  the  cession  of  Lombardy, 
while  Nice  was  to  be  given  to  France  in  case  Venetia 
was  acquired.  Thus  Cavour  set  to  work  to  pave  the 
way  for  the  liberation  and  unification  of  Italy. 

In  those  days  the  attitude  of  Austria  towards  Pied- 
mont was,  in  many  respects,  identical  with  the  atti- 
tude of  the  Dual  Monarchy  towards  Serbia  during  the 
past  decade.  In  1859  Austria  held  the  greater  part  of 
northern  Italy  in  bondage,  just  as  in  our  own  times 
the  Hapsburg  Empire  after  annexing  Bosnia,  in  1908, 
held  the  great  majority  of  the  Jugo-Slavs  within  its 


THE  ACHIEVEMENT  OF  UNITY  3 

power.  As  Serbia,  seeking  to  realise  the  national  am- 
bitions of  the  Southern  Slavs,  turned  to  Russia  for 
help  against  the  encroachments  of  Vienna,  so  Pied- 
mont turned  to  France.  For  Cavour's  arrangement 
for  the  co-operation  of  Napoleon  was  based  solely  on 
the  contingency  of  an  overt  aggression  on  the  part  of 
Austria.  The  analogy  is  still  more  striking  when  it  is 
recalled  that  as  in  1914  England  made  every  effort  to 
avoid  war,  so  in  1859  she  tendered  her  good  offices  as 
mediator  when  the  situation  became  acute  in  April, 
and  Austria  had  despatched  an  ultimatum  to  Pied- 
mont. 

The  attitude  of  France  was  obsciu-e.  Napoleon  had 
made  a  personal  agreement  with  Cavour,  without  in- 
forming his  Ministers,  who  now  flatly  declared  that 
there  was  no  need  of  going  to  war  for  the  aggrandise- 
ment of  the  House  of  Savoy.  The  future  of  Italy  for 
a  moment  hung  by  a  precarious  thread.  Cavour  had 
made  plans,  so  it  is  said,  to  leave  for  America  in  case 
Napoleon  repudiated  his  word. 

England  called  upon  Austria  and  Piedmont  to  meet 
in  conference.  Cavour  bowed  to  the  inevitable,  and 
agreed  to  the  proposal.  This  was  April  17.  Two  days 
later  Austria  sent  an  arrogant  reply,  stating  that  she 
could  not  agree  to  any  mediation.  This  cowp  de  tete 
on  the  part  of  Austria  rallied  France  to  the  support  of 
Italy,  while  the  British  Cabinet,  incensed  at  the  tone 
of  the  Austrian  reply,  was  also  openly  favourable  to 
Italy.  Ten  days  later  Austria  declared  war,  and  the 
Franco-Italian  forces  entered  Lombardy. 

Success  accompanied  the  expedition.  Magenta  and 
Solferino  were  facile  and  brilliant,  if  not  decisive,  vic- 
tories for  the  aUied  arms.    The  liberation  of  Lombardy 


4  GREATER  ITALY 

soon  followed,  and  the  hopes  of  all  Italy  ran  high  that 
at  last  the  detested  Austrian  would  be  driven  beyond 
the  Brenner  and  the  Quanero.  Yet  only  nine  weeks 
after  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  when  Venetia 
was  still  firmly  held  by  Austria,  Napoleon,  fearing  fur- 
ther complications  at  home,  as  reports  had  reached 
him  that  the  Prussians  were  mobilising  along  the 
Rhine,  agreed  to  an  armistice,  and  on  July  11,  in  a 
personal  interview  with  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph 
at  Villafranca,  concluded  the  preliminaries  of  peace, 
which  was  later  signed  at  Ziirich  on  November  10, 
1859.  By  its  terms  Lombardy  was  ceded  to  Napoleon, 
who  in  turn  handed  it  over  to  Piedmont.  This  was 
the  only  tangible  result  of  a  campaign  so  auspiciously 
begun.  Italy  remained  in  as  chaotic  a  state  as  before, 
and  Italian  unity  seemed  as  remote  as  ever. 

The  Italians,  deceived  and  disappointed  by  the 
action  of  Napoleon  at  Villafranca,  were  further  in- 
furiated against  the  French,  when,  in  the  next  year, 
the  Emperor  demanded  his  ''pound  of  flesh,"  and  com- 
pelled Piedmont  to  cede  Nice  and  Savoy  to  France, 
and  at  the  same  time  called  a  halt  to  Italian  ambitions 
by  continuing  to  occupy  Rome  with  French  troops. 
Napoleon's  short-sighted  and  sHghting  attitude  to- 
wards Italy  was  to  prove  of  grave  consequence  to 
France,  not  merely  because  of  the  neutral  attitude 
adopted  by  Italy  during  the  Franco-Prussian  War  of 
1870,  but  during  the  next  half  century  the  spectre  of 
the  wrongs  inflicted  at  this  time  on  Italy  rose  time 
and  again  to  prevent  a  friendly  understanding  between 
the  two  countries. 

Nevertheless,  the  first  seeds  of  Italian  unity  had 
been  sown  in  fertile  soil.    The  princes  of  the  House  of 


THE  ACHIEVEMENT  OF  UNITY  5 

Savoy  felt  themselves  the  chosen  leaders  of  Italian 
unity.  Piedmont  became  the  kernel  of  the  new  Italy. 
The  flame  of  nationalism  had  spread  throughout  the 
peninsula.  The  national  aspirations  of  a  great  race 
cannot  be  quenched  by  temporary  reverses.  In  March, 
1860,  Emilia  and  Tuscany,  by  a  plebiscite  voted  them- 
selves a  part  of  the  new  Kingdom,  while  Garibaldi, 
with  his  famous  Thousand,  set  sail  from  Quarto,  near 
Genoa,  for  the  south.  One  by  one,  in  rapid  succession, 
Umbria,  the  Marches,  Naples,  and  Sicily  all  voted 
their  adherence  to  the  growing  Italian  Kingdom.  In 
November,  1866,  the  greater  part  of  Venetia  was 
wrested  from  Austria,  while  in  1870  the  chief  event  of 
the  nationalisation  of  the  Italian  peninsula  was 
achieved  when  the  Italian  forces  captured  Rome,  and 
the  city  became  the  capital  of  the  country.  Thus, 
briefly,  are  set  forth  the  outHnes  of  the  struggle  which 
brought  into  being  modern  Italy. 

It  is  more  than  a  mere  coincidence  that  the  year  1870 
should  have  been  marked  by  the  appearance  of  two 
new  states  in  the  firmament  of  nations.  The  history 
of  the  rise  of  Prussia  and  of  Piedmont  is  emphatically 
similar.  The  objects  of  both  were  the  same:  to  group 
and  weld  into  one  united  whole  the  motley  members 
which  formed  each  body  poHtic.  This  was  the  aim  of 
both  Prussia  and  Piedmont.  As  in  Prussia,  so  in  Pied- 
mont a  landed  aristocracy  and  an  old  military  caste 
held  the  reins  of  government.  As  in  Prussia,  so  in  Pied- 
mont a  man  was  found  equal  to  the  task  of  driving  out 
the  cumbersome  Austrian  and  of  setting  the  seal  of 
national  independence  on  the  united  nations  under 
the  hegemony  of  their  respective  sovereigns.  Cavour 
and  Bismarck  are  the  two  nation-builders  of  modern 


6  GREATER  ITALY 

times.  Under  their  guidance  both  Prussia  and  Pied- 
mont assumed  the  leadership  of  their  race,  and  con- 
sohdated  their  peoples  into  an  organic  whole.  The 
constructive  work  of  unification  received  its  greatest 
immediate  impetus  when  the  two  States,  Prussia  and 
Piedmont,  became  allies  to  drive  out  the  Austrians. 
The  victorious  campaign  of  1866,  which  ended  in 
Sadowa,  was  conducted  single-handed  by  the  Prussians, 
for  the  Italians  met  with  reverses  during  the  first  days 
of  the  struggle.  But  Bismarck,  who  was  looking  be- 
yond the  immediate  present,  foresaw  the  advantages 
to  be  gained  by  an  unwonted  leniency  towards  the 
humbled  Austrian.  A  truce,  followed  by  peace,  was 
speedily  arranged  for,  and  Italy  received  Venetia  as 
her  share  of  the  spoils;  a  brave  step  in  advance  in  the 
programme  of  national  unity. 

But  the  crowning  year  of  the  rise  of  the  two  States 
was  reached  in  1870.  Once  again  Prussia  took  up  the 
cudgels  for  the  cause  of  German  expansion,  and  Italy, 
profiting  by  the  embarrassment  of  France,  entered 
Rome,  which  was  forthwith  proclaimed  the  capital  of 
the  new  Kingdom  of  Italy,  under  the  sovereignty  of 
Victor  Emmanuel  II.  When,  three  months  later, 
Bismarck  placed  the  Imperial  crown  upon  the  head  of 
WilUam  I  at  Versailles,  he  was  merely  following  the 
Itahan  example.  The  task  was  complete.  The  first 
cycle  of  the  epic  of  nationalism  had  ended. 

During  the  ensuing  years  Prussia  and  Piedmont, 
within  their  respective  spheres,  were  busy  endeavouring 
to  make  the  smaller  and  weaker  States  of  the  union 
forget  their  particularist  past,  and  to  imbue  the  newly 
united  peoples  with  a  sense  of  national  patriotism. 
But  here  the  similarity  ends.     Prussia  brought  into 


LnngitnJe 


THE  UNIFICATION  OF  ITALY 


THE  ACHIEVEMENT  OF  UNITY  7 

being  the  German  Empire  by  ''blood  and  iron."  From 
the  very  outset  the  principles  of  nationaUty  were 
violated;  first,  in  1864,  by  the  annexation  of  the 
Danish  Duchies;  then,  in  1870,  by  the  incorporation 
of  Alsace-Lorraine.  Piedmont,  on  the  contrary,  rose 
to  leadership  in  response  to  the  desire  of  a  people  of 
one  tongue,  tradition,  and  culture,  who  were  ready 
for  the  great  experiment  in  national  unity. 

The  German  Empire  still  remained  a  patchwork  of 
unassimilated  principaUties,  under  the  leadership  of 
Prussia,  whereas  Piedmont,  fused  into  the  new  Italy, 
soon  lost  her  hegemony  and  much  of  her  identity. 

The  further  shaping  of  the  destiny  of  the  two  new 
States  was  influenced  by  many  internal  factors.  The 
confederation  of  German  States,  under  Prussian  leader- 
ship, as  created  by  Bismarck,  was  an  elastic  organisa- 
tion, capable  of  indefinite  expansion.  The  ItaUan 
Kingdom,  on  the  other  hand,  soon  set  itself  in  a  mould 
of  a  certain  rigidity.  From  a  constructive  point  of 
view  the  early  death  of  Cavour  in  1861,  before  the 
work  of  unification  was  completed,  left  Italy  without 
a  strong  and  skilful  leader,  while  Bismarck  lived  on  for 
another  thirty  years,  and  was  able  to  shape  the  des- 
tinies of  the  Empire  he  had  created.  Yet  Prussia  and 
Piedmont  have  always  had  a  certain  comradeship  of 
spirit,  which  subsists  to  this  day.  This  is  only  natural 
when  viewed  in  the  light  of  the  many  important  crises 
which  the  two  States  endured  in  common,  and  of  the 
remarkable  similarity  of  the  episodes  in  their  national 
development. 

No  sooner  had  national  unity  in  Italy  been  firmly 
achieved,  no  sooner  did  Italy  feel  her  new  national 


8  GREATER  ITALY 

strength,  than  she  looked  about  her  and  discovered, 
for  the  first  time,  the  weakness  of  her  geographical 
position.  Jutting  out  into  the  Mediterranean,  the 
long,  boot-shaped  peninsula  is  unprotected  by  any 
natural  coast  defenses.  Across  the  narrow  Adriatic 
and  along  her  northeastern  boundary,  holding  the 
keys  to  all  the  valleys  leading  into  the  Venetian  plain, 
Austria  loomed  menacingly.  In  the  west,  not  thirty 
miles  from  the  Itahan  coast,  Corsica,  in  the  hands  of 
France,  was  a  thorn  in  the  side  of  the  new  Italy.  The 
Mediterranean  was  rapidly  becoming  an  EngHsh 
lake,  as  by  the  acquisition  of  the  control  of  the  Suez 
Canal  by  purchase  in  1875,  the  British  had  succeeded 
in  bottUng  up  the  States  bordering  on  its  shores. 
Though  Italy  had  no  reason  to  fear  England,  who  had 
always  taken  a  most  friendly  attitude  on  all  matters 
concerning  the  new  Kingdom,  the  ItaUans  chafed  at 
the  patronising  tone  of  British  statesmen,  who  were 
in  the  habit  of  treating  Italy  in  a  romantic  rather 
than  in  a  reahst  spirit.  Furthermore,  the  Italians 
thought  that  their  national  will  would  be  continually 
thwarted  by  England  in  any  sphere  of  colonial  expan- 
sion. 

To  any  one  looking  out  on  the  world  through  Italian 
eyes,  during  the  years  inunediately  following  the  unifi- 
cation of  Italy,  Europe  presented  a  sorry  spectacle. 
The  ItaHans,  with  their  hearts  still  full  of  their  great 
epic  adventure  in  nation-building,  beheld  England 
busy  rounding  out  her  colonial  domain,  earmarking  the 
few  remaining  '' uncivilised"  districts  for  her  own  uses, 
maintaining  an  attitude  of  ''splendid  isolation"  which 
chilled  the  sensibilities  of  the  Italian  patriots.  France, 
after  the  throes  of  the  Commune,  set  about  coura- 


THE  ACHIEVEMENT  OF  UNITY  9 

geously  to  repair  the  wastage  of  recent  disasters,  in- 
augurating the  Third  RepubHc  under  inauspicious  cir- 
cumstances. She  was  so  busy  setting  her  own  house 
in  order  that  she  found  no  time  for,  what  seemed  to 
her,  the  childish  enthusiasms  of  Italy.  Furthermore, 
Italy  openly  mistrusted  France,  and  feared  that  at 
any  time  France  might  take  it  into  her  head  to  set  the 
Pope  back  on  his  temporal  throne,  or  undertake  some 
other  quixotic  expedition. 

In  1876  the  control  of  the  Government  at  Rome 
passed  from  the  Right;  pragmatists  in  politics,  follow- 
ers of  the  Piedjmontese  tradition,  they  had  patterned 
their  parhamentary  conduct  on  the  English  model  and 
pursued  a  poHcy  of  exclusiveness  and  self-interest  in 
foreign  affairs,  initiated  and  so  successfully  carried  out 
by  Cavour.  Piedmont  now  lost  its  ascendency  in  na- 
tional affairs,  and  the  reins  of  power  passed  to  the 
South,  where  the  Left  dominated. 

With  the  accession  of  the  Depretis  Ministry  to  office 
in  jMarch,  1876,  ItaUan  foreign  relations  follow  a  hap- 
hazard course.  A  spirit  of  \dsionary  .altruism,  based 
on  high-sounding  phrases,  seized  hold  of  the  Govern- 
ment. At  a  period  when  cold,  hard-headed  reaUsm  in 
the  conduct  of  affairs  was  needed,  Itahan  statesmen, 
or  rather  the  pohticians  in  power,  were  more  concerned 
with  retaining  their  parliamentary  majority  than  with 
the  real  interests  of  their  country.  During  the  first 
years  of  ItaUan  national  existence  the  new  State 
showed  no  singular  aptitude  to  take  advantage  of  its 
position  as  a  force  in  European  affairs.  Timidity, 
combined  with  lassitude  and  a  desire  for  peace, 
seemed  to  express  the  wdll  of  the  people.  Italy 
continued  to  maintain  an  attitude  of  aloofness  as  re- 


10  GREATER  ITALY 

gards  international  affairs  of  peculiar  interest  to  her, 
which  betrayed  the  fact  that  the  strong  current  which 
had  brought  about  national  unity  had  not  as  yet  been 
suflficiently  channelled  so  as  to  permit  a  sane  con- 
ception of  Italy's  international  obligations  and  inter- 
ests. Public  men  and  public  opinion  were  both  ner- 
vous lest  a  foreign  state  should  interfere  in  Italian 
home  affairs. 

In  order  to  sound  the  Powers  regarding  their  atti- 
tude towards  Italy,  Crispi,  who  later  was  to  prove  so 
ardent  an  exponent  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  set  out  in 
August,  1877,  on  a  tour  of  the  various  capitals  to  find 
out  the  temper  of  European  statesmen.  In  Paris  he 
was  well,  if  coolly,  received.  He  soon  became  con- 
vinced that  France  would  not  make  any  attempt  to 
restore  the  temporal  power  of  the  Papacy;  one  of  the 
chief  fears  which  still  lingered  in  Italian  minds.  Yet 
Crispi  fancied  that  he  discovered  that  France  looked 
with  no  favourable  eye  on  any  further  expansion  of 
Italy,  and  he  left  Paris  firmly  believing  that  France 
and  Italy  could  not  be  friends.  Crispi  then  sought 
out  Bismarck  at  Gastein.  The  Iron  Chancellor  told 
Crispi  very  frankly  that  though  he  would  not  be 
averse  to  assisting  Italy  in  case  of  an  aggressive  at- 
titude on  the  part  of  France  he  would  in  nowise  in- 
tercede in  Austria  in  behalf  of  a  rectification  of  the 
Italo-Austrian  boundary-line,  which,  drawn  hastily 
in  1866,  had  left  Italy  very  vulnerable  from  a  strategic 
view-point,  while  many  hundred  thousand  Italians 
in  the  Trentino  and  the  Adriatic  littoral  still  remained 
under  Austrian  rule.  London,  not  wishing  to  meddle 
in  Continental  politics  of  no  immediate  concern  to 
herself,  took  little  notice  of  the  Italian  envoy.    Count 


THE  ACHIEVEMENT  OF  UNITY         11 

Andrassy,  in  Vienna,  very  pointedly  remarked  that 
the  question  of  the  eventuahty  of  a  Hapsburg  protec- 
torate over  Bosnia,  which  was  at  that  time  rumoured, 
was  of  no  concern  to  Italy,  and  that  compensations 
elsewhere,  as  suggested  by  Crispi,  in  regard  to  a  rear- 
rangement of  the  frontier  would  not  be  pacij&cally 
entertained.  Crispi  returned  to  Italy  feeling,  though 
without  much  foundation,  that  Bismarck,  notwith- 
standing his  gruff  and  uncompromising  manner,  was 
the  only  friend  whom  Italy  could  count  on  in  Europe. 

It  was  a  year  later  that  the  Congress  of  Berhn 
(1878)  met  to  undo  the  handiwork  of  the  Treaty  of 
San  Stefano  in  an  attempt  to  settle  more  equitably 
the  Near  Eastern  Question,  which  at  that  time  had 
come  to  the  fore  of  international  affairs  as  a  result  of 
the  Russo-Turkish  War.  Italy's  envoy.  Count  Corti, 
having  no  mandate,  or  programme  of  pohcy,  main- 
tained throughout  the  conference  an  attitude  of  lofty 
unconcern,  allowing  Austria  to  acquire  the  Bosnian 
protectorate,  while  England  annexed  C;yprus.  Empty- 
handed  the  ItaUan  delegate  returned  to  Rome  from 
an  international  gathering,  where,  by  skilful  negotia- 
tions and  representations,  Italy  might  readily  have 
gained  some  substantial  territorial  compensation,  as 
both  Austria  and  England  had  succeeded  in  doing. 

The  repercussion  in  Italy  of  this  diplomatic  de- 
bacle was  wide-spread.  The  ItaUans  keenly  felt  their 
weakness  as  a  nation  and  the  incompetence  of  their 
leaders  to  deal  with  international  problems.  The 
humihation  of  the  Italians  at  this  juncture  increased 
their  national  sensitiveness  and  made  them  realise 
their  isolation  in  Europe.  Their  amour-propre  had  re- 
ceived a  decided  rebuff,  and  they  fancied  that  they  ap- 


12  GREATER  ITALY 

peared  before  the  world  in  a  ridiculous  light.  Thrown 
back  on  themselves,  they  turned  towards  the  south 
and  cast  their  eyes  across  the  Mediterranean. 

The  Italians,  owing  to  the  central  position  of  their 
country  in  the  Mediterranean,  believe  that  they  will 
be  naturally  called  upon  to  control  its  destiny.  The 
heritage  of  ancient  Rome,  with  its  vast  dominions, 
cannot  be  forgotten  by  a  people  who  live  on  the  seven 
hills  of  the  Eternal  City  and  to  whom  the  pageantry 
of  the  past  is  a  living  reminder.  But  turning  to  more 
practical  considerations,  only  one  hundred  and  twenty 
miles  of  open  sea  separates  Sicily  from  northern  Africa. 
For  centuries  the  Italians  have  gone  forth  and  settled 
along  the  African  shores  of  the  Mediterranean,  taking 
with  them  their  culture  and  customs,  and  retaining 
in  a  large  degree  their  Italian  characteristics. 

As  France  by  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  in  1815,  ex- 
cluded from  the  direction  of  European  affairs,  focussed 
her  attention  on  northern  Africa  and  in  1830  achieved 
the  conquest  of  Algeria,  so  Italy,  rebuffed  by  the 
Powers  in  1878,  fixed  her  ambitions  on  the  acquisition 
of  Tunis.  The  Italian  settlement  at  Tunis  was  the 
richest  and  most  prosperous  of  any  of  the  foreign 
settlements  established  there.  The  trade  relations 
between  Tunis  and  Italy  were  close  and  friendly. 
Italy,  though  hampered  by  her  lack  of  resources,  set 
to  work  eagerly  to  acquire  this  African  domain,  which 
was  to  offset  her  recent  humiliation.  Tunis,  governed 
by  a  weak  Bey,  had  already  fallen  into  the  hands  of 
foreign  exploitation.  But  if  Italy  was  anxious  to 
acquire  this,  her  first  colony,  by  the  annexation  of 
Tunis,  she  found  in  France  a  strong  and  determined 
rival.    For  France  felt  that  she  also  had  pre-eminent 


THE  ACHIEVEMENT  OF  UNITY         13 

interests  in  Tunis,  though  her  settlement  there  was 
barely  one-third  as  large  as  the  Italian.  Yet,  owing  to 
the  fact  that  Tunis  adjoins  Algeria,  France  beheved 
that  she  had  special  rights,  and  determined  not  to 
tolerate  that  another  European  Power  should  gain 
possession  of  this  country. 

It  has  been  repeatedly  stated  that  Bismarck,  after 
the  Berlin  Conference,  told  both  the  French  and 
Itahan  envoys  separately  that  they  might  each  aspire 
to  the  possession  of  Tunis, — Bismarck  being  desirous 
of  further  embittering  Franco-Italian  relations.  This 
account,  which  is  of  French  origin,  has  never  been 
confirmed,  though  it  is  true  that  England,  in  return 
for  France's  acquiescence  in  the  acquisition  of  Cy- 
prus, expressed  her  willingness  to  countenance  a  French 
protectorate  over  Tunis.  These  negotiations  were  un- 
known to  the  Italians  at  large,  who  welcomed  the 
prospect  of  a  vast  colonial  domain  as  a  symbol  of 
power.  All  Italy  was  united  in  the  project,  which  was 
widely  discussed  in  the  press,  before  any  actual  steps 
had  been  taken.  Matters  were  brought  to  a  head 
when  in  January,  1881,  King  Humbert  visited  Sicily. 
The  occasion  was  used  to  have  a  deputation  of  Italians 
from  Tunis  wait  upon  the  King.  This  deputation 
presented  an  address  in  which  the  ancient  ties  be- 
tween Tunis  and  Rome  were  referred  to  in  no  veiled 
terms.  France  thereupon  decided  that  her  interests 
were  in  jeopardy.  Profiting  by  a  disturbance  along 
the  Tunisian  border  of  Algeria,  the  French  sent  an 
expedition  into  Tunis,  marched  the  troops  to  the 
capital,  and  on  May  12  forced  the  Bey  to  sign  a 
treaty  placing  Tunis  under  the  protectorate  of  France. 
Italy  was    stunned  by  the  news.       She  felt  herself 


14  GREATER  ITALY 

helpless  to  vindicate  what  she  believed  to  be  her 
rights.  The  Italian  people  now  realised  that  there 
was  something  radically  wrong  with  the  conduct  of 
their  international  affairs.  Italy  must  have  friends, 
allies.  Thwarted  by  Austria  in  1878,  now  tricked  by 
what  they  believed  to  be  the  deceit  of  France,  the 
Italians  turned  first  to  England,  who  had  always 
been  a  friend  of  the  young  Kingdom.  However, 
England  did  not  welcome  the  idea  of  being  burdened 
with  Italian  affairs,  so  she  gave  an  evasive  reply. 
Russia  lay  too  far  out  of  the  sphere  of  Italian  rela- 
tions.     There  remained  only  Germany. 

It  depends  on  the  angle  at  which  the  arrangement 
which  resulted  in  the  Triple  Alliance  is  looked  upon 
to  determine  its  value.  The  majority  of  foreign  ob- 
servers who  have  hitherto  discussed  the  subject  will 
tell  you  that  Italy  was  blindly  forced  into  an  agree- 
ment totally  devoid  of  advantages  to  herself,  while 
conferring  great  benefits  on  the  other  two  members  of 
the  alliance;  that  Italy  was  just  another  available 
army  at  the  disposal  of  Prussia  for  the  defense  of 
Alsace-Lorraine,  and,  as  an  ally  of  the  Hapsburgs, 
freed  Austria  from  any  worries  regarding  her  south- 
western boundary  and  gave  her  a  free  hand  to  play  an 
active  part  in  Balkan  affairs.  It  is  usually  assigned 
to  the  credit  of  Bismarck,  as  one  of  his  most  masterly 
diplomatic  strokes,  that  he  forced  Italy  to  pay  for 
Germany's  aid,  while  he  in  reality  was  most  eager  to 
secure  the  co-operation  of  the  Italians.  Bismarck's 
sudden  volte  face  in  his  attitude  towards  the  Papacy — 
which  hitherto  he  had  treated  with  much  harshness 
— alarmed  the  Italians.  Europe  rang  with  reports, 
emanating  from  Germany,  of  the  alleged  difficulties 


THE  ACHIEVEMENT  OF  UNITY         15 

of  the  Pope's  position  at  Rome,  and  Bismarck  even 
went  so  far  as  to  propose  that  the  Papacy  should 
move  to  Germany,  where  temporal  asylum  would  be 
guaranteed.  But  Bismarck  played  his  most  astute 
role  when  he  intimated  to  the  Italian  Government  that 
the  road  to  Berlin's  friendship  lay  through  Vienna. 
Only  five  months  after  the  Tunisian  catastrophe  the 
King  and  Queen  of  Italy  paid  a  visit  of  state  to  Vienna, 
where  they  were  received  with  much  ceremony. 
Though  no  political  discussions  were  broached,  it 
became  evident  that  the  way  for  an  understanding 
was  being  paved.  During  the  ensuing  weeks  no  oc- 
casion was  missed  to  impress  upon  Italy  the  precari- 
ousness  of  her  existence  as  an  independent  State. 
This,  we  are  told,  was  Bismarck's  method  of  making 
Italy  realise  that  she  was  a  '^neghgible  quantity,"  and 
that  Prussia  was  to  be  the  senior  partner  in  any  agree- 
ment entered  into.  But  was  this  really  necessary? 
The  weakness  of  Italy,  both  from  a  mihtary  and  finan- 
cial standpoint,  was  patent  to  all.  The  country  had 
great  possibilities  of  development  in  the  future,  but 
at  the  time  Italy  was  in  no  position  to  dictate  terms. 
She  would  even  have  accepted  far  more  onerous  con- 
ditions than  those  of  the  agreement  she  entered  into. 
Several  projects  were  discussed,  until  a  seemingly 
suitable  agreement  was  drawn  up  which  was  signed 
at  Vienna  on  May  20,  1882. 

Though  the  full  text  of  the  treaty  of  the  Triple 
Alhance  has  never  been  published,^  whatever  its  exact 
terms  may  be,  its  main  object  was  to  create  a  defen- 

'  In  1915  Articles  I,  III,  IV,  VII  of  the  treaty  were  for  the  first  time 
revealed.  Article  I  was  disclosed  in  a  Note  transmitted  by  Baron 
Sonnino,  the  Itahan  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  ItaUan  diplomatic 


16  GREATER  ITALY 

sive  military  alliance  between  the  contracting  parties 
against  foreign  aggression  for  a  period  of  five  years. 
It  is  known  that  Italy  agreed  to  rehnquish  her  claims 
to  the  Itahan  districts  still  under  Austrian  rule,  while 
both  Germany  and  Austria  refrained  from  any  com- 
ment in  regard  to  the  Mediterranean,  and  left  Italy 
a  free  hand  to  pursue  whatever  policy  she  deemed 
opportune.  This  was  the  weakest  link  of  the  treaty, 
when  looked  at  from  the  Italian  standpoint,  as  neither 
of  Italy's  new  allies  offered  any  guarantees  in  the  event 
of  an  aggression  directed  against  Italy  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean. Though  the  material  advantages  gained  by 
the  Alliance  were,  for  Italy,  negligible,  the  signature 
of  this  treaty  marks  the  beginning  of  a  new  epoch  in 

representatives  abroad  on  May  24  for  communication  to  the  Powers. 
The  remainder  were  pubUshed  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
during  the  same  month  in  their  Diploinatische  Aktenstikke  (Red  Book). 
The  clauses  read  as  follows: 

Article  I. — The  High  Contracting  Parties  mutually  promise  to  re- 
main on  terms  of  peace  and  friendship,  and  that  they  will  not  enter 
into  any  alUance  or  engagement  directed  against  one  of  their  States. 

They  pledge  themselves  to  undertake  an  exchange  of  views  regard- 
ing aU  general  and  political  questions  which  may  present  themselves, 
and  promise  furthermore  their  mutual  assistance,  commensurate  with 
their  individual  interests. 

Article  III. — In  case  one  or  two  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties, 
without  direct  provocation  on  their  part,  should  be  attacked  by  one 
or  more  Great  Powers  not  signatory  of  the  present  Treaty  and  should 
become  involved  in  a  war  with  them,  the  casus  foederis  would  arise 
simultaneously  for  all  the  High  Contracting  Parties. 

Article  IV. — In  case  a  Great  Power  not  signatory  of  the  present 
Treaty  should  threaten  the  State  security  of  one  of  the  High  Contract- 
ing Parties,  and  in  case  the  threatened  party  should  thereby  be  com- 
pelled to  declare  war  against  that  Great  Power,  the  two  other  Contract- 
ing Parties  engage  themselves  to  maintain  benevolent  neutraHty  to- 
wards their  ally.  Each  of  them  reserves  its  right,  in  this  case,  to  take 
part  in  the  war  if  it  thinks  fit  in  order  to  make  common  cause  with  its 
ally. 

Article  VII. — Deals  with  Italo- Austrian  agreement  respecting  the 
Balkans.     See  p.  125, 


THE  ACHIEVEMENT  OF  UNITY         17 

world  politics.  Italy,  rescued  from  her  position  of 
obscure  isolation,  began  to  play  a  part  in  European 
affairs.  The  shaping  of  the  whole  course  of  world 
events  was  altered  by  Italy's  step  at  this  time.  The 
''balance  of  power,"  that  favorite  British  doctrine 
for  the  maintenance  of  world  peace,  was  upset  by  the 
Triple  Alliance.  France  now  was  isolated  in  Europe, 
and  Italy  entered  upon  a  period  of  national  develop- 
ment and  unprecedented  prosperity.  Germany,  under 
Prussian  leadership,  was  rapidly  forging  to  the  front 
rank  of  power.  Aside  from  the  natural  historical 
affinity  of  the  rise  to  nationhood  of  Germany  and 
Italy,  Germany  seemed  the  only  State  in  Europe  which 
did  not  directly  in  some  manner  cross  the  path  of 
Italian  development.  At  that  time  the  Drang  nach 
Osten  had  not  as  yet  been  evolved,  and  Bismarck 
still  frowned  upon  colonial  adventures  as  threatening 
the  stability  of  the  new  Germany. 

Two  significant  events  occurred  within  a  few  months 
of  the  conclusion  of  the  Triple  Alliance  which  in- 
dicated clearly  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of 
Italy's  new  position.  Two  months  after  the  signing 
of  the  treaty,  England,  whether  she  regretted  her 
aloofness  towards  Italian  affairs  in  the  past,  and 
the  httle  regard  she  had  had  for  the  colonial  am- 
bitions of  Italy,  or  whether  she  felt  the  need  of  con- 
donation for  her  plans  of  territorial  expansion  in  the 
Mediterranean,  through  the  British  Minister  at  Rome 
invited  Italy  to  join  in  a  contemplated  expedition  for 
the  pacification  of  Egypt,  which  she  proposed  to 
undertake  at  this  time.  Italy  was  surprised  at  this 
offer  from  England  and  not  a  little  gratified  by  the 
jiew  attitude  of  this  great  Power.     However,  whether 


18  GREATER  ITALY 

from  timidity  or  diffidence  or  lack  of  interest,  the 
Italians  refused  to  join  the  expedition,  and  England 
set  about  the  Egyptian  venture  alone.  Many  Italians 
felt  that  they  had  already  reaped  the  first-fruits  of 
the  Triple  Alhance  and  that  England's  unwonted 
deference  was  due  mainly  to  Italy's  position  as  an 
ally  of  the  Central  European  Powers.  Suddenly  a 
cloud  appeared  to  darken  their  roseate  dreams.  The 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph  visited  Trieste  in  December 
of  the  same  year  (1882).  A  young  native  of  Trieste, 
William  Oberdank,  who,  in  spite  of  his  German 
name,  was  an  ardent  Italian  patriot  who  had  fled 
from  Austria  to  escape  military  service,  returned  at 
this  juncture  and  was  arrested  and  found  in  posses- 
sion of  two  bombs.  Though  no  actual  attempt  against 
the  life  of  the  Emperor  was  made,  or  even  a  plot  un- 
covered, Oberdank  was  convicted  and  hanged,  in 
spite  of  official  representations  made  in  Vienna  by 
the  Italian  Government.  The  people  of  Italy  were 
aroused  to  anger  by  this  event,  which  was  seized 
upon  and  turned  into  pohtical  capital  by  certain 
nationalist  elements  to  discredit  the  alliance.  Here, 
within  a  few  months,  Italy  had  tasted  the  fruits  of 
her  new  alUance.  Bitter  sweet  was  to  be  the  fate  of 
the  relations  of  Italy  with  the  Central  Powers.  Where- 
as Itahan  foreign  prestige  was  greatly  increased,  her 
nationalist  ambitions  were  constantly  rubbed  raw  by 
the  exasperating  policy  of  Austria  towards  the  ItaUans 
within  the  Hapsburg  realm. 

The  days  of  timidity  in  politics  were  passing;  a 
stern,  almost  ruthless  realism,  concerned  only  with 
immediate  advantages  to  be  gained,  was  becoming 
the  guiding  principle  in  public  affairs.    The  ascendant 


THE  ACHIEVEMENT  OF  UNITY         19 

star  of  the  Prussians  was  shining  forth  with  an  ever 
stronger  and  more  brilUant  hght.  Germany,  through 
the  added  prestige  of  her  new  alUance  came  to  be  the 
chief,  and  at  the  same  time  the  most  menacing,  figure 
in  European  pohtics.  Under  the  HohenzoUern  leader- 
ship, during  the  next  thirty  years,  the  German  people 
seized  upon  Europe  and  proposed  to  make  it  a  vassal 
to  theu'  will.  The  lust  of  power  at  home  soon  trans- 
formed itself  into  a  lust  for  world  power.  The  gigantic 
strides  of  German  expansion — commercial,  industrial, 
and  technical — dragged  along  in  their  orbit  the  new 
Italy.  In  Germany,  Germanism  became  pan-Ger- 
manism, nationalism  soon  became  imperiaUsm.  Italy 
found  herself  adopting,  almost  unwittingly,  this  trend 
of  thought.  Plans  of  colonial  expansion  in  Africa, 
and,  above  all,  of  nationalist  expansion  across  the 
Alps  and  the  Adriatic,  took  definite  shape. 

Thus  closes  the  first  epoch  in  the  history  of  modern 
Italy.  The  same  impulse  of  nationalism  which  brought 
Germany  and  Italy  into  being  was  still  at  work  when 
the  two  countries  once  again  linked  their  fortunes. 
It  is  certain  that  both  felt  that  their  tasks  were  still 
unfinished.  Italy  had  at  last,  after  three  hundred 
and  fifty  years,  accomphshed  the  aims,  so  lucidly 
set  forth  by  MachiaveUi  when  he  exclaimed : 

*' Italy  without  life  waits  for  him  who  shall  heal 
her  wounds,  and  put  an  end  to  the  ravaging  and 
plundering  of  Lombardy,  the  swindling  and  taxing 
of  Tuscany,  and  cleanse  those  sores  which  have  long 
festered." 


CHAPTER   II 
FORMATIVE  FORCES 

Nationalism.     Irredentism.     Futurism 

The  unification  of  Italy  had  been  brought  about 
by  putting  into  practice  a  long-cherished  theory  that 
all  men  of  the  same  language,  customs,  and  tradi- 
tions have  the  right  to  form  a  separate  political  entity. 
The  Italians  were  the  first  to  bring  to  a  successful  con- 
clusion, on  a  large  scale,  this  great  experiment  in  state- 
craft, which  was  to  become  so  impelling  a  force  in 
nation-building  during  the  ensuing  years.  In  France 
and  England  national  liberty  and  unity  were,  in  the 
early  days  of  their  accomplishment,  so  inextricably 
confused  with  the  idea  of  the  King  as  State,  that  racial 
unity  played  but  an  unimportant  part  in  their  na- 
tional development.  In  America,  individual  liberty 
was  the  sole  aim  of  the  signers  of  the  Declaration  of 
Independence.  The  Italians  are  the  people  who 
blazed  the  trail  of  national,  racial  unity,  and  set  the 
world  thinking  along  lines  of  nationality.  This  con- 
tribution to  the  historical  evolution  of  Europe  is 
one  of  the  most  important  single  factors  of  political 
progress  during  the  nineteenth  century.  Nationalism 
had  received  at  the  hands  of  the  Italians  the  sanc- 
tion of  authority  which  inspired  the  Rumanes,  Bul- 
gars,  and  Serbs  to  assert  their  right  to  nationhood. 
The  growth  of  nationalism  throughout  the  world  can 
be  traced  to  the  same  source.    As  France,  a  century 

20 


FORMATIVE  FORCES  21 

before,  had  lit  the  torch  of  individual  liberty,  so  Italy 
first  championed  successfully  the  beUef  that  national 
liberty,  which  is  merely  an  extension  of  the  idea  of 
individual  liberty  to  include  all  individuals  of  a  kin- 
dred race,  is  the  most  valuable  asset  of  mankind.  The 
European  War  is  a  struggle  for  the  preservation  of 
this  principle.  The  Allies  are  maintaining  the  right  of 
national  independence  of  smaller  States  against  the  en- 
croachments of  the  Germanic  idea  of  a  State  composed 
of  a  motley  of  races,  marshalled  in  battahon  formation 
under  the  hegemony  of  the  strongest. 

With  so  firm  a  faith  in  the  creed  of  nationality,  the 
ItaUans  could  not  rest  content  as  long  as  all  the  prov- 
inces bearing  the  imprint  of  Italian  culture  were  not 
united  to  the  mother  country.  For,  under  the  stress 
of  necessity,  the  boundary  delimitations  of  the  new 
Kingdom  had  been  drawn  in  a  manner  which  left 
outside  the  realm  more  than  a  milhon  Italians.  Thus 
arose  the  problem  of  ''Italia  irredenta/'  or  "unre- 
deemed Italy,"  as  the  districts  inhabited  by  these 
ItaUans  came  to  be  called. 

Beyond  the  boundary  of  present-day  northern 
Italy  are  isolated  groups  of  Itahans  who  had  gone 
forth  as  early  as  the  time  of  the  Roman  Republic  and 
settled  along  the  western  limits  of  Liguria  and  in  cer- 
tain favourable  and  warm  Alpine  valleys.  Through- 
out the  centuries  which  have  elapsed  they  retained 
their  civilisation.  However,  Nice  and  the  surround- 
ing territory,  ceded  to  France  as  recently  as  1859, 
has  already  lost  much  of  its  ItaHan  character.  The 
Ticino,  to-day  a  Swiss  canton  and  loyally  Swiss,  has 
nevertheless  retained  many  typical  Italian  character- 
istics.   These  two  districts  are  not  usually  held  to  be 


22  GREATER  ITALY 

a  part  of  '^ unredeemed  Italy"  except  by  a  few  ex- 
tremists, as  their  inhabitants  are  overwhelmingly  in 
favour  of  their  present  allegiance.  Moving  farther 
eastward  we  come  to  a  system  of  mild,  fertile,  i^lpine 
valleys  which  compose  the  so-called  Trentino.  This 
province  has  an  area  of  3,950  square  miles,  and  sup- 
ports a  population  of  375,000  Italian  inhabitants. 
An  enclave  between  Lombardy  and  Venetia,  stretch- 
ing on  both  sides  of  the  Adige  from  beyond  Riva  to 
Cortina  d'Ampezzo,  the  Trentino  was  for  centuries 
an  independent  ItaUan  prince-bishopric,  and  was  ar- 
bitrarily annexed  to  Austria  on  the  fall  of  Napoleon. 
Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  for  the  past  thirty 
years  every  effort  has  been  made  to  denationalise 
the  Italians  of  this  district,  and  often  by  the  most 
unscrupulous  methods  to  force  the  inhabitants  to 
abandon  their  racial  allegiance,  the  Trentino  remains 
an  ItaUan  province,  and  its  people  have  striven  val- 
iantly and  patiently  to  knit  ever  more  closely  the 
ties  which  bind  them  to  Italy  until  such  a  time  as 
the  district  may  become  an  integral  part  of  the  King- 
dom of  Italy. 

The  other  great  settlement  of  Italians  who  live 
beyond  the  pale,  and  are  eager  to  be  joined  with  their 
mother  country,  live  in  "Venezia  GuiUa,"  with  the 
great  seaport  of  Trieste  as  its  chief  centre.  As  the 
name  implies,  this  region,  with  the  exception  of 
Trieste,^  was  formerly  under  the  dominion  of  Venice, 
whose  colonial   domain  in  the   Eastern   Adriatic   in- 


^  In  1382  the  city  placed  itself  under  the  protection  of  Leopold  III, 
of  Austria,  and  except  for  a  brief  period  during  the  Napoleonic  regime 
Trieste  has  for  over  five  centuries  been  continuously  under  Austrian 
rule. 


FORMATIVE  FORCES  23 

eluded  also  Istria  and  Dalmatia.  The  irredentist 
problem  in  these  regions  is  far  more  difficult  of  solu- 
tion, for,  though  the  coast  towns  of  the  Adriatic  have 
retained  their  Italian  character  to  a  large  extent,  the 
districts  inland,  even  up  to  the  doors  of  the  cities, 
are  predominantly  Slav;  Slovene  in  the  northern 
Adriatic,  Serbo-Croat  farther  south. 

To  formulate  a  plan  for  the  redemption  of  the 
Italians  living  outside  the  realm  has  preoccupied 
all  Italy  from  the  first  day  of  national  independence. 
Extremists  went  so  far  as  to  include  the  islands  of 
Malta,  Corsica,  and  even  Corfu,  besides  the  Eastern 
Adriatic  mainland  as  far  south  as  Avlona,  in  their 
scheme  of  Italia  irredenta,  while  the  more  conservative 
lay  claim  only  to  such  districts  as,  like  the  Trentino 
and  Trieste,  are  patently  Italian. 

Even  before  national  unity  had  been  achieved. 
Garibaldi,  in  1866,  entered  the  Trentino  with  his 
army,  and  stood  on  the  heights  overlooking  the  city 
of  Trent.  But  the  fruits  of  his  victorious  campaign 
were  snatched  from  the  Italians  by  the  timidity  of 
their  Government,  who  recalled  the  Garibaldian  legions 
before  the  task  had  been  completed,  and  renounced, 
for  the  time  being,  the  acquisition  of  the  Italian 
province. 

As  the  years  passed,  the  irredentist  movement 
seemed  to  be  lulled  into  quiescence.  Exchanges  of 
visits  between  the  King  of  Italy  and  the  Emperor 
of  Austria  took  place.  Victor  Emmanuel  II  journeyed 
to  Vienna  in  September,  1873,  while  Francis  Joseph, 
though  refusing  to  go  to  Rome  in  order  not  to  give 
offense  to  the  Pope,  came  to  Venice  in  April,  1875. 
The  relations  between  the  two  States  seemed  to  be 


24  GREATER  ITALY 

improving.  But  at  the  most  unexpected  moments 
the  passions  of  the  ItaUan  people,  demanding  the 
hberation  of  the  irredente  provinces,  burst  forth. 
Every  important  occasion,  whether  the  anniversary 
of  a  battle,  the  opening  of  an  exposition,  at  which  the 
orator  never  failed  to  recall  the  ancient  Italian  cul- 
ture of  Trieste  and  of  the  Trentino,  and  the  Uke,  was 
seized  upon  to  make  a  demonstration  in  favour  of  the 
coveted  provinces.  These  in  turn  sent  deputations  to 
Italy  and  messages  of  loyalty  to  the  ItaHan  cause, 
and  even  went  so  far  as  to  hail  the  King  of  Italy  as 
their  rightful  sovereign.  Such  popular  outbursts, 
wliich  enkindled  the  imagination  of  the  people,  found 
an  echo  among  the  ruling  classes,  more  especially  in 
the  north  of  Italy,  not  merely  because  of  the  mem- 
ories of  their  own  hardships  under  Austrian  rule,  but 
for  the  more  practical  reason  that  the  unredeemed 
provinces  are  of  strategic  as  well  as  sentimental  value. 

The  Trentino  valleys  have,  from  the  earliest  times, 
been  the  pathway  of  the  numerous  invasions  of 
Italy  from  the  north.  Held  by  Austria,  these  valleys 
constituted  a  continual  menace  to  Italy,  as  Austria 
could  at  any  time  launch  an  attack  into  the  Vene- 
tian plain.  In  the  east  the  valley  of  the  Isonzo  in 
the  hands  of  a  foreign  Power  leaves  the  Friuhan  plain 
open  to  incursion.  Thus  along  nearly  all  her  northern 
boundary  Italy  was  in  a  position  of  marked  strategic 
inferiority. 

While  the  Council  of  Ministers  was  busy  endeavour- 
ing to  solve  the  question  of  the  irredente  provinces 
by  pacific  measures,  popular  demonstrations  in  favour 
of  armed  intervention  grew  apace.  In  every  public 
procession  the  flags  of  the  Trentino  and  of  Trieste 


FORMATIVE  FORCES  25 

now  occupied  the  chief  position.  Even  in  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies  inflammatory  speeches  were  made,  de- 
manding the  annexation  of  the  provinces.  Crispi, 
during  his  European  tour  in  1877,  it  will  be  recalled, 
broached  the  subject  of  the  Trentino  and  Trieste, 
but  both  in  Berhn  and  Vienna  he  met  with  a  cate- 
gorical refusal  even  to  discuss  any  change  in  the 
status  quo.  The  agitation  of  the  irredentists  reached 
a  fever  pitch.  The  death  of  King  Victor  Emmanuel 
II,  the  liberator  of  Italy,  in  1878,  gave  an  opportunity 
for  wide-spread  agitation.  Garibaldi,  whose  spiritual 
authority  among  the  people  of  Italy  was  supreme, 
issued  a  manifesto  in  which  he  exclaimed: 

"The  call  of  the  patriots  of  Trieste  and  Trent  must 
find  an  echo  in  the  hearts  of  all  Italians,  and  the  yoke 
of  Austria,  no  better  than  that  of  the  Turk,  must  once 
for  all  be  broken  from  off  the  necks  of  our  brethren." 

Popular  enthusiasm  for  the  war  of  redemption 
reached  a  white  heat  when,  six  months  later,  it  was 
announced  that  Austria  had  received,  at  the  hands 
of  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  the  permission  to  occupy 
Bosnia,  while  no  compensations  were  offered  to  Italy. 
A  mob  gathered  in  front  of  the  Austrian  Consulate  in 
Venice  and  could  only  be  dispersed  with  difficulty.  The 
movement  began  to  take  on  alarming  proportions. 
The  Government  fell  as  a  result  of  its  inabihty  to  cope 
with  the  situation.  The  position  of  the  dynasty  was 
imperilled,  as  there  was  still  a  large  Republican  party 
in  Italy.  A  new  Ministry  formed  under  Depretis  (1878), 
who  had  already  occupied  the  post  of  Premier,  was  by 
skilful  manipulation  and  great  tact  able  to  steer  the 
ship  of  state  safely  through  the  crisis,  but  not  with- 


26  GREATER  ITALY 

out  arousing  the  animosity  of  Austria,  who  answered 
the  threats  of  the  irredentists  by  making  formidable 
miUtary  preparations  in  the  Trentino. 

During  the  next  two  years  the  irredentist  question 
was  the  chief  topic  in  Itahan  public  affairs,  and  the 
discussion  was  repeatedly  aggravated  by  the  irrec- 
oncilable attitude  of  Austria.  In  Italy  bodies  of 
volunteers  were  being  enrolled.  Garibaldi's  son,  who 
had  now  succeeded  his  father  in  his  position  of  au- 
thority, formulated  a  plan  to  raise  one  hundred  bat- 
talions to  liberate  the  irredente  provinces  by  force  of 
arms.  The  whole  of  Italy  was  in  a  state  of  ferment, 
and  it  was  feared  that  the  slightest  incident  might 
precipitate  a  conflict,  which,  owing  to  the  mihtary 
unpreparedness  of  Italy,  would  almost  certainly  have 
resulted  disastrously.  To  check  the  movement  half 
measures]  would  not  avail.  Italy,  isolated  in  Europe, 
with  France  still  a  potential  enemy,  was  passing 
through  the  most  difficult  crisis  of  her  history  since 
unity  had  been  achieved.  Heroic  measures  alone  could 
save  the  country.  ''Italy  and  Austria  can  only  be 
enemies  or  allies,"  was  an  acute  and  peculiarly  clear- 
sighted summing  up  of  the  situation  by  Count  Nigra, 
Italy's  Ambassador  at  the  Coiu-t  of  Austria.  Italy 
was  too  weak  to  fight  Austria  single-handed;  there  re- 
mained only  the  alliance.  Events  in  Germany  seemed 
to  pave  the  way  for  this  understanding.  The  men- 
acing attitude  of  France  in  the  Tunisian  crisis  further 
contributed  to  drive  Italy  into  the  arms  of  Germany 
and  Austria,  and  thus  only  a  year  after  the  most  vio- 
lent ''irredentist"  campaign,  Italy  had  entered  into  a 
closely  united  alliance  with  her  hated  enemy,  Austria. 

Within   a   few   years   the   anti-Austrian   agitation 


FORMATIVE  FORCES  27 

died  down,  and  many  of  those  who  had  played  a 
leading  part  in  the  irredentist  movement  became 
convinced  that  the  Triple  Alliance  was  of  greater 
benefit  to  Italy  than  the  acquisition  of  the  unre- 
deemed provinces  would  be.  It  seems  reasonable  to 
suppose  that  had  Austria  adopted  a  Uberal  and  en- 
lightened policy  towards  her  Itahan  subjects,  had 
they  been  permitted  to  manifest  openly  their  desire 
to  retain  their  Italian  culture,  the  irredentist  move- 
ment would  have  finally  died  out,  and  the  Italians 
under  Austrian  rule  would  have  become  reconciled 
to  their  fate.  But  Austria,  instead  of  adopting  this 
course,  from  the  earliest  days  of  the  new  regime  showed 
her  animosity  towards  her  Itahan  peoples.  With  dia- 
bolical cunning  she  incited  the  Slav  populations  of  the 
Adriatic,  and  the  Germans  of  Tyrol,  to  penetrate  the 
Itahan  regions,  and  by  the  force  of  numbers,  by  coer- 
cion and  persecution,  to  crush  out  the  Itahanism  of 
these  districts. 

As  a  result  of  the  arbitrary  privileges  conferred  on 
the  Germans  the  relation  of  the  Itahan  Trentino  to 
German  Tyrol  became  that  of  a  vassal  State.  The 
Germans  governed  the  Trentino,  not  merely  without 
any  regard  for  the  Italian  inhabitants,  but  ruthlessly 
repressed  all  attempts  on  their  part  towards  economic 
development,  so  that,  notwithstanding  its  abundant 
water-supply,  suitable  for  the  generation  of  valuable 
industrial  motive  power,  and  a  dense  population, 
providing  a  good  and  adequate  labour  market,  the 
Trentino  remained  in  a  state  of  primitive  agricul- 
tural development,  while  just  south  of  the  boundary, 
in  Italy,  wealthy  and  prosperous  industrial  centres 
everywhere  sprang  up. 


28  GREATER  ITALY 

As  time  passed  the  zeal  and  activity  with  which 
the  Germans  of  Tyrol  worked  to  crush  the  ItaHan 
population  of  the  Trentino  grew  more  bold.  Every 
possible  agency  was  mobilised  throughout  the  Tren- 
tino to  spread  German  influence,  education,  and  cul- 
ture. Such  seemingly  harmless  organisations  as  the 
German- Austrian  Alpine  Club,  the  Hotel  Keepers'  As- 
sociations, and  Tourist  Bureaus  were  subventioned  to 
assist  in  the  Germanising  programme.  The  task  of 
the  Germans  of  Tyrol  soon  became  identified  with 
the  Pan-Germanic  movement,  and  their  campaign 
was  organised  with  all  the  care,  patience,  and  skill 
with  which  the  Pan-Germans  enter  upon  any  under- 
taking. While  Italy  was  busy  protesting  her  friend- 
ship for  Germany,  and  the  relations  of  the  two  coun- 
tries had  for  long  been  intimate,  the  Italians  beyond 
the  boundary,  in  the  Trentino,  were  being  subjected 
to  all  manner  of  persecution  to  compel  them  to  re- 
nounce their  Italian  fealty.  The  Allgemeiner  Deutscher 
Schulverein,  the  most  virulently  active  and  impor- 
tant protagonist  of  Germanic  civihsation,  including  a 
membership  of  more  than  200,000,  had  for  its  pro- 
graname  the  estabhshment  of  German  schools,  hbraries, 
orphan  asylums,  and  other  mediums  of  German  prop- 
aganda, throughout  the  Trentino.  This  and  other 
similar  organisations,  such  as  the  Sildmark  and  the 
Tiroler  Volkshund  strove  to  offer  educational  facilities 
of  such  distinct  advantage  that  every  ambitious  Ital- 
ian parent  of  the  Trentino,  wishing  to  improve  the 
condition  of  his  children,  would  send  them  to  these 
German-speaking  schools,  where,  by  insidious  teach- 
ing, the  child  would  soon  be  influenced  to  abjure  his 
Italian  heritage.      Economic  advantages  and  favours 


FORMATIVE  FORCES  29 

were  lavished  on  the  Itahan  peasantry  of  the  Trentino, 
while  by  bribes  and  boycott,  and  other  coercive 
measures,  many  of  them  were  won  over  to  the  Ger- 
mans. From  year  to  year  German  influence  extended 
more  widely  over  the  Trentino.  The  Germans  already 
felicitated  themselves  on  the  success  of  their  prop- 
aganda. 

In  the  region  of  the  Adriatic  conditions  were  some- 
what different.  The  race  hatred  of  the  Slavs  for  the 
Italians,  who  had  always  treated  the  Slavs  rather  in- 
differently, chiefly  because  the  Jugo-Slavic  peoples 
were  peasants  who  had  hitherto  achieved  only  a  very 
low  stage  of  cultural  development,  had  long  been 
latent.  Under  the  auspices  of  the  Vienna  Govern- 
ment, the  Slovenes  of  the  Northern  Adriatic  willingly 
lent  themselves  to  the  plans  of  Vienna  to  combat 
the  growing  irredentist  movement  of  the  ItaUans  of 
the  Uttoral.  With  enthusiasm  the  Slovenes  entered 
upon  their  new  role.  This  was  the  first  time  in  their 
history  that  their  expansion  had  been  tolerated,  and 
the  opportunity  was  avidly  seized  upon  by  the  more 
intelligent  among  them.  Trieste  became  the  goal  of 
their  ambitions,  and  the  city  was  seemingly  deUvered 
up  to  them  as  their  prey  by  the  Austrians.  The  move- 
ment developed  rapidly  and  soon  embraced  all  the 
ItaUan  cities  of  the  Adriatic  Httoral.  "The  ItaHan- 
ism  of  Trieste  is  purely  artificial,"  ''Trieste  must  be 
Slav,"  and  other  similar  watchwords  became  current, 
and  found  their  way  into  the  Slavic  newspapers.  The 
demands  of  the  Slavs  for  educational  and  representa- 
tive equahty,  and  even  control  of  cities  predominantly 
Italian,  to  which  the  Slavs  had  but  recently  emigrated 
under  Austrian  subvention,  embittered  the  struggle. 


30  GREATER  ITALY 

Clashes  between  the  Slavs  and  the  Italians  in  Trieste 
became  every-day  occurrences,  instigated  by  the 
Slavs,  whose  agitators  felt  secure  in  the  knowledge 
that  they  would  not  only  not  be  prosecuted,  but  would 
even  be  recompensed  by  the  Vienna  authorities.  This 
showering  of  benefits  and  privileges  on  the  Slav  ele- 
ments of  the  population  of  the  Adriatic  and  on  the 
Germans  in  the  Trentino  drove  the  Italian  inhabitants 
to  call  more  desperately  than  ever  for  the  help  of  their 
kinsmen  of  Italy. 

The  irredentist  movement  now  took  on  a  new 
aspect.  It  became  a  struggle  for  Italian  cultural 
survival.  Armed  intervention  from  Italy  was  no 
longer  hoped  for.  On  the  other  hand,  intellectual 
help  was  asked,  to  keep  alive  the  Italian  spirit  of  the 
irredente  provinces,  which  were  rapidly  succumbing 
to  the  Slav  and  German  encroachments.  In  the 
Trentino  the  Pan-Germans  had  become  the  dominat- 
ing factor  in  local  affairs,  and  their  efforts  to  implant 
German  culture  by  coercion  and  cajolery  had  met 
with  no  little  success.  Along  the  Adriatic,  the  Slavs, 
goaded  by  Vienna,  grew  more  imperious.  In  Trieste 
and  the  other  cities  of  the  littoral,  they  increased  so 
rapidly  in  numbers  that  even  though  they  remained 
a  foreign  and  unassimilated  element,  the  Italians  had 
good  reason  to  fear  that  in  time  the  Slavs  would 
control  the  cities  of  the  Eastern  Adriatic. 

The  Italians  no  longer  remained  idle.  They  formed 
societies  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Italian  culture 
of  the  irredente  provinces.  The  Lega  Nazionale,  in 
the  .Trentino  and  Trieste,  and  the  Dante  AUgheri 
Society,  in  Italy,  were  organised,  and  with  funds  con- 
tributed largely  from  Italy  they  made  it  their  pro- 


FORMATIVE  FORCES  31 

gramme  to  support  schools,  libraries,  and  other  social 
centres  of  Italian  character  in  the  unredeemed  dis- 
tricts, while  by  official  representations  Italy  en- 
deavoured to  obtain  an  amelioration  of  the  condition 
of  her  nationals  under  Austrian  rule.  With  the  aid 
of  these  societies  the  Italians  of  the  Trentino  and 
Trieste,  supported  and  encouraged  by  their  brethren 
of  Italy,  organised  a  stubborn  resistance  to  further 
propaganda. 

Frequent  outbursts  which  followed  the  harsh,  re- 
pressive measures  of  Vienna,  more  especially  in  the 
Adriatic,  such  as  the  appointment  of  Slovene  bishops 
to  sees  whose  congregations  were  overwhelmingly 
Italian,  showed  that  the  temper  of  the  irredenti  Italians 
was  still  strongly  separatist.  As  time  passed,  and 
the  ItaHan  predominance  of  the  provinces  became 
more  menaced,  the  irredentist  inhabitants  came  to 
disregard  Vienna,  and  looked  only  to  Rome.  The 
municipal  councils  of  the  cities  still  predominantly 
ItaUan,  such  as  Trent,  Gorizia,  and  Trieste,  busied 
themselves  erecting  monuments  to  Dante,  Petrarch, 
and  other  great  Italians  of  the  past  to  remind  the 
people  of  their  Italian  allegiance,  and  thus  keep  ahve 
the  Italianism  of  the  provinces. 

It  is  throughout  this  period,  when  materiahsm  was 
making  continually  deeper  inroads  in  Italy,  that  the 
great  flame  of  nationalism  was  kept  alive  by  the 
needs  of  the  irredente  provinces.  The  spiritual  strength 
of  Italy  was  forged  on  the  anvil  of  irredentism.  Car- 
ducci,  the  illustrious  Italian  poet-patriot,  became  the 
champion  of  Italian  nationalism.  His  was  not  a 
romantic  attachment  for  the  provinces  beyond  an 
arbitrary  boundary-line,  but  a  stern  conviction  that 


32  GREATER  ITALY 

all  Italians  must  some  day  be  united  with  their  mother 
country  if  Italy  would  but  remain  true  to  the  pure 
flame  of  nationalism  which  had  brought  about  her 
unity  and  independence.  The  irredentist  movement 
thus  became  a  hterary,  patriotic  creed  rather  than 
a  pohtical  design.  It  passed  deep  into  the  hearts  of 
the  Italian  people.  While  Italian  statesmen  were 
engaged  in  protesting  their  sentiments  of  friendship 
to  the  Vienna  Government,  suppressing  all  outward 
signs  of  enmity  towards  Austria  on  the  part  of  the 
ItaHan  people,  the  zeal  of  the  poets  of  Italy  never 
flagged  in  keeping  alive  the  picture  of  their  oppressed 
brethren  beyond  the  Alps.  It  was  not  '4and  greed" 
or  a  hunger  for  territorial  expansion  so  much  as  a 
spirit  like  that  of  the  Christian  crusader,  who  set  out 
to  redeem  the  shrines  of  the  Holy  Land,  which  inspired 
the  Itahan  people  to  look  forward  to  the  hberation 
of  their  nationals  still  under  the  Austrian  yoke.  For 
to  the  Italians  racial  independence  had  received  the 
sanctification  of  a  rehgious  creed.  This  must  be 
borne  in  mind  in  considering  the  attitude  which 
Italy  was  to  assume  during  the  coming  years. 

If  nationahsm,  as  conceived  by  the  Italians,  brought 
forth  ''irredentism,"  ''irredentism"  in  turn,  by  a 
circuitous  path,  brought  into  being  what  has  been 
termed  ''futurism."  Though  of  very  recent  growth, 
and  at  the  present  writing  still  a  new  and  only  half- 
revealed  force,  in  the  national  life  of  the  Italian  people 
''futurism"  must  be  taken  into  account  in  order  to 
gain  a  clear  conception  of  the  formative  forces  of 
present-day  Italy. 

For  twenty  centuries  Italy  has  been  the  cultural 


FORMATIVE  FORCES  33 

focus  of  Western  Europe.  No  other  race  of  men  can 
show  so  long  a  line  of  pre-eminent  geniuses  as  can  the 
inhabitants  of  the  Italian  peninsula.  The  civihsation 
of  the  West  owes  its  present  direction  to  the  impulse 
received  from  Italy.  In  all  fields  of  human  endeavour 
Italy  has  stood  forth  the  master;  the  Western  world 
has  listened  obediently,  learned,  and  then  followed 
the  current  of  the  mighty  stream  of  civihsation  which 
rose  beyond  the  Alps,  among  the  hills  of  Rome,  in 
Umbria,  Tuscany,  Lombardy,  and  Venetia,  to  spread 
over  Europe  and  the  world.  Letters,  arts,  and  science, 
rehgion,  jurisprudence — all  owe  to  Italy  the  tribute 
of  their  most  luminous  flowering.  Caesar  the  con- 
queror, Cicero  the  orator,  Virgil  the  poet,  and  the 
long  galaxy  of  Romans  who  were  the  first  Italians, 
belong  to  the  first  era  of  Western  history.  Then, 
after  a  period  of  darkness,  out  of  the  night,  in  letters 
of  indelible  purity  and  beauty,  shine  the  names  of 
Dante  and  Petrarch,  precursors  of  a  new  epoch.  The 
art  of  painting  is  revived,  and  finds  a  Giotto,  whose 
art  is  carried  to  a  climax  by  a  Leonardo  and  a  Titian. 
Gahleo  revolutionises  the  accepted  concepts  of  cos- 
mography, and  a  Christopher  Columbus  discovers  a 
new  world.  And  this  same  race  brought  forth  a 
Lucrezia  Borgia,  and  a  St.  Catherine  of  Sienna,  a 
Benvenuto  Celhni,  a  MachiaveUi,  and  a  St.  Francis 
of  Assisi.  Each  as  he  passed  across  the  stage  of  life 
left  a  work  wrought  with  the  highest  perfection  in 
its  particular  sphere. 

There  followed  a  period  of  relative  decay,  until 
from  the  North  came  a  Winckleman  and  a  Goethe, 
followed  soon  by  a  Shelley  and  a  Browning.  Italy 
still  remained  the  teacher;   the  past  became  sanctified. 


34  GREATER  ITALY 

glorified  by  these  new  disciples.  Then  came  the  sub- 
sequent invasions  of  a  Ruskin  and  his  phalanx,  who 
made  of  Italy  a  shrine.  The  new  votaries  from  all 
parts  of  the  world  sang  pseans  of  praise  of  the  Italy 
of  the  past,  and  gave  to  the  Italy  of  the  present  no 
thought.  Like  a  race  of  servile  pygmies,  modern 
Italians  trod  among  the  Titan  figures  of  the  past. 
Men  refused  to  consider  Italy  in  any  other  hght  than 
as  a  treasure-house  of  ancient  glory;  the  holders  of 
a  sacred  trust,  Itahans  must  aspire  to  no  other  role. 
The  dank  romanticism  of  the  early  nineteenth 
century,  though  swept  aside  by  a  ruthless  realism  in 
other  countries,  still  lingered  in  association  with  the 
name  of  Italy.  National  independence  in  Italy  had 
been  achieved;  by  her  new  strength  Italy  had  as- 
serted her  position  as  a  World  Power,  but  to  the  world 
at  large  Italy  remained  a  museum.  ''We  have  made 
Italy,  we  must  now  make  Itahans,"  was  the  spon- 
taneous outcry,  after  the  great  ordeal  of  unification 
had  been  achieved.  Italy,  so  eager  to  redeem  her 
irredente  provinces,  suddenly  felt  the  need  of  self- 
redemption.  Oppressed  by  the  grandeur  of  the  past, 
by  their  long  and  illustrious  heritage,  vexed  at  the 
condescension  of  foreigners  towards  their  aspiration 
for  modern  development,  already  during  the  first 
days  of  national  existence  a  few  Italians  realised  that 
Italy,  in  order  to  develop  nationally,  must  trample 
underfoot  the  ever-present  past.  Italy  must  become 
something  more  than  a  haven  for  dilettante  art  critics 
and  artists,  the  birthplace  of  tenors,  the  refuge  of 
idyllic  lovers.  The  Italians  were  sick  unto  death  of 
hearing  the  glories  of  the  Renaissance  discussed  and 
commented  upon  by  foreign  observers;   sated  by  the 


FORMATIVE  FORCES  35 

universal  and  eternal  repetition  of  the  "Cinque- 
Cento,"  as  though  Italy  had  ceased  to  exist  since  the 
days  of  Michelangelo.  While  the  world  prattled  on 
about  Italian  art,  and  thought  of  modern  Italy  in 
the  same  old  romantic  strain,  the  Italians  by  a  dynamic 
realism,  by  closing  their  eyes  to  the  past,  by  concern- 
ing themselves  with  the  present,  and  by  looking  only 
to  the  future,  rung  by  rung  were  winning  their  way 
up  to  recognition  as  a  World  Power.  Though  many 
refused  to  consider  the  Italians  other  than  as  an  old, 
worn-out  race,  the  people  of  Italy  were  daily  more 
vigorously  and  lustily  asserting  their  rejuvenescence. 
Germany,  the  most  kindred  in  recent  development 
of  all  the  States  of  Europe,  alone  seemed  to  realise 
the  potential  strength  of  the  new  Italy,  and  it  is  per- 
haps from  Germany  that  the  inspiration  of  futurism 
was  drawn. 

Until  the  present  decade,  futurism  remained  in  the 
background  of  men's  minds — an  ideal  rather  than 
a  creed.  With  the  opening  years  of  the  present  cen- 
tury there  arose  in  Italy  a  group  of  young  men,  ar- 
dent men,  sincere  men,  who  believed  that  if  Italy 
was  to  take  her  place  among  nations,  if  she  was  to 
play  a  part  in  keeping  with  her  real  power,  this  dotage 
of  the  past  must  cease;  this  disregard  of  the  present- 
day  Italy  must  be  stamped  out.  How  could  Italy 
subsist  and  grow  with  a  world  of  men,  both  within 
and  without  her  boundaries,  engrossed  only  with 
the  period  of  efflorescence  of  a  golden  age  of  genius 
already  covered  with  the  dust  of  four  elapsed  cen- 
turies? The  Renaissance  and  its  heritage  must  be 
relegated  to  a  secondary  position;  the  Risorgimento 
and  its  epic  achievement  must  command  the  atten- 


36  GREATER  ITALY 

tion  of  the  world.  The  futurists  as  their  name  im- 
pHes,  believed  that  Italy's  destiny  lay  in  the  future; 
that  looking  backward  is  a  sign  of  senility;  that 
looking  to  the  future  is  the  privilege  of  youth.  Italy 
felt  herself  young  and  vigorous  now  that  she  had 
been  admitted  to  the  comity  of  nations.  But  more 
than  this,  Italy  felt  the  need  of  keeping  for  herself 
the  fruits  of  her  present  genius.  Hitherto  she  had 
lived  for  the  world;  an  international  forum,  in  the 
past  she  had  given  the  free  gift  of  her  soul  to  the 
world,  with  the  result  that  foreign  armies — French, 
Spanish,  Austrian — had  despoiled  her  lands  and  borne 
off  her  treasures,  the  trophies  of  victory.  Ahen  poets 
and  philosophers,  artists  and  historians,  had  stripped 
bare  the  tree  of  ItaHan  culture,  leaving  but  the  empty 
symbols  to  inspire  coming  generations.  Thus  arose 
the  demand  for  independence,  liberty  of  action  and 
self-reUance;  that  ''sacred  egoism"  which,  in  the 
grave  crisis  of  1914  became  a  political  watchword,  an 
outgrowth  of  the  older  and  more  cogent  Vltalia 
Jara  da  se.  These  are  a  few  of  the  manifestations  of 
this  same  spirit  of  trusting  to  Italy's  future,  which 
this  new  group  sought  to  formulate. 

In  order  to  gain  a  hearing  for  their  programme  the 
futurists  very  evidently  overstepped  the  mark  of 
moderation.  Marinetti,  the  leader  of  a  phase  of  this 
new  movement  for  the  glorification  of  the  new  and 
contempt  for  the  old,  gained  an  unpleasant  notoriety 
rather  than  a  serious  consideration.  But  his  work 
has  not  been  without  importance  in  that  it  expresses 
boisterously  and  exaggeratedly  sentiments  for  a  long 
time  widely  diffused,  though  latent,  in  Italy.  His 
praise  of  the  forge  and  the  workshop,  his  exaltation 


FORMATIVE  FORCES  37 

of  the  machine,  his  reiterated  insistence  on  the  banal- 
ity of  admiring  only  the  works  of  the  past,  whether 
they  be  the  canvases  and  marbles  of  the  Renaissance 
or  the  ruins  of  a  Roman  aqueduct,  have  had  a  potent 
effect,  even  beyond  the  boundaries  of  Italy.  Nor 
can  we  dismiss  as  the  lucubrations  of  a  maniac  his 
proposal  to  jfill  in  the  canals  at  Venice,  or  at  least 
abolish  the  use  of  gondolas,  as  unsuited  to  our  epoch. 
For  Venice  is  no  longer,  to  the  Italians,  a  golden- 
domed  bauble,  a  background  for  honeymoons,  as  many 
foreigners  are  still  wont  to  consider  it,  but  an  im- 
portant commercial  port,  the  only  good  harbour 
which  Italy  possesses  along  the  whole  length  of  the 
Italian  shore-line  of  the  Adriatic,  a  fortress  and  a 
naval  base,  besides  being  a  chief  city  in  Italy.  Or, 
again,  the  more  recent  plan  of  selling  to  America  the 
art  treasures  of  the  past,  and  with  the  great  sums 
secured  by  this  transaction  providing  for  the  main- 
tenance, for  many  years  to  come,  of  a  great  navy  and 
a  powerful  army,  besides  pajdng  for  the  cost  of  her 
war,  without  undue  burden  to  the  ItaUan  people, 
and  at  the  same  time  getting  rid  of  a  cumbersome 
heritage  and  giving  to  America,  which  is  without  a 
past,  a  semblance  of  continuity  in  history,  found 
throughout  Italy  many  willing  listeners. 

But  futurism  has  to  it  another  side,  which  dis- 
tinguishes it  as  a  phenomenon  singularly  suggestive. 
While  futurism  preaches  a  cult  of  progress,  it  is  a 
progress  based  on  the  strength  to  maintain  itself, 
if  need  be,  by  the  force  of  arms.  Arbitration,  paci- 
fism, internationalism,  the  Utopian  dreams  of  a  world 
freed  from  racial  conflicts  and  wars,  programmes 
to  provide  for  perpetually  friendly  relations  between 


38  GREATER  ITALY 

the  various  States,  based  on  treaties,  so  common  in 
all  other  progressive  platforms,  find  no  place  in 
ItaUan  futm-ism.  For  it  is  essentially  a  belhgerent 
doctrine.  ''War  is  the  only  hygiene  of  the  world," 
was  a  main  tenet  enunciated  by  Italian  futurists 
over  a  decade  ago,  when  Uberal  pacifism  was  daily 
gaining  more  consideration  from  parliaments  and 
the  proletariat.  ''War  is  the  culminating  sjmthesis 
of  progress,  the  school  of  ambition  and  heroism," 
was  to  be  the  cry  of  the  futurists  during  the  painful 
days  of  ItaHan  neutrality.  For  present-day  Itahans 
dared  not  forget  their  struggles  up  from  slavery; 
they  still  felt  the  lacerations  of  the  fetters  which 
bound  them  during  their  long  period  of  captivity, 
when  their  genius  was  engrossed  in  the  embellish- 
ments and  the  pleasures  of  life.  Modern  Itahans 
must  know  how  to  handle  a  rifle  as  well  as  a  paint- 
brush; the  lathe  and  the  motor  as  well  as  the  sculp- 
tor's chisel.  Nationahsm,  irredentism,  futurism,  were 
to  be  the  leaven  of  modern  Italy.  They  embody  the 
doctrines  of  vigour,  of  aggressive  strength,  kindred 
to  the  German  "might  is  right,"  yet  tempered  by  a 
Latin  geniality  of  twenty  centuries  of  cultural  tradi- 
tion. 


CHAPTER   III 

THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE 

The  Rule  op  Crispi.    Colonial  Expansion.    The  Abyssinian 

War 

During  the  first  lustrum  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
Italy  derived  Httle  tangible  profit  from  her  new  posi- 
tion. The  Itahans  soon  reahsed  that  they  could  only 
reap  a  benefit  from  the  alliance  commensurate  with 
their  own  strength.  They  at  once  set  about,  to  the 
limit  of  their  resources,  to  imitate  the  Prussian  mili- 
tary system  by  introducing  sweeping  reforms  through- 
out their  armies  and  bringing  their  cadres  up  to  full 
strength. 

The  old  dream  of  a  colonial  domain  in  Africa  was 
again  revived,  and  a  motion  was  passed  in  the  Cham- 
ber sanctioning  the  project  of  establishing  an  Itahan 
colony  along  the  shores  of  the  Red  Sea.  Partly  to 
wipe  out  the  memory  of  the  humiliations  endured  as  a 
result  of  her  thwarted  ambitions  in  Tunis,  partly  be- 
cause the  Itahans  realised  that  unless  they  took  imme- 
diate action  all  available  territory  suitable  for  colonial 
expansion  would  be  occupied  by  other  States,  the 
Itahan  Government  fitted  out  a  small  expedition  to 
take  possession  of  Massua,  the  centre  of  the  district 
later  known  as  Eritrea,  on  the  southwestern  shores  of 
the  Red  Sea,  previously  opened  up  by  Italian  explorers 
and  in  a  measure  exploited  by  Italian  merchants. 
The  region  selected  for  this  enterprise  was  not  propi- 

39 


40  GREATER  ITALY 

tious.  The  coastland  along  this  section  of  the  Red 
Sea  is  a  sun-scorched  waste  of  sand,  inhabited  by  wild 
nomad  tribes  and  of  value  as  a  colony  only  in  so  far 
as  it  gives  access  to  the  rich  and  fertile  high  plateau 
of  Abyssinia.  This  latter  region,  well  suited  for  Euro- 
pean colonisation,  formed  part  of  the  Christian  King- 
dom of  Abyssinia,  the  only  strong  independent  State 
of  Africa  possessing  an  army  worthy  of  the  name, 
marshalled  along  European  hnes  and  armed  with  mod- 
ern weapons.  Whether  the  ItaUans  expected  the  Ne- 
gus of  Abyssinia  to  submit  meekly  to  the  loss  of  this 
territory  is  not  clear,  no  project  for  the  conquest  of 
the  hinterland  having  been  openly  mentioned.  How- 
ever, the  Italians  deemed  their  enterprise  easy.  The 
landing  of  the  expeditionary  force  was  effected  in 
February,  1885.  The  Itahans  met  with  httle  or  no 
resistance  as  long  as  they  remained  along  the  coast. 
But  soon  ItaUan  ambitions  looked  farther  afield.  The 
broad,  sandy  desert  land  was  crossed,  and  the  hopes 
of  Italy  ran  high  that  at  last  a  great  colonial  empire 
would  be  carved  out  of  the  heart  of  one  of  the  most 
fertile  regions  of  the  African  continent.  But  these 
hopes  were  soon  to  be  doomed  to  disappointment. 
No  sooner  had  the  Itahan  troops  entered  the  highlands 
than  they  met  with  strong  resistance,  and  one  section 
of  the  invading  forces  was  later  attacked  by  the  Abys- 
sinians  and  cut  to  pieces  near  DogaU  in  January,  1887. 
Thus  the  Italians  had  set  forth  on  their  adventiu-ous 
colonial  enterprise,  and,  though  the  shores  of  the  Red 
Sea  remained  in  Itahan  hands  and  Eritrea  was  pro- 
claimed an  Italian  colony,  the  fruits  of  the  undertak- 
ing were  neghgible. 

As  the  time   approached   for   the  renewal   of   the 


THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  41 

Triple  Alliance  a  current  of  opinion  made  itself  heard 
which  announced  in  no  uncertain  terms  that  Italy 
could  profit  but  httle  by  her  alliance  with  Austria  and 
Germany,  and  pointed  to  the  sterility  of  the  first 
epoch  of  the  alliance.  The  menace  of  France  had 
been  removed.  The  Italians  no  longer  feared  that 
any  foreign  Power  would  attempt  to  restore  the  Pope 
to  his  temporal  throne,  and  the  raison  d'etre  of  the 
Triple  Alliance  had  thus  vanished.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  alliance  kept  Italy  in  an  attitude  of  tension  vis-a- 
vis the  other  Powers,  while  Germany  and  Austria 
seemed  to  have  a  free  hand  to  promote  their  own 
particular  interests.  Bismarck  had,  by  his  famous 
"Re-Insurance  Treaty"^  with  Russia  (1884),  entered 
into  a  separate  and  secret  agreement  with  that  Power 
for  the  purpose  of  protecting  Germany  from  an  attack 
in  the  East.  Italy  was  not  advised  of  this  arrange- 
ment, though  from  the  course  of  events  the  Itahan 
Government  could  soon  discern  that  the  alUance  with 
the  Central  Empires  had  lost  much  of  its  significance. 
This  slighting  conduct  of  Germany  towards  her  ItaUan 
ally  could  not  fail  to  awaken  the  doubts  of  the  Itahans 
as  to  any  benefits  which  might  accrue  to  them  from  a 
treaty  so  loosely  interpreted  by  the  other  contracting 
parties.     On  the  other  hand,  those  in  favour  of  the 

1  The  existence  of  this  secret  agreement  was  not  made  known  vmtil 
on  October  24,  1896,  it  was  divulged  in  the  Hamburger  Nachrichten, 
Prince  Bismarck's  own  organ,  which  stated:  "Very  soon  after  the 
change  of  throne  (in  Russia  by  the  assassination  of  Alexander  III)  and 
the  retirement  of  Gortchakoff,  a  good  understanding  was  established 
between  German  and  Russian  policy  and  remained  in  force  until  1890. 
Until  then  both  Empires  were  completely  in  agreement  that  should  either 
one  of  them  be  attacked  the  other  would  remain  benevolently  neutral, 
so  that  if,  for  example,  Germany  were  attacked  by  France  the  friendly 
neutrality  of  Russia  was  expected,  and  the  friendly  neutraUty  of  Ger- 
many if  Russia  were  attacked  without  provocation." 


42  GREATER  ITALY 

renewal  of  the  Triple  Alliance  were  anxious  to  secure 
an  addition  to  its  clauses  in  order  to  be  assured  of  the 
co-operation  of  Germany  and  Austria  for  the  adequate 
protection  of  Italy's  interests  in  the  Mediterranean, 
of  which  no  mention  was  made  in  the  original  treaty. 
Count  di  Robilant,  the  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  was  firmly  opposed  to  any  renewal  of  the 
treaty  without  definite  additions.  He  beheved  that 
the  subservient  poUcy  followed  by  Italy  at  the  signa- 
ture of  the  treaty  in  1882  had  been  detrimental  to 
Itahan  interests.  He  refused  to  take  the  initiative  in 
the  negotiations  for  the  renewal  of  the  alUance.  Writ- 
ing in  July,  1886,  to  di  Launay,  ItaUan  Ambassador 
at  Berlin,  he  remarks: 

"Decidedly  Italy  is  tired  of  this  sterile  alliance,  and 
I  do  not  feel  desirous  of  forcing  her  to  renew  it,  be- 
cause I  feel  too  deeply  that  it  will  always  be  unpro- 
ductive for  us.  It  is  probable  that  M.  de  Bismarck 
has  made  a  mistake  as  regards  myself,  not  knowing 
me  at  all,  and  imagines  that  I  will  feel  the  need  of 
following  his  lead  always,  in  spite  of  everything.  If 
he  thought  that  he  is  strangely  mistaken.  It  is  there- 
fore more  than  probable  that  I  shall  not  renew  the 
alUance."^ 

Some  months  later  di  Robilant  let  it  be  known  that 
Italy  required  definite  guarantees  against  French  ex- 
pansion eastward  in  northern  Africa,  which  might  ulti- 
mately involve  Tripoh,  and  that  a  plain  discussion 
with  Austria  regarding  the  maintenance  of  the  status 
quo  in  the  Balkans  was  desirable.  Negotiations  re- 
garding these  points  were  no  doubt  entered  into. 
However,  no  understanding,  definitely  incorporated  in 

'Chiala:  "Pagine  di  Storia  Contemporanea,  La  Triplice  e  la  Du- 
plice,"  p.  471. 


THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  43 

the  text  of  the  treaty,  was  reached.  A  semiofficial 
writer,^  in  April,  1887,  declared,  ''that  no  innovation 
in  the  Mediterranean,  and  especially  in  Africa,  will  be 
possible  without  our  consent.  We  are  therefore  in- 
sured against  a  possibiUty  of  events  such  as  occurred 
at  Tunis  being  repeated  in  Tripoli  or  elsewhere.  This 
would  be  a  casus  belli  which  would  involve  our  alhes." 
At  the  same  time,  though  the  principle  of  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  status  quo  in  the  Balkans  may  have  been 
conceded  by  Austria,  and  the  way  opened  for  the  in- 
clusion of  Article  VII  in  the  treaty  of  alHance  between 
Austria  and  Italy,  it  was  not  definitely  agreed  to  until 
fifteen  years  later  (1902).  Referring  to  this  question, 
the  same  WTiter  states  :^  ''Austria-Hungary  will  not  take 
a  step  in  this  direction  (Salonika  or  Albania)  without 
previous  agreement  with  us;  whatever  may  happen,  if 
Austria  wishes  to  advance  in  the  Near  East  she  will 
do  it  with  our  consent,  and  as  a  result  our  interests 
find  the  broadest  guarantee  in  the  treaty." 

The  cause  for  the  change  of  heart  on  the  part  of 
Italy  can  in  part  be  explained  by  the  defeat  of  the 
Italian  colonial  expedition  at  the  hands  of  the  natives 
at  DogaH  a  few  months  before  the  aUiance  was  to  be 
renewed,  which  left  Italy  materially  weakened.  Afraid 
to  find  herself  once  again  isolated  in  Europe,  and  un- 
able to  force  BerUn  or  Vienna  to  consider  any  revision 
of,  or  addition  to,  the  treaty  clauses  in  a  definite  form, 

^  "Ex-Diplomat,"  in  the  Nuova  Antologia,  April  16,  1887,  p.  733. 
This  extract  is  quoted  by  Professor  Salvemini  in  his  series  of  interesting 
studies  on  the  Triple  Alliance,  published  in  the  Revtie  des  Nations 
Latines  (July,  1916),  who  adds:  "The  articles  deahng  with  foreign 
poUtics  published  by  'Ex-Diplomat'  in  the  Nuova  Antologia  during 
these  years  were  written  under  the  inspiration  of  the  Premier,  M. 
Depretis." 

*  Ibidem. 


44  GREATER  ITALY 

Italy  placed  her  signature  to  the  renewal  of  the  alli- 
ance in  its  original  form  for  a  period  of  five  years. 

Though  Italy  was  unable  to  secure  the  desired 
modifications  embodied  in  the  treaty  of  the  Triple 
Alhance,  she  was  able,  probably  through  the  good 
offices  of  Bismarck,  to  enter  upon  an  understanding 
with  England  regarding  the  recognition  of  Italy's  vital 
interests  in  the  Mediterranean.  No  formal  treaty  was 
concluded  between  Great  Britain  and  Italy;  there  was 
merely  an  exchange  of  Notes,  yet  it  became  known 
that  Great  Britain  would  defend  Italy  if  the  latter 
were  attacked  by  sea,  and  that  an  alliance  had  been 
entered  into  between  the  two  States  to  safeguard  the 
status  quo  in  the  Mediterranean  and  the  adjacent  wa- 
ters. Thus  Italy  found  herself  aUied  on  the  Conti- 
nent with  the  Central  Empires,  the  greatest  miUtary 
Powers;  on  the  sea  with  Great  Britain,  the  greatest  naval 
Power,  and  her  position  and  prestige  greatly  enhanced. 

The  ensuing  decade  was  to  \\dtness  the  high-water 
mark  of  the  Triple  AUiance.  Hitherto,  Italy,  while 
outwardly  faithful  to  her  treaty  engagements  with 
Germany  and  Austria,  nevertheless  had  endeavoured 
to  remain  on  friendhest  terms  with  the  other  Powers. 
This  difficult  task  was  only  partially  successful,  and 
Italy's  relations,  particularly  with  France,  were  marred 
by  continual  chicanery,  followed  by  retahatory  mea- 
sures of  a  commercial  nature,  which  materially  injured 
the  interests  of  both  countries. 

The  renewal  of  the  Triple  Alhance  in  May,  1887, 
was  followed  in  a  few  months  by  the  accession  to  the 
Premiership  of  Crispi,  who  for  the  next  nine  years  was 
to  hold  this  office  almost  uninterruptedly.  He  was  to 
leave  no  stone  unturned  to  cement  the  bonds  of  the 


THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  45 

alliance  which  bound  Italy  to  the  Central  Empires, 
more  particularly  to  Germany.  An  ardent  advocate 
of  the  TripHst  agreement,  as  well  as  an  avowed  Ger- 
manophil,  during  his  term  of  office  he  modelled  Italian 
poUcy  along  Bismarckian  hues,  and  became  a  zealous 
exponent  of  Germanic  aims  and  ideals,  content  with 
the  material  benefits  which  accrued  to  Italy  by  this 
arrangement. 

Next  to  Cavour  the  name  of  Crispi  shines  forth  as 
that  of  the  most  important  figure  in  ItaUan  pubHc 
affairs  since  the  formation  of  the  Kingdom  of  Italy. 
Cavour  brought  Italy  into  being  as  a  united  nation; 
Crispi  raised  Italy  to  the  rank  of  a  great  Power. 
The  contrast  between  the  temper  and  character  of  the 
two  men  vividly  illustrates  how  contradictory  may  be 
the  qualities  and  quahfications  of  great  statesmen. 
Cavour  came  from  the  most  northern  province  of 
Italy,  Piedmont.  An  aristocrat  by  bu'th,  cold,  shrewd, 
methodical,  sincere,  silent,  a  reaUst  in  politics,  he  lived 
and  acted  by  the  old  maxim,  ''a  bird  in  the  hand  is 
worth  two  in  the  bush."  Crispi  was  a  Sicihan  of 
humble  extraction,  a  former  Repubhcan  conspirator,  a 
follower  of  Mazzini,  an  exile  who  had  rallied  to  the 
House  of  Savoy.  Hot-headed,  self-confident,  a  florid 
and  facile  orator,  suspicious  by  nature,  always  looking 
for  some  hidden,  underhand  motives  in  the  actions  of 
others,  yet  endowed  with  an  astonishing  flair  which 
enabled  him  to  discount  the  future,  though  he  very 
often  was  unable  to  gauge  rightly  a  problem  in  hand, 
he  possessed  withal  a  remarkable  capacity  for  govern- 
ment. Notwithstanding  the  faults  imputed  to  him, 
he  was  inspired  by  a  deep  patriotism  and  a  firm  behef 
in  the  potential  greatness  of  Italy. 


46  GREATER  ITALY 

Crispi  was  eager  to  see  Italy  enjoy  her  rights  and 
privileges  as  a  World  Power.  He  believed  that  it  was 
due  chiefly  to  the  timidity  and  vacillation  of  former 
Cabinets  that  Italy  had  not  hitherto  played  an  impor- 
tant part  in  world  affairs.  His  admiration  for  the 
Prussian,  or  rather  the  Bismarckian  regime,  was  very 
great,  and  he  hoped,  by  following  in  the  footsteps  of 
the  Iron  Chancellor,  to  bring  forth  a  greater  Italy. 
That  he  paved  the  way  for  Pan-German  expansion 
towards  the  Mediterranean  would  seem  incontestable; 
that  he  delivered  Italy  up  to  Germany  to  be  exploited 
commercially  is  also  true;  but  it  cannot  be  denied  that 
his  motives  were  high-minded,  and  that  he  sought  to 
benefit  his  country  by  increasing  her  economic  strength 
and  industrial  resources.  He  brought  Italy  from  a 
position  of  inferiority  and  obscurity  to  a  fuller  enjoy- 
ment of  her  just  privileges  as  an  independent  State, 
and  in  no  small  measure  he  made  it  possible  for  her 
to  rely  on  her  own  strength  in  periods  of  crises  which 
were  to  confront  her  later  on. 

Hitherto  Italy's  position  had  been  equivocal.  Al- 
though the  Triple  AlHance  was  known  to  exist,  Italian 
Ministers  had  carefully  refrained  from  making  any 
public  references  thereto,  and  had  endeavoured  to 
remain  on  equally  friendly  terms  with  all  the  Powers. 
Crispi  had  not  been  in  office  two  months  when,  in 
July,  1887,  he  paid  a  visit  to  Bismarck  at  Friedrichs- 
ruhe,  which  was  in  the  nature  of  a  profession  of  faith. 
Ten  years  before  Crispi  had  visited  the  Imperial 
Chancellor;  then  his  journey  had  seemed  a  pilgrim- 
age, he  had  come  as  a  suppliant,  now  he  was  received 
as  an  equal,  the  spokesman  of  the  Kingdom  of  Italy. 

Though  this  visit  was  of  no  immediate  pofitical  im- 


THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  47 

portance,  and  was  merely  intended  by  Crispi  to  pro- 
claim boldly  Italy's  open  adhesion  to  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance, its  effects  abroad  were  not  long  in  making  them- 
selves felt.  Italy  now  stood  forth,  a  firm  advocate 
of  the  alliance.  Her  intentions  could  no  longer  be 
doubted.  The  defensive  policy  of  the  alliance  which 
had  hitherto  governed  the  relations  between  the  allied 
States  seemed  to  be  drifting  towards  a  more  aggressive 
attitude.  This  impression  was  confirmed  when  Crispi, 
on  his  return  from  Germany,  in  his  pubUc  utterances 
proclaimed  that  the  Triple  Alliance  was  the  firmest 
safeguard  of  the  peace  of  Europe. 

Six  months  later  two  Emperors  passed  from  the 
scene  of  German  affairs.  The  nonagenarian  William  I 
was  followed  to  his  grave  by  his  son,  the  Emperor 
Frederick,  who  had  hastened  from  the  health-giving 
shores  of  Liguria  in  March  to  the  death-bed  of  his 
father,  only  himself  to  die  three  months  later,  in  June, 
1888.  The  sceptre  of  Imperial  Germany  passed  into 
new  and  untried  hands.  The  men  who  had  created 
the  German  Empire  and  implanted  in  the  character  of 
its  institutions  and  constitution  the  harsh  rigour  of 
the  ordeal  by  fire,  now  made  way  for  a  young  man  of 
twenty-nine  years  of  age,  endowed  with  a  boundless 
and  restless  energy,  a  strenuous  desire  to  see  all  and 
do  all  by  himself;  an  odd  mixture  of  an  intellect  curious 
and  alert  to  the  new  advantages  of  his  time  and  age, 
yet  blended  though  unassimilated  with  a  temperament 
feudal,  arbitrary,  and  arrogant.  Such  was  the  man 
called  upon  to  occupy  the  throne  of  the  Hohenzollerns, 
as  he  appeared  to  the  ItaHans  when,  four  months  after 
his  accession,  William  II  visited  Rome. 

As  the  new  ruler  of  Germany  rode  down  the  Corso 


48  GREATER  ITALY 

in  an  open  landau  the  multitudes  who  lined  the  streets 
looked  in  vain,  in  the  cortege  of  gala  carriages,  for  the 
stern,  shaggy-browed  face  of  Bismarck.  The  Iron 
Chancellor  had  not  been  invited  to  accompany  the 
new  Emperor  to  Rome,  and  the  Itahans  were  quick  to 
discover  that  a  new  era  had  opened  in  Germany,  and 
they  at  once  set  about  to  reap  the  advantages  of  the 
situation.  The  ovation  which  Wilham  II  received  at 
Rome  was  the  most  sincere  of  any  which  he  has  since 
received  dming  his  niunerous  peregrinations  through 
the  capitals  of  Europe.  He  won  the  hearts  of  all 
Italy  spontaneously  by  the  mere  fact  that  he  was  the 
first  sovereign  of  a  great  State  to  come  to  Rome  since 
the  foundation  of  the  Kingdom  of  Italy. 

The  Emperor's  courteous  and  frank  manner,  the 
intense  interest  which  he  bestowed  on  all  who  ap- 
proached him,  and  the  success  with  which  he  played 
the  part  of  Prince  Charming  dehghted  Itahans  of  all 
classes,  while  WilUam  II  himself  found  no  httle  plea- 
sure in  playing  the  dramatic  role  of  Emperor  in  the 
city  of  the  Caesars.  The  alHance  with  Italy  seemed 
to  offer  more  advantages  in  the  eyes  of  the  new  sov- 
ereign than  any  one  in  Germany  had  hitherto  reahsed. 
With  keen  perception  the  Emperor  grasped  the  fact 
that  here  lay  a  vast  domain  needed  by  Germany  for 
her  growing  commerce,  and  a  fair  field  for  industrial 
conquest.  Italy,  bound  by  aUiance  to  Germany, 
would  welcome  Germans  more  warmly  than  any  other 
foreigners;  Italy  would  be  an  excellent  market  for 
German  products,  and  no  doubt  German  influence 
could  shape  the  pohcy  of  this  Mediterranean  Power 
to  its  will.  It  was  during  this  visit  to  Rome  that  the 
first  seeds  of  the  Emperor's  Weltpolitik  were  sown. 


THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  49 

William  II,  during  his  week's  sojourn  in  Italy,  was 
taken  to  Naples.  There,  amid  the  enchanting  scenery 
of  the  blue  waters  and  high-rising  hills  of  Parthenope, 
with  the  bleak  Vesuvius,  vapour-crowned,  cut  clear 
against  the  morning  sky,  the  German  Emperor  was 
present  at  the  launching  of  a  battleship.  Here  again  the 
young  sovereign  seemed  to  find  new  food  for  thought, 
and  the  impression  which  this  launching  made  on  his 
mind  at  this  time  opened  new  vistas  of  world  dominion. 

Returning  to  Rome,  the  Emperor  took  it  upon  him- 
self to  pay  his  respects  to  the  Pope,  as  the  head  of 
the  church  of  his  Catholic  subjects.  As  a  Protestant 
prince,  he  besought  an  interview,  which  was  readily 
granted.  A  curious  ceremonial  was  followed,  by  which 
the  Emperor  set  out  for  his  visit  to  the  Vatican  from 
the  Prussian  Legation — the  fiction  being  that  this  was 
German  soil — to  the  Papal  Court.  The  Pope  received 
the  HohenzoUern  Emperor  alone,  in  audience.  In  the 
adjoining  apartment  Prince  Henry  of  Prussia  and 
Count  Herbert  Bismarck,  who  accompanied  the  Em- 
peror, waited  the  return  of  their  sovereign.  Growing 
impatient  and  nervous  as  a  result  of  the  prolonged 
interview.  Count  Bismarck,  notwithstanding  the  pro- 
tests of  the  Papal  Chamberlain,  burst  into  the  audience- 
chamber,  and  the  colloquy  of  the  Pope  and  William  II 
was  brought  to  an  abrupt  close.  This  incident,  vari- 
ously exploited  as  portraying  the  gruff  manners  of 
the  Prussians  and  their  shght  regard  for  the  Pope, 
nevertheless  did  not  displease  many  Italians  in  official 
circles,  who  were  not  loath  to  applaud  any  event 
which  might  diminish  the  temporal  prestige  of  the 
Papacy. 

The  voyage  of  the  German  Emperor  to  Italy  had 


50  GREATER  ITALY 

proved  a  triumphant  sanction  of  Crispi's  programme. 
In  order  to  convince  Germany  of  the  sincerity  of 
Italy's  desire  to  co-operate  actively  in  the  alliance, 
and  to  be  worthy  of  the  consideration  of  her  allies, 
Crispi  m*ged  the  vote  of  imposing  credits  for  arma- 
ments, amounting,  for  the  current  year  of  1888-9 
to  553,000,000  lire  (£22,120,000),  an  increase  of  140,- 
000,000  lire  (£5,600,000)  over  the  preceding  year. 
At  the  same  time  Italy's  attitude  towards  France 
became  uncompromising.  Already,  before  Crispi's  ac- 
cession to  power,  owing  to  the  abrogation  of  commercial 
treaties  with  France,  in  1886,  the  commerce  between 
the  two  nations  was  slowly  dwindling,  and  in  1888  a 
sharp  decline  in  the  imports  from  France  was  noticed. 
At  the  same  time  rumours  were  spread  abroad  in 
Italy  of  the  hostile  demeanour  of  France.  The  fact 
that  Italy  had  openly  joined  hands  with  Austria, 
from  whose  yoke  France  had,  thirty  years  before, 
spent  her  blood  and  treasure  to  liberate  her,  rankled 
in  the  minds  of  many  Frenchmen  when  they  realised 
that  Italy  was  ranging  herself  on  the  side  of  France's 
enemies.  The  wound  to  the  national  pride  and  honour 
of  France  caused  by  the  War  of  1870  still  bled.  Al- 
sace-Lorraine was  first  and  foremost  in  the  thoughts 
and  plans  of  France.  Italy  was  now,  by  her  alliance, 
pledging  her  increased  armed  forces  to  Prussia  for 
the  defense  of  these  ravished  provinces.  Is  it  to  be 
wondered  that  France  showed  her  ill  humour  at  Italian 
conduct  ? 

But  Crispi  was  looking  out  only  for  Italian  in- 
terests; he  had  little  natural  sympathy  for  France. 
Whether  there  was  any  foundation  for  his  fear  of  an 
aggression  on  the  part  of  France,  or  whether  he  be- 


THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  51 

lieved  himself  to  be  playing  a  Bismarckian  role,  Crispi 
with  much  zeal  and  vigour  feverishly  pushed  ahead 
the  fortifications  of  the  Piedmont  frontier,  while  he 
invited  a  British  squadron  to  visit  Genoa  in  order  to 
intimidate  the' French.  The  Italian  Premier's  Franco- 
phobia  took  on  alarming  dimensions.  First,  a  rumour 
spread  rapidly  throughout  Italy  of  a  plan  on  the  part 
of  France  to  attack  and  destroy  the  Itahan  naval 
base  at  Spezia;  then  of  a  French  project  to  land 
troops  in  Sicily.  No  sooner  had  this  proved  unfounded 
than  it  was  replaced  by  the  alleged  plan  of  the  occu- 
pation by  the  French  of  Tripoli,  which  had  already 
been  marked  out  as  a  field  for  future  Italian  colonial 
conquest.  While  these  "events"  were  disturbing 
the  Italian  Government,  minor  incidents,  such  as 
race  riots  in  Modane  and  other  French  towns,  in 
which  Italians  were  maltreated — their  cause  was  to 
be  sought  solely  in  the  fact  that  Italian  workmen 
were  willing  to  accept  a  lower  scale  of  wages  than 
the  French — and  a  violation  of  the  French  Consulate 
at  Florence  by  a  local  judge,  aggravated  the  already 
strained  relations  between  Rome  and  Paris. 

In  the  meantime  Italy  had  thrown  in  her  lot  even 
more  whole-heartedly  with  the  Triple  Alliance.  In 
May  1889,  King  Humbert,  accompanied  by  Crispi, 
returned  the  visit  of  his  German  guest.  He  was 
entertained  at  Berlin  by  his  Imperial  host  in  the 
accustomed  manner,  with  military  pageants  and 
reviews,  gala  performances  at  the  Imperial  Opera 
House,  and  all  the  trappings  of  a  State  visit.  Crispi 
renewed  his  protestations  of  friendship  for  Germany, 
while  his  sovereign,  King  Humbert,  convinced  of  the 
sincerity  of  German  good-will,  went  so  far  as  to  de- 


52  GREATER  ITALY 

clare  ''Italians  and  Germans  members  of  one  and 
the  same  family." 

In  the  early  spring  of  the  next  year  (March,  1890) 
Bismarck  retired  from  the  ofSce  of  Chancellor.  Crispi 
was  eager  to  prove  to  the  world  that  the  Triple 
Alliance  was  in  no  manner  weakened  by  this  event. 
The  newly  appointed  Imperial  Chancellor,  Count 
Caprivi,  willingly  lent  himself  to  this  idea,  and  shortly 
afterwards  he  visited  Italy,  where  he  was  met  by 
Crispi  at  Milan,  and  the  two  statesmen  came  to  a 
complete  understanding;  while  Caprivi,  continuing 
his  journey,  was  received  by  the  King  of  Italy  at 
Monza  with  every  mark  of  esteem  and  consideration. 

Nor  did  Crispi  omit  to  endeavour  to  ameliorate 
existing  relations  with  Austria.  After  having  made 
several  fruitless  attempts  to  secure  German  aid  for 
the  settlement  of  the  vexed  question  of  the  Trentino 
and  Trieste,  Crispi  suddenly  decided  that  all  dis- 
cussion of  the  matter  must  cease.  In  a  well-worded 
speech  in  the  Chamber,  he  set  forth  the  fact  that 
irredentist  agitation  was  detrimental  to  the  best  in- 
terests of  Italy,  and  that  in  order  to  strengthen  the 
position  of  Italy  abroad  the  question  of  the  unre- 
deemed provinces  must  be  put  out  of  mind.  With  an 
exemplary  rigour  he  suppressed  all  irredentist  prop- 
aganda, dissolved  the  societies  which  had  supported 
the  movement,  and  even  went  so  far  as  to  dismiss 
the  Minister  of  Finance  in  his  own  Cabinet  for  having 
Hstened  without  protest  to  an  irredentist  harangue. 
He  let  Austria  see  plainly  that  he  was  in  earnest  in 
his  endeavour  to  wipe  the  slate  clean  and  begin  anew 
the  intercourse  between  the  two  countries.  But 
Austria,    unmindful    of    Italian    advances,    continued 


THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  53 

her  policy  of  repression  and  annoyance  of  her  Italian 
subjects. 

Under  Crispins  guidance  Italy's  foreign  relations 
had  grown  more  complex.  No  longer  isolated  in 
Europe,  insured  of  German  assistance  and  Austrian 
acquiescence  on  the  Continent,  as  well  as  of  the  help 
of  England  at  sea,  Italy  found  herself  in  a  position 
of  hberty  of  movement  which  she  had  not  hitherto 
enjoyed.  Crispi  in  the  brief  space  of  three  years  had 
raised  Italy  to  a  position  of  relative  dominance  in 
Europe,  while  he  now  assimied  for  himself  the  role 
of  the  spokesman  of  the  Triple  AlHance,  which  he 
proclaimed  the  chief  factor  of  peace  and  stability  in 
world  affairs. 

Leaving  the  gates  of  Italy  open  to  German  peace- 
ful penetration,  Crispi  now  turned  his  attention  to 
Italy's  colonial  problem  and  entered  upon  a  course 
of  colonial  adventure,  which,  brilliantly  initiated, 
was  to  end  in  a  disaster  that  dragged  Crispi  down 
in  its  partial  collapse.  Notwithstanding  the  inauspi- 
cious inauguration  of  the  Itahan  colonial  enterprise 
in  Eritrea,  and  the  successive  defeats  which  the  native 
forces  had  inflicted  on  the  Itahans,  Crispi  was  de- 
termined to  push  forward  vigorously  the  project  of 
African  colonisation.  Here  he  hoped  to  reap  the  tan- 
gible reward  and  proclaim  to  the  world  the  proof  of 
the  new  greatness  of  Italy. 

By  means  of  negotiations  with  the  native  chiefs, 
and  of  a  private  understanding  with  Great  Britain, 
Somaliland,  an  extensive  tract  of  rocky  and  infertile 
coastland  bordering  the  Indian  Ocean  and  adjoining 
British  East  Africa,  passed  peacefully  under  ItaUan 
protectorate.     Though   the  district  itself  is  of  Httle 


54  GREATER  ITALY 

value,  yet  its  vast  area  of  139,430  square  miles  satis- 
fied the  growing  megalomania  of  Crispi,  and  the  new 
colony  was  annexed  amid  the  loud  applause  of  all 
Italy. 

Not  satisfied  with  this  first  success,  Crispi  took 
advantage  of  the  death  of  the  Negus  of  Abyssinia, 
and  the  disorders  which  had  arisen,  to  push  Italian 
conquest  inland  and  wipe  out  the  memory  of  recent 
reverses.  These  efforts  were  crowned  with  a  vic- 
torious advance  and  the  occupation  of  several  im- 
portant centres  in  the  hinterland.  Then  Crispi,  em- 
boldened by  his  good  fortune,  successfully  championed 
the  cause  of  Menelek,  one  of  the  pretenders  to  the 
vacant  throne  of  the  Negus.  When  Menelek  had 
been  established  firmly  on  his  Abyssinian  throne,  by 
a  treaty  between  himself  and  the  Italian  Government 
signed  at  Uccialli  in  May,  1889,  a  portion  of  the  high 
plateau  including  Asmara  was  granted  to  Italy,  and 
Italy  further  assumed  what  amounted  to  a  quasi- 
protectorate  over  the  empire  of  the  Negus  in  the  form 
of  an  alliance  in  perpetuity  between  Italy  and  Abys- 
sinia, by  which  Italy  reserved  for  herself  the  exclusive 
right  to  furnish  arms  and  financial  aid  which  the 
Negus  might  need.  This  treaty  also  contained  a 
clause,^  somewhat  loosely  drawn,  which  conferred 
upon  Italy  according  to  the  Italian  contention,  the 
right  to  represent  Abyssinian  interests  in  Europe. 
The  Negus  contested  the  Italian  interpretation  of 
this  article  of  the  treaty,  which,  according  to  Roman 

^  This  clause  on  which  Italy  based  her  claims  to  a  protectorate  over 
Abyssinia,  reads:  "His  Majesty  the  King  of  Kings  of  Ethiopia  con- 
sents to  make  use  of  the  Government  of  His  Majesty  the  King  of 
Italy  for  treatment  of  all  questions  concerning  other  Powers  and  Gov- 
ernments." 


THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  55 

opinion,  was  a  definite  obligation  on  the  part  of  Abys- 
sinia to  be  represented  abroad  by  Italy,  while  the 
Negus  contended  that  it  merely  conferred  a  privilege 
on  Abyssinia  to  have  recourse  to  ItaUan  aid  when 
she  so  desired,  but  in  no  way  could  be  interpreted 
as  a  fixed  obligation.  Thus  the  question  remained 
unsettled,  and  from  the  very  outset  the  relations 
between  Italy  and  her  new  Abyssinian  ''ally"  were 
not  as  friendly  as  might  be  desired,  and  portended  a 
conflict  in  a  no  distant  future. 

Meanwhile,  not  content  with  the  astonishing  suc- 
cess which  he  had  achieved  in  the  brief  space  of  two 
years  in  affirming  Italy's  colonial  conquests,  Crispi 
turned  his  attention  towards  Tripoli,  and  began  by 
gaining  the  friendship  of  the  native  chiefs,  among 
them  Hassuna  Pasha  Karamanli,  whose  loyalty  and 
friendship  was  to  prove  valuable  to  Italy  later  on. 
This  is  as  far  as  this  undertaking  developed  at  this 
time.  For  though  Crispi  earmarked  Tripoh  for  future 
occupation  by  Italy,  and  blocked  French  advance 
into  this  territory,  nothing  further  was  done,  as  before 
Crispi  could  push  the  negotiations  with  his  accus- 
tomed vigour  an  important  event  at  home  prevented 
him  from  carrying  out  his  plan  for  the  acquisition  of 
Tripoli.  To  Crispi  must  be  given  the  credit  of  having 
launched  Italy  on  the  Tripolitan  campaign  which 
twenty  years  later  she  was  to  bring  to  a  successful 
conclusion. 

Crispi's  achievement  had  been  brilliant.  He  had 
brought  Italy  from  a  position  of  subservient  ob- 
scurity into  the  enjoyment  of  a  sense  of  national  self- 
rehance  and  strength.  He  had  endowed  his  country 
with  her  much-desired  colonial  domain,  and  had  af- 


56  GREATER  ITALY 

firmed  the  position  of  Italy  as  a  great  Power.  Though 
his  attitude  towards  France  was  taunting  and  ag- 
gressive, it  is  explained  by  his  desire  to  proclaim  the 
new  power  of  Italy,  in  that  Italy  dared  tenir  tete  with 
France,  before  whose  menace  all  Italy  had  hitherto 
trembled.  Crispi  stood  at  the  height  of  his  fortunes. 
Never  had  his  position,  both  at  home  and  abroad, 
seemed  stronger.  Suddenly  by  one  of  those  inex- 
plicable caprices  which  have  always  prevailed  in 
ItaHan  pohtics,  and  are  a  chief  disadvantage  of  the 
system  of  the  responsibility  of  Ministers  to  ParUament, 
by  an  adverse  vote  of  the  Chamber  on  a  matter  of 
secondary  importance,  chiefly  as  the  result  of  a  violent 
speech  on  the  part  of  Crispi,  in  which  he  accused 
''the  Right"  of  having  acted  servilely  in  the  interests 
of  foreign  Powers  before  1876,  he  was  compelled  to 
retire  from  office  in  January,  1891. 

Had  Crispi  ended  his  pubHc  career  at  this  time, 
all  his  fellow  countrymen  would  have  retained  an 
enthusiastic  admiration  for  his  ability  and  a  sense 
of  indebtedness  for  his  accomplishment  on  behalf  of 
a  greater  Italy.    But  fate  deemed  otherwise. 

It  would  seem  a  strange  conjunction  of  fortune 
that  Crispi,  the  most  sincere  advocate  of  the  Triple 
Alliance,  should  never  have  been  called  upon  to  con- 
sider the  question  of  the  terms  of  its  renewal.  Called 
to  office  after  the  treaty  had  been  somewhat  reluc- 
tantly renewed  in  1887,  Crispi  was  compelled  to  re- 
Hnquish  his  post  a  few  months  before  the  question 
of  its  renewal  again  came  up.  However,  the  stamp 
given  to  ItaHan  affairs  during  Crispi's  long  tenure 
of  office,  proved  that,  though  he  himself  was  no 
longer  in  power,  the  change  of  Ministers  could  not 


THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  57 

mean  a  change  of  policy.  His  successor  in  office, 
the  Marchese  di  Rudini,  although  he  belonged  to  the 
Right  and  was  known  to  be  only  a  lukewarm  Trip- 
hst,  did  not  dare  to  take  it  upon  himself  to  weaken 
the  bonds  of  the  Triple  AUiance.  Crispi,  it  is  true, 
had  hoped  for  and  laboured  to  secure  the  formation 
of  a  more  closely  knit  coalition,  which  would  include 
the  three  alHes  in  an  economic  as  well  as  mihtary 
alliance.  He  had  planned  the  foundation  of  a  cus- 
toms union  along  the  hnes  of  the  German  Zollverein, 
to  include  Austria-Hungary,  Germany,  and  Italy, 
which  would  have  rendered  the  strength  of  the  Triple 
AUiance  far  more  effective.  However,  these  projects 
were  not  carried  out,  though  in  order  to  assert  more 
patently  the  firm  foundation  of  the  alhance,  the 
treaty  was  now  drawn  so  as  to  bind  the  contracting 
parties  for  a  period  of  six  years,  and  it  was  under- 
stood that  the  treaty  was  to  continue  automatically 
in  force  for  another  six-year  period  unless  specifically 
repudiated  by  one  of  the  parties  thereto  one  year 
before  the  expiration  of  the  first  period.  At  the  same 
time  Italy  entered  into  private  trade  agreements  with 
Germany  and  Austria  which  were  to  offset  the  dam- 
ages to  Italy  resulting  from  the  commercial  war  with 
France. 

Crispi 's  action  in  avowedly  placing  Italy  within 
the  orbit  of  the  Triple  Alhance,  and  adhering  to  and 
even  fostering  its  new  aggressive  pohcy,  could  not 
fail  to  find  a  repercussion  in  Europe.  The  same  year 
which  marked  the  renewal  of  the  Triple  Alhance  by 
Crispi's  successor,  and  thus  proclaimed  that  the""  al- 
hance had  become  Italy's  national  policy,  and  could 
no  longer  be  considered  the  personal  policy  of  Crispi, 


58  GREATER  ITALY 

is  marked  by  the  first  signs  of  a  rapprochement 
between  France  and  Russia,  which  can  be  dated  from 
the  visit  of  the  French  fleet  to  Cronstadt  in  the  summer 
of  1891.  Wilham  II  had  seen  fit  not  to  continue  the 
tradition  of  Bismarck,  and  had  not  renewed  the  '^  Re- 
Insurance  Treaty"  with  Russia.  The  immediate 
result  of  this  policy  was  the  Franco-Russian  under- 
standing, which  was  soon  to  ripen  into  a  formal  al- 
liance. 

The  Cabinet  of  the  Marchese  di  Rudini,  which  had 
been  hastily  patched  up  on  the  fall  of  Crispi,  was  not 
destined  to  survive.  Finding  himself  in  a  minority, 
di  Rudini  relinquished  his  office,  and  a  new  figm-e 
now  for  the  first  time  appears  on  the  horizon  of  Itahan 
public  affairs,  who  through  later  years  was  destined 
to  play  so  important  a  part  in  Italian  public  fife.  It 
is  Giovanni  Giolitti.  A  Piedmontese,  brought  up  in 
the  Triplist  tradition,  who  looked  on  foreign  affairs 
merely  as  they  might  be  reflected  in  the  mirror  of 
domestic  requirements,  an  astute  manipulator  of 
parliamentary  majorities,  to  whom  a  compromise 
was  more  dear  than  a  fight,  his  debut  in  the  office  of 
Premier  in  May,  1892,  was  fraught  with  difficulties 
which  would  have  dismayed  many  a  stronger  man. 

During  the  preceding  years  Crispi,  engaged  chiefly 
in  affirming  the  growing  power  of  Italy  abroad,  had 
left  home  affairs  to  drift.  The  ever-increasing  ex- 
penditures for  armaments  and  colonial  enterprises 
had  burdened  Itahan  finances  to  the  breaking-point. 
The  day  of  reckoning,  long-postponed,  came  during 
the  first  weeks  of  GioHtti's  Ministry,  accompanied 
by  the  uncovering  of  unsavoury  scandals  in  the  finan- 
cial dealings  of  pubHc  men  in  high  position,  as  well 


THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  59 

as  by  agrarian  difficulties  in  the  south  of  Italy. 
Giolitti  found  himself  faced  by  a  series  of  seemingly 
insurmountable  problems.  Amid  these  trying  cir- 
cumstances, by  devoting  his  entire  energies  to  home 
affairs,  by  a  shrewd  policy  of  whitewashing  and  tem- 
porising, rather  than  by  making  any  attempt  to 
eradicate  the  evils  of  the  situation  root  and  branch, 
Giolitti  was  able  to  extricate  himself,  for  the  time 
being,  from  the  quagmire,  and  at  the  same  time  gain 
a  large  personal  following  among  public  men  in  all 
parts  of  Italy  by  a  judicious  use  of  political  patronage. 

During  Giolitti's  first  Ministry  Italian  foreign  rela- 
tions were  allowed  once  again  to  follow  a  random  course. 
There  seemed  to  be  a  return  to  the  old  Depretis  tradi- 
tion of  endeavouring  to  be  on  friendly  terms  both  with 
the  allies  and  with  the  other  Powers,  which  well  suited 
the  character  of  Giolitti.  The  German  Emperor,  to 
prove  his  esteem  for  Italy  and  the  House  of  Savoy, 
came  to  Rome  on  the  occasion  of  the  twenty-fifth 
anniversary  of  the  wedding  of  King  Humbert,  in 
April,  1893,  accompanied  this  time  by  the  Empress, 
and  was  welcomed  with  warmth,  though  with  less 
enthusiasm  than  on  his  previous  visit.  Then  a  French 
squadron,  bearing  an  autograph  letter  from  the  Pres- 
ident of  the  French  Republic  to  the  King  of  Italy, 
was  feted  at  Genoa  with  much  cordiality,  and  a  few 
weeks  later  a  French  military  mission  fraternised  with 
Italian  officers  on  the  occasion  of  the  inauguration  of 
a  monument  at  Palestro,  commemorating  the  battles 
in  which  the  French  had  fought  for  Italian  liberty. 

But  this  policy  of  endeavouring  to  be  on  friendly 
terms  with  both  sides  was  not  destined  to  continue. 
In  France  the  animosity  towards  Italy  was  steadily 


60  GREATER  ITALY 

growing.  The  French  refused  to  accept  one  hand 
proffered  in  friendship  while  the  other  was  a  men- 
acing mailed  fist.  A  natural  race  jealousy  between 
these  two  main  branches  of  the  Latin  family  sub- 
sisted. Misunderstandings,  exaggerated  and  ag- 
gravated by  wilful  distortion,  made  amicable  inter- 
course difficult.  ItaHan-baiting  and  race  riots  were 
frequent  in  France,  which  aroused  the  hostility  of 
the  Itahans,  who  moreover  accused  France  of  bad 
faith  in  not  wishing  to  accept  the  advances  of  Italian 
friendliness,  while  France  accused  Italy  of  double- 
deahng.  The  situation  became  unbearable  to  the 
French  when,  at  the  personal  invitation  of  the  Ger- 
man Emperor,  the  heir  to  the  throne  of  Italy  was 
present  at  German  Grand  Manoeuvres  in  the  autumn 
of  1893,  which  were  held  in  the  neighbom-hood  of 
Metz.  France  felt  herseK  personally  insulted  by 
this  act  of  the  House  of  Savoy  in  openly  parading  its 
name  and  fame  through  the  conquered  province  under 
the  aegis  of  the  Prussians.  Many  Itahans,  it  is  said, 
deplored  this  thoughtless  act  on  the  part  of  their 
future  sovereign,  which  had  aroused  the  French  un- 
duly, and  though  the  fact  itself  was  of  little  signif- 
icance, it  well  illustrates  the  lax  GioHttian  concep- 
tion of  foreign  obligations. 

The  result  of  this  act  was  immediately  seen.  The 
French  beheving  it  to  be  an  overt  affront  which  might 
lead  to  grave  consequences,  and  even  presaged  war, 
hquidated  their  holdings  of  Italian  securities  to  the 
extent  of  1,000,000,000  fire  (£40,000,000),  which 
created  a  panic  in  Italy.  Italy's  position  had  be- 
come increasingly  critical.  The  situation  had  been 
aggravated  by  GioUtti's  temporising  pohcy.     He  was 


THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  61 

no  longer  able  to  cope  with  the  situation.  Though 
he  maintained  his  majority  at  the  elections,  he  re- 
signed his  office,  and  Crispi  was  called  to  the  rescue 
as  the  one  strong  man  capable  of  putting  Italy's 
house  in  order. 

The  task  was  one  requiring  not  merely  strenuous 
energy  and  political  insight,  but  deep  corn-age.  Italy 
had  sunk  to  a  lower  level  of  economic  depression  and 
internal  disorder  than  she  had  found  herself  in  since 
the  foundation  of  the  united  Kingdom.  Crispi  ac- 
cepted the  task  thrust  upon  him,  and  in  December, 
1893,  again  forming  a  Cabinet,  assumed  the  office 
of  Premier.  In  Sicily  disturbances  which  Giohtti 
had  failed  to  combat  had  now  assumed  alarming 
proportions.  The  peasants  in  the  country  districts, 
as  well  as  the  workmen  in  the  to^vns,  had  been  organ- 
ised by  Socialist  agitators  into  fasci  or  labour  imions, 
which  had  multiplied  throughout  the  island.  They 
soon  gained  the  upper  hand  in  their  contests  with 
the  local  authorities,  and  a  serious  insurrection  was 
now  threatened.  Crispi  at  once  despatched  a  large 
body  of  troops  to  Sicily.  Martial  law  was  proclaimed; 
the  fasci  were  suppressed,  their  leaders  sentenced  to 
imprisonment,  and  within  a  few  weeks,  by  a  firm 
policy  order  was  restored. 

Crispi  was  unable  or  unwilling  to  amehorate  re- 
lations with  France,  which  had,  if  possible,  become 
more  embroiled  than  ever.  As  a  result  on  the  one 
hand  of  the  assassination  of  the  President  of  the 
French  Republic,  Carnot,  at  the  hands  of  an  Italian 
anarchist,  and  on  the  other  of  the  arrest  of  a  French 
officer  in  uniform  on  Italian  territory  near  frontier 
fortifications,    wliich   caused   him   to   be   condemned 


62  GREATER  ITALY 

for  espionage,  the  period  of  mutual  suspicion  and 
antagonism  reached  its  culmination. 

Having  by  the  presence  of  William  II  at  Venice 
again  proven  that  the  Triple  Alliance  held  firm,  not- 
withstanding the  manifold  internal  difficulties,  Crispi 
determined  to  seek  in  Africa  fresh  triumphs  and  re- 
awaken in  the  hearts  of  the  Italian  people  confidence 
in  their  greatness  as  a  nation. 

The  Negus  Menelek  had  formally  denoimced  the 
Uccialli  treaty  of  alliance  with  Italy,  and  was  known  to 
be  endeavouring  to  form  a  league  of  all  the  Ethiopian 
chieftains  under  his  leadership  to  resist  the  further 
advance  of  the  Italian  forces.  At  the  instigation  of 
Crispi,  General  Baratieri,  the  Italian  Governor  of 
Eritrea,  sent  a  column  of  Itahan  troops  eastward  into 
the  Sudan,  and  reached  Kassala,  nearly  three  hundred 
miles  inland,  after  a  brilliantly  conducted  campaign. 
The  news  of  this  achievement  was  greeted  with  en- 
thusiasm in  Italy,  and  spurred  Crispi  on  to  demand 
still  greater  efforts. 

Relations  with  the  Ethiopian  rulers  meanwhile  had 
become  more  and  more  strained,  and,  fearing  an 
attack.  General  Baratieri  then  led  his  forces  against 
the  Ras  Mangasha,  the  chief  vassal  of  the  Negus,  and 
in  January,  1895,  in  two  separate  encounters,  at  Coatit 
on  the  13th  and  at  Senafe  two  days  later,  he  defeated 
the  Abyssinians  and  occupied  Adua,  the  capital  of  the 
district.  The  first  phase  of  the  African  campaign  had 
been  brought  to  a  successful  conclusion.  General 
Baratieri  returned  to  Rome  and  was  received  with 
adulation. 

While  Crispi  was  sharing  with  the  successful  general 
the  applause  of  the  people  of  Italy,  Menelek  was  pre- 


THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  63 

paring  to  avenge  the  defeat  of  his  vassal.  General 
Baratieri  returned  to  Eritrea.  The  first  serious  en- 
counter occurred  December  7,  1895,  when  the  Abys- 
sinian forces  fell  upon  the  Itahans  at  Amba  Alagi. 
The  Italians,  though  they  fought  obstinately,  were 
outnumbered  and  badly  beaten,  only  a  handful  of 
their  men  being  able  to  escape.  The  Negus,  following 
up  this  first  success,  now  attacked  the  Itahans  at  the 
fort  of  Makalle.  After  a  first  bloody  encounter  in 
which  they  were  repulsed,  the  Abyssinian  commanders 
decided  to  besiege  the  fort  in  the  conventional  style. 
The  lack  of  water  compelled  the  Italians  to  surrender, 
and  they  filed  out  of  their  stronghold  with  the  due 
honours  of  war. 

Crispi  now  realised  that  the  Italians  were  confronted 
by  a  miUtary  force  of  considerable  magnitude.  Re- 
inforcements were  at  once  ordered  to  be  despatched 
to  Africa,  while  the  Premier  did  not  refrain  from  ex- 
pressing his  disgust  at  the  recent  disasters,  w^hich  he 
now  attributed  to  the  inefficiency  of  General  Bara- 
tieri. Menelek,  learning  of  the  extensive  preparations 
which  the  Itahans  were  making  to  push  their  African 
campaign  to  a  successful  issue,  was,  now  that  his 
vassal  had  been  avenged,  ready  to  treat  with  the 
Italians  regarding  terms  of  peace.  Crispi,  however, 
confident  in  the  ultimate  success  of  the  enterprise, 
insisted  that  if  peace  were  to  be  made  the  treaty  of 
aUiance  between  Italy  and  Abyssinia,  in  its  original 
form,  which  amounted  to  a  virtual  Italian  protectorate 
over  the  Ethiopian  domain,  must  be  renewed,  and  that 
the  Italians  should  occupy  again  all  territory  that 
they  had  conquered  during  the  campaign  of  the  pre- 
ceding year.    Menelek  refused  to  consider  these  terms, 


64  GREATER  ITALY 

and  both  sides  continued  their  preparations  for  war. 
Though  in  Italy  there  was  a  strong  party  opposed  to 
the  African  campaign,  volunteers  in  great  numbers 
had  enlisted  for  service  in  Africa.  Early  in  February, 
1896,  the  Italian  forces,  both  native  and  white,  in 
Eritrea,  under  the  command  of  General  Baratieri, 
numbered  nearly  20,000  men,  with  twenty  batteries  of 
field  artillery.  The  expedition  had  been  hastily  assem- 
bled and  suffered  from  lack  of  organisation.  The 
troops,  arriving  in  Africa,  found  it  difficult  to  become 
acclimatised;  their  equipment  was  defective,  and, 
above  all,  the  system  of  transport  of  supplies  wholly 
inadequate,  while  the  discipline  of  the  native  troops 
was  bad  and  several  detachments  deserted  and  went 
over  to  the  enemy  in  a  body.  The  Abyssinian  army 
numbered  over  90,000  men,  the  largest  force  ever 
marshalled  in  one  single  army  by  an  African  ruler. 
The  troops  were  of  excellent  fighting  material,  armed 
with  automatic  rifles,  supplied  with  abundant  ammu- 
nition, and  with  an  artillery  more  modern  than,  and 
superior  to,  the  Itahan.  There  was,  besides  this,  a 
reserve  force  of  20,000  men  armed  with  shields  and 
lances. 

General  Baratieri  believed  that  to  attack  so  large  a 
force  would  be  imprudent,  and  he  telegraphed  to 
Crispi,  in  answer  to  repeated  inquiries,  as  to  the  cause 
of  his  delays:  "If  we  are  attacked  we  will  conquer;  if 
we  attack  we  will  lose."  Crispi  was  impatient  to  wipe 
out  the  memory  of  the  recent  defeats  of  Italian  arms. 
He  had  led  the  country  into  this  African  adventure, 
and  he  felt  that  he  m^ust  push  it  through  speedily,  as 
both  Parliament  and  the  nation  had  grown  restive. 
It  was  thereupon  decided  to  supersede  General  Bara- 


THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  65 

tieri.  This  step  had  been  contemplated  for  some  time 
past,  and  was  at  length  secretly  carried  out,  and  Gen- 
eral Baldissera  set  out  to  take  command  of  the  Italian 
forces  in  Africa. 

General  Baratieri,  learning  from  private  sources  of 
the  proposed  change,  decided  to  risk  an  action  before 
the  arrival  of  his  successor.  On  February  29,  he  divided 
his  forces  into  three  columns  and  set  out  to  attack  the 
Abyssinian  armies,  which  were  encamped  beyond  Adua. 
The  country  is  hilly,  with  abrupt  rocks  rising  stark 
out  of  the  soil,  wliich  is  covered  with  rich  tropical 
vegetation.  There  were  no  roads,  and  the  columns 
had  to  advance  through  the  gullies  and  along  the 
stony  beds  of  dry  torrents,  with  no  means  of  keeping 
in  close  communication.  At  dawn  on  March  1,  the 
advance  column  on  the  left  of  the  Italian  forces  came 
into  contact  with  the  main  body  of  the  enemy.  A 
pitched  battle  was  fought  in  which  the  Italians  were 
driven  from  the  field  with  heavy  losses.  The  right 
wing  of  the  Italian  forces  lost  its  way,  and  was  unable 
to  co-operate  in  the  action,  while  the  centre  engaged 
the  enemy  near  Abba  Garima.  After  a  brief  encounter 
here  it  was  evident  that  the  enemy  was  in  vastly 
superior  numbers  and  was  gaining  ground.  The  na- 
tive contingents  of  the  Italian  forces  now  rebelled,  and 
amid  scenes  of  indescribable  cruelty  and  slaughter  the 
Itahans  were  hterally  hacked  to  pieces.  An  hour  later 
the  rout  of  the  Italians  was  complete.  General  Bara- 
tieri became  separated  from  his  staff  and  only  escaped 
with  great  difficulty.  The  victorious  Abyssinians 
swarmed  from  all  sides,  and  pursued  the  small  rem- 
nant of  the  defeated  Italians  through  the  broken  coun- 
try, and  captured  or  killed  all  who  came  within  their 


66  GREATER  ITALY 

path.  The  Itahans  lost  5,000  white  troops  killed  in 
action,  with  250  officers  and  2  generals,  as  well  as 
their  whole  artillery.  Never  before  had  Europeans 
suffered  such  a  defeat  at  the  hands  of  native  troops. 

The  news  of  the  disaster  at  Adua  reached  Rome 
late  in  the  evening  of  the  same  day,  but  was  not 
known  to  the  public  until  the  next  day.  Many  Ital- 
ians, who  had  been  opposed  to  Crispi's  colonial  plans, 
debased  themselves  so  far  as  to  express  their  unmixed 
deUght  at  the  failure  of  the  African  campaign,  and 
cried  "Long  live  Menelek,"  but  the  majority  vented 
their  rage  against  Crispi  and  loudly  demanded  retribu- 
tion. 

Three  days  later,  on  March  5,  Parliament  opened. 
The  Chamber  was  in  an  uproar.  Crispi  entered;  a 
tense  silence  fell  upon  the  assembled  deputies.  "I 
have  the  honour  to  announce  that  the  Cabinet  has 
placed  its  resignation  in  the  hands  of  the  King." 
Crispi  spoke  slowly.  ''His  Majesty  has  accepted  the 
resignation,"  he  added.  Immediately,  from  all  sides 
of  the  House  loud  cheering  broke  forth:  "Long  live 
the  King !    Long  live  the  King ! " 

The  aged  Minister — Crispi  at  that  time  was  nearly 
eighty — who  had  done  so  much  for  Italy,  who  had 
played  so  active  a  role  in  Italian  public  affairs  from 
the  earUest  days  of  ItaHan  unity,  who  had  borne  his 
part  on  the  battlefield  as  well  as  in  the  political 
arena,  who  first  raised  Italy  to  a  position  of  impor- 
tance in  world  affairs,  left  his  seat  in  the  Chamber 
amid  the  hoots  and  jeers  of  his  compatriots.  Outside 
the  Chamber  the  fury  of  the  mob  was  even  more  vio- 
lent. A  hostile  demonstration  was  made  in  front  of 
Crispi's    residence.     ^'Abbasso    Crispi!"    "Death    to 


THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  67 

Crispi !"  were  the  cries  which  rang  through  the  streets 
of  Rome  during  the  ensuing  days. 

The  crisis  became  more  serious  when  it  seemed  that 
no  one  could  be  found  who  was  wiUing  to  take  upon 
himself  the  task  of  forming  a  Ministry.  Finally,  after 
several  days  of  uncertainty,  during  which  it  is  reported 
that  King  Humbert,  despairing  of  the  situation,  had 
even  thought  of  abdicating,  the  Marchese  di  Rudini 
undertook  the  task  and  succeeded  in  forming  a  Min- 
istry. 

Crispi  thus  disappeared  from  public  life.  He  con- 
tinued to  frequent  the  Chamber,  and  never  shirked  his 
responsibility  as  a  deputy,  and  though  numbers  of  his 
friends  and  admirers,  drawn  from  the  most  vigorous 
and  healthy  elements  of  Italian  public  life,  rallied 
around  the  great  Imperialist,  he  never  regained  his 
prestige,  and  his  last  days  were  clouded  by  many  diffi- 
culties and  by  the  infamous  accusations  heaped  upon 
him  by  his  political  opponents. 


CHAPTER   IV 
THE  PERIOD  OF  RETRENCHMENT 

189&-1903.    Internal  Difficulties.    The  House  of  Savoy 

The  overthrow  of  Crispi  had  severely  shaken  Italy. 
The  difficulty  in  finding  a  successor  further  discouraged 
the  Italian  people.  Finally  the  Marchese  di  Rudini 
was  able  to  constitute  his  Ministry.  His  first  act,  in 
order  to  win  popular  favour,  was  to  declare  a  general 
amnesty  on  March  14,  the  birthday  of  the  King. 
The  prison  doors  were  opened,  and  poUtical  and  civil 
offenders,  chiefly  the  victims  of  the  repressive  measures 
of  the  former  Cabinet,  were  released. 

On  March  17,  di  Rudini  presented  his  Ministry  to 
the  Chamber.  He  announced  that  General  Baldis- 
sera,  now  commanding  in  Eritrea,  had  been  given  full 
powers  to  take  such  measures  as  he  deemed  expedient, 
and  that  the  instructions  sent  on  March  8,  by  the 
former  Cabinet  to  treat  for  peace,  had  been  con- 
firmed. Di  Rudini  let  it  be  plainly  understood  that 
he  proposed  to  follow  a  colonial  policy  diametrically 
opposed  to  that  pursued  by  Crispi.  Though  he  was 
prepared  to  continue  the  war  against  Abyssinia  if 
necessity  compelled,  and  demanded  a  credit  of  150,- 
000,000  fire  (£6,000,000)  for  this  purpose,  he  declared 
that  the  period  of  colonial  expansion  had  come  to  an 
end,  that  even  if  Itahan  arms  should  be  victorious, 
he  would  not  seek  any  increase  in  territory  in  Africa, 
and  that  he  was  going  to  pursue  a  pohcy  of  retrench- 
es 


THE  PERIOD  OF  RETRENCHMENT      69 

ment  as  best  suited  to  the  interests  of  Italy.  An 
order  of  the  day,  presented  at  this  time,  though  not 
acted  upon,  gives  a  clear  insight  into  the  temper  of 
the  Chamber  and  the  country: 

''The  Chamber,  esteeming  that  the  responsibility 
for  the  recent  disaster  in  Africa  rests  solely  with  the 
Government,  which,  violating  the  constitution,  and 
deceiving  the  country  regarding  its  character  and 
importance,  has  given  to  the  plan  of  military  enter- 
prise an  expansion  not  desired  by  Parliament,  and 
has  sacrificed  to  its  pohcy  the  fives  and  vital  interests 
of  the  nation,  befieving  that  the  African  expedition 
favours  only  mifitarists,  speculators,  and  political 
adventurers,  is  contrary  to  humanity,  and  incom- 
patible with  the  economic  status  of  Italy,  concludes 
to  recall  immediately  the  troops  from  Africa,  and  in 
accordance  with  Article  47  of  the  Statutes,  to  im- 
peach the  Ministry."^ 

Yet  the  defeat  at  Adua  was  not  so  disastrous  to 
the  Itafians  in  Eritrea  as  was  believed  at  home.  Gen- 
eral Baldissera  showed  himself  to  be  an  energetic 
and  efficient  officer.  He  opened  up  peace  negotia- 
tions with  Menelek,  and  despatched  Major  Salsa  to 
discuss  terms  with  the  Negus.  But  the  conditions 
imposed  were  deemed  unacceptable,  and  General 
Baldissera  continued  his  preparations  for  a  renewal 
of  the  conflict.  Three  times  Major  Salsa  returned 
with  Italian  counter-proposals  and  during  the  last 
interview,  the  terms  still  being  deemed  unsatisfactory, 
Menelek  detained  the  Italian  envoy.  Impressed  by 
the  losses  sustained  by  his  troops  in  the  battle  of 
Adua,  and  learning  of  the  arrival  of  Italian  reinforce- 

ip.  Vigo:  "Trent'  Ultimi  Anni  del  Secolo,XIX,"  vol.  VII,  Treves, 
Milan,  1915,  p.  127. 


70  GREATER  ITALY 

ments,  he  broke  camp,  and  marched  southward  towards 
Shoa. 

The  peace  negotiations  had  failed,  but  General 
Baldissera  did  not  remain  inactive.  His  army  was 
now  reorganised.  He  thereupon  detached  a  force  to 
relieve  Kassala,  which  was  seriously  threatened  by 
the  Dervishes.  This  difficult  mission  was  success- 
fully carried  out,  and  on  April  1,  Kassala  was  safe, 
and  the  enemy  put  to  flight.  At  the  same  time,  Baldis- 
sera, with  his  main  force,  16,000  strong,  marched  to 
the  assistance  of  the  ItaUan  garrison,  closely  besieged 
at  Adigrat,  and  here  Italian  arms  were  again  vic- 
torious, and  the  garrison  was  relieved  on  May  4. 
It  is  not  improbable  that,  owing  to  the  skill  of  Baldis- 
sera, the  Italians  would  have  been  able  to  defeat  the 
main  forces  of  the  Negus,  which  had  now  become 
demoralised,  but  di  Rudini  was  intent  upon  following 
his  policy  of  retrenchment,  and  he  did  all  in  his  power 
to  hasten  peace  negotiations.  Acting  on  instruction 
from  his  Government,  Baldissera  now  turned  over 
to  the  Ras  Mangasha  the  fort  of  Adigrat,  which  had 
been  so  vaHantly  defended  and  so  skilfully  relieved. 
On  May  19,  the  remaining  stores  and  munitions  were 
destroyed,  and  the  Italian  force  withdrew  from  this 
hard-won  post. 

Crispi,  though  fallen  from  power,  addressed  a  ring- 
ing appeal  to  the  King  to  protest  against  the  supine 
policy  of  the  Government,  and  urged  that  the  war 
against  Menelek  be  prosecuted  with  vigour.  But 
his  voice  was  not  heeded,  and  on  June  5,  the  Itahan 
plenipotentiary.  Doctor  Nerazzini,  set  sail  from  Na- 
ples for  Adis  Ababa,  the  Abyssinian  capital.  After 
many  delays  peace  was  finally  concluded  there  on 


THE  PERIOD  OF  RETRENCHMENT      71 

October  26.  By  its  terms,  the  Treaty  of  Uccialli  was 
annulled;  the  absolute  independence  of  Abyssinia 
was  recognised;  the  final  dehneation  of  the  boundary- 
line  between  Eritrea  and  Abyssinia  was  postponed 
(in  the  meantime  the  Itahans  held  the  line  Nareb- 
Belesa-Muna),  and  the  sum  of  £400,000  was  paid  as 
an  indemnity  by  the  Italians  for  the  return  of  prisoners 
held  by  the  Negus.  After  an  attempt  made  by  di 
Rudini  to  abandon  the  greater  part  of  Eritrea,  this 
frontier  Hne  was  finally  confirmed  to  Italy  during  the 
Ministry  of  his  successor.  Kassala  was  turned  over 
to  the  Anglo-Egyptian  forces  on  Christmas  Day,  1897, 
and  two  other  sUght  changes  were  made  in  the  bound- 
ary between  Eritrea  and  the  Anglo-Egyptian  Sudan. 
Eritrea  now  passes  from  active  discussion  in  Italian 
affairs.  The  cabal  against  Crispi  had  greatly  exag- 
gerated the  magnitude  of  the  Italian  disaster  in  Africa. 
The  majority  of  the  Itahans  appeared  satisfied  with 
the  treaty  of  Adis  Ababa,  and  were  loath  to  enter 
upon  any  further  colonial  undertakings.  While  the 
temporary  reverse  at  Adua  for  the  time  being  in- 
jured Itahan  prestige  abroad,  it  in  nowise  prevented 
Italy  from  taking  a  leading  part  in  important  inter- 
national events. 

Only  a  few  months  after  peace  with  Abyssinia  was 
proclaimed,  a  fleet  of  the  Powers,  composed  of  Italian, 
French,  British,  Russian,  and  Austrian  ships,  under 
the  command  of  an  Italian  admiral.  Count  Canevaro, 
appeared  off  the  Island  of  Crete  (February  16,  1897). 
Since  the  month  of  May  of  the  preceding  year,  the 
island  had  been  in  a  state  of  upheaval.  Conflicts 
between  the  Christians  and  the  Turkish  troops  had 
been  frequent.    To  put  an  end  to  an  intolerable  situa- 


72  GREATER  ITALY 

tion  the  Greek  Government  had  despatched  a  small 
squadron  under  the  command  of  Prince  George  of 
Greece  to  the  island  in  January,  1897,  and  a  few  weeks 
later  (February  14)  landed  an  expeditionary  force 
to  assist  the  insurgents.  The  day  after  the  arrival 
of  the  international  fleet  a  landing  party  under  the 
command  of  an  ItaUan  officer  occupied  Canea. 
Though  the  policy  of  the  Powers  in  ordering  a  bom- 
bardment of  the  encampment  of  the  Greeks,  when 
the  latter  refused  to  obey  the  summons  given  them 
to  evacuate  the  island,  was  openly  inveighed  against 
throughout  Italy,  the  fact  that  an  Italian  Admiral 
was  in  command  of  a  fleet  of  all  the  Powers  did  much 
to  restore  public  confidence. 

Throughout  di  Rudini's  administration  his  guiding 
passion  was  that  of  rancour  against  Crispi.  To  dis- 
credit the  "Imperialist,"  to  heap  shame  upon  him, 
seemed  to  di  Rudini  to  be  of  great  political  importance. 
In  pursuing  this  vindictive  personal  policy  he  brought 
about  a  period  of  tension  between  Italy  and  Great 
Britain,  by  the  pubfication  (April,  1896)  of  a  ''Green 
Book"  on  the  Abyssinian  war,  wherein  he  included, 
without  the  authorisation  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment, certain  confidential  documents  concerning  An- 
glo-Italian negotiations  regarding  Abyssinia.  The 
incident  was  soon  dismissed  by  Great  Britain,  but  it 
weakened  the  Italian  Premier's  position  in  his  at- 
tempt to  initiate  a  new  orientation  in  Italy's  foreign 
intercourse.  Di  Rudini  outlined  this  new  policy 
when  he  declared  in  the  Chamber  on  May  25: 

"I  intend  to  uphold  the  Triple  Alliance,  but  I  ex- 
pect to  interpret  it  in  such  a  manner  that  it  will  not 
alter  our  friendly  relations  with  France  and  Russia; 


THE  PERIOD  OF  RETRENCHMENT      73 

relations  which  I  hope  to  render  more  cordially,  sin- 
cerely, I  would  almost  say  affectionately,  friendly."^ 

Italy  was  now  once  again  drifting  into  a  poUcy  of 
compromise  in  her  foreign  relations.  The  Crispian 
policy  of  militant  ''Triplism"  was,  as  was  to  be  ex- 
pected, abandoned,  and  had  it  not  been  for  the  fact 
that,  in  the  room  of  the  Duke  Caetani  di  Sermoneta, 
the  Marchese  Visconti  Venosta,  the  most  distin- 
guished Itahan  diplomatist,  after  twenty  years  of 
retirement  consented  to  take  charge  of  the  Italian 
Foreign  Office  (July,  1896),  and  by  his  astuteness  and 
skill  was  able  to  direct  and  modify  di  Rudini's  rather 
incoherent  policy,  Italy  would,  in  all  likelihood  have 
soon  found  herself  in  a  difficult  position. 

If  Italy  was  intent  upon  seeking  new  friends,  Ger- 
many was  more  anxious  than  ever  to  retain  her  hold 
over  Italy.  German  penetration  was  at  this  time 
only  seriously  beginning,  and  William  II  felt  the  need 
of  consolidating  the  bonds  which  bound  the  people 
of  Italy  to  Germany,  even  if  the  ItaHan  Government 
should  choose  to  follow  a  more  eclectic  poUcy.  There- 
fore, on  March  24,  less  than  three  weeks  after  Adua, 
the  German  Emperor  arrived  at  Genoa,  accompanied 
by  the  Empress,  the  Crown  Prince,  and  his  second 
son.  Prince  Eitel  Frederick.  Amid  the  cheers  of 
the  populace,  he  went  on  board  the  Imperial  yacht 
Hohenzollern,  cruised  slowly  down  the  coast  to  Naples, 
where  the  party  landed,  and  remained  for  some  days. 
Then  after  visiting  Sicily,  the  voyage  was  continued 
up  the  Adriatic  shore-line  to  Venice,  where,  in  the 
company  of  his  Ministers,  WilHam  II  had  repeated 

1  Chiala:  " Pagine  di  Storia  Contemporanea:  La Triplice  e  la  Duplice," 
Turin,  1898,  p.  626. 


74  GREATER  ITALY 

interviews  with  King  Humbert  and  his  advisers. 
The  ItaHan  people  were  visibly  impressed  by  this 
exuberant  demonstration  on  the  part  of  Germany 
that  she  was  not  merely  a  fair-weather  friend.  But 
di  Rudini  looked  upon  the  matter  in  another  hght. 
A  half-hearted  supporter  of  the  Triple  AlHance,  he 
had  made  it  his  chief  aim  to  establish  cordial  rela- 
tions with  France  and  Russia,  though  he  seemed  to 
have  no  constructive  programme  of  the  course  of  ac- 
tion to  be  pursued  in  order  to  carry  out  his  desire. 
The  object  of  the  Triple  Alliance  was  to  maintain  the 
balance  of  power  in  Europe  and  the  peace  of  the 
world.  Italy,  bound  to  Great  Britain  by  her  naval 
agreements,  had  in  a  measure  attached  Great  Britain 
to  the  Triple  Alliance.  Yet  Italy  now  sought  to  enter 
upon  not  merely  pacific  relations  with  France,  which 
Berlin  had  always  encouraged,  but  cordial  relations, 
which  Germany  had  hitherto  studiously  sought  to  pre- 
vent. The  time  was  now  approaching  when  the  Triple 
Alliance  again  came  up  for  discussion,  regarding  its 
prolongation  or  abrogation.  The  procedure  adopted 
was  peculiar.  The  month  of  May  (1896),  the  normal 
date  for  the  final  discussion  of  the  terms  of  the  treaty, 
or  for  its  renewal,  passed  by  with  no  announcements 
regarding  the  decision  taken.  It  was  not  until  June 
that  it  was  casually  made  known  by  a  remark  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Golu- 
chowski,  that  the  treaty  had  not  been  '^renewed,"  but 
merely  ''continued,"  and  thus  remained  in  force  until 
1903.  Though  there  was  no  modification  in  the  text 
of  the  Treaty  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  it  soon  became 
evident  that  full  privilege  was  now  conceded  to  Italy 
to  cultivate  cordial  relations  with  Russia  and  France. 


THE  PERIOD  OF  RETRENCHMENT      75 

On  June  20  the  Italian  Foreign  Minister,  the  Duke 
Caetani  di  Sermoneta,  speaking  in  the  Chamber,  de- 
clared: 

"The  Triple  Alliance,  a  pact  of  mutual  fidelity,  in 
no  way  excludes,  and  on  the  contrary  implies,  that 
each  of  the  allied  states  should  remain  on  good  and 
cordial  terms  with  all  the  other  Powers.  Therefore,  in 
so  far  as  we  are  concerned,  our  friendly  relations  with 
Russia  and  our  efforts  to  bring  it  about  that  our  rela- 
tions with  France  shall  be  imbued  with  that  mutual 
sympathy  and  courtesy  which  are  in  accordance  with 
our  racial  affinity,  and  the  memory  of  unforgettable 
events,  do  not  prevent  that  there  should  persist  towards 
us  the  unlimited  intimacy  and  confidence  of  the  two 
alUed  Powers,  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany."^ 

Henceforth  the  bonds  of  the  Triple  AUiance  were 
being  imperceptibly  loosened.  Italy  seemed  by  de- 
grees to  be  regaining  her  independence  of  action  abroad, 
though  to  maintain  a  nice  balance  in  her  relations 
towards  both  groups  of  Powers,  and  not  to  find  her- 
self suddenly  isolated  in  Europe,  required  quick  per- 
ception and  sound  judgment. 

The  results  of  this  new  trend  of  events  soon  made 
themselves  felt.  In  September  Italy  concluded  a 
treaty  with  France,  concerning  Tunis,  and  amicably 
settled  this  question,  which  had  hitherto  created  much 
bitterness  between  the  contracting  parties.  A  month 
later  the  marriage  of  the  Italian  Heir  Apparent,  the 
future  King  Emmanuel  III,  to  Princess  Helen  of  Mon- 
tenegro, took  place  on  October  24.  This  alliance  was, 
in  the  near  future,  to  open  a  new  sphere  of  Itahan 

^  Camera  dei  Deputati:  "Discussione  XIX,  Legislatura,"  p.  6867. 


76  GREATER  ITALY 

influence,  in  that  it  again  directed  Italian  attention  to 
the  Eastern  Adriatic.  At  the  time  it  was  interpreted 
as  cementing  the  growing  friendship  with  Russia. 

While  di  Rudini  was  courting  Franco-Russian  friend- 
ship, the  Marchese  Visconti  Venosta  prudently  saw  to 
it  that  the  pact  of  the  Triple  Alliance  was  firmly  main- 
tained. He  accompanied  King  Humbert  and  Queen 
Margherita  on  their  visit  to  Germany  in  the  autumn 
of  1897,  where  his  sovereign  again  demonstrated  his 
loyalty  towards  his  German  ally. 

During  this  year  Italy  played  an  important  part  in 
co-operating  with  Great  Britain  in  protecting  the 
Greeks  from  the  disastrous  consequences  of  their  un- 
fortunate war  against  Turkey,  and  took  an  active  part 
in  the  establishment  of  the  autonomous  government 
of  Crete.  The  Italians  were  gratified  at  the  increasing 
consideration  in  which  Italy  had  come  to  be  held  by 
British  statesmen.  The  words  of  Lord  Salisbury,  who, 
speaking  in  the  House  of  Lords,  declared  that  the 
''great  and  sincere  sympathy"  of  England  towards 
Italy  ''was  dictated  not  by  sentiment  but  by  con- 
siderations of  interest"^  confirmed  the  fact  that]  the 
Anglo-Italian  Entente  was  a  living  factor  in  maintain- 
ing the  stability  of  the  peace  of  Europe. 

While  Italy  was  thus  successfully  conducting  her 
foreign  policy,  at  home  affairs  had  lapsed  into  a  la- 
mentable state  of  chaos.  Notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  the  finances  of  the  country,  owing  to  careful  hus- 
banding, were  soon  placed  on  a  relatively  sound  foot- 
ing, nothing  was  done  to  ameliorate  the  condition  of 
the  poor.  Di  Rudini's  weakness  was  soon  patent. 
Though  a  member  of  the  Right  he  had  attained  office 

1  "Parliamentary  Debates,"  LI,  935. 


THE  PERIOD  OF  RETRENCHMENT     77 

only  by  means  of  a  secret  coalition  with  the  Radicals. 
Unable  to  maintain  himself  alone,  he  was  compelled  to 
bow  to  the  demands  of  the  Radical  leader,  Cavallotti, 
an  unscrupulous,  though  brilHant,  political  agitator. 
Pursuing  his  policy  of  persecution  towards  Crispi, 
di  Rudini  lent  the  support  of  the  Government  in  the 
prosecution  of  the  former  Premier  on  the  charge  of 
embezzlement,  which  dragged  on  for  nearly  two  years, 
and  finally  ended  in  virtually  clearing  Crispi  of  the 
charge,  though  the  Chamber  voted  to  censure  him  for 
irregular  procedure.  Not  content  with  hounding 
Crispi,  di  Rudini  used  the  influence  of  the  Govern- 
ment to  crush  Crispi's  parUamentary  partisans  at  the 
General  Election,  which  was  held  in  March,  1897. 
The  result  was  that  the  number  of  Radicals  and 
Republicans  in  the  Chamber  was  greatly  increased, 
and  the  country  soon  found  itself  at  the  mercy  of 
the  revolutionary  elements.  Di  Rudini  had  promised 
much  in  the  way  of  social  reforms,  and  that  he  would 
cleanse  the  political  hfe  of  the  country.  When  fresh 
bank  scandals  were  revealed  and  the  guilty  were  still 
allowed  to  go  unpunished,  it  became  evident  that  not 
merely  had  the  Premier  repudiated  his  word,  but  that 
the  Government  was  daily  losing  its  control  of  the 
situation. 

The  economic  condition  of  the  country,  more  par- 
ticularly in  the  South,  was  deplorable.  To  please 
the  agrarians,  di  Rudini  increased  the  duty  on  the 
cheaper  grades  of  cereals,  at  a  time  when  thousands 
were  faced  with  starvation.  Towards  the  end  of  1897 
food  riots  broke  out  in  the  south  of  Italy,  as  the  result 
of  the  increase  in  the  price  of  bread.  These  continued 
intermittently  throughout  the  autumn  and  early  win- 


78  GREATER  ITALY 

ter.  By  January  they  had  spread  all  over  the  south 
of  Italy  and  Sicily.  The  disturbances  were  readily 
suppressed  by  armed  force,  not  without  some  loss  of 
life.  Though  the  movement  was  not  revolutionary  in 
its  origin,  it  gathered  strength  from  the  fact  that  the 
Socialists  and  RepubUcans  made  use  of  the  general 
dissatisfaction  to  fiu-ther  their  interests.  Di  Rudini 
became  alarmed;  he  ordered  the  temporary  reduction 
of  the  corn  duties,  and  even  suspended  them  in  the 
South,  but  otherwise  no  steps  were  taken  to  alleviate 
the  sufferings  of  the  people,  which  were  very  real. 
The  Premier's  feeble  poUcy  and  his  apparent  indiffer- 
ence in  the  face  of  grave  events,  hastened  the  growth 
of  the  vast  army  of  malcontents.  Slowly  the  move- 
ment spread  northward.  In  April  there  was  a  general 
strike  near  Bologna,  then  at  Ravenna  and  Parma;  in 
each  case  accompanied  by  serious  disturbances  and 
clashes  between  the  civiUans  and  the  police.  The  un- 
rest throughout  the  country  had  grown  to  vast  pro- 
portions. The  subversive  elements  had  already  gained 
the  upper  hand  in  the  northern  districts,  centring 
around  Milan.  It  seems  improbable  that  there  was 
any  carefully  framed  revolutionary  plot.  A  Milanese 
Radical  Deputy  had  spoken  of  ''the  vote  and  the 
carbine"  as  the  weapons  of  the  people;  but  no  steps 
were  taken  to  organise  or  arm  them.  The  Socialists 
were  in  the  vanguard,  and  actively  spread  the  dis- 
content. At  Milan  there  was  much  real  distress  and 
poverty,  though  no  active  outbreak  would  have  re- 
sulted had  the  authorities  acted  with  firmness  and 
moderation.  On  May  7  a  great  crowd  gathered  to 
protest  against  the  kiUing,  on  the  previous  day,  of 
two  workmen  in  a  scuffle  with  the  pohce.    The  crowd 


THE  PERIOD  OF  RETRENCHMENT      79 

was  in  an  ugly  mood.  It  was  soon  joined  by  groups 
of  workmen  and  factory  girls.  Some  employers  closed 
their  factories.  The  demonstrators  now  paraded  the 
streets.  Suddenly  in  the  Corso  Venezia  a  platoon  of 
cavalry  charged  the  crowd  at  a  gallop.  Though  it  was 
evident  that  the  outbreak  had  not  been  planned,  the 
pent-up  fury  of  the  mob  burst  forth.  Barricades  were 
thrown  up;  some  of  the  demonstrators  climbed  to  the 
roof  tops  and  threw  tiles  and  other  missiles  down  on 
the  police.  The  troops,  having  received  no  further 
instructions,  looked  on  idly  while  the  crowd  continued 
its  labours  of  barricade  building.  The  mob  was,  for 
the  most  part,  imarmed  and  without  leadership,  yet 
the  Government,  hearing  of  the  outbreak,  hastily  des- 
patched considerable  reinforcements  to  Milan,  and 
proceeded  to  suppress  the  ''revolution"  with  ruthless 
violence.  For  two  days  the  mob  was  hunted  down 
by  the  soldiery  and  the  police.  Over  one  hundred  per- 
sons were  killed  and  several  hundred  wounded. 

The  Government  tried  in  vain  to  fix  the  responsi- 
bility and  find  a  scapegoat.  SociaUst,  Republican,  and 
Clerical  leaders  were  brought  into  court,  but  the  evi- 
dence against  them  collapsed.  It  would  appear  that 
the  real  responsibility  lay  with  the  di  Rudini  Govern- 
ment, which  by  its  laxity  and  weakness  had  allowed 
the  movement  to  get  under  way,  and  then  repressed  it 
with  undue  brutality.  The  Government  did  not  long 
survive  the  eventful  Milanese  outbreak.  On  June 
18,  in  order  to  appease  popular  indignation,  di  Rudini 
attempted  to  make  over  his  Cabinet.  During  the 
two  years  that  he  had  been  in  office  he  had  already 
modified  his  Ministry  three  times,  according  to  the 
exigencies   of   the   moment.     But  this  last  attempt 


80  GREATER  ITALY 

failed,  and  ten  days  later  the  Ministry  fell,  and  di 
Rudini  retired  from  public  affairs. 

Though  the  authorities  were  unable  to  attach  any 
blame  for  the  riots  at  Milan  to  the  Socialists,  the  more 
conservative  elements  of  the  population,  the  rich  and 
the  well-to-do,  who  had  paid  little  heed  to  the  out- 
breaks in  the  south  of  Italy,  aroused  by  the  outburst 
at  Milan,  loudly  clamoured  for  repressive  measures. 
Under  di  Rudini's  successor.  General  Pelloux,  martial 
law  was  proclaimed  at  Naples,  where  there  had  been 
no  disturbance  whatever,  as  well  as  at  Florence,  where 
there  had  been  very  little,  and  at  Milan.  Railway 
servants  and  all  public  employees  were  mobilised  on  a 
military  basis.  Two-thirds  of  the  Catholic  societies, 
many  of  them  purely  philanthropic,  were  dissolved  on 
the  ground  of  their  being  anti-dynastic.  Republican 
associations  were  outlawed,  newspapers  were  suspended, 
schoolmasters  dismissed  for  discussing  socialism  out  of 
school  hours.  The  military  court  at  Milan  passed  out- 
rageous sentences  on  trumped-up  charges.  "Two  well- 
known  journalists  were  sentenced  to  six  and  four 
years'  imprisonment  respectively,  'for  continually  at- 
tacking the  institutions  and  authorities,'  'exaggerating 
the  sufferings  of  the  people,  and  thus  embittering  the 
hatred  of  classes,'  and  'creating  the  environment  from 
which  the  disorders  sprang.'  A  CathoHc  journalist  was 
sentenced  to  three  years  for  'attacking  the  monarchy 
and  institutions  with  subtle  irony,'  'sowing  class  hatred 
between  peasants  and  landlords,'  and  'turning  many 
of  the  clergy  from  their  natural  work  of  pacification.' 
There  was  hardly  a  pretense  of  decent  legal  procedure. 
The  president  of  the  court,  General  Bava-Beccaris,  was 
as  indifferent  to  equity  as  he  was  ignorant  of  law.".^ 

»King  and  Okey:  "Italy  To-day,"  London,  1909,  p.  98. 


THE  PERIOD  OF  RETRENCHMENT      81 

Nor  were  the  condemnations  confined  to  Milan. 
Throughout  Italy,  on  one  charge  or  another,  wholesale 
arrests  were  made.  But  a  reaction  soon  set  in  against 
the  arbitrary  procedure  of  these  courts.  Petitions 
were  widely  circulated  throughout  Italy  demanding  the 
release  of  the  prisoners.  Before  the  end  of  the  year 
over  2,700  prisoners  were  released,  and  within  three 
years  all  those  condemned  at  this  time  in  connection 
with  the  events  of  those  fateful  May  days  were  re- 
leased by  royal  amnesty. 

General  Pelloux,  supported  by  a  majority  of  the 
Chamber  which  was  strongly  reactionary,  now  pre- 
sented a  bill  concerning  public  safety  which  would, 
if  passed,  confer  even  more  autocratic  powers  on  the 
Government  than  it  already  possessed,  regarding  the 
right  to  prohibit  pubHc  meetings  and  suppress  asso- 
ciations, etc.  Presented  before  the  Chamber  in  No- 
vember, 1898,  the  measure  met  w^ith  violent  opposi- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  Repubhcans,  Radicals,  and 
SociaHsts.  To  prevent  its  passage  every  means  of  ob- 
struction was  made  use  of,  until  in  June,  1899,  de- 
spairing of  securing  the  passage  of  the  bill  by  the 
usual  parUamentary  procedure,  in  view  of  the  violence 
of  the  obstruction — fist-fights  and  other  disturbances 
had  become  every-day  scenes  in  the  Chamber — the 
Government  announced  that  the  measure  was  by  royal 
decree  declared  a  law.  The  following  year  (February, 
1900)  the  Court  of  Cassation  at  Rome  declared  that 
the  Public  Safety  Bill  did  not  have  the  validity  of  a 
law.  The  w^hole  matter  was  again  brought  before 
ParHament;  again  the  Radicals  resorted  to  their  meth- 
ods of  obstruction.  An  attempt  was  made  to  alter  the 
standing  orders;  scenes  of  unruly  conduct  were  again 


82  GREATER  ITALY 

witnessed  in  the  Chamber.  New  orders  were  finally 
drafted  which  were  intended  to  empower  the  President 
to  suspend  disorderly  members,  etc.  But  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Chamber  found  himself  unable  to  cope  with 
the  concerted  disturbance  of  the  group  of  extreme 
members.  The  sitting  broke  up  in  confusion.  The 
President  of  the  Chamber  resigned,  and  General  Pel- 
loux  now  determined  to  appeal  to  the  country.  The 
result  of  the  election  was  an  increase  in  the  strength  of 
the  radical  groups.  General  Pelloux  thereupon  resigned. 
During  Pelloux's  administration  Italy's  foreign  pol- 
icy was  largely  opportunist.  The  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  was  Admiral  Canevaro,  the  former  commander 
of  the  international  fleet  off  Crete.  His  methods  were 
those  of  the  quarter  deck  rather  than  those  of  di- 
plomacy. He  despatched  an  Italian  cruiser  to  South 
America  to  secure  redress  from  Colombia  for  injuries 
done,  thirteen  years  before,  to  an  Itahan  subject.  He 
joined  Great  Britain  in  preventing  the  Vatican  from 
being  invited  to  be  represented  at  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence convoked  at  The  Hague  by  the  Tsar  of  Russia. 
He  endeavoured  to  secure  for  Italy  the  control  of 
the  San-Mun  Bay  in  China,  but  his  demand  was 
rejected,  and  as  a  result  of  this  diplomatic  fiasco  his 
resignation  soon  followed.  He  was  succeeded  by 
Visconti  Venosta,  who  once  again  was  willing  to 
straighten  out  the  tangles  of  Italy's  foreign  poUcy. 
Instead  of  abandoning  altogether  the  project  of  secur- 
ing a  sphere  of  influence  for  Italy  in  China,  he  seized 
the  opportunity  to  despatch  an  Itahan  contingent 
to  join  the  Powers  in  suppressing  the  Boxer  uprising 
(1900),  and  as  a  result  Italy  secured  a  foothold  in 
China  in  the  form  of  a  concession  at  Tienstin. 


THE  PERIOD  OF  RETRENCHMENT      83 

On  the  fall  of  the  Pelloux  Cabinet,  M.  Saracco  was 
called  upon  to  form  a  Ministry  of  pacification  (June, 
1900),  and  he  succeeded  in  a  measure  in  reconciHng 
the  conservatives  with  the  more  moderate  radicals. 
A  little  over  a  month  later,  on  July  29,  King  Humbert, 
while  leaving  an  outdoor  festival  at  Monza,  was  as- 
sassinated by  an  anarchist. 

The  reign  of  the  late  King,  though  relatively  quiet, 
had  not  been  uneventful.  Though  he  was  unable  to 
retain  for  the  monarchy  that  loyalty  and  popularity 
which  it  had  enjoyed  under  his  father,  he  had  con- 
solidated the  Kingdom  into  a  coherent  unit.  He  had 
adhered  strictly  to  the  constitution,  and  chose  his 
Ministers  in  accordance  with  the  will  of  the  Chamber. 
However,  he  surrounded  himself  with  a  small  coterie 
of  persons  who  had  little  sympathy  with  popular 
reforms,  and  thus  failed  to  remain  in  close  touch 
with  the  country.  Of  distinct  Germanophil  ten- 
dencies, he  was  a  stanch  supporter  of  the  Triple  Alh- 
ance,  and  did  much  to  bring  about  close  and  friendly 
relations  between  Italy  and  Germany.  He  exerted 
his  energies  to  strengthen  the  army  and  navy,  and 
approved  of  the  programme  of  colonial  expansion. 
A  man  of  fearless  courage  and  great  good-will,  he  had 
won  popular  esteem  by  his  personal  assistance  ren- 
dered freely  at  the  time  of  any  national  disaster,  such 
as  the  earthquake  at  Ischia,  where  with  his  own  hands 
he  rescued  several  persons  from  beneath  the  ruins. 
His  presence  at  Naples  and  Busca,  during  the  cholera 
epidemic  in  1884,  did  much  to  restore  confidence  in 
the  community.  He  was  furthermore  extremely 
generous,  and  distributed  over  £100,000  annually 
in    relieving    the    wants    of    the    poor.      It    is    not 


84  GREATER  ITALY. 

surprising   that   he   was   surnamed     ''  Humbert    the 
Good." 

In  1868  King  Humbert  married  his  first  cousin, 
Princess  Margherita  of  Savoy,  the  daughter  of  the 
Duke  of  Genoa.  The  niece  of  the  first  King  of  Italy, 
the  wife  of  the  second,  she  had  Hved  through  the 
heroic  days  when  the  men  of  her  House  fought  for  and 
won  Itahan  hberty.  A  woman  of  great  personal 
beauty,  high  accomplishments,  and  intense  patriotism, 
she  was  to  exert  a  considerable  influence  in  Italy, 
though  without  actively  interfering  in  public  affairs. 
It  is  reported  that  in  later  years  she  remarked:  ''In 
the  House  of  Savoy  only  one  person  rules  at  a  time." 
On  her  only  child,  Victor  Emmanuel,  Prince  of  Naples, 
the  Queen  lavished  her  affection  and  care.  Though 
deUcate  in  his  youth,  Victor  Emmanuel  outgrew  his 
weakness,  and  while  still  young  entered  the  army. 
He  early  showed  great  capacity  for  military  admin- 
istration. Devoted  to  outdoor  living,  he  has  com- 
bined his  love  for  hunting  and  yachting  with  studious 
habits.  He  is  a  recognised  authority  on  numis- 
matics, and  has  gathered  together  one  of  the  most 
important  collections  of  Italian  coins  now  extant. 
Liberal  in  his  politics,  progressive  in  his  opinions, 
he  soon  became  an  ardent  advocate  of  economic 
improvements  and  social  reforms.  Thoroughly  ahve 
to  the  needs  and  interests  of  commercial  develop- 
ment, a  believer  in  the  need  of  industrial  expansion 
to  foster  the  power  of  the  State,  he  has  sought  to 
place  the  greatness  of  Italy  before  his  own.  He  has 
effaced  himself  to  allow  the  Italy,  which  he  loves  with 
flaming  patriotism,  to  grow  greater,  richer,  more 
powerful.     He  looks  upon  Italy  as  on  a  great  corpora- 


THE  PERIOD  OF  RETRENCHMENT      85 

tion,  over  which  he  has  been  appointed  Managing 
Director.  The  prerogative  of  sovereignty  is,  to  him, 
that  of  directing  and  increasing  the  efficiency  and 
output  of  this  '^Corporation-State."  Yet  he  was 
never  to  forget  that  he  is  descended  from  a  long  hne 
of  soldier-kings,  and  that  the  honour  and  greatness 
of  Italy  must,  if  occasion  demanded,  be  asserted  by 
the  force  of  arms.  Such  was  the  man  who,  as  Victor 
Enunanuel  III,  adapting  himself  to  the  needs  and 
conditions  of  his  time,  assumed  the  sceptre  of  the 
House  of  Savoy,  and  undertook  conscientiously  the 
difficult  metier  de  roi. 

One  of  the  most  singular  phenomena  of  the  crea- 
tion of  United  Italy  is  the  part  played  therein  by  the 
House  of  Savoy.  The  ItaHan  patriots,  who  during 
the  early  years  of  the  Risorgimento  struggled  for  the 
freedom  and  unity  of  Italy,  sought  to  estabhsh  a 
repubUc.  Mazzini  at  Rome,  Manin  at  Venice,  Gari- 
baldi were  stalwart  Republicans.  The  thought  of  a 
monarchy  was  distasteful  to  all  Italians.  In  seeking 
to  create  United  Italy  their  chief  incentive  was  the 
overthrowing  of  the  seven  despotic  princes  who  ruled 
over  Italy,  not  least  among  them  the  Princes  of 
Savoy.  For  after  their  re-establishment  at  Turin 
in  1814,  they  had  made  a  clean  sweep  of  all  reforms 
instituted  by  the  French  and  re-established  a  reac- 
tionary government.  Yet  there  was  a  young  prince 
of  the  House,  Charles  Albert  by  name,  who  had  in- 
herited in  a  measure  the  capacity  for  sagaciously 
gauging  the  significance  of  the  events  that  were  taking 
place.  Though  not  in  direct  line  of  succession,  he 
was  soon  to  be  called  to  the  throne,  and  though  a 


86  GREATER  ITALY 

weak  and  vacillating  ruler  whose  qualms  of  con- 
science forbade  him  to  take  a  firm  stand,  he  made 
possible  the  reconciliation  between  reaction  and  rev- 
olution, between  democracy  and  aristocracy,  which 
took  place  during  the  reign  of  his  son,  Victor  Em- 
manuel II,  the  first  King  of  United  Italy.  Thus  at 
a  crucial  moment  in  their  history  the  Princes  of  Savoy 
once  again  accommodated  themselves  to  the  temper 
of  their  times,  and  followed  the  oldest  tradition  of 
the  House. 

This  in  a  measure  explains  the  present-day  vigour 
of  the  most  ancient  ruling  dynasty  in  Europe,  which 
traces  its  lineage  clearly  in  the  male  line  to  Humbert 
the  Whitehanded,  whose  domains  in  the  first  years 
of  the  eleventh  century  were  situated  on  the  Lake 
of  Geneva,  and  later  included  all  of  Savoy  and  the 
chief  passes  over  the  Alps — the  Mont  Cenis  and  the 
Greater  and  Lesser  St.  Bernard.  His  son  Oddone 
added  Piedmont. 

During  the  centuries  which  elapsed  the  counts, 
and  later  the  dukes  of  the  House  conformed  their 
poUcy  to  the  needs  of  their  day.  Defending  them- 
selves, sword  in  hand,  they  were  Guelphs  and  Ghibel- 
hnes  in  turn.  They  took  a  prominent  part  in  the 
Crusades,  and  were  ever  ready  to  fight  in  a  just  cause, 
more  particularly  if  the  occasion  offered  an  oppor- 
tunity to  extend  their  domain  and  sway. 

It  was  not  until  towards  the  end  of  the  fourteenth 
century  that  the  princes  of  the  House  of  Savoy  in- 
augurated the  policy  of  paying  more  attention  to 
their  Italian  than  to  their  Savoyard  possessions,  and 
thus  became  identified  with  Itahan  affairs.  They 
succeeded  in  extending  their  power  and  estates  by 


THE  PERIOD  OF  RETRENCHMENT      87 

co-ordinating  policy  with  opportunity.  Their  vigor- 
ous reahsm  is  well  shown  by  the  conduct  of  Duke 
Amadeus  VIII,  who  though  not  a  priest,  was  elected 
Pope  by  the  Council  of  Basel  in  1439.  While  never 
travelling  to  Rome,  he  assumed  the  Papal  tiara,  and 
as  Felix  V  reigned  for  nine  years,  recognised  by  half 
Christendom.  Through  fortune  and  misfortune  the 
Savoyard  princes  understood  the  secret  of  adapting 
themselves  to  the  conditions  and  circumstances  of 
their  times,  so  that  though  repeatedly  driven  out  of 
their  estates  by  more  powerful  foes,  they  were  in- 
variably reinstated  in  their  ancient  domains. 

During  the  eighteenth  century  they  continued  their 
policy  of  accommodation.  It  is  not  surprising  there- 
fore, that  when  in  the  ensuing  century  the  revolu- 
tionary societies,  which  had  sprung  up  thi'oughout 
Italy,  gained  in  strength  and  importance,  and  enlisted 
the  support  of  the  most  energetic  and  intelhgent  men 
of  the  epoch  who  were  eager  to  bring  about  the  unity 
of  the  Italian  people,  the  House  of  Savoy,  realising 
that  a  progressive  policy  was  the  one  best  suited  to 
their  own  interests,  as  well  as  those  of  Italy,  should 
have  taken  an  active  part  in  the  movement.  Victor 
Emmanuel,  ably  advised  by  Count  Cavour,  who  was 
himself  of  old  aristocratic  lineage,  understood  that 
the  destiny  of  his  House  depended  upon  the  pohcy 
to  be  pursued.  It  so  came  about  that  the  world  wit- 
nessed the  extraordinary  sight  of  a  King  taking  into 
his  service  red-shirted  Garibaldians,  and  placing  him- 
self at  the  head  of  armed  revolutionaries,  in  order  to 
compass  the  overthrow  of  the  other  sovereign  princes 
of  Italy,  including  the  Pope.  United  Italy,  long  the 
dream   of   Italian  Republican  patriots,  owed   its   ac- 


88  GREATER  ITALY 

complishment  to  the  strong  hand  and  the  daring  enter- 
prise of  the  royal  House  of  Savoy.  It  was  the  princes 
of  this  ruHng  House  who  were  able  to  bring  the  ques- 
tion of  ItaHan  unity  to  the  attention  of  Europe.  It 
is  owing  to  their  initiative  that  foreign  aid  was  secured, 
without  which  the  undertaking  would  have  failed. 
It  was  the  forces  of  Piedmont,  pledged  by  Victor 
Emmanuel  to  co-operate  with  the  French,  which 
secured  Napoleon's  assistance.  Step  by  step  as  the 
task  of  union  was  being  carried  out,  Victor  Emmanuel 
undertook  to  reconcile  the  peoples  of  Italy  with  the 
idea  of  accepting  a  new  sovereign,  rather  than  a  repub- 
lican form  of  government.  It  is  unquestionable  that 
had  it  not  been  for  the  fact  that  national  sentiment 
and  the  desire  for  unity  were  more  profound  than 
the  movement  towards  democratic  government,  the 
task  would  have  been  impossible.  But  Italian  revolu- 
tionary leaders,  whose  unselfish  patriotism  was  so 
strikingly  set  forth  by  Garibaldi  himself  when  he 
declared,  ''I  have  never  been  a  partisan  of  Kings, 
but,  inasmuch  as  Charles  Albert  has  made  himseK 
the  defender  of  the  cause  of  the  people,  it  is  my  duty 
to  offer  him  my  sword,"  soon  recognised  that  the 
aims  of  the  House  of  Savoy  were  as  legitimate  as  they 
were  useful  to  the  cause  of  United  Italy.  Without 
a  strong  leadership,  without  a  closely  welded,  unified 
State,  Italy  as  a  nation  could  not  have  survived.  Not 
even  federaUsm  would  have  been  practical,  had  it 
been  possible.  The  future  prosperity  of  Italy  de- 
pended on  the  successful  accomplishment  of  the  task 
of  union.  The  same  laws  and  regulations,  even  down 
to  the  minutest  detail;  the  same  flag  and  uniform 
in  Piedmont  as  in  Sicily,  in  Venetia  as  in  Romagna 


THE  PERIOD  OF  RETRENCHMENT      89 

or  Calabria,  could  alone  bring  it  about  that  the  ItaUan 
people  would  feel  themselves  racially  as  well  as  na- 
tionally one. 

The  star  of  Piedmont  rose  high  on  the  horizon  as 
the  task  of  unification  was  methodically  proceeding. 
It  reached  its  zenith  when,  shortly  after  the  occupa- 
tion of  Rome,  Victor  Emmanuel,  in  opening  the  first 
ItaHan  Parhament  at  Florence,  on  December  5,  1870, 
exclaimed:  "With  Rome,  the  capital  of  Italy,  I  have 
carried  out  my  promise,  and  crowned  the  enterprise 
begun  by  my  illustrious  father  twenty-three  years 
ago.  My  heart  of  a  sovereign  and  of  a  son  feels  a 
solemn  joy  in  welcoming,  here  assembled  for  the 
first  time,  the  representatives  of  our  beloved  coun- 
try, and  in  pronouncing  these  words:  Italy  is  free 
and  united,  it  is  for  us  to  make  her  great  and  happy." 
Henceforth  the  Kingdom  of  Italy  was  the  sole  thought 
and  preoccupation  of  this  prince  of  the  House  of  Savoy. 
Piedmont  and  the  narrower  needs  of  his  native  king- 
dom were  forgotten.  Instead  of  ruUng  Italy  from 
Piedmont  as  the  Hohenzollerns  proceeded  to  rule 
Germany  through  Prussia,  Victor  Emananuel  with 
the  subtle  flexibihty  which  has  always  characterised 
the  princes  of  this  House,  adapted  himself  to  the  new 
conditions  which  had  arisen,  and  in  the  brief  eight 
years  which  remained  until  his  death,  succeeded  in 
proving  to  the  people  of  Italy  that  he  was  worthy 
to  be  their  King,  and  at  the  same  time  rendered  the 
Monarchy  popular  throughout  the  peninsula. 

The  House  of  Savoy  owes  to  ItaUan  unity  its  pres- 
ent greatness,  but  it  is  not  an  exaggeration  to  say  that 
without  the  leadership  of  its  princes  the  unification 
of  Italy  would  have  been  long  postponed.    Yet  there 


90  GREATER  ITALY 

remained  among  a  not  inconsiderable  section  of  the 
community  the  regret  that  Italy,  when  united,  had 
not  cast  off  the  yoke  of  Kings. 

During  the  reign  of  King  Humbert  the  popularity 
of  the  monarchy  waned,  though  the  old  RepubUcan 
spirit  cannot  be  said  to  have  grown  stronger.  Italy 
was  passing  through  a  period  of  transition;  social 
and  economic  questions  came  to  the  fore.  The  coer- 
cive measures  adopted  to  quell  parliamentary  distur- 
bances, as  well  as  popular  uprisings  which  marked  the 
closing  years  of  his  reign,  showed  that  King  Humbert 
had  failed  to  appreciate  the  true  significance  of  the 
prevailing  unrest.  The  situation  had  become  in- 
creasingly difficult  when  the  King  was  removed  by 
the  bullet  of  an  anarchist.  In  view  of  this  event,  it 
would  have  been  reasonable  to  expect  that  a  period 
of  reaction  would  be  initiated  by  his  successor.  But 
Victor  Emmanuel  III  refused  to  consent  to  such  a 
policy.  With  his  reign  an  era  of  Hberalism  opened, 
and  within  a  very  brief  space  of  years  SociaHsts  and 
Radicals  no  longer  considered  any  change  in  the 
Government  as  a  necessary  part  of  their  programme; 
even  Clericals,  who  were  for  so  long  active  anti-dynastic 
agents,  appeared  to  have  become  reconciled  to  the 
Monarchy.  Victor  Emmanuel  had  taken  the  lead  in  the 
new  trend  of  events.  He  removed  the  Monarchy  from 
the  sphere  of  controversy  and  originated  the  democ- 
racy of  kingship.  In  pursuing  this  policy  of  hberal- 
ism he  left  the  task  of  governing  too  much  in  the 
hands  of  parhamentary  leaders,  and  allowed  the 
country  to  be  ruled  by  a  parliamentary  dictator, 
while  he  bent  his  energies  on  improving  the  social 
and  economic  conditions  of  his  subjects.    Yet,  when 


THE   PERIOD   OF   RETRENCHMENT     91 

in  later  years  the  Italian  people  rose  to  vindicate 
their  independence  as  a  World  Power,  Victor  Em- 
manuel III  was  ready  to  lead  them.  Then  the  soldiers 
of  Italy,  Socialists,  Republicans,  Royalists,  Clericals, 
peasants,  bourgeois,  and  aristocracy,  from  Sicily  and 
Naples,  from  Rome,  Tuscany  and  the  Marches,  from 
Venetia,  Lombardy  as  well  as  Piedmont,  were  to  go 
into  battle  with  the  cry  " Avanti  Savoia"  on  their 
lips,  proclaiming  the  unity  of  the  Kingdom  of  Italy 
under  the  sceptre  of  the  House  of  Savoy. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  DICTATORSHIP  OF  GIOLITTI 

Political  Cobruption.    The  Erosion  op  Parties.    Algeciras 
AND  Agadir 

The  year  1903  marks  a  turning-point  in  the  his- 
tory of  Italy.  Up  to  this  time  the  benefits  of  national 
existence  had  been  but  vaguely  sensed  by  the  major- 
ity of  the  Italian  people.  National  unity,  achieved 
by  foreign  aid,  had  failed  to  arouse  the  Italians  to  a 
realisation  of  their  obligations  in  the  realm  of  world 
politics.  Concerned  with  domestic  dissensions,  the 
despised,  silent,  subservient  partner  of  the  Triple 
Alliance,  Italy,  during  recent  years  had  wallowed  in 
a  slough  of  political  despondency. 

The  history  of  the  ensuing  decade  of  Itahan  public 
affairs  is  largely  that  of  one  man,  Giovanni  Giolitti, 
''the  dictator."  To  estimate  fairly  the  capacity  and 
character  of  a  man  who,  by  the  use  or  rather  abuse 
of  power,  was  able  to  control  the  destiny  of  a  great 
people  through  a  long  period  of  years,  requires  patient 
analysis.  Few  men  have  experienced  such  marked 
tokens  of  loyalty  and  public  favour;  few  have  been 
accused  of  such  baseness,  corruption,  and  crime. 

Born  at  Mondovi  in  Piedmont  on  October  27,  1842, 
the  son  of  a  minor  government  official,  Giolitti,  after 
having  completed  his  university  training,  entered 
the  civil  service,  first  in  the  Ministry  of  Justice,  later 
in  that  of  Finance.    During  the  stormy  days  of  1860- 

92 


THE  DICTATORSHIP  OF  GIOLITTI       93 

70,  when  Italy  was  struggling  to  be  free,  when  the 
youth  of  the  land  loyally  gave  their  lives  for  the  cause 
of  national  unity  and  independence,  Giolitti  was 
never  moved  to  enhst  in  any  such  enterprise.  The 
inthralling  drama  of  nation-building  failed  to  awaken 
any  enthusiasm  in  the  mind  of  the  plodding  bureau- 
crat. Giolitti  remained  quietly  at  his  fireside.  He 
read  the  news  of  the  victories  of  Solferino  and  Magenta, 
of  the  expeditions  of  Garibaldi  and  the  Thousand  to 
Sicily,  of  the  liberation  of  Venetia,  and  the  conquest 
of  Rome  with  seeming  unconcern.  A  zealous  and 
devoted  civil  servant,  he  remained  at  his  desk,  and 
his  careful,  methodically  prepared  reports  won  for 
him  the  commendation  of  his  chiefs  and  rapid  promo- 
tion. 

When  in  1882  Italy,  on  her  entry  into  the  Triple 
AlHance,  had  firmly  estabUshed  her  position  among 
nations,  Giolitti,  abandoning  his  career,  succeeded  in 
securing  a  seat  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  He 
brought  with  him  an  intimate  acquaintance  with  the 
bureaucratic  machine,  a  skilled  perception  of  how 
this  machine  might  be  used  to  control  an  electorate 
and  even  a  Government,  as  well  as  a  profound  knowl- 
edge of  matters  of  finance.  Supple,  phant,  unham- 
pered by  any  political  or  ethical  principles,  totally 
devoid  of  any  lofty  ideals  of  patriotism,  moved  to 
action  only  by  the  expediency  of  the  moment,  giving 
what  was  wanted  rather  than  what  was  needed,  Giolitti 
found  himself  after  ten  years  of  active  politics,  called  to 
the  Premiership  in  1892.  His  first  Ministry,  as  will  be 
recalled,  ended  disastrously  ^  His  name  was  covered 
with  opprobrium.    For  several  years  he  dared  not  rise 

'  See  p.  58  et  seq. 


94  GREATER  ITALY 

to  speak  in  Parliament.  Then,  by  degrees,  the  past 
was]  forgotten.  In  1900  we  find  GioHtti  accepting  the 
portfoHo  of  Minister  of  the  Interior  in  the  ZanardelU 
Cabinet. 

His  pohtical  resurrection  did  not  pass  unnoticed, 
though  few  voices  were  raised  against  him.  From 
this  time  onward  GioHtti's  influence  in  the  Chamber 
grew  rapidly.  His  bold  programme  of  social  reform, 
which  in  reaUty  amounted  to  Httle  more  than  a  policy 
of  non-interference  on  the  part  of  the  Government, 
in  the  struggle  between  capital  and  labour,  won  for 
him  wide  support.  In  comparison  with  the  repressive 
policy  towards  labour  resorted  to  by  his  predecessors, 
the  new  GioUttian  regime  must  be  looked  upon  as  a 
step  forward.  The  right  to  strike,  the  right  to  hold 
pubhc  meetings,  the  freedom  of  the  Press,  were  now 
conceded  to  the  deUght  of  the  Socialists,  while  other 
less  extreme  Uberal  members  of  the  Chamber,  eagerly 
courting  the  favour  of  the  new  leader,  flocked  to  his 
standard.  It  was  only  natural,  therefore,  that  when 
ZanardelU  resigned  Giolitti  should  have  been  called 
upon  to  form  a  Ministry.  He  accepted  the  offer,  and 
on  November  3,  1903,  constituted  his  Cabinet,  calling 
M.  Tittoni,  a  Prefect  of  Naples,  to  the  Foreign  Ofiice. 

Giolitti,  as  long  as  it  served  his  purpose,  was  in 
the  vanguard  of  all  hberal  movements.  But  though 
he  apparently  concerned  himself  with  problems  of 
pubhc  pohcy,  his  real  and  unquestioned  abihty  as 
a  ruler  of  men  was  consumed  in  affirming  his  par- 
liamentary dominance  and  in  subjecting  the  members 
of  the  Chamber  to  his  will.  Owing  to  the  pecuUarities 
of  the  Italian  parhamentary  system,  the  Government 
in  power  at  the  time  of  a  General  Election  is  able  to 


THE  DICTATORSHIP  OF  GIOLITTI      95 

exert  such  pressure  that  the  governmental  candidate 
is  almost  invariably  elected.  As  the  Minister  of  the 
Interior  appoints  the  Prefects  and  other  local  officials 
who  are  in  a  position  to  exercise  absolute  control 
over  all  elections,  he  is  able  to  create  for  himself  a 
personal  following  of  Deputies  who  owe  their  election 
to  the  support  given  to  them  by  the  Government 
"machine."  During  the  three  General  Elections  which 
took  place  in  1904,  1909,  1913,  Giohtti  was  each  time 
in  power.  He  saw  to  it  that  only  docile  candidates 
were  elected.  Bribery,  corruption,  and  coercion, 
were  resorted  to  when  needed  to  secure  the  desired 
results.  The  Giolittian  system  of  exercising  par- 
liamentary control  is  without  precedent  in  contem- 
porary Europe.  As  soon  as  the  Chamber  was  elected, 
and  had  entered  upon  its  legislative  duties,  Giohtti, 
after  a  brief  delay,  was  in  the  habit  of  resigning  from 
office  with  the  majority  still  loyal  to  him.  He  would 
iretire  from  public  affairs  content  to  allow  some  faith- 
ful follower  or  weak  opponent  to  assume  the  burden 
of  office.  Then  when  the  situation  became  involved, 
owing  to  the  lack  of  cohesion  in  the  Chamber,  when 
the  Deputies  turned  once  again  their  thoughts  to 
their  re-election,  Giohtti  would  upset  the  Ministry, 
return  to  office  and,  assured  of  the  personal  support 
of  the  majority  of  the  Deputies,  lead  the  Chamber 
and  the  country  through  the  toils  of  a  fresh  General 
Election.  Within  a  few  years  he  succeeded  in  breaking 
down  completelj^  the  already  feeble  barriers  of  poht- 
ical  parties ;  and  thus  freed  from  the  trammels  of  party 
allegiance  or  pohtical  programmes,  Giolitti  was  in  a 
position  to  rule  Italy  as  befitted  his  fancy.  His  des- 
potism was,  however,  enlightened.     His  methods  were 


96  GREATER  ITALY 

simple.  He  endeavoured  to  satisfy,  in  so  far  as  pos- 
sible, every  one.  On  the  one  hand,  he  redressed  labour 
grievances,  on  the  other  he  satisfied  the  capitalists 
in  their  demands  for  privileges  and  protection.  He 
held  his  sway  over  the  landowners  and  large  farmers 
by  maintaining  the  customs  duties  on  wheat.  He  raised 
the  salaries  of  the  clergy  and  encouraged  the  efforts 
of  the  Church  to  extend  its  influence  in  the  schools, 
while  appointing  notorious  Freemasons  to  posts  in 
the  Ministry  of  Education.  To  satisfy  the  masses  he 
reduced  the  length  of  the  period  of  service  of  con- 
scripts, and  at  the  same  time  increased  the  effectives 
of  the  army  and  navy  to  satisfy  the  upper  classes. 
His  maxim  of  government  was  to  grant  immediately 
every  demand  which  was  made  upon  him  by  insistent 
public  clamour;  to  give  way  to  all  active  currents  of 
public  opinion.^ 

After  a  protracted  period  of  economic  crises,  the 
country  was  now  entering  upon  an  era  of  prosperity 
and  expansion.  Politics  no  longer  engrossed  the  at- 
tention of  the  multitude,  and  it  became  evident  that 
Giohtti,  while  not  brooking  any  interference  with  his 
methods  of  government,  was  eager  to  keep  the  ship 

1  Cf.  G.  Ferrero:  "La  Guerre  Europe^nne,"  Payot  &  Cie.,  Paris,  1916. 
Writing  on  the  Giolittian  regime,  page  207,  he  remarks: 

"This  Government  will  seem  strange  to  many.  It  is,  in  fact,  a  sys- 
tem of  government  which  has  almost  entirely  disappeared  in  Europe. 
Caesar  and  Augustus  used  two  such  governments:  the  one  to  conquer 
Gaul,  the  other  to  reorganise  the  Empire.  Interesting  analogies  could 
be  found  in  the  history  of  Florence  and  in  the  republics  of  South 
America.  It  is  the  kind  of  government  which  is  found  everywhere, 
where  the  electoral  system  is  not  dominated  by  strongly  organised 
parties.  Sooner  or  later  a  man  or  a  family  or  a  family  group  gains 
control  of  the  electoral  machine,  and  uses  it  to  his  own  advantage. 
This  system,  moreover,  put  into  practice  for  ten  years  in  Italy  by  an 
intelUgent,  dexterous,  adroit  man,  a  clear-thinking,  strong-willed  man, 


THE  DICTATORSHIP  OF  GIOLITTI      97 

of  state  riding  on  an  even  keel.  As  a  result  of  agrarian 
and  industrial  difficulties,  in  September,  1904,  Italy 
was  confronted  with  a  general  strike  of  unprecedented 
magnitude,  promoted  by  the  extreme  Socialists  with 
the  avowed  object  of  upsetting  the  Giolittian  Ministry. 
For  two  days  the  normal  life  of  northern  Italy  was 
paralysed.  Serious  disorders  broke  out  in  Rome  and 
Naples.  Giolitti,  while  maintaining  order,  determined 
not  to  interfere  except  in  the  event  of  flagrant  violence. 
The  disorders  soon  died  down,  and  at  the  General 
Elections,  held  two  months  later,  the  entire  country, 
indignant  at  the  attempts  made  to  wreck  the  Govern- 
ment by  resorting  to  force,  swept  the  Socialist  Deputies 
who  had  fomented  the  strike  from  office.  Even  the 
Vatican  suspended  the  non  expedit  so  that  Catholics 
might  vote.  The  Giolittians  were  everywhere  re- 
turned by  large  majorities. 

Soon  afterwards  (March,  1905)  Giohtti,  in  accord 
with  his  policy,  retired  from  office.  A  vain  attempt 
was  made  to  form  a  stable  Ministry  under  Giolitti's 
faithful  lieutenant,  Tittoni.  Finally  M.  Fortis,  an 
old  Garibaldian  legionary,  patched  up  a  short-lived 


did  not  fail  to  produce  remarkable  results.  It  allowed  Italy  to  profit 
by  the  period  of  prosperity  which  the  world  has  enjoyed  since  1900. 
.  .  .  Whatever  may  have  been  its  merits,  this  personal  Government 
exercised  its  functions  under  the  cloak  of  being  a  parhamentary  institu- 
tion. This  contradiction  between  the  substance  and  the  form  could 
not  fail  to  produce  grave  consequences:  debates,  voting,  parties,  the 
formation  and  overthrow  of  Ministries,  the  interplay  of  majorities  and 
minorities,  elections;  everything  which  goes  to  make  up  the  essence  of 
a  parhamentary  system  could  be  nothing  more  than  fictions,  more  or 
less  concealed.  .  .  .  One  phenomenon  above  all  irritated  many — the 
decadence  of  Parliament.  It  is  impossible  to  deny  that  the  Chamber 
and  the  Senate  stand  for  much  less  than  they  did  twenty  years  ago 
.  .  .  and  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  governments  which  endeavour 
to  satisfy  everybody  often  satisfy  no  one." 


98  GREATER  ITALY 

Ministry.  The  new  Premier,  forbidden  to  carry  oui 
any  measure  which  might  offend  Giohtti,  above  all 
to  tamper  with  the  dictator's  poHtical  machine,  found 
his  position  burdensome,  and  it  was  a  surprise  to  no 
one  when  he  resigned  in  February  of  the  following 
year.  Giolitti,  not  yet  ready  to  take  up  the  reins  of 
power,  deemed  it  expedient  to  intrust  the  leadership 
of  the  Cabinet  to  the  leader  of  a  small  group,  the 
feeble  remnant  of  the  Opposition,  Baron  Sidney 
Sonnino,^  Sonnino's  Ministry  was  a  Cabinet  such  as 
had  been  rarely  constituted  in  Italy,  made  up  of  men 
drawn  from  all  ranks  and  all  parties,  imbued  -v^ith  a 
deep  patriotism,  and  united  in  their  desire  to  serve 
their  country.  This  Ministry  at  once  set  about  to 
grapple  with  urgent  reforms.  The  reorganisation 
of  the  railways  which  had  recently  been  nationalised, 
the  conversion  of  the  national  debt,  and  measures  to 
improve  the  deplorable  economic  conditions  in  the 
South  of  Italy  were  the  chief  items  of  their  pro- 
gramme. 

Baron  Sonnino  was  temperamentally  unfit  to  con- 
trol an  Itahan  Chamber.  His  bad  parhamentary 
tactics,  his  total  lack  of  political  adroitness  created 
the  impasse  which  Giolitti  had  no  doubt  foreseen.  On 
a  simple  technicaUty  the  Sonnino  Ministry  was  over- 

^  Sonnino  was  bom  at  Florence  in  1847,  of  Anglo-Jewish  extraction. 
He  served  for  some  years  in  the  Italian  diplomatic  service,  but  resigned 
to  devote  himself  to  the  study  of  Italian  social  conditions.  On  enter- 
ing Parliament  his  ability  attracted  attention.  A  recluse,  cold,  shy, 
diffident,  he  has  ever  remained  a  lonesome  figure  in  ItaHan  politics. 
Totally  devoid  of  an  understanding  of  parliamentary  intrigue,  and  an 
indifferent  speaker,  he  has  been  unable  to  hold  together  a  following. 
A  man  of  great  moral  rectitude  and  sincere  patriotism,  he  was  in  later 
years  to  be  called  upon  to  guide  Italy  through  the  most  difficult  crisis 
of  her  history. 


THE  DICTATORSHIP  OF  GIOLITTI       99 

thrown,  little  more  than  two  months  after  its  crea- 
tion, and  Giolitti,  now  ready  to  re-enter  the  field, 
again  took  up  the  reins  of  government.  He  at  once 
adopted  the  most  popular  features  of  Sonnino's  pro- 
posed reforms,  and  with  a  docile  House  ready  to 
execute  his  commands,  the  dictator,  for  the  ensuing 
three  years,  ruled  Italy,  while  the  country  enjoyed 
an  era  of  ever-increasing  prosperity  and  material  well- 
being. 

In  the  realm  of  foreign  affairs  Giohtti  endeavoured 
to  apply  those  principles  which  had  so  well  succeeded 
at  home.  A  faithful  adherent  of  the  Triple  Alhance, 
he,  nevertheless,  made  friendly  advances  to  the  other 
Powers.  Giolitti  cared  little  for  Italy's  international 
relations  and  remained  blind  to  her  position  as  a 
World  Power.  Yet  by  the  force  of  circumstances 
Italy  was  called  upon  to  play  a  considerable  role  in 
world  affairs.  The  ever-increasing  expansion  of  the 
Pan-Germanic  movement,  the  pretensions  of  Prussia 
to  European  hegemony,  the  reawakening  of  irredent- 
ism,  and,  above  all,  the  growth  of  nationalism  were 
essential  contributing  factors. 

Italy  had  already  entered  into  a  more  friendly 
understanding  with  France,  and  after  the  visit  of 
President  Loubet  in  the  autumn  of  1904,^  steps  were 
taken  to  put  an  end  to  the  commercial  warfare  which 
had  been  waged  between  the  two  countries  for  many 
years  past.  The  Italian  Rente  was  once  again  listed 
on  the  Paris  Bourse,  much  to  the  benefit  of  Italian 
credit  abroad. 

Italian  official  apathy  in  the  domain  of  foreign 
relations   was   rudely   aroused   when,   on   March   31, 

1  See  p.  170. 


100  GREATER  ITALY 

1905,  the  German  Emperor  visited  Tangier.  This 
coup  de  theatre  was  to  have  far-reaching  effects.  Wil- 
liam II,  so  it  was  alleged,  asserted  that  he  had  come 
to  protect  Moroccan  independence  from  further  French 
aggression,  as  well  as  to  safeguard  German  commercial 
interests  in  Morocco.  This  active  interference  on  the 
part  of  Germany  in  the  affairs  of  the  Mediterranean 
would,  if  permitted  to  continue,  have  upset  the  nicely 
balanced  equilibrium  which  had  at  last  been  arrived 
at  in  these  waters. 

Nine  months  later,  on  January  16,  1906,  an  inter- 
national conference  met  at  Algeciras  to  settle  the 
questions  raised  by  this  Imperial  visit.  The  shadow 
of  war  which,  for  a  brief  period  had  overspread  Eu- 
rope during  the  preceding  summer,  had  not  alto- 
gether been  dissipated.  When  the  delegates  assembled 
it  was  found  that  Great  Britain  firmly  supported  the 
French  thesis  which  asserted  the  exclusive  priority  of 
French  interests  in  Morocco.  Austria  in  her  zealous 
advocacy  of  German  claims  earned  the  title  of  ''a 
brilhant  second,"  which  William  II  grandiloquently 
bestowed  on  the  Foreign  Minister  of  the  Dual  Mon- 
archy. The  course  which  Italy  was  to  pursue  at 
the  conference  was  of  necessity  complex.  Bound 
to  the  Central  Empires  in  all  matters  concerning 
Continental  policy,  Italy  had  entered  into  agree- 
ments with  Great  Britain  regarding  the  Mediter- 
ranean. Furthermore,  Italy  was  bound  by  a  recent 
understanding^  with  France  not  to  oppose  French 
expansion  in  Morocco,  in  return  for  the  recognition 
of  Italian  pre-eminence  in  Tripoli.  Italy  chose  to 
regard  her  agreements  with  France  and  Great  Britain 

1  See  p.  116. 


THE   DICTATORSHIP  OF  GIOLITTI     101 

as  more  important  than  her  alUance  with  Germany, 
so  that  in  principle  the  Italian  delegates  supported 
the  French  thesis  at  the  conference,  and  Italy  was 
thus  instrumental  in  bringing  about  the  triumph  of 
France  and  the  exclusion  of  Germany  from  Mediter- 
ranean affairs.  The  anger  of  Germany  on  learning 
of  the  independent  attitude  which  Italy  had  dared 
to  assume  in  opposing  her  all-powerful  German  ally 
was  very  great,  and  for  the  year  following  the  con- 
ference in  both  Berlin  and  Rome  there  was  an  ex- 
change of  official  visits,  and  an  endeavour  on  the  part 
of  prominent  Triplists  to  efface  the  unpleasant  mem- 
ory of  the  Algeciras  Conference.  It  was  no  surprise, 
therefore,  that  the  Triple  Alliance,  notwithstanding 
the  fact  that  it  had  lost  all  but  formal  significance, 
was  not  denounced  in  the  summer  of  1907,  and 
thus  automatically  remained  in  force  until  1914. 

Relations  with  Austria  were  far  from  friendly.  In 
Vienna  the  conviction  was  gaining  ground  that  the 
ItaHans  could  not  be  relied  upon  in  a  crisis,  while  it 
was  evident  to  many  Italians  that  the  yoke  of  the 
alliance  with  the  Dual  Monarchy  had  become  un- 
bearable. Austria,  as  early  as  1904,  took  steps  which 
could  only  be  interpreted  as  overtly  hostile  acts  by 
Italy.  Along  the  Italo-Austrian  boundary  the  Aus- 
trian General  Staff  initiated  at  great  cost  an  elaborate 
system  of  fortifications,  manned  with  heavy-cahbre 
guns.  Fresh  troops  from  remote  confines  of  the  Haps- 
burg  Empire  were  now  garrisoned  here.  The  Emperor 
Francis  Joseph  attended  in  person  the  Grand  Manoeu- 
vres held  in  Tjrrol  in  1905.  In  November  of  the 
same  year  the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand,  the  Heir 
Apparent  to  the  throne,  the  recognised  leader  of  the 


102  GREATER  ITALY 

anti-Italian  party,  approved  the  vote  of  a  Catholic 
congress,  held  under  his  presidency,  in  favour  of  the 
re-estabhshment  of  the  temporal  power  of  the  Papacy. 
The  advent  of  a  ''strong  man,"  Baron  von  Aehrenthal, 
in  October,  1906,  at  the  Foreign  Office,  in  Vienna, 
was  to  put  to  severe  test  the  cohesive  strength  of  the 
Triple  Alliance.  Reverting  at  first  to  a  more  friendly 
policy  towards  Italy  in  order  to  allay  Itahan  sus- 
picions, the  new  Austrian  Foreign  Minister  after  a 
reasonable  delay  in  January,  1908,  announced  that 
he  had  obtained  from  the  Ottoman  Government  a 
concession  to  build  a  railway  across  the  Sanjak  of 
Novi  Bazar,  uniting  the  Bosnian  fines  with  the  Vardar 
road  rimning  from  Mitrovitza  to  Salonika.  This 
project  aroused  the  apprehensions  of  the  Itafians. 
The  Roman  Cabinet  was  accused  of  weakness  in 
permitting  Austria  to  upset  the  status  quo  in  the  Bal- 
kans as  stipulated  by  Article  VII  of  their  treaty  of 
alfiance.  Giolitti,  to  escape  further  recriminations, 
through  his  Foreign  Minister  declared  that  Italy  had 
not  given  her  consent  to  the  Austrian  project,  but  on 
the  contrary  favoured  the  counter-proposal  presented 
by  Russia,  which  was  to  fink  Serbia  with  the  Adriatic. 
This  announcement,  as  was  to  be  expected,  brought 
about  a  period  of  tension  between  the  Austro-Italian 
alfies,  which  was  only  refieved  by  the  energetic  in- 
tervention on  the  part  of  Berfin.  Yet  this  episode 
has  a  wider  significance  in  that  it  marks  the  first 
active  co-operation  on  the  part  of  Italy  and  Russia. 
The  friendly  relations  between  the  two  countries 
were  further  strengthened  by  the  visit  of  M.  Isvolsky 
the  Russian  Foreign  Minister,  to  the  King  of  Italy  at 
Racconigi,  on  September  29.  Thus  a  new  orientation 
in  Italian  foreign  poficy  was  inaugurated. 


THE  DICTATORSHIP  OF  GIOLITTI     103 

A  week  later,  on  October  5,  1908,  Austria  pro- 
claimed the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina. 
The  Giolittian  laisser-aller  pohcy  in  foreign  affairs 
had  exposed  Italy  to  so  many  humiliations,  both 
within  and  without  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  guaran- 
teed so  little  the  security  of  the  Kingdom  that  the 
more  enlightened  elements  of  the  nation  were  loudly 
indignant  at  this  fresh  affront,  by  so  flagrant  a  dis- 
turbance of  the  status  quo  in  the  Balkans,  the  corner- 
stone of  the  alHance  with  Austria.  Popular  exaspera- 
tion reached  its  culmination  in  Italy  when  it  was 
learned  that,  in  spite  of  the  declaration  made  at  Carate 
the  next  day,  October  6,  by  M.  Tittoni,  that  ''Italy 
might  await  events  with  serenity" — words  inter- 
preted to  mean  that  Italy  was  to  receive  adequate 
compensation — instead  of  the  rectification  of  the 
Austro-ItaUan  frontier,  which  was  confidently  ex- 
pected, Austria  merely  agreed  to  evacuate  the  San- 
jak  of  Novi  Bazar  which  she  had  formerly  poHced. 
In  Rome,  when  the  news  became  generally  known, 
disorders  broke  out.  The  Austrian  Embassy  was  as- 
saulted, the  windows  smashed,  and  popular  disap- 
proval was  loudly  voiced  in  the  Chamber.  The  in- 
ternational situation  was  acute.  War,  again  con- 
jured up  by  the  Central  Empires  was  menacingly 
near.  For  a  moment  it  seemed  as  though  Russia 
would  come  to  the  support  of  Serbia  and  protect 
the  interests  of  the  Jugo-Slavs.  But  the  belHcose 
attitude  of  Germany,  who  made  Austria's  quarrel 
her  own,  prevented  armed  intervention,  as  neither 
France  nor  Great  Britain  were  in  a  position  to  act 
in  concert.  Once  again  Italy  found  herself  on  the 
brink  of  a  great  European  war,  in  an  ambiguous 
position   in   which   her   unnatural   alliance   with   the 


104  GREATER  ITALY 

Central  Empires  placed  her.  In  the  midst  of  the 
crisis  a  terrible  national  calamity  overwhelmed  the 
Italian  people  and  plunged  the  country  into  mourn- 
ing. 

On  the  28th  of  December  an  earthquake  of  un- 
precedented intensity  destroyed  Messina,  Reggio  di 
Calabre,  and  the  towns  and  villages  of  the  surround- 
ing territory,  causing  desolation  and  ruin  unequalled 
in  modern  times.  According  to  carefully  compiled 
official  records  77,283  persons  perished.  The  dis- 
aster was  rendered  more  terrible  by  the  fact  that  for 
twelve  horn's  no  help  arrived,  as  all  the  local  author- 
ities had  perished  and  the  few  survivors  had  no  means 
of  communicating  with  the  outside  world.  Sailors 
from  British  and  Russian  battleships,  which  happened 
to  be  in  the  neighbourhood,  were  the  first  to  render 
aid.  The  King  and  Queen  of  Italy  arrived  soon  after- 
wards and  personally  took  part  in  the  work  of  salvage 
and  rescue,  which  continued  for  two  full  weeks,  while 
all  Italy  united  in  providing  for  the  homeless  and 
destitute. 

This  national  disaster  had  a  political  influence  of 
no  small  import  to  Italy.  Distracted  from  any  con- 
sideration of  foreign  affairs,  Italy  for  the  time  being 
forgot  the  European  crisis,  and  the  Italians  from  all 
parts  of  the  peninsula  proved  the  soHdarity  of  the 
Kingdom  in  their  efforts  to  help  their  hapless  brethren 
of  Sicily  and  Calabria. 

The  events  of  October,  1908,  were  in  the  nature  of 
a  dress-rehearsal  for  the  great  drama,  staged  by  the 
Central  Empires,  on  which  they  were  to  ring  up  the 
ciu-tain  in  August,  1914.  In  1908  the  Powers,  who 
were  later  to  form  the  Triple  Entente,  were  not  yet 


THE  DICTATORSHIP  OF  GIOLITTI     105 

ready  to  act  in  concert  to  oppose  the  Pan-German 
Drang  nach  Osten.  But  it  was  plainly  evident  that 
henceforth  Italy  did  not  consider  herself  as  part  of 
the  Triple  Alliance  in  any  campaign  of  aggression 
which  the  Central  Empires  might  see  fit  to  under- 
take, and  that  in  the  event  of  a  European  war,  such 
as  had  been  threatened  in  1905  and  1908,  Italy  could 
be  expected  to  pursue  a  policy  which  her  best  in- 
terests alone  would  dictate,  regardless  of  treaty  agree- 
ments. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  Austria  took  full  advantage 
of  the  circumstances  which  had  rendered  Italy  help- 
less. When  the  ItaHans  were  once  again  able  to  con- 
sider their  position  in  international  affairs  they  had 
to  acknowledge  that  their  prestige  had  suffered  greatly 
at  the  hands  of  Austria.  By  the  annexation  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  19,696  square  miles  of  territory, 
with  a  population  of  over  1,800,000  inhabitants,  was 
added  to  the  realm  of  the  Hapsburgs.  Yet  after  pro- 
longed negotiations,  Italy  was  only  able  to  obtain  the 
abolition  of  the  privilege  granted  to  Austria  by  the 
Treaty  of  BerUn  to  poHce  Montenegrin  waters  and 
the  promise  of  the  estabUshment  of  an  Italian  univer- 
sity at  Vienna.  Baron  Sonnino,  speaking  in  February, 
1909,  stated:  "It  behooves  the  country  to  recognise 
that  it  has  lost  weight  and  influence  in  the  world, 
and  to  study  how  best  to  repair  the  damage  done." 

The  crisis  was  thus  passed,  but  it  left  in  the  hearts 
of  the  ItaUan  people  the  profound  conviction  that 
Austria  had  ridden  rough-shod  over  Italian  national 
aspirations.  It  was  clear  to  all  Italy  that,  after  en- 
deavouring loyally  for  nearly  thirty  years  to  live  on 
terms   of   friendship  with    the   Dual    Monarchy,  the 


106  GREATER  ITALY 

solution  of  their  difficulties  must  of  necessity  be  sought 
on  the  field  of  battle.  To  prepare  for  this  eventuality 
must  henceforth  be  the  single  purpose  of  Italy's  for- 
eign relations.  In  March,  1909,  Giolitti  dissolved 
the  Chamber,  and,  notwithstanding  the  discontent  of 
the  country  with  his  foreign  policy,  by  means  of 
coercive  measures  he  was  able  to  control  the  elec- 
tions and  was  returned  with  a  good  majority. 

An  era  of  more  careful  consideration  of  Italy's  for- 
eign poKcy  is  now  entered  upon.  The  period  of  what 
has  come  to  be  known  as  the  '4nterpenetration  of 
affiances"  had  begun.  Though  no  official  announce- 
ments were  made,  and  the  Triple  Affiance  remained 
in  force  as  in  the  past,  the  friendship  of  the  Entente 
Powers  was  again  openly  courted.  On  April  12,  1909, 
a  British  squadron  visited  Genoa.  On  the  29th,  the 
King  and  Queen  of  Italy  entertained  very  cordially 
King  Edward  VII  and  Queen  Alexandra  at  Baia. 
A  fortnight  later  the  German  Emperor  was  received 
at  Brindisi,  while  the  newly  appointed  German  Am- 
bassador to  Italy,  M.  von  Jagow,  who  was  believed  in 
Italy  to  be  strongly  pro-Italian,  arrived  at  Rome  to 
counteract  the  tendency  of  Italy  to  ''ffirt"  with  the 
other  Powers,  and  announced  that  it  was  admitted  in 
Italy  that  "the  Triple  Alliance  is  best  for  the  peace  of 
Europe."  A  month  later  a  delegation  of  French  officers 
was  sent  to  Italy  to  take  part  in  the  celebrations  com- 
memorating the  fiftieth  anniversary  of  the  battles  of 
Magenta  and  Solferino.  But  the  most  important 
visitor  of  this  eventful  year  was  the  Tsar  of  all  the 
Russias.  In  1903,  Nicholas  II  had  already  con- 
templated paying  an  official  visit  to  Italy,  but  was 
prevented  from  carrying  out  his  project  by  the  op- 


THE   DICTATORSHIP  OF  GIOLITTI     107 

position  of  Italian  Socialists.  This  opposition  had 
since  died  down.  The  Tsar  now  arrived  in  Italy,  and 
was  received  by  Victor  Emmanuel  at  Racconigi  on 
October  23.  Nicholas  II  during  his  journey  from 
Russia  to  Italy  had  made  it  a  point  carefully  to  avoid 
entering  Austrian  territory.  The  warmth  of  his  re- 
ception and  the  friendly  nature  of  the  toasts  exchanged 
was  the  source  of  great  satisfaction  to  all  Itahans, 
and  created  a  deep  impression  throughout  Europe. 
In  France  public  opinion  was  gratified  to  find  that 
Italy  was  daily  becoming  more  detached  from  the  Cen- 
tral Empires.  In  Austria  the  news  of  the  visit  of  the 
Tsar  was  received  with  marked  ill-hmnour,  and  in  of- 
ficial circles  an  excuse  was  eagerly  sought  to  humiliate 
Italy  for  her  boldness  in  daring  to  initiate  an  indepen- 
dent policy.  The  occasion  was  not  long  in  arising. 
Shortly  after  the  Russian  Imperial  visit,  the  Vienna 
Government  peremptorily  demanded  the  dismissal 
from  the  Italian  army  of  one  of  Italy's  most  distin- 
guished superior  officers,  General  Asinari  di  Bernezzo, 
the  commander  of  an  army  corps,  who,  in  the  course 
of  a  speech,  in  presenting  the  flag  to  a  body  of  recruits, 
remarked  that  he  hoped  that  they  would  see  it  float 
over  the  irredente  provinces.  Italy,  in  order  to  keep 
the  peace,  complied  with  the  Austrian  demand,  and 
on  November  11,  the  general  was  placed  on  the  re- 
tired list.  Itahan  national  pride  was  deeply  wounded 
by  this  summary  interference  on  the  part  of  Aus- 
tria, and  while  the  Vienna  Government  gloated  over 
the  success  of  the  browbeating  which  it  had  ad- 
ministered to  Italy,  the  incident  added  fuel  to  the 
fire  of  hatred  smouldering  in  the  hearts  of  the  Italian 
people. 


108  GREATER  ITALY 

In  December,  Giolitti,  following  his  now  well- 
established  custom,  resigned  from  office,  and  in  order 
to  give  a  semblance  of  reality  to  the  parliamentary 
system  of  responsible  government,  the  leader  of  the 
Opposition  was  again  called  upon  to  take  office. 
Baron  Sonnino  accepted  the  offer,  and  constituted 
his  Cabinet,  but  owing  to  the  Giolittian  methods 
of  party  erosion  which  had  won  over  nearly  all  the 
members  of  the  Chamber,  the  Opposition  represented 
only  30  members  out  of  a  total  of  508  Deputies. 
Baron  Sonnino,  in  spite  of  his  moral  courage  and  good 
intentions,  was,  owing  to  his  uncompromising  atti- 
tude, unable  to  win  the  good-will  of  the  Chamber. 
In  the  face  of  the  hostility  of  a  majority  which  frankly 
despised  him,  Sonnino's  Cabinet  could  not  be  expected 
to  survive,  and  after  another  brief  rule  lasting  three 
months,  he  was  overthrown.  Giolitti  chose  as  his 
successor  M.  Luzzatti,  a  distinguished  authority  on 
finances,  who  had  held  a  portfolio  in  previous  Cabinets. 
M.  Luzzatti,  who  was  the  direct  opposite  of  Baron 
Sonnino  in  temperament,  desired  to  please  everybody. 
He  promised  many  reforms,  among  them  universal 
suffrage,  which  had  been  loudly  demanded  by  the 
SociaUsts,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  GioUtti  had  de- 
clared himself  opposed  to  it.  However,  he  succeeded 
no  better  than  Sonnino  in  conciliating  the  Chamber, 
so  that  the  majority  would  have  eagerly  seized  the 
first  opportunity  to  overthrow  him  but  for  the  fact 
that  Giolitti  bade  them  refrain,  as  he  wished  to  en- 
joy a  period  of  rest  in  the  country,  freed  from  the 
worries  of  political  life.  The  Luzzatti  Ministry  thus 
dragged  on  its  feeble  existence  through  the  summer 
and  autumn  of  1910.    No  untoward  event  disturbed 


THE  DICTATORSHIP  OF  GIOLITTI     109 

the  even  tenor  of  world  affairs.  Relations  with  Aus- 
tria resumed,  outwardly  at  least,  a  more  friendly 
course.  The  Marchese  di  San  Guliano,  the  new  Ital- 
ian Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  who  was  imbued  with 
a  deep  admiration  for  all  things  German,  made  ev- 
ery endeavour  to  smooth  over  the  strained  relations 
between  Italy  and  Austria.  In  August  he  journeyed 
to  Salzburg  to  confer  with  Count  Aehrenthal,  and 
later  to  Ischl  to  pay  his  respects  to  Emperor  Francis 
Joseph.  His  visit  was  promptly  returned  by  the 
Austrian  Foreign  Minister.  As  a  result  of  these  visits 
it  was  announced  that  the  two  countries  were  in  per- 
fect accord  regarding  the  status  quo  in  the  Balkans, 
and  that  the  maintenance  of  the  Triple  Alliance  in 
its  full  strength  and  vigour  was  the  ardent  wish  of  its 
signatories.  Meanwhile  the  discontent  of  the  Cham- 
ber with  the  Luzzatti  Cabinet  was  steadily  growing. 
Even  the  country  felt  that  it  was  being  weakly  gov- 
erned. 

The  crash  came  in  March,  1911.  Giohtti,  with  his 
usual  dexterity,  presented  himself  to  all  Italy  as  the 
man  of  the  hour.  He  was  welcomed  by  the  Chamber 
and  the  country  as  the  only  man  who  could  not  merely 
rule,  but  govern.  He  thus  again  took  up  the  duties 
of  Premier  on  March  29,  1911.  The  question  of  uni- 
versal suffrage  brought  before  the  country  by  Luz- 
zatti in  a  complicated  form  was  now  advocated  by 
Giolitti  as  zealously  as  he  had  hitherto  opposed  it. 
He  proposed  a  much  broader  enfranchisement  than 
had  hitherto  been  considered  advisable.  At  the 
same  time  he  introduced  a  bill  for  the  creation  of  a 
Government  monopoly  for  Hfe  insurance.  This  latter 
measure  was  badly  drawn,  in  flagrant  violation  of 


110  GREATER  ITALY 

existing  provisions  of  the  law,  so  that  it  amounted 
almost  to  a  confiscatory  measure.  These  proposals 
aroused  wide-spread  opposition  in  the  Lower  House. 
The  dictator  found  that  the  Chamber,  hitherto  so 
docile,  was  preparing  to  dispute  with  its  maker  the 
right  of  sovereignty.  Notwithstanding  the  recalcitrant 
temper  of  Parliament,  Giolitti  stubbornly  persisted 
in  forcing  the  insurance  bill  through.  The  discontent 
of  the  Deputies  increased  daily.  The  despotism  of 
the  GioHttian  regime  was  at  last  beginning  to  bear 
fruit.  Yet  few  were  found  who  dared  to  attack  the 
dictator,  for  all  knew  that  he  might  at  any  time  dis- 
solve the  Chamber,  and  as  his  electoral  machine  was 
still  in  perfect  working  order  he  would  see  to  it  that 
the  ^'rebels"  were  not  returned  at  the  next  elections. 
This  was  the  situation  when  ParUament  rose  at  the 
end  of  June. 

On  July  1,  the  German  gunboat  Panther,  appeared 
off  Agadir.  For  a  third  time  \\dthin  the  brief  space 
of  five  years  a  European  war  was  threatened  by  the 
"mailed-fist"  policy  of  the  Central  Empires.  The 
Moroccan  question  had,  to  all  intents  and  purposes, 
been  settled  at  the  Algeciras  Conference,  which  was 
further  confirmed  by  the  Franco-German  convention 
of  1909.  When  France  was  compelled  to  extend  the 
sphere  of  her  operations  in  Morocco,  Berlin,  beheving 
that  the  opportunity  was  propitious  to  reopen  the 
whole  question  de  novo,  despatched  the  Panther,  fol- 
lowed by  the  cruiser  Berlin,  to  Agadir  ostensibly  to 
protect  German  trading  interests  in  southern  Mo- 
rocco. Once  again  Great  Britain  stood  shoulder  to 
shoulder  '  with  France.  Germany  thereupon  (July 
15)     demanded    territorial    compensations    in    Mo- 


THE  DICTATORSHIP  OF  GIOLITTI     111 

rocco  itself.  This  demand  was  firmly  declined  by 
France.^ 

The  Moroccan  question,  which  had  been  one  of 
the  most  thorny  problems  in  international  politics, 
was  now  tending  towards  a  solution,  and  it  was  evi- 
dent that  the  establishment  of  a  French  protectorate 
over  Morocco  would  not  be  long  delayed.  Suddenly 
Italy  remembered  the  engagements  entered  into  by 
France  and  Great  Britain  regarding  Italian  rights  in 
Tripoh. 

In  the  dismal,  confused  twihght  of  Italian  public 
opinion,  depressed  by  long  years  of  political  servitude 
and  by  a  system  of  government  which  had  enfeebled 
and  enslaved  even  the  more  vigorous  intellects  of 
the  community,  there  flared  forth  a  flame  which  now 
burned  brightly,  illuminating  the  darkened  corners 
of  Italian  life  and,  in  its  fierce,  white  heat,  sought  to 
amalgamate  the  struggling  elements  [of  a  people  en- 
deavouring to  find  itself.  Such  was  the  mission  of 
Italian  nationalism  a  half  century  after  the  founding 
of  the  Kingdom  as  expressed  by  M.  Corradini  and 
the  small  group  which  had  gathered  around  him. 
This  newer  nationalism  was  in  the  nature  of  a  revival 
of  the  older,  virile  spirit  which  had  made  the  Risor- 
gimento  possible.    In  the  words  of  its  leader  i^ 

''Patriotism  is  altruistic.  Nationahsm  is  egoistic. 
When  we  want  to  express  our  love  for  Italy  let  us 
say  'our  country'  (patria);  when  we  wish  to  affirm 
the  power  of  Italy,  let  us  say  'nation'  (nazione)." 

^  The  matter  was  finally  settled  by  the  Franco-German  treaties, 
signed  November  4,  1911.  Germany  agreed  to  recognise  a  French 
protectorate  over  Morocco;  France  ceded  to  Germany  approximately 
100,000  square  miles  of  territory  in  the  Congo. 

^E.  Corradini:  "II  NationaUsmo  ItaUano,"  Treves,  Milan,  1914,  p.  28. 


112  GREATER  ITALY 

To  assert  the  strength  and  vigour  of  Italy  as  a  na- 
tion, to  arouse  the  Itahans  to  a  sense  of  their  position 
as  a  World  Power,  was  the  chief  aim  of  the  nationaHst 
propaganda  which  was  now  carried  on  actively  through- 
out Italy.  It  was  not  until  1911  that  the  new  move- 
ment came  out  openly  with  a  definite,  political 
programme,  and  ardently  advocated  the  Tripolitan 
enterprise.  The  prospect  of  the  conquest  of  Tripoli 
was  a  concrete  fact  which  could  easily  be  built  upon. 
The  propaganda  of  the  Nationalists  gained  number- 
less wilHng  proselytes.  Few  Italians  recalled  the  fact 
that  Tripoli  belonged  to  Turkey,  and  that  the  Porte 
at  the  time  ruled  over  a  vast  empire  potentially  pow- 
erful, the  integrity  of  which  was  zealously  watched 
over  by  the  Powers.  Fewer  still  concerned  themselves 
with  the  fact  that  to  assault  Turkey,  and  to  wrest 
from  her  her  last  remaining  African  possessions,  would 
inevitably  be  the  signal  for  a  general  assault  on  the 
Ottoman  Empire,  which  would  upset  the  balance  of 
power  of  Europe,  on  which  the  peace  of  the  world 
depended.  Even  the  better  informed,  who  had  re- 
sisted all  attempts  to  drag  Italy  into  a  war  to  redeem 
the  irredente  provinces,  on  the  ground  that  it  would 
lead  to  a  general  European  conflict,  light-heartedly 
gave  their  support  to  the  Tripolitan  expedition. 
Many,  perhaps,  confidently  believed  that  the  Porte 
would  offer  no  armed  resistance,  and  would  give  way 
to  the  pressure  of  Italian  demands. 

The  causes  of  this  change  must  be  sought  in  the 
fact  that  the  Italian  people,  worn  out  and  enervated 
by  the  long  debihtating  rule  of  Giohtti,  were  ready 
to  plunge  into  any  enterprise  which  they  thought 
would  simultaneously  increase  their  national  wealth 


THE   DICTATORSHIP   OF   GIOLITTI     113 

and  strength  as  a  World  Power,  and  bring  about  a 
change  in  government.  Above  all,  Italy  through  the 
great  expansion  of  her  resources,  and  the  increase  in 
her  material  wealth,  was  eager  to  assert  the  growth 
of  her  power  as  a  nation.  A  victorious  campaign,  so 
the  Nationalists  believed,  alone  could  proclaim  this 
growth.  The  clamour  for  war  grew  insistently.  Many 
believed  that  Giolitti  would  never  dare  to  undertake 
a  foreign  campaign.  It  was  not  expected  that  he 
would  wilUngly  permit  Italy  to  enter  into  any  enter- 
prise which  might  jeopardise  his  hold  over  ParHament 
and  the  country.  Already  it  was  whispered  that  he 
again  would  betray  the  best  interests  of  Italy. 

Giohtti  did  not  want  war,  yet  he  could  find  no 
way  out  of  the  crisis.  His  power  had  been  so  badly 
shaken  as  a  result  of  his  attempts  to  force  unpopular 
measures  through  the  Chamber  during  the  spring 
session,  that  the  dictator  realised  that  he  would  be 
unable  to  withstand  the  ever-increasing  clamour  of 
public  opinion,  tutored  by  the  Nationahsts,  demand- 
ing the  acquisition  of  Tripoli.  Tripoli  had  been 
promised  to  Italy  by  the  Powers.  The  subject  had 
been  thrashed  out  both  in  and  out  of  ParHament  for 
many  years  past.  The  conditions  stipulated  by  the 
Powers  had  been  fulfilled  and,  above  all,  the  shadow 
of  the  German  eagle  had  spread  suddenly  over  the 
Tripolitan  coastland  which  all  Italians  had  been 
brought  up  to  consider  their  rightful  heritage.  The 
time  for  action  had  come.  Giolitti,  after  vain  at- 
tempts to  resist  the  popular  outcry,  unwilling  to  sur- 
render his  dictatorship,  gave  way  to  the  demand  of 
the  multitude,  and  led  Italy  into  the  Libyan  War. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  LIBYAN  WAR 

Aims  and  Aspirations.    Account  op  the  Conflict,    The  War 

AND  After 

Italian  aspirations  to  a  share  of  the  lands  of 
Northern  Africa,  bordering  on  the  Mediterranean, 
date  back  to  the  chaotic  days  before  unity  was 
achieved.  Even  as  early  as  1838,  only  three  years 
after  Tripoli  had  been  declared  a  Turkish  vilayet, 
Mazzini  and  other  Italian  patriots,  looking  to  the 
future,  asserted  that  Tripoli  must  become  an  Italian 
colony.  In  1866  Bismarck,  writing  to  Mazzini,  de- 
clared : 

"Italy  and  France  cannot  be  associated  to  their 
conmion  benefit  in  the  Mediterranean.  That  sea  is 
a  heritage  which  it  is  impossible  to  divide  among 
relatives.  The  empire  of  the  Mediterranean  incon- 
testably  belongs  to  Italy,  who  possesses  there  coast- 
lands  twice  as  long  as  those  of  France.  Marseilles 
and  Toulon  cannot  be  compared  with  Genoa,  Leg- 
horn, Naples,  Palermo,  Ancona,  and  Venice.  The 
empire  of  the  Mediterranean  must  be  the  constant 
thought  of  Italy,  the  objective  of  her  Ministers,  the 
fundamental  aim  of  the  Cabinet  of  Florence."^  Words 
pleasant  to  Italian  ears,  though  obviously  intended  to 
embroil  Franco-Italian  relations. 

1  "Politica  Segreta  ItaHana"  (1863-70),  Turin,  1881.  PubUehed  by 
Diamilla  Mulla,  Mazzini's  secretary. 

114 


THE  LIBYAN  WAR  115 

When  Italy  attained  to  nationhood  aimost  her 
first  soUcitude  was  to  turn  her  attention  to  the  North 
African  httoral.  The  severe  check  to  Itahan  am- 
bitions administered  by  France  in  occupying  Tunis, 
made  Itahan  statesmen  all  the  more  determined  to 
gain  the  control  of  Tripoli.  In  1890  Crispi  resolutely 
set  about  to  secure  Itahan  sovereignty  of  the  Barbary 
Coast,  and  by  making  friends  with  Hassuna  Pasha 
Karamanh,  the  direct  descendant  of  the  old  Tripohtan 
"Bashaws,"  took  the  first  decisive  step  in  behalf  of 
Italy.  In  a  communication  dated  July  25,  1890,  Crispi 
addressed  an  informal  Note  to  Lord  Sahsbury  with 
a  view  to  receiving  British  sanction  to  his  programme. 
But  Lord  Sahsbury,  while  acknowledging  that  in 
the  event  of  any  change  of  the  status  quo  in  the 
Mediterranean  it  was  indispensable  for  Italy  to 
occupy  TripoU,  stated  that  the  time  for  such  a  step 
had  not  yet  arrived,  and  he  bade  Italy  wait,  adding: 

''The  Itahan  Government  wiU  have  Tripohtana,  but 
the  huntsman  to  bring  down  the  stag  must  wait  until 
it  comes  within  the  range  of  his  gun,  so  that  even 
wounded,  it  will  not  escape."^ 

This  programme  was  not  foUowed  up  by  Crispi 's 
successors  in  office,  and  the  disaster  at  Adua  so  damp- 
ened the  colonial  ardour  of  the  Itahans  that  during 
the  years  which  followed  no  effort  was  made  openly 
to  press  Italy's  claim  to  Tripohtana.  However, 
towards  the  end  of  this  same  year  (1896)  the  Marchese 
Visconti  Venosta,  who  had  taken  over  the  direction 
of  ^the  Foreign  Office,  entered  into  an  agreement  with 
France  regarding  the  revision  of  the  treaties  respect- 

» Crispi:  "PoUtica  Estera,"  Treves,  Milan,  1912,  p.  369. 


116  GREATER  ITALY 

ing  Tunis,  and  he  pointed  out  clearly  that  Italy  ex- 
pected compensations  for  this  step  in  Tripolitana. 
Italy,  in  recognising  French  sovereignty  over  Tunis, 
had  opened  the  road  for  her  own  occupation  of  TripoU. 
Tunis  was  now  admittedly  for  all  time  the  terra 
perduta  for  the  Italians,  while  Tripoli  had  become 
the  terra  promessa. 

In  March,  1899,  France  and  Great  Britain  without 
informing  Italy,  signed  a  treaty  defining  the  spheres 
of  their  respective  influence  in  Central  Africa,  which 
directly  concerned  the  Tripolitan  hinterland.  The 
Italians  were  thoroughly  alarmed.  They  feared  a 
repetition  of  the  Tunisian  fiasco.  The  Government 
was  unable  to  give  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  its 
policy.  The  Ministry  fell,  and  the  Marchese  Visconti 
Venosta,  once  again  called  upon  to  direct  the  destinies 
of  the  Foreign  Office,  was  able  to  arrange  a  detente 
with  France,  which  later  led  to  definite  agreements 
regarding  the  recognition  of  the  priority  of  Italian 
interests  in  Tripoli.  Thus  in  1902  M.  Delcasse,  at 
the  time  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  was  able 
to  declare: 

"In  exchange  for  assurance  given  by  France,  not 
to  interfere  in  Tripolitana,  Italy  has  promised  to  do 
nothing  which  could  obstruct  French  policy  in  Mo- 
rocco." 

From  this  time  onward  Tripoli  and  Morocco  were 
hnked  together  in  the  minds  of  the  Italians,  so  that 
it  was  inevitable  that  when  the  Moroccan  question 
should  come  up  for  settlement,  Italy  would  press 
for  a  solution  of  the  Tripolitan  affair. 

Italian   negotiations  with  Great  Britain  regarding 


THE  LIBYAN  WAR  117 

Tripoli  are  less  clear.  Questioned  concerning  the  at- 
titude of  England,  M.  Prinetti,  the  Italian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  in  May,  1902,  replying  in  the  Chamber 
to  the  query:  '^Whether  we  (Italy)  could  hope  to 
obtain  from  England,  regarding  Tripoli's  eastern 
boundary-Une,  a  declaration  identical  with  that  re- 
ceived from  France/'  stated  "Yes,  certainly,  these 
same  assurances  have  been  given."  ^ 

From  1902  onward,  Italy  showed  that  she  meant 
to  be  faithful  to  her  agreement  with  France  respect- 
ing Morocco,  and  in  pursuance  of  this  policy,  at  the 
Algeciras  Conference  (1906),  the  ItaUan  delegate 
voted  with  France  against  his  ally,  Germany,  proving 
conclusively  that  Italy  would  not  permit  the  Triple 
AUiance  to  stand  in  the  path  of  her  vital  interests  in 
the  Mediterranean. 

The  ItaHan  Government  repeatedly  made  it  evi- 
dent that  they  had  no  desire  to  force  matters.  But 
when  the  French  column  marched  on  Fez,  and  Ger- 
many despatched  the  Panther  to  Agadir  (July  1,  1911), 
the  ItaUans  were  spurred  to  action.  For  not  only 
did  the  hquidation  of  Moroccan  affairs  point  logically 
to  a  solution  of  the  pending  Tripolitan  question,  but 
in  responsible  quarters  in  Italy  it  was  widely  believed 
that  if  Italy  did  not  occupy  Tripoli,  Germany  would 
do  so.  In  recent  years  Germany  had  shown  a  singular 
interest  in  TripoUtana.  A  German  Consulate  was 
newly  established  at  Tripoli,  and  a  German  line  of 
steamers  now  made  the  city  a  regular  port  of  call; 
German  capital  was  being  invested  in  local  enter- 
prises, and  towards  the  end  of  the  spring  of  1911, 
the  Italians  learned  that  a  German  group  was  on  the 

1  "L'ltalie  et  la  Tripoli taine,"  Le  Correspondant,  October  10,  1911. 


118  GREATER  ITALY 

eve  of  securing  considerable  concessions  from  the 
Ottoman  Government,  which  would  have  given  the 
German  interests  essential  commercial  advantages  in 
Tripoli  which  had  hitherto  been  refused  to  Italians. 
The  Italian  Cabinet  understood  only  too  well  the 
methods  of  German  Interessenpolitik,  which  created 
political  capital  out  of  commercial  enterprise.  ItaHans 
throughout  the  peninsula  believed  that  the  hour  had 
come  for  Italy  to  pursue  a  vigorous  policy  in  North 
Africa.  The  modification  of  the  status  quo  in  the 
Mediterranean,  by  French  occupation  of  Morocco, 
stipulated  by  Lord  Salisbury  twenty  years  before, 
as  a  sine  qua  non,  had  at  last  occurred.  The  assent 
of  the  Powers  had  been  secured.  Italy,  therefore, 
felt  justified  in  seizing  the  occasion  to  vindicate  her 
claims  to  Tripolitana  and  Cyrenaica. 

Italian  grievances  against  Turkish  rule  in  Tripol- 
itana were  numerous.  Italians  were,  so  it  was  alleged, 
hostilely  treated  by  Turkish  officials.  The  new  Young 
Turk  regime  had  made  matters  worse  rather  than 
better.  Insults  to  the  Italian  flag;  the  forcible  ab- 
duction and  conversion  to  Islamism  of  a  young  Italian 
working  girl;  obstacles  to  commercial  development; 
obstruction  and  bad  faith  were  charged.^ 

On  July  29,  1911,  the  ItaUan  Government  in- 
structed its  representatives  abroad  that,  unless  there 
was  an  improvement  in  their  relations  with  Tm-key 
regarding  Tripoli,  Italy  would  take  action.  Negotia- 
tions dragged  on.  Italy,  it  cannot  be  denied,  desired 
no  other  solution  than  one  which  would  give  her 
complete  control  of  TripoHtana.      The  Porte  made 

^  See  semiofficial  statement  of  Italian  case,  also  Turkish  reply. 
Times,  September  30,  1911. 


THE  LIBYAN  WAR  119 

belated  concessions  when  it  was  realised  that  Italy 
was  in  earnest.  Wide  commercial  privileges  were 
suggested.  Italy  refused  these  offers.  On  September 
22,  an  anti-Italian  demonstration  took  place  in  Con- 
stantinople. The  next  day  ItaUan  reservists  of  the 
class  of  1888  were  called  to  the  colours.  Then  the 
news  reached  Rome  that  a  Turkish  vessel,  laden  with 
arms  and  munitions,  was  due  to  arrive  at  TripoU. 
On  September  25,  the  ItaUan  Charge  d' Affaires  at 
Constantinople  presented  an  emphatic  Note  to  the 
Porte,  warning  Turkey  that  its  attitude  was  un- 
friendly, and  that  the  shipment  of  arms  and  suppUes 
to  Tripoli  at  such  a  time  could  only  be  interpreted 
as  a  hostile  act.  Three  days  later,  on  September 
28,  the  Italians  delivered  an  ultimatum  wherein, 
after  setting  forth  Italy's  grievances,  it  was  stated: 

"The  Italian  Government,  therefore,  finding  itself 
forced  to  safeguard  its  dignity  and  its  interests,  has 
decided  to  proceed  to  the  military  occupation  of 
Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica.  This  solution  is  the  only  one 
which  Italy  can  accept,  and  the  Italian  Government 
rehes  upon  the  Imperial  Government  giving  such 
orders  as  may  prevent  any  opposition  on  the  part  of 
the  Ottoman  representatives,  in  order  that  all  neces- 
sary measures  may  be  effected  without  difficulty." 

The  Turkish  reply  to  the  ultimatum,  though  con- 
ciliatory in  tone,  was  not  held  to  be  adequate.  The 
Italian  Government,  therefore,  announced  that: 

"As  the  Ottoman  Government  has  not  accepted 
the  demand  contained  in  the  Italian  ultimatum, 
Italy  and  Turkey  are  from  this  date,  September  29, 
2.30  p.  M.,  in  a  state  of  war." 


120  GREATER  ITALY 

The  announcement  took  Europe  by  surprise.  In 
England  the  Turks  were  held  to  be  the  victims  of 
Itahan  greed.  "Only  once  in  the  memory  of  living 
man  has  any  war  to  such  an  extent  as  the  present 
one  taken  the  world  by  surprise.  On  September  25, 
for  the  first  time,  we  heard  that  Italy  had  any  serious 
grievance  against  Turkey."  ^  All  shades  of  English 
opinion  were  at  the  outset  unfriendly  to  Italy,  who  was 
looked  upon  as  a  wanton  aggressor.  Yet  for  the  past 
ten  years  the  Tripolitan  question  had  been  continuously 
discussed  in  Italy,  and  for  the  past  nine  years  Italy's 
rights  in  Tripolitana  had  been  agreed  to  by  the  Powers, 
more  especially  by  France  and  Great  Britain. 

Up  to  the  last  moment  it  was  believed  at  Rome 
that  the  Porte  would  accede  to  Italian  demands,  and 
that  the  Tripolitan  expedition  would  be  in  the  nature 
of  a  'promenade  militaire.  On  September  28  an 
Italian  squadron  proceeded  to  North  African  waters. 
The  blockade  of  the  coast  of  Cyrenaica  and  Tripol- 
tana  was  announced,  and  Italy  notified  Turkey  that 
unless  within  three  days  TripoH  surrendered,  the  city 
would  be  bombarded.  On  the  morning  of  October  1 
the  cable  binding  Tripoli  with  the  outside  world  was 
cut,  and  the  next  day  the  Italian  fleet  cleared  for 
action.  Even  then  it  was  not  believed  that  the  Turks 
would  resist.  But  word  was  passed  that  a  show  of 
resistance  was  to  be  made.  Large  numbers  of  the 
native  civiHan  population  fled,  and  on  October  3, 
at  3.30  p.  M.,  the  first  Itahan  shell  struck  the  old 
Spanish  fort  which  defends  the  seaside  of  TripoH.^ 

1  "The  Turco-Italian  War  and  Its  Problems,"  by  Sir  Thomas  Bar- 
clay, Constable,  London,  1912,  p.  21. 

2  For  a  detailed  account  of  the  Italian  campaign,  see  "Italy  in  North 
Africa,"  by  W.  K.  McClure^  Constable,  London,  1913. 


THE  LIBYAN  WAR  121 

Two  hours  later  all  resistance  had  been  silenced. 
No  troops,  however,  had  arrived  from  Italy  to  occupy 
the  town.  A  sudden  change  in  Italian  plans  had 
diverted  the  first  transports  from  heading  for  Tripoli 
to  Tobruk,  the  spot  which  it  was  feared  Germany 
had  intention  of  seizing.  Time  had  to  be  gained  until 
troops  could  arrive.  On  October  4  another  bombard- 
ment of  the  forts  took  place,  and  on  the  next  day  the 
Turkish  troops  having  evacuated  the  city,  the  Arabs 
began  to  pillage  the  town.  It  was  imperative  that  the 
Itahans  should  land  to  maintain  order.  Therefore,  a 
detachment  of  1,600  sailors  was  landed,  and  the  Italian 
flag  hoisted  over  the  city.  On  October  7  Rear-Admiral 
Borea  Ricci  took  over  the  governorship  of  Tripoli.  A 
large  number  of  sheiks  and  Arab  notables  swore  al- 
legiance to  the  Itahan  Government;  most  conspicuous 
among  them  was  Hassuna  Pasha,  whose  friendship 
Crispi  had  gained  twenty  years  before. 

Without  incident  the  expeditionary  force  landed, 
and  by  October  20,  after  brief  skirmishes,  the  chief 
towns  of  Tripolitana  and  Cyrenaica:  Tripoh,  Derna, 
Homs,  and  Tobruk  were  safely  in  Itahan  possession. 
At  Benghazi  alone  did  the  Italians  encounter  serious 
obstacles,  but  the  capital  of  Cyrenaica  also  fell  into 
Italian  hands  after  a  two  days'  assault.  Elsewhere 
Turkish  resistance  had  been  feeble,  and  in  Tripoli 
order  was  so  speedily  established  that  the  campaign 
seemed  over  before  it  had  properly  begun.  The  na- 
tives seemed  to  accept  Itahan  rule  with  equanimity. 

Three  days  later,  on  October  23,  came  a  rude 
awakening  at  Tripoh.  The  Turco-Arab  forces  had 
withdrawn  to  the  south  and  west  of  the  city;  their 
nimibers  were  not  definitely  known,  but  they  were 


122  GREATER  ITALY 

believed  to  be  well  over  12,000.  At  8  A.  m.  they 
began  an  attack  on  the  Itahan  intrenched  positions 
to  the  eastward  of  the  El  Hanni  plateau.  It  was 
soon  rumoured  that  the  Italian  left  had  been  crushed, 
and  that  the  Turks  were  about  to  enter  the  town. 
Panic  seized  hold  of  the  inhabitants.  Suddenly  the 
cry  arose:  ''Death  to  the  Christians."  Italian  soldiers 
were  attacked  with  knives  and  sticks;  some  shots 
were  fired,  and  in  a  moment  what  seemed  to  be  a 
serious  uprising  burst  forth.  Orders  were  given  to 
clear  the  streets,  and  natives  found  with  weapons  in 
hand  were  in  some  cases  shot  down.  Whenever  pos- 
sible the  Italian  soldiery  refrained  from  extreme 
measures.  The  rumour  of  the  Turkish  advance  proved 
unfounded,  and  order  was  soon  restored.  On  the 
next  day  it  was  deemed  advisable  to  clear  out  what- 
ever rebels  remained.  The  work  was  trying.  It  re- 
quired a  house-to-house  search.  Sharp  encounters 
took  place  between  the  Italian  troops  and  the  Arabs 
who  had  hidden  in  the  oasis.  "But  by  the  evening 
of  October  27  the  task  was  practically  completed. 
Several  thousand  Arabs  had  been  brought  into  Tripoli, 
and  of  these  some  2,500  were  deported  to  Tremiti  and 
Ustica."^  The  Italians  had  lost  heavily;  13  officers 
and  361  men  killed,  and  16  officers  and  142  men 
wounded. 

In  quelling  this  native  rising  harsh  measures  were 
inevitable,  but  Europe  soon  rang  with  the  tales  of 
Italian  atrocities,  of  wilful  murder  of  helpless  men 
and  women,  which  would  seem  altogether  unfounded. 
The  opinion  of  Field-Marshal  Lord  Roberts  on  the 
events  in  Tripoli  as  stated  in  the  Times  of  November 

1  McClure:  "Italy  in  North  Africa,"  p.  67. 


THE  LIBYAN  WAR  123 

29,  1911,  is  a  valuable  commentary  in  extenuation  of 
the  Italian  action: 

"It  is  totally  unfair,  as  we  are  a  friendly  nation, 
to  criticise  any  military  measures  which  the  Italian 
Commander-in-Chief  may  have  found  it  necessary  to 
put  in  force,  without  having  access  to  the  informa- 
tion upon  which  he  acted.  As  far  as  can  be  learnt 
from  the  more  trustworthy  reports  that  have  reached 
this  country,  the  Italians  were  suddenly  faced  with 
a  rising  of  Arabs  in  the  direct  rear  of  their  line  of 
resistance.  Such  a  desperate  state  of  affairs  would, 
in  any  case,  warrant  desperate  measures  to  re-establish 
the  equilibrium  of  battle.  Time  also  was  pressing, 
as  the  main  attack  by  the  Turks  and  Arabs  was  im- 
minent. That  the  means  employed  to  re-estabhsh 
what  I  have  called  the  equilibrium  of  battle  was 
severe,  is  doubtless  true,  but  in  war  it  is  usually  the 
severest  measures  that  are,  in  the  long  run,  the  most 
humane.  No  soldier  will  put  any  credence  in  the 
reports  that  women  and  children  were  deliberately 
killed  by  the  Italians,  but,  doubtless,  in  the  act  of 
clearing  hostile  villages  behind  the  Italian  lines  many 
innocent  people  suffered  with  the  guilty.  Such  things 
are,  unfortunately,  inevitable  in  war. 

"In  no  army  in  the  world  could  the  orders  which 
General  Caneva  found  it  imperative  to  issue  for  the 
clearance  of  the  Tripoli  oasis  have  been  carried  out 
without  instances  of  regrettable  severity.  The  very 
urgency  of  the  operation  alone  would  necessitate  this 
severity.  Only  those  who  have  the  experience  of  war 
in  all  its  phases  have  the  right  to  judge  of  the  ex- 
pediency of  reprisals,  and  then  only  when  they  have 
access  to  the  information  which  was  at  the  time  in 
the  possession  of  the  directing  staff." 

It  cannot  be  denied  that,  after  the  rising  of  October 
23,  the  Italians  were  looked  upon  with  mistrust  and 


124  GREATER  ITALY 

suspicion  by  the  native  population,  and  their  posi- 
tion became  more  difficult. 

On  November  5  Tripolitana  and  Cyrenaica  were, 
by  a  royal  decree,  annexed  to  Italy  under  the  generic 
name  of  Libya.  The  work  of  conquest  had  not,  how- 
ever, been  completed.  The  Itahans  held  only  the 
main  to^vTis  along  the  coast  and  the  territory  imme- 
diately surrounding  these.  Fighting  continued  in  a 
desultory  fashion  throughout  the  ensuing  months, 
with  long  periods  of  inactivity.  In  Cyrenaica  more 
particularly,  Turkish  resistance  was  tenacious.  Enver 
Bey,  who  at  the  time  of  the  outbreak  of  the  war  was 
Turkish  Military  Attache  at  Berhn,  left  his  post,  pro- 
ceeded to  the  scene  of  action,  and  organised  the  war- 
hke  Arabs  into  an  efficient  force  which  seriously 
menaced  the  Italians  during  the  early  months  of 
1912.  Desperate  fighting  took  place  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Benghazi,  resulting  in  heavy  casualties 
on  both  sides. 

It  would  seem  reasonable  to  lend  credence  to  the 
report  that  Turkish  resistance  to  Italy  was  encouraged 
and  supported  by  Germany.  Von  der  Goltz  Pasha, 
the  chief  of  the  German  military  mission  at  Constan- 
tinople, urged  in  so  far  as  lay  in  his  power — and  this 
was  very  great — the  continuation  of  the  struggle, 
while  the  arrival  of  Enver  Bey  on  the  scene,  coming 
directly  from  Berhn,  would  in  the  fight  of  his  pro- 
nounced pro-German  sympathies  conclusively  prove 
that  Germany  had  a  direct  interest  in  making  the 
Tripofitan  campaign  as  burdensome  as  possible  to 
the  Italians.  There  seems  little  doubt  that  the  Berlin 
Government  had  expected  to  receive  Tobruk  for  its 
own  uses  as  a  naval  base  in  the  Mediterranean,  in 


THE  LIBYAN  WAR  125 

return  for  its  acquiescence  in  the  Italian  occupation 
of  Libya.  This  explains  the  undue  haste  of  the  Ital- 
ians in  occupying  this  base  to  the  detriment  of  the 
broader  needs  of  the  campaign.  Further  than  this 
it  is  not  unreasonable  to  assume  that  the  Central 
Empires,  no  longer  able  to  count  on  Italian  support 
in  the  event  of  a  European  war,  wished  to  make  the 
campaign  of  North  Africa  so  arduous  as  not  merely 
materially  to  weaken  the  resources  of  the  Kingdom, 
but  actually  to  deter  the  Italians  from  further  miU- 
tary  enterprise  for  some  time  to  come. 

The  war  against  Tiu*key  was  also  carried  on  in 
other  spheres.  At  the  very  outset  of  hostihties  on 
September  29  and  30,  an  Italian  squadron  under  the 
command  of  the  Duke  of  the  Abruzzi  attacked  and 
sank  two  Turkish  torpedo-boats  off  Prevesa  in  the 
Adriatic.  But  Italy  was  prevented  from  carrying 
the  war  into  European  Turkey  by  the  vigorous  pro- 
tests of  Austria.  In  November,  1911,  Count  Aehren- 
thal,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, declared  that  ''Italian  action  on  the  Ottoman 
coasts  of  European  Turkey  or  the  ^gean  Islands 
could  not  be  permitted,  as  contrary  to  Article  VII^ 
of  the  treaty  of  alhance."  This  protest,  wliich  Italy 
could  not  fail  to  heed  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Ger- 


1  This  clause,  as  published  in  the  "Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book"  in 
May,  1915,  reads: 

"Austria-Hungary  and  Italy,  who  have  solely  in  view  the  mainte- 
nance, as  far  as  possible,  of  the  territorial  stahis  quo  in  the  East,  engage 
themselves  to  use  their  influence  to  prevent  all  territorial  changes 
which  might  be  disadvantageous  to  the  one  or  the  other  of  the  Powers 
signatory  of  the  present  Treaty.  To  this  end  they  wiU  give  reciprocally 
all  information  calculated  to  enUghten  each  other  concerning  their 
own  intentions  and  those  of  other  Powers.  Should,  however,  the  case 
arise  that,  in  the  course  of  events,  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo 


126  GREATER  ITALY 

many  let  it  be  known  that  she  fully  supported  the 
Austrian  thesis,  restricted  for  the  time  being  the  scene 
of  operations. 

Throughout  the  early  months  of  the  campaign 
Austria  had  shown  herself  singularly  hostile  to  Italy. 
An  Italophobe  party,  which  found  strong  supporters 
in  exalted  circles  in  Vienna,  led  by  the  Chief  of  the 
Austrian  General  Staff,  Baron  Conrad  von  Hotzen- 
dorf,  asserted  in  no  veiled  language  that  the  moment 
had  come  to  attack  Italy,  who  was  daily  growing 
stronger,  and  at  the  first  opportunity  would  fall  upon 
the  Dual  Monarchy.  The  Austrian  Press  welcomed  the 
news  of  Italian  difficulties,  and  gave  wide  publicity  to 
exaggerated  reports  emanating  from  Turkish  quarters. 
Count  Aehrenthal,  unwilling  to  precipitate  a  conflict 
with  Italy  at  this  time,  when  the  Balkan  problem  had 
not  been  settled  and  a  possible  pathway  to  Salonika 
still  lay  open,  was  able  to  bring  about  the  temporary 
retirement  of  General  Conrad,  but  not  before  exten- 
sive military  preparations  had  been  effected  by  Aus- 
tria along  her  Italian  boundary,  which  caused  deep 
annoyance  to  the  ItaHans. 

The  German  Press  was  even  more  bitter.  The 
Italian  expedition  was  treated  as  an  "act  of  piracy," 
and  German  statesmen  were  especially  resentful  that 

in  the  territory  of  the  Balkans  or  of  the  Ottoman  coasts  and  islands 
in  the  Adriatic  or  the  Jilgean  Seas  becomes  impossible,  and  that,  either 
in  consequence  of  the  action  of  a  third  Power  or  for  any  other  reason, 
Austria-Hungary  or  Italy  should  be  obUged  to  change  the  status  quo 
for  their  part  by  a  temporary  or  permanent  occupation,  such  occupa- 
tion would  only  take  place  after  previous  agreement  between  the  two 
Powers,  which  would  have  to  be  based  upon  the  principle  of  a  reciprocal 
compensation  for  all  territorial  or  other  advantages  that  either  of  them 
might  acquire  over  and  above  the  existing  status  qux),  and  would  have 
to  satisfy  the  interests  and  rightful  claims  of  both  parties." 


^  THE  LIBYAN  WAR  127 

Italy  as  a  member  of  the  Triple  Alliance  should  have 
dared  to  endanger  the  position  of  predominance  which 
Germany  had  acquired  in  the  Ottoman  Empire. 

Of  all  the  European  nations  France  had  received 
with  the  most  fair-minded  equanimity  the  news  of 
the  Itahan  advance  into  Libya.  During  the  early 
days  of  the  campaign,  notwithstanding  tl\e  efforts 
of  the  politico-financial  Press  to  discredit  the  Itahan 
enterprise,  the  majority  of  the  French  people  looked 
upon  the  Tripohtan  venture  as  a  sequel  to  their  own 
Moroccan  campaign.  No  untoward  incident  had 
marred  the  friendly  relations  of  the  two  countries, 
when,  on  January  16, 1912,  the  Italian  cruiser  Agordat 
stopped  the  French  mail  packet  Carthage,  bound  for 
Tunis,  and  took  it  into  Cagliari,  the  Sardinian  port, 
on  the  pretext  that  it  was  carrying  aeroplanes  destined 
for  the  enemy.  This  action  on  the  part  of  the  Itahan 
authorities  aroused  the  anger  of  the  French,  who 
demanded  the  immediate  release  of  the  detained 
vessel,  and  public  opinion  was  united  in  its  support 
of  the  most  energetic  measures  that  the  Government 
might  deem  necessary  to  take.  Two  days  later,  when 
the  anti-Itahan  agitation  was  at  its  height,  news 
reached  Paris  that  another  French  steamer,  the  Ma- 
nouha,  also  bound  for  Tunis,  had  been  taken,  in  a  similar 
manner,  into  custody  by  the  Itahans  on  the  ground 
that  29  Turkish  passengers,  who  were  travelling  as 
doctors  and  nurses  of  the  Turkish  Red  Crescent, 
were  in  reality  Turkish  army  officials.  The  French 
beheved  this  second  incident  to  be  a  direct  affront  to 
their  national  dignity.  The  Government  peremptorily 
demanded  the  immediate  release  of  the  steamers. 
On  January  20  the  Carthage  and  Manouba  were  al- 


128  GREATER  ITALY 

lowed  to  proceed.  The  next  day  the  French  Govern- 
ment required  the  release  of  the  29  Turkish  officials. 
M.  Poincare,  then  Premier  and  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  speaking  in  the  Chamber,  in  answer  to  a 
number  of  violent  questions  regarding  the  incident, 
used  what  may  be  termed  extremely  firm,  if  not  un- 
friendly, language  towards  Italy.  A  week  later  the 
affair  was  liquidated.  Italy  was  compelled  to  hand 
over  the  Turkish  passengers  of  the  Manouha  to  the 
French  authorities,  while  it  was  agreed  by  both  parties 
to  refer  the  whole  matter  to  The  Hague  Tribunal.^ 
This  regrettable  incident  once  again,  at  a  critical 
moment,  disturbed  Franco-Italian  relations  when 
they  seemed  on  the  eve  of  becoming  friendly.  In 
Italy  the  conviction  was  wide-spread  that  the  Italians 
had  been  browbeaten  by  the  French,  while  in  France, 
what  seemed  to  the  French  the  high-handed  policy 
of  Italy  in  the  Mediterranean  was  keenly  resented. 
The  war  in  Libya  dragged  on.  The  Itahans  were 
making  very  slow  headway.  The  cost  of  the  cam- 
paign now  amounting  to  nearly  1,500,000  lire  (£60,- 
000)  per  day  was  growing  burdensome.  In  Cyrenaica 
the  enemy  was  still  able  to  put  up  a  strong  resistance. 
Nowhere  had  the  Italians  penetrated  far  into  the 
interior.  Though  peace  rumours  had  been  at  various 
times  circulated,  it  was  evident  that  the  Porte  did 
not  feel  itself  beaten,  and  was  unwilling  to  consider 


^  In  May,  1913,  The  Hague  Tribunal  rendered  its  decision.  It  sus- 
tained the  Italian  contention  that  neither  incident  could  be  interpreted 
as  an  act  of  intentional  hostility  towards  France.  No  damages  were 
awarded  for  alleged  affront  to  the  French  flag.  In  the  case  of  the 
Carthage,  £6,400  were  awarded,  while  for  the  detention  of  the  Manouha, 
only  £200  were  assessed.  This  verdict  virtually  proclaims  that  Italian 
action  was  justified. 


THE  LIBYAN  WAR  129 

the  question  of  surrendering  the  last  Turkish  pos- 
sessions in  North  Africa.  Early  in  January  the  Ital- 
ians gained  a  victory  at  sea,  when  near  Kunfida, 
off  the  Arabian  coast,  an  Italian  cruiser,  assisted  by 
two  torpedo-boats,  sank  seven  Turkish  torpedo-boats 
and  captured  an  armed  yacht.  But  the  Ottoman 
Government  seemed  in  nowise  impressed  by  reverses, 
secure  in  the  protection  of  the  Powers  and  the  ban 
placed  on  carrying  the  war  into  any  other  than  the 
African  zone. 

On  February  27  the  Italians,  wearied  of  the  inde- 
cisive nature  of  the  contest,  braved  the  anger  of  the 
European  Powers,  and  sank  two  Turkish  ships  in  the 
harbour  of  BejTout.  Italy  by  this  act  had  once  again 
opened  up  the  Near  Eastern  Question.  Russia,  France, 
and  Great  Britain  expressed  grave  concern.  None 
were  eager  to  precipitate  a  crisis  in  the  Near  East. 
Within  ten  days,  Russia,  acting  in  behalf  of  the  Powers, 
made  confidential  inquiries  at  Rome  regarding  the 
terms  of  peace  which  Italy  would  be  ready  to  accept. 
On  March  15,  the  Italian  Government  formulated  its 
proposals,  which  included  the  recognition  of  Itahan 
sovereignty  over  Libya.  The  Porte  refused  these 
terms,  and  the  negotiations  fell  through. 

Italy  had  now  carried  the  war  into  the  eastern 
Mediterranean,  and  she  was  soon  to  prove  that  she 
meant  to  push  operations  vigorously  in  this  quarter. 
After  due  preparations,  a  month  later,  on  April  18,  an 
imposing  Itahan  squadron  appeared  off  the  entrance 
of  the  Dardanelles.  The  land  batteries  of  the  forts 
of  Kum  Kaleh  and  Sedil-Bahr  opened  fire.  The  Ital- 
ian guns  soon  reduced  them  to  silence.  The  Ottoman 
Government   became,  for   the   first   time,    thoroughly 


130  GREATER  ITALY 

alarmed.  The  closing  of  the  Dardanelles  was  imme- 
diately ordered,  and  the  chancelleries  of  Europe  were 
busied  with  negotiations  regarding  this  event,  while 
Austria  threateningly  announced  that  it  declined  to 
admit  the  right  of  Italy  to  make  an  attack  on  Turkey 
in  Europe,  and  that  further  action  in  this  quarter 
would  result  in  serious  consequences.  A  month  later 
the  Dardanelles  were  reopened  for  traffic. 

But  the  bold  course  pursued  by  the  Italians  was  to 
have  a  profound  repercussion  throughout  Europe 
and  the  Near  East.  Italy  in  the  face  of  the  protests 
of  Europe  had  dared  to  hunt  the  Turk  in  his  lair. 
The  Near  Eastern  Question,  which  for  the  past  thirty 
years  had  never  been  faced  since  the  Congress  of 
Berhn  had  patched  up  a  makeshift  peace  in  the 
Balkans,  was  once  again  the  problem  of  the  hour. 

The  Italian  fleet  now  cruised  unmolested  about  the 
iEgean,  cutting  cables,  and  shelUng  various  points 
both  on  the  mainland  and  the  Turkish  Islands. 
Realising  that  the  umbrage  of  the  Powers  was  not 
very  terrible,  the  Italians  made  ready  to  gain  a  foot- 
hold in  the  JEgean  which  could  not  fail  to  prove  useful 
in  the  future.  On  May  4,  an  Italian  expeditionary 
force  landed  at  the  Island  of  Rhodes,  and,  overcoming 
the  tenacious  resistance  of  the  Turkish  garrison,  en- 
tered the  city  of  Rhodes,  while  the  Turks  retreated 
to  Psithos,  in  the  interior  of  the  island.  Simulta- 
neously other  islands  of  the  Sporades,  known  as  the 
Dodecanese  group,  were  occupied  by  the  Itahan 
forces.  On  May  17  the  Turkish  troops  at  Psithos 
were  surrounded,  and  after  a  stiff  encounter  were 
forced  to  surrender.  By  the  end  of  May,  ItaUan  rule 
was  firmly  estabhshed  in  the  ^Egean  Islands,  though 


THE  LIBYAN  "WAR  131 

the  occupation  was  reported  to  be  merely  tempo- 
rary. 

In  the  meantime  a  period  of  renewed  activity  had 
been  inaugm'ated  in  TripoUtana.  The  Itahan  forces 
pushed  westward  and  encountered  a  stubborn  re- 
sistance at  Zanzur.  The  Turks  had  dug  themselves 
in  and  strongly  fortified  their  positions  about  the 
oasis.  Here  one  of  the  bloodiest  battles  of  the  cam- 
paign was  fought,  and  though  the  Itahans  gained  a 
notable  success,  it  was  not  until  three  months  later, 
on  September  20,  that  the  oasis  was  occupied.  Not- 
withstanding the  torrid  smnmer  heat,  the  ItaUans 
pushed  their  operations  in  all  directions.  The  Arabs, 
now  well  organised,  put  up  a  plucky  fight,  but  were 
slowly  succumbing  to  the  methodical  Italian  advance. 
The  war  in  many  sectors  had  settled  down  to  static, 
trench-warfare,  with  frequent  saUies  by  the  Itahans 
and  furious  counter-attacks  by  the  Turco-Arab  troops. 

The  Porte  at  last  reaUsed  that  nothing  was  to  be 
gained  by  prolonging  the  conflict.  Furthermore, 
news  was  reaching  Constantinople  of  efforts  which 
were  being  made  to  form  a  league  of  the  Balkan  States, 
directed  against  Turkey.  The  thunder  of  the  Itahan 
guns  in  the  ^gean  had  drifted  across  the  Balkans 
and  aroused  the  longing  of  the  Serbs,  the  Greeks,  and 
the  Bulgars  to  emancipate  their  kinsmen  still  under 
Turkish  rule. 

On  July  12  secret  peace  negotiations  were  initiated 
at  Ouchy,  near  Lausanne,  Switzerland,  between  Prince 
Said  Halim,  the  Turkish  representative,  and  a  com- 
mission of  three  Itahan  delegates,  MjVI.  Bertohni,  Fusi- 
nato,  and  Volpi.  It  was  evident  at  once  that  there 
seemed  Uttle  chance  of  securing  a  satisfactory  settle- 


132  GREATER  ITALY 

merit.  The  Italian  Government  realised  that  the 
only  way  by  which  it  could  hope  to  attain  its  de- 
mands was  to  push  miUtary  activities  ahead  with 
all  possible  energy. 

A  week  after  pourparlers  had  been  begun,  five 
Italian  torpedo-boats  slipped  up  the  Dardanelles  on 
a  raiding  expedition  which,  though  a  daring  enterprise, 
achieved  no  tangible  advantage.  Fighting  continued 
actively  in  TripoUtana,  while  the  peace  negotiations, 
which  had  been  interrupted,  were  resumed  at  Caux 
between  the  Italian  delegates  and  two  new  Turkish 
envoys,  Naby  Bey  and  Fahreddin  Bey.  The  ItaHan 
Government  now  made  permanent  arrangements  for 
the  governance  of  Libya.  General  Caneva,  who  had 
been  in  sole  command  since  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 
after  receiving  high  honours  was  reHeved,  and  as  the 
principal  as  well  as  minor  points  along  the  coast  were 
now  safely  in  Italian  hands,  Libya  was  divided  into  two 
distinct  provinces  of  Cyrenaica  and  Tripolitana,  each 
having  its  own  governor  and  separate  administration. 

Through  August  and  September  the  peace  negotia- 
tions were  tortuously  pursued.  The  patience  of  the 
ItaUan  delegates,  their  firm  resolve  to  obtain  their 
own  terms,  contrasted  with  the  indirect  ''bluff"  of 
the  Turkish  envoys,  who  made  desperate  attempts 
to  secure  a  more  favourable  peace. 

On  October  1,  Bulgaria,  Serbia,  and  Greece  mobil- 
ised their  forces.  Reshid  Pasha  thereupon  arrived 
in  Switzerland  from  Constantinople  with  full  powers. 
Eight  days  later  Montenegro  declared  war  on  Turkey, 
and  the  other  States  of  the  Balkan  League  joined  in 
the  war.  The  position  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  was 
critical,  assailed  by  the  strong  league  of  Balkan  States, 


THE  LIBYAN  WAR  133 

with  the  ItaHan  war  unfinished.  The  Porte  never- 
theless procrastinated.  On  October  12  the  ItaHan 
Government  forwarded  what  amounted  to  an  ul- 
timatum to  Turkey,  demanding  that  its  terms  of 
peace  be  accepted  within  five  days,  and  at  the  same 
time  the  ItaHan  fleet  was  ordered  into  the  ^gean. 
Thus  under  pressure,  Turkey,  on  October  16,  signed 
the  preHminaries  of  peace.  Two  days  later  the  Italian 
and  Turkish  plenipotentiaries  affixed  their  signatures 
to  the  final  draft  of  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne. 

By  the  terms  of  the  treaty  Italy  acquired  the  sover- 
eignty over  TripoHtana  and  Cyrenaica.  The  Italians 
engaged  to  evacuate  the  Dodecanese  as  soon  as  the 
Turkish  officials,  both  civil  and  military,  had  left 
Libya.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  Turkish  Govern- 
ment had  reason  to  fear  that  Greece  would  seize  the 
islands  if  Italy  evacuated  them,  no  steps  were  taken 
to  carry  out  this  provision,  and  Italy  stiU  holds  the 
islands.  Wide  reHgious  freedom  was  granted  by  special 
decree  to  the  populations  of  Libya,  and  the  complete 
freedom  of  worship  assured;  the  name  of  the  Sultan 
was  still  to  be  pronounced  in  public  prayers,  and  the 
Sultan  was  to  appoint  his  representative  in  Libya, 
who  was  to  look  after  Mohammedan  interests. 

Thus  the  war,  which  had  lasted  for  nearly  thirteen 
months,  came  to  an  end.  Russia,  who  throughout 
the  campaign  had  shown  herself  friendly  to  ItaHan 
interests,  immediately  recognised  ItaHan  sovereignty 
over  the  conquered  provinces,  followed  by  the  other 
Powers,  except  France,  who  delayed  her  recognition 
for  several  days;  a  fact  which  was  widely  commented 
upon  at  the  time.  The  Turk  had  been  driven  out  of 
Africa,  and  the  act  of  the  Italians  was  a  signal  for  the 


134  GREATER  ITALY 

Balkan  peoples  to  unite  and  drive  him  ''bag  and  bag- 
gage out  of  Europe." 

Italy  had  entered  the  war  believing  that  it  would 
be  more  of  a  military  promenade  than  a  serious  cam- 
paign. As  time  passed,  and  the  war  became  more 
costly;  as  the  number  of  casualties  increased,  and 
the  expenses  of  the  expedition  mounted  to  unprec- 
edented figures,  many  Italians  expressed  concern 
lest  the  people  become  discontented;  lest  scenes  such 
as  were  witnessed  during  the  Abyssinian  war  be  re- 
peated. But  the  Italian  people  had  progressed  greatly 
since  those  days.  The  war  in  Africa  was  to  show  that 
Itahans  of  all  parts  of  the  peninsula  had  attained  to 
a  sense  of  national  consciousness.  The  Italian  army 
had  undertaken  a  difficult  campaign  abroad  on  a 
large  scale,  and  had  acquitted  itself  with  great  credit. 
The  slowness  in  the  operations  and  a  certain  timidity 
of  command  were  due  mainly  to  pohtical  reasons. 
The  Government  of  Giolitti,  which  had  entered  upon 
the  war  only  after  much  pressm-e  had  been  brought 
to  bear,  constantly  dreaded  a  serious  reverse,  which 
might  end  in  an  episode  such  as  accompanied  the  fall 
of  Crispi.  Yet  when  peace  with  Turkey  was  finally 
concluded,  Giolitti,  speaking  in  the  Chamber  on 
December  3,  1912,  could  exclaim  with  truth: 

"The  peace  which  we  have  concluded,  leaves  Italy 
stronger  and  more  respected;  it  gives  her  a  great 
colony  in  the  Mediterranean  opposite  her  own  terri- 
tory; it  gives  her  a  mission  to  perform  (and  it  is 
not  a  small  matter  for  a  great  people  to  have  a  mission 
to  perform);  it  gives  her,  furthermore,  as  a  great 
Power,  full  hberty  of  action.  With  this  full  Hberty 
of  action  in  times  of  difficulty  we  can  provide  ef- 


THE   LIBYAN   WAR  135 

ficaciously  for  the  defense  of  our  interests,  and  we 
can  at  the  same  time  enforce  our  authority  to  pro- 
tect the  legitimate  interests  of  other  people." 

The  Libyan  war  up  to  this  time  had  cost  Italy 
458,000,000  hre  (£18,320,000.)^  Notwithstanding  the 
fact  that  the  campaign  was  difficult  and  casualties  rel- 
atively very  heavy,  the  ItaUan  people  sustained  the 
ordeal  with  splendid  spirit.  Nearly  200,000  men  had 
taken  part  in  the  fighting,  and  the  patriotism  of  the 
Itahan  people  had  brilliantly  asserted  the  growth  of 
soUdarity  and  unity  throughout  the  length  and  breadth 
of  the  Kingdom. 

The  African  campaign  had,  however,  again  ahenated 
the  friendship  of  the  Powers.  The  inimical  attitude 
of  France  after  the  Carthage  incident,  the  sulky  mood 
of  the  French  people  regarding  the  fait  accompli  when 
ItaUan  sovereignty  over  Libya  was  finally  acknowl- 
edged, and  the  harsh  British  criticism  of  Itahan 
methods  and  motives,  made  a  strong  impression  in 
Italy.  For  the  Italians  had  counted  on  the  support 
and  sympathy  of  France  and  Great  Britain,  with 
whose  approval  the  Tripohtan  campaign  had  been 
undertaken.  The  active  opposition  of  Austria  and 
Germany  had  not  surprised  the  people  of  Italy,  and 
made  them  desirous  of  freeing  themselves  from  the 
shackles  of  the  Triple  Alhance.  But  Itahan  leaders 
beheved  that  the  Triple  Alliance  still  served  the  best 
interests  of  peace.  Germany  was  quick  to  gauge  the 
significance  of  the  dissatisfaction,  rife  in  Italy,  with 
France  and  Great  Britain.    To  bind  Italy  more  firmly 

*  The  estimate  of  the  actual  total  cost  of  the  campaign  made  in 
February,  1914,  was  £46,000,000. 


136  GREATER  ITALY 

to  the  Central  Empires  it  was  expedient  to  proclaim 
unequivocally  the  strength  of  the  Triple  Alliance. 
Thus  on  December  7,  1912,  eighteen  months  before 
the  date  of  expiration,  the  Triple  Alliance  was  once 
again  renewed. 

Italy  now  entered  upon  a  period  of  what  appeared 
to  be  the  closest  intimacy  with  Austria-Hungary. 
Not  for  many  years  had  there  been  such  a  seemingly 
amicable  understanding.  Italy  supported  the  Aus- 
trian contention  regarding  the  inviolability  of  Al- 
bania. The  Itahan  Government  agreed  to  co-operate 
with  the  Dual  Monarchy  to  compel  Montenegro  to 
evacuate  Scutari;  an  Austro-ItaUan  Note  was  handed 
to  Greece,  demanding  its  withdrawal  from  southern 
Albania.  Yet  everywhere  Italy  was  actively  safe- 
guarding her  interests,  compelling  the  Vienna  Govern- 
ment to  consider  Itahan  aims. 

During  the  spring  of  1913  severe  fighting  continued 
to  take  place  in  Libya,  where  the  Itahans  encountered 
a  determined  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  Arabs. 
In  Cyrenaica  the  problem  of  pacification  was  ex- 
tremely difficult,  owing  to  the  unruly  nature  of  the 
population.  Fresh  troops  were  despatched  to  Africa, 
and  engagements  took  place  intermittently  throughout 
the  summer  with  bands  of  raiding  Arabs. 

On  July  2  the  King  and  Queen  of  Italy,  on  their 
way  to  pay  a  visit  to  the  Swedish  Court,  w^re  enter- 
tained with  much  cordiality  by  Wilham  II  and  the 
Empress  at  Kiel.  Though  no  official  communication 
was  made,  it  was  known  that  at  this  meeting  Itahan 
interests  in  Asia  Minor  were  considered.  The  Italian 
Press  now  for  the  first  time  discussed  Italy's  '^ Asiatic 
policy,"   and   three  months  later  it  was   announced 


THE  LIBYAN  WAR  137 

that  a  group  of  Italian  financiers  had  been  granted  a 
concession  to  build  a  railway  in  southwest  Asia  Minor, 
from  Adalia  on  the  Mediterranean  northwest  of  Cyprus, 
to  a  junction  point  on  the  Bagdad  Railway. 

Meanwhile,  the  ItaHans  had  established  themselves 
firmly  in  the  Dodecanese.  At  Rhodes  municipal  im- 
provements had  been  taken  rigorously  in  hand;  city 
hghting  and  road  building  had  been  speedily  pushed 
forward;  a  good  postal-service  was  estabUshed,  and 
plans  were  made  to  open  ItaUan  schools,  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  France,  inspired  in  part  by  phil-Hellenic 
motives,  expressed  grave  concern  regarding  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  Itahan  occupation  of  the  islands. 
Thereupon  Sir  Edward  Grey,  on  behalf  of  the  Entente 
Powers,  addressed  a  formal  Note  to  Italy,  demanding 
the  evacuation  of  the  islands  in  accordance  with  her 
promise.  The  Triple  Alliance  repUed  to  this  Note,  on 
behalf  of  Italy,  though  no  definite  assurances  were 
given  regarding  evacuation. 

Thus  Italy,  who  two  years  before  had  been  satis- 
fied to  play  a  negative  role  in  world  poHtics,  sud- 
denly found  herself  in  a  position  of  dominant  in- 
fluence. She  had  possessed  herself  of  Libya  in  the 
face  of  the  opposition  of  nearly  all  the  Powers;  she 
had  matched  her  strength  against  Austria;  assured 
the  integrity  of  Montenegro  and  the  neutrahty  of 
the  Otranto  Channel;  she  had  furthered  the  estab- 
Hshment  of  an  independent  Albanian  kingdom,  and 
thus  blocked  the  designs  of  Serbia  to  an  outlet  to  the 
Adriatic,  and  prevented  the  expansion  of  Greece. 

But  if  on  the  surface  Italy  seemed  in  agreement 
with  her  Austrian  ally,  many  incidents  showed  how 
precarious   were    the   foundations    of    their    friendly 


138  GREATER  ITALY 

understanding.  The  Libyan  war  had  aroused  afresh 
the  irredentist  aspirations  of  the  Itahans,  while  Aus- 
tria dehberately  chose  to  continue  her  anti-Itahan 
poUcy  in  the  Adriatic.  In  August,  1913,  at  the  time 
when  General  Caneva,  the  conqueror  of  Libya,  was 
paying  an  official  visit  to  Vienna,  orders  were  issued 
dismissing  all  the  Itahan  employees  of  the  municipal- 
ity of  Trieste.  This  intentional  affront  to  Italy  could 
not  fail  to  excite  popular  indignation  throughout  the 
peninsula.  The  relations  between  the  two  countries 
were  further  strained  when,  during  this  same  month, 
the  Vienna  Government  broached  to  Italy  the  project 
of  attacking  Serbia,  in  order  to  break  the  rising  power 
of  the  Serbs  (a  plan  which  the  Dual  Monarchy  was 
to  put  into  execution  twelve  months  later),  and  re- 
quested Italian  acquiescence  to  this  plan.  Rome 
categorically  refused  to  consider  such  a  project,  and 
warned  Count  Berchtold  that  such  a  policy  of  aggres- 
sion could  not  be  undertaken  with  the  consent  of  Italy. 
General  Conrad  von  Hotzendorf  had  been  reappointed 
to  the  position  of  Chief  of  the  Austrian  General 
Staff,  and  there  were  many  indications  that  the  Dual 
Monarchy  proposed  at  the  opportune  time  to  carry 
out  its  Balkan  policy,  relying  only  on  the  support  of 
Germany. 

GioUtti,  who  had  been  in  office  during  these  event- 
ful years,  took  unto  himself  the  full  credit  of  the  vic- 
torious Tripolitan  war  and  the  successful  peace.  He 
had  renewed  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  affii'med  the 
important  position  of  Italy  in  European  affairs.  In 
October,  1913,  the  universal  suffrage  law  which  he  had 
decreed  was  put  to  test.  The  number  of  voters  had 
been  raised  from  three  million  to  eight  milHon,  yet 


THE   LIBYAN   WAR  139 

so  well  did  the  dictator  control  the  situation,  that 
the  elections  resulted  in  an  overwhelming  majority 
for  himself.  Nevertheless,  five  months  later,  in  March, 
1914,  Giolitti  retired  from  office.  There  was  no  ap- 
parent reason  for  his  retirement  except  that,  as  was 
his  custom,  he  withdrew  for  the  time  being  from  pubUc 
affairs  in  order  that  his  successor  should  grapple  with 
the  difficulties  arising  out  of  his  own  administration, 
or  rather  maladministration,  which  could  no  longer 
be  staved  off.  Thus  after  a  dictatorship  lasting  eleven 
years  and  four  months  Giolitti,  still  the  most  power- 
ful personage  in  Italian  public  affairs,  retired  to  private 
life  to  watch  and  wait  for  an  opportune  moment  to 
return  to  power. 

During  the  decade  of  his  ''regency,"  he  had  cor- 
rupted the  pohtical  hfe  of  Italy;  he  had  demoralised 
Parhament  by  his  methods  of  party-erosion  so  that 
no  vigorous  opposition  remained.  He  had  blotted 
out  party  hnes  so  that  though  there  were  groups, 
there  were  no  real  parties.  He  had  been  a  Liberal 
and  then  turned  Conservative,  and  even  semi-Clerical. 
He  had  adopted  the  programmes  and  policy  which 
seemed  most  Ukely  to  succeed,  and  taken  unto  him- 
self the  credit  thereof.  He  left  office  with  the  finances 
of  the  country  compromised,  its  foreign  pohcy  obscure, 
and  the  subversive  forces  of  the  State  strengthened. 
Notmthstanding  the  demorahsed  state  of  Italian 
pohtical  Hfe,  the  resihent  strength  of  the  ItaHan  people 
was  soon  to  reassert  itself.  Giolitti's  hold  on  the 
country  was  wdde-spread  but  had  nowhere  taken  deep 
root.  It  had  undermined,  but  not  sapped,  the  vitahty 
of  the  country.  So  that  when,  during  the  great  up- 
heaval that  was  to  come  in  May,  1915,  Giolitti  en- 


140  GREATER  ITALY 

deavoured  to  oppose  the  will  of  the  nation,  he  was 
swept  aside  by  the  mighty  current  of  popular  opinion, 
by  the  sacred  desire  of  the  Italian  people  to  fulfil 
their  manifest  destiny. 


CHAPTER  VII 

ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT 

Social  and   Vital  Statistics.    Industrial  and   Commercial 
Expansion.    Colonial  Dominions 

The  fiftieth  anniversary  of  the  founding  of  the 
Kingdom  was  celebrated  in  1911  throughout  Italy, 
with  appropriate  ceremonies.  In  Rome  the  vast 
monument  to  King  Victor  Emmanuel  II  was  un- 
veiled. Covering  the  greater  part  of  the  slope  of  the 
Capitoline  Hill,  facing  the  Corso,  glitteringly  new, 
of  white  marble  with  the  equestrian  statue  of  the 
King  in  gilt  bronze,  it  symbolised  characteristically 
Italian  aspirations  for  expansion  and  world  power, 
and  represented  the  achievement  of  United  Italy 
under  the  leadership  of  the  House  of  Savoy.  No 
other  monument  in  Italy  since  the  days  of  the  Rome 
of  the  Caesars  had  been  undertaken  on  such  a  grandiose 
scale.  Aside  from  any  discussion  of  its  artistic  merit, 
it  proclaimed  significantly  the  Italian  craving  for 
''bigness,"  and  was  a  forceful  assertion  of  the  unity 
of  the  nation.  In  Turin,  the  home  of  the  Piedmontese 
Kings,  an  international  industrial  exhibition  was 
held,  which  showed  to  the  world  for  the  first  time  the 
giant  strides  of  Italian  economic  development.  The 
statistics,  carefully  compiled  at  this  time,  afford  a 
glimpse  of  the  position  of  present-day  Italy  in  the 
affairs  of  the  world,  and  bring  home  the  salient  features 
of  Italian  growth  and  expansion. 

141 


142  GREATER  ITALY 

The  area  of  the  Ejngdom  of  Italy,  including  Sicily 
and  Sardinia,  is  110,623  square  miles.  According  to 
the  census,  taken  in  the  Jubilee  year  (June  10,  1911), 
the  population  amounted  to  34,686,683  inhabitants, 
as  compared  with  only  28,801,154  in  1871,  which  is 
an  increase  of  nearly  23  per  100.  When  it  is  taken 
into  consideration  that  during  this  period  over  five 
and  a  half  million  Italians  have  emigrated,  and  still 
retained  their  Italian  nationality,  the  figures  here 
given  are  representative  of  a  vast  growth  in  population 
well  over  50.1  per  100,  which  Russia  (103.4  per  100) 
and  Germany  (58.1  per  100)  alone  of  European  na- 
tions have  outdistanced  during  the  same  period.  Com- 
pared with  the  growth  of  the  other  great  Latin  State 
of  Europe,  France,  whose  increase  of  population  during 
this  half  century  has  only  been  9.7  per  100,  it  would 
seem  probable  that  within  a  very  brief  space  of  time 
the  population  of  Italy  will  be  greater  than  that  of 
France,  which  in  1911  had  39,601,500  inhabitants, ^  and 
is  now  reported  as  stationary  or  even  declining. 

In  examining  the  records  of  Italian  vital  statistics, 
marked  improvement  is  everywhere  met  with.  Italy 
to-day  occupies  third  place  among  European  nations 
in  point  of  natural  increase  of  her  population,  as 
against  fifth  in  1871.  Though  her  birth-rate  has 
declined  in  common  with  that  of  the  rest  of  Europe, 
(32.4  per  1,000  inhabitants),  only  Russia  and  Hun- 
gary can  show  a  better  record. 

For  many  years  Italy  had  almost  the  highest  death- 

^  The  Italian  population  in  Europe,  not  incorporated  in  the  Kingdom 
of  Italy,  is  estimated  at  2,495,549,  occupying  a  territory  of  approxi- 
mately 23,288  square  miles,  distributed  as  follows:  Monaco,  19,121; 
Switzerland,  171,166;  Malta,  228,442;  France  (Nice  and  Corsica), 
536,820;  Austria,  1,540,000. 


ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT  143 

rate  in  Europe.  To-day,  by  great  amelioration  in 
the  sanitary  condition  of  the  population,  not  merely 
in  the  cities,  but  more  especially  in  the  rural  dis- 
tricts, the  ratio  of  mortaUty  has  been  materially  re- 
duced. The  manner  in  which  malaria,  which  as  re- 
cently as  1900  still  averaged  as  high  as  31  per  100 
of  the  population  in  the  contaminated  districts  of 
the  Maremma,  was  reduced  to  only  2  per  100  in  1908, 
and  pellagra,  which  in  1881  totalled  104,000  cases, 
and  notwithstanding  the  insidious  character  of  the 
disease  was  reduced  by  over  two-thirds,  are  fair  ex- 
amples of  the  advance  made  in  stamping  out  prevent- 
able disease  in  Italy.  However,  the  death-rate  in 
Italy  is  still  higher  than  in  the  other  chief  European 
States,  varying  between  19.6  to  21.9  per  1,000,  as 
compared  with  Great  Britain  (14.8),  France  (17.98). 
The  excess  of  births  over  deaths  in  1911  in  Italy 
amounted  to  350,734  or  10.1  per  1,000. 

The  principal  cause  of  this  relatively  small  in- 
crease in  population,  not\\dthstanding  the  fecundity 
of  the  race,  is  emigration.  Bad  crops,  low  wages, 
bad  housing  conditions  in  the  south  of  Italy,  the 
desire  to  improve  their  economic  status,  and  the  ex- 
ample of  so  many  successful  emigrants  who  have  re- 
turned home  prosperous  after  a  few  years  abroad 
are  the  chief  causes  of  emigration.  For  a  long  period 
these  able-bodied  young  ItaUans,  who  had  gone 
forth  into  the  world  to  earn  a  Uvelihood,  owing  to 
the  short-sighted  policy  of  the  Government,  which 
endeavoured  to  obstruct  emigration,  found  themselves 
abandoned  to  their  own  resources.  This  is  no  longer 
the  case.  The  ItaUan  Government  now  realises  that 
this  great  stream  of  emigrants  is  not  merely  a  means 


144  GREATER  ITALY 

of  propagating  Italian  influence  in  the  less  populous 
districts  of  the  New  World,  more  particularly  in 
South  America,  but  that  it  is  the  source  of  an  ever- 
increasing  income,  which  has  begun  to  flow  into  Ital- 
ian coffers  from  abroad.  Moreover,  many  of  those 
who  have  emigrated  in  poverty,  return  to  Italy  to 
enjoy  the  fruits  of  their  hard- won  fortunes,  bringing 
with  them  modern  ideas  and  influences,  which  has 
done  much  to  rouse  the  peasantry  of  the  South  from 
its  apathy.  From  135,832  emigrants  who  left  Italy 
in  1881,  when  the  tide  of  emigration  set  in,  the  figures 
have  risen  until  they  reached  the  astonishing  total 
of  872,598  in  1913.  Of  these  313,032  emigrated  to 
European  or  Mediterranean  countries,  while  407,475 
set  out  for  the  United  States  and  Canada,  and  145,- 
702  for  the  Argentine  Repubhc  and  the  other  South 
American  States.  The  number  of  ItaUan  emigrants 
who  returned  to  Italy  during  this  year,  numbered 
188,978.  According  to  the  official  pubfication,  An- 
nuario  Statistico  Italiano  (1913),  the  number  of  Ital- 
ians resident  abroad  numbered  5,557,746.  In  recent 
years,  these  Itahan  emigrants,  Hving  abroad,  have 
remitted  annually  important  sums  of  money  to  their 
relatives  and  famiUes  who  have  remained  in  Italy. 
According  to  computation  made  of  the  postal  money- 
orders  received  in  Italy  from  emigrants  abroad,  these 
amounted  to  nearly  £5,000,000  in  1913  from  this 
one  source,  and  showed  an  increase  of  £1,360,000 
since  1906. 

Sixty  per  cent  of  the  population  of  Italy  are  en- 
gaged in  agriculture.  Though  the  trend  towards  in- 
dustrial pursuits  is  increasing,  agriculture  in  its  varied 
forms   still   remains  the   foundation   of   the   nation's 


ECONOMIC  DE\rELOPMENT  145 

wealth.  The  total  value  of  the  whole  agricultural 
produce  in  1910  was  estimated  at  £28,000,000.  Great 
efforts  are  being  made  to  increase  the  productivity 
of  the  soil  by  the  use  of  carefully  selected  fertihsers. 
The  vineyards  are  now  the  subject  of  scientific  atten- 
tion, and  greater  care  is  being  paid  to  the  quahty  of 
the  wines.  Mechanical  implements  are  being  in- 
troduced, and  in  certain  regions  in  the  northern  dis- 
tricts, more  particularly  in  Emilia,  where  co-operative 
methods  are  much  in  vogue,  the  initiative  and  im- 
provements introduced  in  dairy-farming  and  in  the 
making  of  cheese,  butter,  etc.,  have  been  widely  copied 
abroad.  These  co-operative  societies,  which  have 
sprung  up  everj-where  in  the  north  of  Italy,  are  spread- 
ing rapidly  and  have  proved  themselves  eminently 
successful,  contributing  much  to  the  prosperity  of 
Italy.  ^  Rural  credit  banks  to  help  the  farmers  with 
loans,  agrarian  unions,  and  Government  travelHng 
teachers  of  agriculture,  who  visit  every  district  to 
instruct  the  farmers  in  the  most  approved  and  modern 
methods  of  carrying  on  their  particular  type  of  farm- 
ing, have  multipHed. 

The  case  of  the  South  is  different,  the  conditions 
there  are  still  far  from  satisfactory.  The  appalUng 
poverty  of  the  people — a  man's  wages  are  often  not 
more  than  6d.  a  day — is  here  the  chief  incentive  to 
emigration,  as  a  way  out  of  an  unbearable  situation. 
Vast  estates,  absent  landlordism,  and  all  the  evils 
of  a  defective  agrarian  system,  have  for  so  long  been 
the  rule,  that  the  progress  that  is  being  made  has  as 
yet  borne  but  little  fruit. 

1  In  1910  there  were  5,064  co-operative  societies,  and  the  returns 
from  4,222  showed  817,529  members. 


146  GREATER  ITALY 

Though  Italy  is  not  a  country  of  mineral  wealth,  the 
output  of  her  mines  in  1910  was  valued  at  £3,210,000. 
Owing  to  the  fall  in  the  price  of  sulphur,  the  output 
of  the  Sicilian  sulphur  mines,  which  two  decades  ago 
was  of  great  importance,  has  materially  decreased, 
whereas  the  tonnage  of  iron  has  increased  greatly, 
amounting  to  551,000  in  1910.  Copper,  zinc,  and  lead 
were  also  mined  in  small  quantities.  The  value  of 
the  products  of  the  rock  quarries,  travertine,  marble, 
etc.,  has  increased  to  approximately  £2,000,000. 
Italy  produces  only  about  one- twelfth  (562,000  tons 
in  1910)  the  amount  of  coal  which  is  annually  consumed 
there,  and  though  this  has  in  a  measure  retarded  her 
industrial  development,  it  has  encouraged  her  en- 
gineers to  seek  methods  of  emancipating  Italy  from 
the  need  of  coal.  It  has  been  conservatively  estimated 
that  the  streams  and  rivers  of  Italy  could  furnish  her 
with  over  5,000,000  horse-power.  According  to  recent 
reports  (1914),  968,100  electrical  horse-power  were  in 
operation.  Italy  thus  leads  all  Europe,  and  is  second 
only  to  the  United  States  in  this  field.  The  first 
electrified  railway  to  be  successfully  operated  in  Eu- 
rope was  inaugurated  in  1890  on  the  line  between 
Florence  and  Fiesole,  and  the  work  of  electrification 
has  been  steadily  extended.  A  direct  electric  line 
from  Rome  to  Naples,  a  distance  of  120  miles,  is  near- 
ing  completion,  and  it  is  hoped  that  eventually  the 
entire  railway  system  of  the  peninsula  will  be  operated 
exclusively  by  electricity. 

Notwithstanding  the  high  price  of  coal  in  Italy, 
mdustrial  progress  has  been  steady.  According  to 
the  census  taken  in  1911,  2,305,720  persons  were  en- 
gaged in  industrial  labour,  of  whom  one-fourth  were 
in  Lombardy. 


ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT  147 

Whereas  very  little  pig-iron  was  produced  in  Italy 
as  recently  as  1900,  and  the  production  was  only 
seriously  undertaken  within  the  present  decade,  the 
output,  353,000  tons  (1910),  was  nearly  threefold  as 
great  as  when  the  census  was  taken  four  years  before; 
while  in  the  same  four-year  period  the  output  of 
wrought-iron  increased  from  237,000  to  311,000,  and 
steel  from  333,000  to  670,000  tons.  During  this 
period  the  value  of  the  products  of  chemical  industries 
increased  from  £4,093,000  to  £6,001,000.  The  textile 
industries  also  developed  most  rapidly.  The  pro- 
duction of  raw  silk  has  more  than  tripled  since  1875, 
while  the  value  of  silk  and  woven  silk  products  ex- 
ported in  1911  is  estimated  at  close  to  £18,000,000, 
so  that  Milan  now  rivals  Lyons  as  the  centre  of  the 
silk  trade  of  the  world.  Cotton-mills  have  sprung  up 
everywhere  in  northern  Italy,  and  Itahan  cotton 
fabrics  were  already  competing  in  foreign  markets, 
the  exports  to  Turkey  alone  amounting  to  over  10,000 
tons,  while  the  value  of  cotton  exports  totalled  (1911) 
£7,320,000.  The  beet-sugar  industry  shows  an  equal 
expansion.  In  1899  only  5,972  tons  were  produced, 
while  the  figures  for  the  production  eleven  years  later 
are  173,184  tons,  besides  62,700  tons  of  syrups  and 
molasses.  Italy  supplies  nearly  one-third  of  the  total 
world  consumption  of  ohve-oil,  her  exports  (1911) 
in  this  article  amounting  to  £1,800,000.  The  Italian 
automobile  industry  has  won  for  itself  a  position  of 
creditable  pre-eminence,  and  the  export  of  Italian 
automobiles,  though  numerically  small,  were  valued 
at  £1,100,000. 

Italy  was  a  late  comer  in  world  markets,  yet  the 
figures  of  her  commercial  development  are  amazing. 
In  1910  imports  into  Italy,  excluding  precious  metals, 


148  GREATER  ITALY 

amounted  to  £129,839,039,  and  her  exports  during 
this  year  were  valued  at  £83,199,095.  ''It  was  cal- 
culated that  between  1898  and  1910,  Italian  imports 
had  risen  143  per  cent,  and  her  exports  124  per  cent — 
increases  which  surpass  those  of  all  other  countries 
except  the  exportation  figures  of  the  United  States."  ^ 
Italy's  chief  imports  are  cereals,  raw  cotton,  coal, 
chemical  products,  machinery,  and  w^ood.  Her  chief 
exports  are  silk,  cotton  and  silk  goods,  fruits,  wine, 
and  agricultural  produce.  Exclusive  of  coal,  which 
came  chiefly  from  Great  Britain,  and  raw  cotton  from 
the  United  States,  Germany,  as  was  to  be  expected 
from  her  position  of  control  over  Italian  markets, 
furnished  Italy  with  nearly  one-fourth  of  her  total 
imports;  while  Germany  was  Italy's  best  customer, 
Italian  exports  to  Germany  being  nearly  £4,000,000 
greater  than  to  the  next  best  customer,  the  United 
States,  with  Great  Britain  third  on  the  hst,  in  191 1.^ 

As  in  other  fields,  the  increase  in  Italian  maritime 
trade  has  been  important.  The  number  of  ships 
which  entered  and  cleared  ItaUan  ports  in  1910  was 
312,689,  with  a  tonnage  of  102,390,908  as  compared 
with  only  32,070,704  tons  in  1881,  while  the  Itahan 
mercantile  marine  numbered  680  steamships,  with  a 
tonnage  of  about  630,000,  and  4,723  saiUng  ships  of 
approximately  440,000  tons. 

Naples  is  now  the  first  port  of  Italy,  and  has  shown 
the  extraordinary  increase  of  nearly  50  per  cent  in 
tonnage  in  the  four-year  period  1906-10.  The 
harbour   facihties  have   been   greatly   extended,   and 

1  The  "Britannica  Year  Book,"  1913,  p.  1045. 

2  For  the  year  1914,  that  is,  before  ItaUan  participation  in  the  Euro- 
pean War,  the  imports  from  Great  Britain  to  Italy  exceeded  those  of 
any  other  country. 


ECONOxMIC  DE^rELOPMENT  149 

large  sums  have  been  voted  for  harbour  improvements. 
Genoa,  long  the  most  important  port  in  Italj^,  has 
now  taken  second  place.  The  congestion  of  traffic 
at  Genoa  and  the  difficulty  of  increasing  dockage 
facilities  have  hampered  its  growth.  Venice  is  Italy's 
third  mercantile  port,  though  Palermo  is  competing 
strongly  and  has  already  won  third  place  in  passenger 
traffic. 

The  total  mileage  of  railways  in  1907  amounted  to 
10,368,  and  there  have  been  few  new  fines  opened, 
though  a  certain  amount  of  doubling  of  existing  fines 
has  taken  place.  Itafian  railways  have  passed  through 
many  vicissitudes.  At  the  outset,  built  and  operated 
by  the  State,  they  were,  in  1885  turned  over  to  private 
corporations,  and  then  repurchased  by  the  State  in 
1905.  The  value  of  Italian  railways  in  1911  was 
estimated  at  £295,500,000  and  the  profits  at  £6,000,- 
000.  There  has  been  much  improvement  in  adminis- 
tration in  recent  years,  and  great  efforts  are  being 
made  to  bring  the  passenger  traffic  up  to  the  level 
of  that  of  the  chief  European  States.  Steam  and 
electric  tramways  have  a  mileage  of  3,018,  while 
motor-omnibus  service  is  steadily  being  extended 
through  rural  districts  not  tapped  by  the  railways, 
and  over  2,000  miles  of  highroad  were  thus  under 
operation.  The  motor  fines  receive  subvention  from 
the  Government. 

The  number  of  post-offices  in  Italy  in  1910  was 
10,238,  whfie  the  number  of  letters  handled  increased 
by  600,000,000  between  1906  and  1912.  There  were 
8,147  telegraph  offices  in  1912,  as  compared  \\dth  only 
1,930  eight  years  before.  The  figures  for  1912  include 
22  wireless  stations.     The  development  of  the  tele- 


150  GREATER  ITALY 

phone  system  has  been  even  more  rapid.  In  1904 
there  were  only  92  urban  and  66  intenirban  systems, 
while  by  1910  there  were  219  urban  and  426  inter- 
urban  systems,  and  the  expansion  continues  steadily. 

The  great  economic  development  during  the  past 
two  decades  has  brought  Italy  up  from  the  rank  of 
a  "poor"  country,  to  which  she  was  long  confined, 
to  that  of  a  nation  of  ever-increasing  wealth  and  well- 
being.  The  North  of  Italy  is  one  of  the  most  prosperous 
regions  of  Europe,  and  if  the  total  of  Itahan  wealth 
is  still  much  below  that  of  the  other  Great  Powers 
its  increase  has  been  considerable.  According  to  esti- 
mates of  an  Italian  economist,  the  private  wealth  of 
the  nation  is  estimated  at  over  eighty  milhard  lire,^ 
nearly  three  and  a  fifth  thousand  milhons  sterHng  or 
about  £90  per  capita.  This  amount  is  an  estimated 
increase  of  a  thousand  million  sterhng  in  a  decade. 
These  figures  are  of  necessity  only  approximate,  and 
a  more  accurate  insight  into  the  increasing  wealth  of 
Italy  is  gained  by  looking  into  the  condition  of  the 
savings-banks.  In  1901  the  total  deposits  in  the 
savings-banks,  credit  banks,  and  other  similar  insti- 
tutions, averaged  about  £3-4-0  per  head.  At  the 
end  of  1910  these  deposits  had  increased  to  £6-3-0 
or  nearly  50  per  cent,  in  the  nine-year  period,  and 
the  total  amounts  thus  deposited  were  £214,500,000. 
To  this  figure  must  be  added  £74,000,000  in  the 
postal  savings-bank,  and  £98,000,000  in  savings  in 
ordinary  banks. 

During  the  early  years  of  Italy's  existence  as  a 
united  Kingdom,  her  financial  position  was  precarious. 

iPrinzivalli:  "L'ltalia  nella  sua  Vita  Economica,"  Treves,  Milan, 
1915,  p.  66. 


ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT  151 

The  new  State  had  inherited  a  long  Hst  of  debts  from 
the  various  units  incorporated  in  the  Kingdom.  The 
war  of  1866  had  added  to  the  already  overburdened 
Itahan  finances.  This  year  ended  with  a  deficit  of 
£28,840,000.  Only  the  most  stringent  economy  and 
drastic  forms  of  taxation  could  save  the  young  State 
from  bankruptcy.  A  grist  tax  (macinato)  was  in- 
troduced, which,  though  highly  unpopular  as  it  in- 
creased the  price  of  bread  appreciably,  netted  the 
relatively  large  sum  of  £3,200,000  a  year;  while  econ- 
omies introduced  in  all  State  and  Government  depart- 
ments and  the  expropriation  of  Church  property 
saved  the  situation.  Yet  the  period  of  financial  dif- 
ficulties was  not  at  an  end,  and  though  the  deficits 
were  reduced  from  year  to  year,  the  size  of  the  budget 
increased  rapidly.  It  was  not  until  after  the  incor- 
poration of  Rome  in  the  Kingdom,  and  the  unsettled 
state  of  the  country  came  to  an  end,  that  Itahan 
finances  began  to  be  on  a  more  stable  footing.  The 
year  1875  showed  the  first  surplus,  and  for  the  ensuing 
decade  the  financial  situation  of  the  country  was  on 
a  solvent  basis.  The  economies  were  by  degrees 
abandoned;  the  country  now  entered  upon  a  period 
of  premature  expansion.  The  grist  tax  was  abolished, 
extravagant  expenditures  on  railways,  unsound  bank- 
ing, and  later,  burdensome  colonial  enterprises  again 
brought  on  a  period  of  financial  difficulties,  and  the 
long  years  of  increasing  deficits  from  1884  to  1898 
were  finally  terminated  by  careful  economies  and 
reforms  which  once  again  rescued  Italy  from  financial 
chaos.  During  the  ensuing  fourteen  years,  owing  in 
part  to  the  great  economic  development  of  the  coun- 
try,  Itahan  finances  showed  a  yearly  surplus,   not- 


152  GREATER  ITALY 

withstanding  the  fact  that  expenditures  increased 
over  thirty  milhons  sterhng.  The  Itahan  Rente,  which 
stood  at  78  in  1893  soon  passed  par,  while  a  conversion 
of  the  Debt,  carried  out  in  1906,  brought  about  an 
economy  of  a  million  and  a  half  sterhng  a  year.  Though 
at  the  time  it  seemed  as  though  the  Tripohtan  war 
had  not  affected  Italy's  financial  position,  yet  a  period 
of  appreciable  deficits  was  again  inaugurated  during 
the  past  three  fiscal  years.  During  the  year  1913-14 
the  receipts  of  the  exchequer  amounted  to  £100,950,- 
000,  and  the  expenditure  was  £107,506,400,  showing  a 
deficit  of  £6,556,400. 

Revenues  are  derived  chiefly  from  imposts  on 
lands,  buildings,  and  personal  estates;  monopolies 
on  salt,  tobacco,  and  the  lottery,  and  taxation  on  im- 
ports. Italy  has  not  only  a  high  protective  tariff, 
but  also  taxes  necessities,  not  produced  in  the  coun- 
try, such  as  wheat,  sugar,  coffee,  etc.  The  expenses 
of  collection  are  heavy,  the  burden  of  taxation  is  very 
unevenly  distributed,  and  weighs  onerously  on  the 
poor.  The  service  of  the  National  Debt  still  repre- 
sents a  great  proportion  of  expenditure,  amounting  to 
about  twenty  and  a  quarter  millions  sterhng  yearly. 
In  1913  the  figures  of  the  debt  on  the  Grand  Livre 
amounted  to  £551,920,000,  of  which  only  approx- 
imately 12  per  cent  is  owned  abroad.  The  gold  held 
by  the  Bank  of  Italy  (June,  1912)  was  £40,976,000. 

Crime  in  Italy  is  decreasing.  Brigandage,  in  its 
more  picturesque  forms,  wliich  was  once  indigenous 
in  Calabria,  has  been  wiped  out,  and  the  '^Camorra" 
has  been  shorn  of  much  of  its  vigour  as  a  result  of  the 
Viterbo  trial  of  1912.  Vendettas  still  survive  in  the 
southern  provinces,  and  though  homicides  are  pro- 


ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT  153 

portionately  more  frequent  in  Italy  than  in  any  other 
European  country,  their  number  is  rapidly  diminishing, 
having  decreased  by  nearly  50  per  cent  since  1880. 

Hand  in  hand  with  this  decrease  in  criminahty, 
there  has  been  a  slow  though  steady  increase  in  edu- 
cational facihties.  The  Itahan  Kingdom's  inheritance 
of  illiteracy  was  appalling.  The  percentage  of  il- 
literates in  1871  was  73  per  cent,  the  second  highest 
in  Europe.  In  1910  it  was  still  50  per  cent  for  the 
total  and  30  per  cent  for  the  male  population.  In  the 
North  of  Italy  education  is  widely  diffused,  and  the 
schools  are  efficient;  in  the  South  they  are  still  defec- 
tive, yet  much  progress  has  been  made  in  elementary 
schools,  both  in  numbers  and  attendance.  The  total 
number  of  schoolrooms  has  risen  in  a  decade  from 
61,777  to  68,031  (1911),  while  attendance  has  increased 
during  this  period  nearly  400,000  to  3,150,249  or  9.3 
per  100  of  the  population.  Schools  for  adult  illiterates, 
estabhshed  in  1906,  had  an  attendance  of  128,000,  of 
whom  four-fifths  were  men.  Though  increasingly 
large  credits  have  been  voted  for  educational  pur- 
poses, there  is  still  much  room  for  improvement, 
especially  in  the  South  of  Italy  where  school  build- 
ings are  inadequate,  the  teachers  poorly  paid,  and 
evasions  from  school  attendance  common.  Though 
the  Ginnasi  and  Licei,  or  classical  secondary  schools, 
show  a  distinct  decrease  both  in  number  and  atten- 
dance, the  technical  schools  and  institutes  have  gained 
appreciably,  both  of  these  latter  gaining  nearly  50  per 
cent  in  numbers  of  scholars  in  the  eight-year  period 
1902-10.  The  500  technical  schools  had  in  this  latter 
year  83,621,  and  the  technical  institutes  20,305,  schol- 
ars in  attendance.    This  trend  towards  technical  train- 


154  GREATER  ITALY 

ing  cannot  fail  to  have  a  very  beneficial  effect  in  Italy, 
where  in  the  past  the  liberal  professions  were  far  too 
overcrowded.  The  rapid  economic  development  of 
Italy  is  now  attracting  more  and  more  the  type  of  men 
into  business  who  hitherto  wasted  their  time  in  some 
Government  sinecure  after  completing  a  course  of  study 
at  a  university.  So  that  it  is  not  surprising  to  find 
that  the  number  of  students  in  attendance  at  the  uni- 
versities (28,000)  has  been  practically  stationary  during 
the  past  decade. 

Italy,  in  order  to  protect  herself  from  foreign  ag- 
gression, from  the  earliest  days  of  her  existence  felt 
the  necessity  of  having  a  strong  army.  After  her  en- 
trance into  the  Triple  Alliance  she  further  increased 
her  effectives,  and  voted  large  credits  for  mihtary 
purposes,  which  caused  serious  financial  embarrass- 
ment. Though  the  army  budget  was  subsequently 
reduced,  the  Itahan  General  Staff  has  always  been 
directed  by  intelligent  and  efficient  officers,  whose 
spirit  of  initiative  has  kept  the  Italian  forces  in  the 
vanguard  of  development  in  all  branches  of  military 
science.  Italy  was  the  country  first  to  train  troops 
for  mountain  warfare,  and  her  corps  of  Alpini  were 
imitated  by  both  France  and  Austria;  as  were  her 
Bersaglieri,  the  first  chasseurs  a  pied  or  light  infantry 
in  Europe.  Aviation  was  actively  encouraged  as 
an  essential  branch  of  the  service  from  the  very 
earhest  days  of  its  practical  usefulness,  and  dirigibles 
were  first  used  in  modern  warfare  by  the  Itahans 
during  the  Tripolitan  campaign.  Italy  was  one  of 
the  first  countries  to  adopt  an  "invisible"  field  uni- 
form. Though  hampered  by  lack  of  funds,  her  armies 
have  been  kept  up  to  a  high  standard  of  efficiency 


ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT  155 

and  discipline.  Service  in  the  Italian  army  is  com- 
pulsory, beginning  with  the  age  of  20;  the  men  re- 
maining 19  years  with  the  colours.  Active  service, 
formerly  3  years  in  the  infantry  and  5  years  in  the 
cavalry,  was  reduced  to  2  years,  while  those  paying 
£48  and  passing  an  examination  were  required  to 
serve  only  one  year.  The  peace  footing  of  the  Italian 
army  was  14,000  officers  and  255,000  men,  while  the 
nominal  war  footing  was  1,215,000.  The  actual  war 
footing,  however,  was  41,692  officers  and  3,433,150 
men  in  1913. 

Concerned  with  her  position  as  a  naval  Power, 
and  owing  to  the  great  length  of  her  coast-fine,  Italy, 
when  she  entered  upon  the  period  of  colonial  ex- 
pansion, made  a  great  effort  to  bring  her  navy  up  to 
a  high  standard.  She  embarked  upon  a  daring  pro- 
gramme of  naval  construction,  and  set  the  example 
of  building  monster  ships,  armed  with  monster  guns, 
the  precursors  of  the  modern  Dreadnoughts.  As  the 
result  of  great  enterprise  and  efforts,  by  1893  Italy 
had  reached  the  position  of  third  naval  Power  in  the 
world,  ranking  immediately  after  Great  Britain  and 
France.  But,  owing  to  financial  difficulties,  her  am- 
bitious policy  of  naval  expansion  had  to  be  abandoned, 
so  that  one  by  one  the  United  States,  Germany,  and 
Japan  passed  her,  and  the  Itafian  navy  now  ranks 
sixth.  During  the  past  decade  Itafian  expenditures 
for  naval  piu-poses  have  again  risen.  The  total  naval 
efTectives  in  1913,  on  a  peace  footing,  included  2,016 
officers  and  32,984  men,  with  329  vessels  of  all  types. 
Her  programme  of  naval  construction  for  that  year 
provided  for  seven  new  ''Super-Dreadnoughts,"  a  nima- 
ber  exceeded  only  by  Great  Britain  and  France. 


156  GREATER  ITALY 

The  total  area  of  Italy's  colonial  domain  is  approxi- 
mately 1,250,000  square  miles,  with  a  population  of 
1,580,000  inhabitants.  The  area  of  Libya  is  roughly 
1,000,000  square  miles,  and  has  a  population  estimated 
at  900,000.  The  Italian  occupation  of  Libya  has  en- 
tailed considerable  expenditure  amounting  to  well  over 
£50,000,000,  though  the  rapid  increase  in  trade  be- 
tween Italy  and  her  new  colony  has,  in  a  measure, 
compensated  therefor.  The  number  of  steamships  ar- 
riving in  Italian  ports  from  Libya  has  risen  from  9, 
with  a  tonnage  of  9,637  in  the  year  1908,  to  705  with 
a  tonnage  of  1,408,000  in  1912;  while  during  the  same 
period  the  number  of  ships  clearing  from  Italy  for 
Libyan  ports  rose  from  42,  with  a  tonnage  of  55,342 
to  990  with  a  tonnage  of  1,863,825.  The  value  of  the 
annual  exports  from  Libya  to  Italy  has  increased  nine- 
fold during  this  same  four-year  period  from  £27,053 
to  £236,098;  imports  from  Italy  to  Libya  having  risen 
from  £120,822  to  £4,031,542.  Communications  be- 
tween Libya  and  Italy  have  been  greatly  improved, 
so  that  Tripoli  may  now  be  reached  in  forty-eight  hours 
from  Rome. 

Eritrea,  with  an  area  of  about  85,000  square  miles, 
had  a  population  of  278,893  at  the  last  census,  of  whom 
3,949  are  Europeans.  The  mihtary  force  is  chiefly 
native,  commanded  by  Italian  officers.  The  expendi- 
tures for  the  year  1911  amounted  to  £559,000,  of  which 
Italy  contributed  one-half.  During  the  foiur-year 
period,  1908-12,  imports  have  doubled,  totalling 
nearly  £1,000,000,  while  exports  from  Eritrea  proper 
have  increased  threefold  to  £374,872.  Though  the 
development  of  Eritrea  has  hitherto  been  slow,  Italy 
has  high  hopes  for  the  future  of  the  colony.    A  care- 


ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT  157 

ful  investigation  has  shown  that  as  soon  as  adequate 
transportation  facihties  are  provided,  Eritrea  will  be 
able  to  produce  enough  cotton  to  make  Italy  inde- 
pendent of  American  cotton.  The  work  of  railway 
construction  is  being  rapidly  carried  on.  The  lines  in 
existence  now  extend  to  111.5  miles,  and  £200,000 
was  allotted  in  1911  for  extensions. 

Italian  Somaliland  is  an  extensive  tract  of  land 
hitherto  little  exploited.  The  annual  expenditures 
amount  to  about  £200,000.  The  colony  exports  ivory, 
coffee,  cotton,  and  gums,  and  imports  cotton  goods, 
chiefly  from  Italy,  the  total  trade  of  the  colony  amount- 
ing to  £430,506. 

Italy  further  occupied  in  the  ^gean,  Rhodes  and 
other  smaller  islands.  The  expenses  of  occupation  at 
the  end  of  1913  amounted  to  £850,000. 

In  looking  over  this  very  brief  survey  of  the  econ- 
omic and  social  development  of  Italy,  one  cannot  fail 
to  be  impressed  by  the  great  progress  which  the  coun- 
try had  made  during  the  half  century  since  unity  had 
been  achieved.  A  new  force  was  arising,  which,  with 
the  passing  years,  was  more  and  more  to  assert  its 
power  in  the  world.  The  Italian  people  were  not  blind 
to  the  fact  that  there  remained  much  to  be  done  to 
establish  on  a  solid  foundation  this  vast  economic 
edifice,  which  had  sprung  up  so  rapidly.  To  check 
the  wastage  of  emigration,  to  educate  her  peoples  of 
the  South  up  to  the  standards  of  the  Western  world, 
still  awaited  to  be  carried  out.  But  of  greater  imme- 
diate importance  was  the  necessity  of  freeing  the 
economic  life  of  Italy  from  foreign  control,  of  eman- 
cipating the  country  from  German  domination.  These 
were  the  two  great  tasks  to  which  Italy  was  next  to 


158  GREATER  ITALY 

turn  her  energies.  Confident  in  her  strength,  relying 
on  the  united  effort  of  her  peoples,  who  under  the 
segis  of  the  House  of  Savoy  were  rapidly  losing  their 
regionalist  traditions,  so  that  ''Italy"  was  no  longer 
merely  a  word,  but  meant  to  each  and  every  Italian 
"la  patria,"  such  was  the  Italy  which  could  calmly  elect 
to  follow  the  course  best  suited  to  her  vital  interests, 
when  the  hour  came.  In  this  hour  the  true  strength 
of  the  nation  was  to  be  revealed. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  VATICAN  AND  THE  QUIRINAL 

Rome  the  Capital  op  the  Kingdom  of  Italy.    The  Law  of 
Guarantees.    The  Roman  Question 

Among  the  various  problems  which  have  con- 
fronted the  new  Kingdom  of  Italy,  none  has  been 
more  difficult  and  vexatious  than  that  of  its  relations 
with  the  Papacy.  Though  an  Italian  Pontiff,  elected 
by  a  majority  of  Italian  cardinals,  sits  on  the  throne 
of  St.  Peter,  no  Pope  has  hitherto  become  openly 
reconciled  to  the  loss  of  his  temporal  power,  and  the 
King  of  Italy  is  still  considered  by  the  Vatican  and 
its  entourage  as  the  unlawful  usurper  of  the  rights  and 
privileges,  as  well  as  the  estates,  of  the  Holy  See. 

It  was  on  September  19, 1870,  that  the  Italian  troops 
under  the  conmaand  of  General  Raffaele  Cadorna  stood 
before  the  walls  of  Rome.  King  Victor  Emmanuel 
had,  in  a  letter  couched  in  terms  of  filial  affection, 
prayed  the  Pope,  Pius  IX,  to  renounce  his  temporal 
prerogatives,  and  thus  permit  the  peaceable  accom- 
plishment of  Italian  unity,  which  with  the  incorpora- 
tion of  Rome  in  the  Kingdom  would  be  complete.  The 
Pope  refused  to  comply  with  this  request,  stating  that 
he  would  resist  by  force  of  arms  all  attempts  to  de- 
prive him  of  his  dominions.  On  September  20  the 
Itahan  forces,  after  a  bombardment  of  the  city  last- 
ing five  hours,  entered  Rome  through  a  breach  in  the 
walls  near  the  Porta  Pia.    Seeing  that  further  resis- 

159 


160  GREATER  ITALY 

tance  was  useless,  the  Pope  ordered  his  troops  to  re- 
tire, and  as  a  protest  to  the  world  against  the  violation 
of  his  sovereignty,  Pius  IX  shut  himself  up  in  the 
Vatican,  never  to  leave  it,  a  self-interned  prisoner. 
This  was  not  the  first  time  in  recent  years  that  the 
Popes  lost  their  temporal  power.  As  a  result  of  the 
Napoleonic  invasion  of  Italy  a  republic  was  proclaimed 
in  Rome  in  1798  which  lasted  but  a  brief  period.  In 
May,  1809,  the  Papal  States  were,  by  a  decree  issued 
by  Napoleon  from  Vienna,  annexed  to  the  French 
Empire,  and  not  until  his  downfall,  five  years  later, 
did  the  Pope  again  enter  into  possession  of  his  domain. 
The  Papal  authority  was  for  a  third  time  overthrown 
in  1849.  In  February,  Mazzini,  the  hero  of  Italy's 
early  struggles  for  unity  and  independence,  hastened 
to  Rome;  Pope  Pius  IX  was  driven  from  the  city;  a 
republican  form  of  government  was  set  up  under  the 
leadership  of  Mazzini.  The  Romans  believed  that 
they  could  rally  around  them  all  Italy,  but  the  at- 
tempts failed.  Tuscany  refused  the  invitation  to 
join  the  Romans,  and  the  disastrous  effort  to  throw 
off  the  yoke  of  the  Austrians  in  the  North  dampened 
the  ardour  of  the  Italians.  The  Pope  from  his  exile 
at  Gaeta  sought  foreign  aid  to  bring  about  his  re- 
estabhshment.  France,  though  at  this  time  a  republic 
under  the  presidency  of  Louis  Napoleon,  the  future 
Emperor,  under  the  pretext  of  protecting  the  new 
Roman  republic,  fitted  out  a  small  expedition  and 
despatched  the  force  under  General  Oudinot  to  Rome. 
The  Republicans,  led  by  Garibaldi,  suspecting  the 
good  faith  of  the  French,  gave  battle  and  obliged  them 
to  retreat.  The  French,  further  reinforced,  now  openly 
announced  their  object  of  reinstating  the  Papal  au- 


THE  VATICAN  AND  THE  QUIRINAL    161 

thority.  On  June  3,  they  began  the  siege  of  Rome. 
For  a  month  Garibaldi's  legions  held  out  against  the 
French  besiegers.  Finally  on  July  2,  it  was  deemed 
impossible  to  hold  the  city  any  longer.  Garibaldi, 
with  the  remnant  of  his  forces  withdi-ew,  and  Rome 
once  again  was  compelled  to  accept  the  rule  of  the 
Popes. 

But  the  temper  of  the  Roman  people  during  this  last 
uprising  showed  clearly  that  they  would  not  rest  con- 
tent until  they  had  overthrown  for  all  time  the  rule  of 
the  Papacy.  Rome  was  now  permanently  garrisoned 
by  French  troops.  This  force  of  some  15,000  men  was 
not  withdrawn  until  1866.  As  soon  as  the  French 
left  the  city,  Garibaldi  again  planned  an  expedition 
to  conquer  the  capital.  Italian  unity  had  now  pro- 
gressed towards  its  triumphant  achievement.  Under 
the  House  of  Savoy  all  Italy  had  been  united  into  one 
great  State.  Rome  alone  remained  outside  the  union. 
The  ItaHan  Government,  out  of  fear  of  France,  had 
by  a  convention,  signed  September  15,  1864,  agreed 
not  to  undertake  an  expedition  against  Rome,  or  to 
make  any  attempt  to  incorporate  the  city  in  the  new 
Kingdom.  Knowing  that  Garibaldi  was  contemplat- 
ing such  an  expedition,  the  Italian  authorities  re- 
moved him  to  Caprera,  a  small  island  close  to  the  coast 
of  Sardinia,  under  an  armed  guard.  Garibaldi,  how- 
ever, eluding  his  guardians,  made  his  way  safely  back 
to  Tuscany,  and  gathering  together  his  legionaries, 
marched  against  Rome.  In  a  first  encounter  the 
Papal  troops  were  defeated  at  Monte  Rotondo  on 
October  29,  1867.  In  the  meantime  Napoleon  III 
had  despatched  a  fresh  army  to  the  assistance  of  the 
Pope.    On  November  3,  at  INIentana  the  Garibaldians 


162  GREATER  ITALY 

met  the  French  and  were  badly  beaten.  Garibaldi 
returned  to  his  exile  at  Caprera,  and  the  French  again 
garrisoned  Rome. 

The  fifth  and  final  attempt  to  deliver  Rome  from 
Papal  rule  was  at  last  successful.  The  French  troops 
were  withdrawn  from  Rome  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
Franco-Prussian  War  of  1870.  At  the  downfall  of 
the  French  Empire,  on  September  4,  1870,  the  Itahan 
Government,  released  from  the  engagement  entered 
into  with  Napoleon  not  to  occupy  Rome,  set  about 
the  undertaking  which  they  so  speedily  brought  to  a 
successful  issue. 

On  October  2,  the  inhabitants  of  Rome  and  the 
Papal  States,  by  a  plebiscite  solemnly  voted  their 
adherence  to  the  Kingdom  of  Italy.  Rome  was  there- 
upon proclaimed  the  capital  of  the  country.  King 
Victor  Emmanuel  II  and  the  Government  removed 
from  Florence  to  Rome.  The  King  took  up  his  res- 
idence in  the  Quirinal,  the  former  summer  palace  of 
the  Popes.  Thus  the  temporal  power  of  the  Papacy, 
which  with  brief  interregnums  had  lasted  for  eleven 
centuries,  came  to  an  end. 

Pius  IX  continued,  however,  not  to  recognise  the 
new  authorities,  or  to  treat  with  them  in  any  manner. 
The  Itahan  Government,  wishing  to  regulate  by 
statute  its  relations  with  the  Papacy,  had,  in  May, 
1871,  passed  the  so-called  ''Law  of  Guarantees," 
whereby  the  Pope  is  conceded  nominal  privileges 
and  prerogatives  as  a  sovereign,  his  person  is  invio- 
lable, his  residence  at  the  Vatican,  as  well  as  at  the 
Lateran  and  the  Villa  Castel  Gandolfo,  enjoy  ex- 
territorial rights.  The  Pope  is  to  have  his  own  armed 
guards,   receive   Envoys   and   Ministers  from  foreign 


THE  VATICAN  AND  THE  QUIRINAL    163 

sovereigns  unmolested  by  the  Italian  authorities. 
Furthermore,  besides  other  provisions  which  provide 
for  every  probable  eventuality,  the  Italian  Govern- 
ment pledged  itself  to  pay  an  annual  indemnity  of 
3,225,000  lire  (£129,000)  towards  the  maintenance 
of  the  Holy  See;  a  simi  which  was  equal  to  the  normal 
Papal  budget. 

The  perplexities  of  the  ItaHan  authorities  were  not, 
however,  smoothed  over  by  the  passage  of  the  Law 
of  Guarantees.  Pius  jX  throughout  his  pontificate 
obstinately  continued  to  ignore  its  terms.  He  refused 
to  accept  the  proffered  indemnity,  and  repeated  his 
protests  to  the  world  against  the  usurpation  of  his 
temporal  authority. 

Though  there  was  a  small  and  cultured  element 
among  the  Roman  churchmen,  who  were  convinced 
that  the  Church  could  develop  its  prestige  and  ex- 
tend its  spiritual  sway  throughout  the  world  more 
widely  if  the  Pope  no  longer  had  to  concern  himself 
with  temporal  problems  of  civil  administration,  the 
majority  of  the  Curia,  as  well  as  pious  Catholics 
throughout  Italy,  felt  that  the  Pope  must  inevitably 
be  impeded  in  the  exercise  of  his  Papal  functions  by 
the  presence  of  another  authority  in  Rome. 

The  entry  of  the  Italians  into  Rome,  instead  of  solv- 
ing the  Roman  Question,  had  thus  on  the  contrary 
virulently  revived  it.  Foreign  nations  which  had 
hitherto  shown  undivided  sympathy  for  the  cause  of 
Italian  unity,  England,  Prussia,  and  Belgium — in 
the  first  the  Irish  Catholics,  in  the  latter  the  Clericals 
— joined  in  protesting,  both  in  and  out  of  Parliament, 
against  the  Italian  occupation  of  the  Eternal  City. 
Cavour's  programme  of  a  "free  Church  within  a  free 


164  GREATER  ITALY 

State,"  was  the  plan  which  the  Itahan  Government 
set  about  loyally  to  execute.  The  separation  of  the 
Church  and  State,  it  was  believed,  might  be  carried 
out  without  prejudice  to  either.  And  though  Pius 
IX,  who  had  been  despoiled  of  his  temporal  sov- 
ereignty, could  not  be  expected  to  accept  the  new 
status,  it  was  confidently  hoped  that  his  successor 
would  in  time  inaugurate  a  more  conciliatory  policy. 
As  long  as  Pius  IX  lived  the  Italian  Governments 
maintained  an  attitude  of  patient  toleration.  The 
anathemas  and  invectives  hurled  against  them  were 
borne  in  a  spirit  of  contrition.  They  were  waiting 
for  better  days. 

In  1878  the  Pope  died.  The  Conclave  assembled 
to  elect  his  successor.  Unmolested,  and  in  complete 
security  and  privacy,  the  College  of  Cardinals  met  for 
the  first  time  under  the  new  regime.  In  the  most  im- 
posing, as  well  as  well-ordered  Conclave  held  in  many 
centuries,  after  an  unusually  brief  meeting  of  only  thirty- 
six  hours.  Cardinal  Pecci  was  elected  Pope,  and  as- 
sumed the  title  of  Leo  XIII.  The  new  Pontiff  in  no- 
wise resembled  his  predecessor.  A  man  of  broad  views, 
and  in  many  respects  fully  alive  to  the  needs  and  con- 
ditions of  our  times,  an  acute  observer  and  skilful 
politician,  he  nevertheless,  in  the  very  first  act  of  his 
reign  dealt  a  cruel  blow  to  the  hopes  of  the  Quirinal. 
It  was  confidently  expected  that  Leo  XIII  would 
consent  to  be  crowned  publicly  in  St.  Peter's.  Instead, 
his  coronation  took  place  in  strict  privacy  in  the 
Sistine  Chapel  and  the  new  Pope  at  once  let  it  be 
known  that  he  saw  fit  to  consider  himself  the  prisoner 
of  the  Italian  Government,  and  locked  himself  up  in 
the  Vatican. 


THE  VATICAN  AND  THE  QUIRINAL    165 

Moderate  in  his  acts  as  in  his  language,  conciliatory 
in  his  attitude  towards  the  peculiar  needs  of  his  Cath- 
oUc  subjects  within  the  boundaries  of  their  respective 
States,  amenable  to  new  ideas,  Leo  XIH  was  anxious 
and  willing  to  compromise  on  almost  every  question 
except  that  of  Rome.  Undaunted,  the  partisans  of 
a  reconciliation  between  the  Vatican  and  the  Quirinal 
endeavoured  to  accommodate  the  relations  between 
them.  In  the  Italian  Chamber  the  matter  was  favour- 
ably discussed,  and  proved  the  eagerness  of  the  Ital- 
ians to  put  an  end  to  an  equivocal  situation.  Leo 
XIII  speedily  quashed  these  negotiations  when  he 
sharply  asserted  his  inahenable  right  to  the  temporal 
sovereignty  of  Rome.  He  maintained  that  Rome 
was  not  large  enough  to  hold  both  a  King  and  a  Pope. 
Unable  to  persuade  the  Italian  Government  to  leave 
the  city  and  establish  the  capital  in  Florence  or 
Naples,  the  Pope  outwardly  made  preparations  to 
leave  Rome.  He  caused  an  inventory  to  be  made  of 
the  treasures  of  the  Vatican,  which  he  proposed  to 
convey  abroad.  The  Itahan  Government  became 
alarmed,  for  though  the  presence  of  a  recalcitrant 
Pontiff  in  their  midst  was  a  source  of  much  embar- 
rassment, nevertheless,  the  removal  of  the  Papacy 
would  be  a  serious  blow  to  the  prestige  of  the  young 
Kingdom. 

Leo  XIII,  in  order  to  strengthen  his  position  in  his 
conflict  with  the  Italian  Government,  came  to  an 
understanding  with  Bismarck.  A  reconciliation  be- 
tween the  Pope  and  the  instigator  of  Catholic  per- 
secution in  Germany  was  effected.  The  Kulturkampf 
came  to  an  end,  and  we  see  Leo  XIII  using  his  in- 
fluence with  the  German  CathoHcs  to  persuade  them 


166  GREATER  ITALY 

to  accept  Bismarck's  dictates,  while  the  Iron  Chan- 
cellor offered  the  Pope  a  dignij&ed  asylum  in  Germany, 
should  he  wish  to  remove  the  Papacy  from  Rome, 
although  this  project  was  never  carried  out.  The  chief 
aim  of  Leo  XIII  had  been  to  increase  his  moral  in- 
fluence abroad,  as  well  as  to  raise  the  status  of  ascen- 
dency of  the  Pope  in  pohtical  matters.  A  skilled 
diplomatist,  and  a  genial  Pontiff,  he  readily  created  for 
the  Papacy  a  high  place  in  international  affairs.  He 
was  selected  by  various  foreign  States  to  act  as  ar- 
bitrator in  their  territorial  quarrels,  and  his  verdicts 
are  luminous  examples  of  astute  and  sound  judgment, 
tempered  by  moderation  and  justice. 

Yet  Leo  XIII  never  ceased  to  look  upon  the  Italian 
Government  with  a  hostile  eye.  He  was  able  to  cause 
innumerable  embarrassments  to  the  Quirinal,  and 
during  the  early  years  of  the  new  Kingdom  the  dom- 
inant figure  of  Leo  XIII  in  the  affairs  of  Rome  pre- 
vented the  Italians  from  developing  their  national 
strength  and  consciousness  as  rapidly  as  would  have 
been  otherwise  possible.  The  Papacy,  throughout  his 
long  reign,  continued  to  ignore  the  Italian  Government, 
and  refused  to  treat  with  the  Quirinal  or  to  permit 
any  loyal  CathoUcs  to  take  part  in  the  public  Hfe  of 
Italy.  Wherever  possible  the  Roman  Curia  placed 
obstacles  in  the  path  of  the  ItaUan  authorities. 
The  Pope  forbade  Catholic  sovereigns  to  pay  visits 
of  State  to  the  Italian  capital,  and  the  pride  of  the 
Italians  was  humbled  by  the  strict  observance  of  this 
command  by  the  rulers  of  all  Catholic  States.  Leo 
XIII,  while  receiving  Ministers  and  Embassies  from 
other  States,  refused  to  negotiate  even  distantly  with 
the  Italian  authorities,  and  in  matters  both  great  and 


THE  VATICAN  AND  THE  QUIRINAL    167 

small,  the  influence  of  the  Papacy  tenaciously  op- 
posed the  increasing  strength  of  the  new  Italy.  So 
that  within  the  Kingdom  there  remained  this  poUt- 
ically  hostile  power  which  militated  against  the  best 
interests  of  the  country,  and  continued  to  be  a  source 
of  disintegration  rather  than  of  unity. 

As  the  years  passed,  and  the  Papacy  tacitly  tolerated 
the  status  quo,  a  new  programme  to  regulate  the  posi- 
tion of  the  Vatican  was  brought  forward,  which  though 
not  enunciated  clearly  until  the  succeeding  pontificate, 
further  complicated  the  situation.  When  the  Pope 
realised  that  no  moral  suasion  would  induce  the  King 
of  Italy  to  leave  Rome,  and  that  no  foreign  State 
would  undertake  an  armed  expedition  to  re-establish 
the  temporal  authority  of  the  Papacy,  it  became  the 
ambition  of  many  churchmen  to  place  the  Vatican 
under  international  protection — in  other  words,  to 
internationalise  the  Roman  Question — and  secure  the 
enforcement  of  the  Law  of  Guarantees  or  other  similar 
statutes,  by  international  sanction,  thus  placing  the 
Pope  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Italian  author- 
ities. This  plan,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Catho- 
Hcs,  nominally  subjects  of  the  Pope,  are  to  be  found 
in  all  countries  of  the  world,  seemed  peculiarly  well 
adapted  to  secure  greater  liberties  for  the  Papacy,  as 
well  as  increased  prestige.  However,  from  the  outset 
this  proposal  was  vigorously  opposed  by  the  ItaUan 
Government.  They  maintained  that  the  Roman 
Question  was  cosmopolitan  and  not  international. 
It  was  cosmopolitan  because  the  Cathohc  Church, 
as  its  name  implies,  embraces  the  whole  world;  it 
was  not  international  because  no  one  group  of  nations 
has  the  right  to  guarantee  by  treaty  the  maintenance 


168  GREATER  ITALY 

of  the  Papacy.  Italy's  Law  of  Guarantees  regarding 
the  Holy  See  is  a  unilateral  contract,  arising  out  of 
the  fact  that  the  residence  of  the  head  of  the  CathoUc 
Church  is  situated  within  the  boundaries  of  Italy, 
and  that  some  arrangement  had  to  be  made  to  define 
the  relations  of  the  Papacy  towards  the  civil  author- 
ities. Italy  thus  endeavoured  to  combat  any  ten- 
dency, which  might  arise  abroad,  to  regard  favourably 
the  plan  of  internationalisation,  and  to  affirm  pos- 
itively her  right  to  be  the  sole  arbiter  of  the  Roman 
Question  which  she  considered  a  purely  domestic 
problem. 

Upon  the  death  of  Leo  XIII  in  July,  1903,  the  Con- 
clave again  met  at  Rome,  to  consider  the  election  of 
his  successor.  Leo  XIII,  throughout  his  pontificate, 
had  been  ably  assisted  by  Cardinal  Rampolla  del 
Tindaro,  his  Secretary  of  State,  a  man  who  by  his 
training,  natural  gifts,  and  his  tolerant  views,  seemed 
well-fitted  to  bear  the  Papal  burden.  The  candidature 
of  Cardinal  Rampolla  had  received  the  support  of 
the  French  Government,  and  the  Itahan  authorities 
would  have  welcomed  his  election,  but  the  Emperor 
of  Austria,  at  the  suggestion  of  Germany,  on  this  oc- 
casion made  use  of  his  ancient  prerogative  of  veto, 
and  prevented  the  elevation  to  the  Papacy  of  a  man 
who,  it  was  believed,  would  have  considered  the  re- 
lations of  the  Vatican  and  the  Quirinal  in  a  new  light. 
Cardinal  Sarto,  Archbishop  of  Venice,  was  the  com- 
promise candidate  upon  whom  the  election  fell.  Of 
humble  parentage,  he  had  risen  from  the  position  of 
village  priest,  through  all  the  grades  of  the  ecclesias- 
tical career,  to  the  throne  of  St.  Peter.  A  man  of  great 
humility  and  religious  zeal,  whose  piety  and  devotion 


THE  VATICAN  AND  THE  QUIRINAL    169 

were  known  throughout  Italy,  yet  unversed  in  the 
legal  aspects  of  the  position  of  the  Vatican  and  the 
intricacies  of  the  Roman  Question,  he  took  Uttle  in- 
terest in  the  pohtical  role  of  the  pontificate.  Pius  X, 
a  ''rehgious  Pope,"  more  engrossed  with  the  affairs 
of  heaven  than  those  of  this  earth,  engaged  in  sup- 
pressing ''Modernism,"  concerned  with  matters  of 
ritual  and  dogma,  neglected  the  more  immediate 
problem  of  the  relation  of  the  Papacy  to  Italy.  Though 
he  departed  from  the  pohcy  of  Leo  XIII  of  playing 
an  active  pohtical  role,  this  did  not  imply  that  he  held 
a  more  tolerant  view  of  the  matter  of  temporal  juris- 
diction. He  followed  and  thus  stamped  as  a  tradi- 
tional custom  the  idea  of  considering  the  Pope  the 
''Prisoner  of  St.  Peter's,"  and  rejected  the  Law  of 
Guarantees. 

In  his  first  encychcal  of  October  4,  1903,  Pius  X 
seemed  to  indicate  that  the  Roman  Question  was 
closed.  A  number  of  Itahans  already  proclaimed 
that  the  day  of  reconcihation  of  the  Kingdom  and  the 
Papacy  had  at  last  arrived.  Pius  X  withdrew  the 
non  expedit  and  freely  granted  permission  to  all  loyal 
Catholics  to  take  an  active  part  in  the  political  life  of 
Italy,  which  the  intransigent  poHcy  of  his  predeces- 
sors had  prohibited;  he  assumed  a  more  concihatory 
attitude  regarding  the  giving  of  rehgious  instruction 
in  the  schools;  sanctioned  the  singing  of  the  Italian 
national  anthem  by  the  Catholic  societies,  and  ad- 
mitted the  Italian  flag  within  the  precincts  of  the 
Vatican.  But  it  was  soon  evident  that  these  con- 
cessions were  of  no  real  significance  when  compared 
with  the  broader  issue  of  the  sovereignty  of  Rome. 
Pius  X  was  to  seize  the  first  opportunity  to  voice 


170  GREATER  ITALY 

his  protest  against  the  usurpation  of  the  Kings  of 
Italy. 

In  the  autumn  of  1904,  President  Loubet  of  France 
paid  an  official  visit  to  the  King  of  Italy  at  Rome. 
The  Pope  immediately  issued  a  circular  note  to  the 
Powers,  protesting  against  the  visit  of  the  chief  of  a 
great  Catholic  State  to  ^'him  who,  against  all  right, 
holds  my  temporal  sovereignty,  and  impedes  its  liberty 
and  independence."  The  result  of  this  protest  was 
the  severing  of  diplomatic  relations  between  France 
and  the  Vatican. 

Pius  X  had  ascended  the  Papal  throne  accompanied 
by  the  best  wishes  of  the  Italian  people.  The  sim- 
plicity of  his  court  contrasted  vividly  with  the  pomp 
and  ceremony  of  the  reign  of  Leo  XIII.  His  humble 
birth,  his  affectionate  regard  for  his  sisters,  who  still 
remained  simple  peasant  women,  as  well  as  the  peace- 
ful atmosphere  of  goodness,  which  impressed  all  those 
who  came  in  contact  with  the  Pope,  created  a  legend 
which  enveloped  the  Pontiff  in  a  halo  of  sanctity. 
Never  before  had  a  Pope  received  Venetian  peasants 
in  the  sumptuous  private  apartments  of  the  Vatican; 
received  them  not  as  a  sovereign  but  as  a  friend. 
Christian  and  Jew  were  alike  admitted  into  his  pres- 
ence, and  every  one  who  so  desired  had  access  to  the 
Holy  Father,  who  was  intent  upon  re-establishing  the 
rule  of  Christ  in  its  literal  form  of  ''peace  on  earth, 
good- will  to  men."  So  that  the  repressive  acts  which 
took  place  under  Pius  X  were  ascribed  chiefly  to  the 
Papal  entourage. 

During  the  later  years  of  the  pontificate  of  Pius  X, 
the  Papacy  revived  virulently  its  anti-Italian  policy. 
The   celebration   of   the   fiftieth   anniversary   of   the 


THE  VATICAN  AND  THE  QUIRINAL    171 

founding  of  the  Kingdom  of  Italy,  in  1911,  was  seized 
upon  by  the  Pope  to  proclaim  that  all  good  CathoHcs 
must  consider  these,  ''days  of  deep  mourning."  Hence- 
forth Pius  X  took  every  opportunity  to  bring  before 
the  world  the  thorny  subject  of  the  temporal  powers 
of  the  Papacy.  At  the  same  time  the  question  of  in- 
ternationalising the  Law  of  Guarantees  was  brought 
to  the  fore,  and  became  the  object  of  careful  con- 
sideration and  study  by  Vatican  jurists. 

The  outbreak  of  the  European  War  found  Pius  X 
still  occupying  the  throne  of  St.  Peter.  The  terrible 
conflict  which  had  been  enkindled  throughout  the 
Christian  world  was  said  to  have  been  a  source  of  deep 
anguish  to  the  Holy  Father.  Borne  down  by  age  and 
infirmity,  bewailing  the  fate  of  his  fellow  men,  Pius 
X  sank  into  his  grave  on  August  21,  1914. 

Ten  days  later  fifty-seven  Cardinals  assembled  in 
the  Vatican  to  elect  the  two  hundred  and  sixtieth 
Pope.  Many  of  the  prelates  who  had  gathered  here 
came  from  States  now  at  war,  and  none  could  entirely 
divest  themselves  of  their  national  allegiance,  or  put 
out  of  their  thoughts  the  national  passions  and  prej- 
udices engendered  by  the  conflict.  The  state  of  the 
Chiu-ch  might  well  give  them  cause  for  preoccupation. 
Under  the  late  Pontiff  the  prestige  of  the  Papacy  had 
been  slowly  declining.  The  gravity  of  the  moment 
demanded  that  the  reins  of  the  CathoUc  Church  be 
placed  in  able  hands  if  the  Papacy  was  again  to  play 
an  important  part  in  worldly  affairs.  It,  therefore, 
was  evident  that  a  "political"  Pope  must  be  intrusted 
with  the  keys  of  St.  Peter's. 

The  papahiU,  as  the  candidates  for  Papal  honours 
are    designated,    were    not     numerous.     No     strong 


172  GREATER  ITALY 

personality  dominated  the  Conclave.  During  the  first 
and  second  of  September,  when  the  ballots  were 
counted,  none  of  the  candidates  received  two-thirds 
of  the  total  votes  necessary  for  election.  It  was 
noticed,  however,  that  the  Cardinal  Delia  Chiesa, 
Archbishop  of  Bologna,  who  had  come  into  the  Con- 
clave a  relatively  unsupported  candidate,  not  even 
ranked  among  the  more  important  papahili  was 
slowly  gaining  the  suffrages  of  his  colleagues.  During 
the  ballot  taking  of  September  3,  no  agreement  could 
be  reached.  Finally  to  break  the  deadlock,  when  it 
became  evident  that  neither  of  the  leading  candidates, 
Cardinals  Maffi  and  Serafini,  could  secure  the  neces- 
sary majority,  on  the  first  ballot  of  September  4, 
Cardinal  Delia  Chiesa  received  39  votes,  the  number 
strictly  necessary  for  his  election. 

During  the  Conclave  the  Pope-elect  had  followed 
the  proceedings  with  a  cool  and  dispassionate  eye. 
He  seemed  to  take  little  interest  in  what  was  going 
on;  upon  hearing  the  announcement  of  his  election, 
the  new  Pontiff  seemed  unmoved.  In  answer  to  the 
question  of  what  name  he  would  assume,  the  Pope 
replied  in  a  calm  voice,  "Benedict  XV."  In  taking 
the  name  of  Benedict,  the  new  Pope  wished  to  show 
that  he  intended  to  break  away  from  the  tradition  of 
both  Leo  XIII  and  Pius  X. 

According  to  custom,  three  sets  of  white  Papal 
robes  of  different  sizes  are  prepared  in  advance,  as 
the  Pope  on  his  election  is  immediately  clad  in  his  new 
vestments,  and  receives  the  homage  of  the  assembled 
Cardinals.  Benedict  XV  now  entered  the  Sistine 
Chapel  arrayed  in  the  Papal  robes  of  the  smallest  size, 
yet  even  these  were  too  large,  and  they  shrouded  his 


THE  VATICAN  AND  THE  QUIRINAL    173 

shrunken  form  in  deep  folds.  His  face,  thin  and  drawn, 
wearing  heavy  lensed,  gold-rimmed  spectacles,  peered 
out  from  over  his  white-caped  gown,  inquisitive,  yet 
confident  and  self-possessed.  The  Pope  received  the 
obeisances  of  the  Princes  of  the  Church  with  great 
dignity.  His  countenance  bore  no  trace  of  emotion. 
Those  who  saw  him  declare  that  it  seemed  as  though  the 
new  Pope  had  been  accustomed  to  his  role  all  his  life. 

On  placing  the  triple  tiara  on  the  head  of  Cardinal 
Delia  Cliiesa,  the  Conclave  had  fulfilled  its  mission 
and  elected  a  "political"  Pope.  The  reign  of  Pius  X 
already  seemed  covered  with  the  dust  of  ages.  A  new 
era  was  to  open  in  the  history  of  Rome.  Never  before 
had  a  Pope  been  called  upon  to  face  a  more  grave 
and  serious  crisis,  both  within  and  without  the  Church. 
Benedict  XV,  undaunted  by  the  difficulties  which 
loomed  before  him,  entered  resolutely  upon  his  new 
duties,  and  the  evening  of  the  day  of  his  election  to 
the  throne  of  St.  Peter,  found  the  Pope  busy,  person- 
ally dictating  telegrams,  announcing  his  accession, 
to  foreign  sovereigns. 

Benedict  XV  is  the  son  of  the  Marchese  Delia 
Chiesa,  of  an  ancient  Genoese  patrician  family.  Born 
at  Genoa  on  November  21,  1854,  he  was  ordained  a 
priest  in  1879,  and  then  pursued  his  studies  in  canon 
law,  more  especially  in  ecclesiastical  diplomacy  at 
Rome.  When  Cardinal  Rampolla,  at  the  time  a 
monsignor,  was  sent  as  Papal  Nuncio  to  Spain  in 
1883,  he  took  with  him  as  his  secretary,  Delia  Chiesa. 
The  young  priest,  who  soon  revealed  great  diplomatic 
aptitude,  became  the  confidential  adviser  of  his  chief, 
and  when  later  Cardinal  Rampolla  assumed  the  oflSce 
of  Secretary  of  State  at  the  Vatican,  Monsignor  Delia 


174  GREATER  ITALY 

Chiesa  became  his  principal  secretary,  and  was  the 
active  collaborator  of  Rampolla  and  Leo  XIII  during 
the  busy  days  of  the  Leonine  pontificate.  When  at 
the  death  of  Leo  XIII,  Cardinal  Rampolla  retired 
from  participation  in  Papal  affairs,  Delia  Chiesa  did 
not  follow  his  example.  He  remained  at  his  post  at 
the  Vatican,  ready  to  serve  his  new  master.  Cardinal 
Merry  del  Val,  who  became  Secretary  of  State.  But 
an  astute  and  skilled  diplomatist  such  as  Monsignor 
Delia  Chiesa,  could  not  long  tolerate  the  careless 
trend  which  Papal  policy  now  followed,  nor  did  he 
ingratiate  himself  with  his  new  chief.  It  was,  there- 
fore, not  long  before  he  was  relieved  of  his  func- 
tions, and  in  1907  he  was  sent  into  relative  exile  to 
Bologna,  as  Archbishop.  Raised  to  the  cardinalate, 
he  continued  to  interest  himself  in  the  broader  issues 
of  Papal  affairs,  and  refused  to  be  drawn  into  the 
local  dissensions  of  his  diocese. 

Thus  Benedict  XV  came  to  the  pontifical  magistracy 
endowed  by  long  years  of  patient  training,  as  well 
as  by  his  natural  gifts,  with  those  qualifications  of 
statecraft  most  useful  to  a  "political"  Pope.  The 
Roman  Curia  could  well  believe  that  it  had  chosen 
wisely  in  selecting  this  skilled  manipulator  of  diplo- 
matic niceties,  who  was  so  familiar  with  both  ec- 
clesiastical and  lay  problems  of  international  import; 
Benedict  XV  could  be  counted  on  to  direct,  guide,  and 
govern  in  a  manner  worthy  of  the  best  worldly  tradi- 
tions of  the  Vatican.  Firm,  subtle,  adaptable,  he  had 
devoted  his  life  to  the  cause  of  affirming  the  temporal 
power  of  the  Vatican,  and  had  had  a  large  share  in 
its  triumphs  under  Leo  XIII.  The  new  Pope  could 
not  fail  to  grasp  the  significance  which  his  accession 


THE  VATICAN  AND  THE  QUIRINAL    175 

to  the  pontificate  would  have  to  the  world.  Never 
in  recent  years  had  the  civilised  nations  of  the  earth 
looked  to  Rome  in  such  a  mood  of  humility.  In  a 
world  where  the  moral  code  was  being  daily  violated, 
where  treachery  and  treason  and  a  ruthless  disregard 
for  the  rights  of  mankind  had  become  the  rule,  where 
the  most  elemental  laws  of  justice  and  humanity  were 
wholly  disregarded,  the  figure  of  the  Pope  rose  out  of 
the  flames  of  battle,  the  calm  and  just  arbiter,  whose 
word  would  at  this  juncture  carry  the  full  weight  of 
divine  inspiration. 

Belligerents  and  neutrals  alike  waited  for  the  pro- 
nouncement of  the  new  Pontiff.  By  a  frank,  out- 
spoken statement  of  policy,  by  a  condemnation  and 
censure  of  the  violation  of  the  accepted  code  of  war 
and  of  international  law,  by  a  high-minded  and  af- 
firmatively authoritative  exposition  of  broad.  Chris- 
tian principles,  which  even  belHgerents  would  be 
bound  to  respect,  it  was  confidently  expected  that  the 
Papacy  would  lend  its  great  moral  support  in  main- 
taining the  structural  fabric  of  society. 

But  the  Pope  had  too  long  been  accustomed  to  the 
arts  of  diplomacy  to  be  able  to  view  with  a  broader 
and  more  statesmanlike  grasp  the  value  of  such  an 
undertaking.  In  his  first  encyclical,  Benedict  XV 
proved  that  he  was  more  concerned  with  what  he 
believed  to  be  the  immediate  needs  of  the  CathoHc 
Church  than  with  those  of  mankind.  The  Pope 
showed  himself  eager  to  take  advantage  of  this  seem- 
ingly favourable  opportunity  to  rehearse  the  grudges 
and  grievances  of  the  Vatican.  After  fulminating 
against  present-day  society  and  discoursing  on  the 
tendencies    towards    "independence,"    deploring    the 


176  GREATER  ITALY 

absence  of  all  respect  for  authority,  and  dwelling  on 
the  ''absurdity  of  socialism,"  the  Pope  discusses  the 
dissensions  within  the  Church,  condemns  Modernism, 
and,  in  the  concluding  and  more  important  paragraphs, 
reaffirms  "that  for  too  long  a  time  the  Church  has 
not  enjoyed  that  liberty  of  which  it  has  need,"  and 
joins  in  a  prayer  for  the  prompt  re-establishment  of 
peace  among  nations,  'Hhe  desire  for  the  cessation  of 
that  abnormal  condition  in  which  the  head  of  the 
Church  finds  himself." 

These  are  the  chief  contents  of  the  first  important 
statement  of  the  new  Pope  to  the  world.  To  many 
influential  Catholics  this  encyclical  came  as  a  distinct 
disappointment;  to  the  world  at  large  it  appeared  as 
a  weak  and  insignificant  document.  The  ItaHans 
were  visibly  annoyed  that  the  Pope  should  see  fit  to 
make  use  of  the  occasion  to  bring  to  the  notice  of 
Europe  the  petty  quarrel  of  the  Vatican  with  the 
Italian  Government.  The  Allies  had  expected  at 
least  a  reference  to  the  war,  and  a  condemnation  of 
its  instigators.  In  France,  the  election  of  Benedict 
XV,  the  confidential  adviser  of  Cardinal  Rampolla, 
who  had  always  been  a  warm  friend  of  France,  was 
hailed  with  much  sympathy,  and  it  was  hoped  that 
the  new  Pope  would  show  some  traces  of  the  former's 
friendship  for  France.  It  was  even  confidently  pre- 
dicted that  the  estrangement  between  the  Vatican 
and  the  French  Repubhc  would  be  brought  to  an  end 
by  Benedict  XV.  The  revulsion  of  feeUng  was  spon- 
taneous and  immediate  when  the  attitude  of  the  Pope 
regarding  the  war  became  known.  For  the  Papacy 
proclaimed  its  strict  neutrality,  just  as  the  States 
not  engaged  in  the  war  had  done.    It  was  the  aim  of 


THE  VATICAN  AND  THE  QUIRINAL    177 

the  Vatican,  leaving  aside  its  moral  and  spiritual  role, 
to  conform  itself  to  the  habitual  acts  of  non-bellig- 
erent, temporal  States. 

It  soon  appeared  evident  that  the  Vatican  was  by 
degrees  falling  under  the  influence  of  the  Central 
Empires.  The  diplomatic  representatives  of  Prus- 
sia, Bavaria,  and  Austria  at  the  Vatican,  owing  in 
part  to  the  fact  that  neither  France  nor  Great  Brit- 
ain maintained  a  mission  at  the  Papal  Court,  while 
the  Russian  Envoy  was  without  influence,  had  by  direct 
negotiations  been  able  to  persuade  the  Pope  that  the 
best  interests  of  the  Holy  See  were  more  closely  linked 
with  those  of  the  Central  Powers,  than  with  those  of 
the  AUies.  As  Prussia  was  pictured  as  representing 
law  and  order,  blind  obedience,  systematic  control, 
and  Austria  is  the  greatest  Catholic  State,  it  is  not 
difficult  to  understand  that  the  Pope  felt  more  sym- 
pathy with  these  than  with  republican  France,  heret- 
ical England,  or  schismatic  Russia.  Nor  were  the 
Austro-German  envoys  slow  to  make  definite  promises 
that  the  question  of  the  re-establishment  of  the  tem- 
poral power  of  the  Papacy  would  receive  careful  con- 
sideration at  the  coming  peace  conference,  and  they 
are  reported  to  have  pledged  the  support  of  the 
Central  Empires  to  the  project  of  internationalism 
ing  the  Law  of  Guarantees,  should  the  broader  issue 
fail. 

Busied  with  his  diplomatic  negotiations,  careful 
not  to  displease  Germany  or  Austria,  the  Pope  re- 
frained from  expressing  any  opinion  regarding  the 
violation  of  Belgian  neutrality,  even  when  it  was 
presented  to  his  notice  by  Cardinal  Mercier,  Primate 
of  Belgium.    The  reply  of  Benedict  XV  to  the  vibrant 


178  GREATER  ITALY 

appeal  of  the  Belgian  Cardinal  is  a  vague  expression 
of  generalities,  devoid  of  significance. 

In  order  to  present  the  cause  of  the  Allies  directly 
to  the  Vatican,  Great  Britain,  in  December,  1914, 
decided  to  send  a  duly  accredited,  diplomatic  mission 
to  the  Papal  Court.  Though  well  received,  the  British 
Envoy  was  unable  to  wean  the  Papacy  from  its  now 
decidedly  pro-German  tendencies.  England  had  other 
causes  for  grave  discontent  with  the  Vatican.  In 
Rome  the  Irish  Catholics  were  in  direct  relations  with 
the  Germans,  and  it  is  rumoured  that  it  was  through 
their  medium  that  the  intercourse,  which  later  re- 
sulted in  the  Easter  Revolution  of  1916  in  Ireland, 
was  actively  carried  on.  It  was  noticeable  and  com- 
mented upon  in  the  Eternal  City,  that  the  Irish 
Catholics  continued  their  relationship  with  the  Ger- 
man Envoy  to  the  Vatican,  even  after  the  arrival 
of  the  British  mission,  which  they  feigned  to  ignore. 
Papal  temporal  prestige  was  greatly  increased  by  the 
presence  of  a  Minister  Plenipotentiary  from  Great 
Britain,  who  after  a  period  of  four  centuries  again 
renewed  diplomatic  relations  between  the  Vatican 
and  the  Court  of  St.  James.  Benedict  XV  was  to  be 
gratified  with  further  solicitations  for  the  opening  up 
of  diplomatic  intercourse,  first  from  the  Ottoman 
Empire,  then  from  the  Netherlands. 

While  the  Vatican,  under  the  guidance  of  Benedict 
XV  was  increasing  its  temporal  prestige,  the  Quirinal 
was  leading  United  Italy  through  the  tortuous  nego- 
tiations with  the  Dual  Monarchy,  which  were  ulti- 
mately to  end  in  Itahan  intervention  in  the  European 
War. 

As  soon  as  the  course  which  the  ItaUan  Government 


THE  VATICAN  AND  THE  QUIRINAL    179 

was  pursuing  became  more  clearly  defined,  as  soon  as 
it  became  evident  that  Italy  was  preparing  to  range 
herself  on  the  side  of  the  Alhed  Powers,  the  Papacy 
began  to  exert  all  its  influence  to  maintain  Itahan 
neutrality.  For  the  Vatican  feared  that  if  Italy  were 
to  declare  war  on  the  Central  Empires  the  position 
of  the  Austro-German  representatives,  accredited  to 
the  Papal  Court,  would  become  untenable,  and  they 
would  be  forced  to  leave  Rome.  In  this  question,  as 
well  as  in  all  others  which  have  arisen  under  the  Bene- 
dictine pontificate,  what  was  believed  to  be  the  best 
interests  of  the  Vatican  were  alone  considered.  It  so 
came  about  that  the  Vatican  mobihsed  all  its  resources 
to  prevent  Italian  participation  in  the  war,  and  thus 
actively  supported  the  efforts  of  the  Austro-Germans. 
Spiritual  and  secular  arguments  were  linked  together, 
and  presented  to  the  numerous  loyal  Catholics  of  the 
Kjngdom,  bidding  them  to  resist  the  current  of  inter- 
vention. The  Vatican  let  it  be  understood  that  if 
Italy  should  engage  in  the  war,  the  Papacy  would 
consider  seriously  the  question  of  emigrating  to  some 
neutral  country,  and  negotiations  were  actually  set 
in  motion  with  a  view  to  securing  asylum  for  the 
Pope  in  Spain. 

Thus  the  Quirinal  found  itself  in  open  conflict  with 
the  Vatican,  and  though  ItaUan  participation  in  the 
war  was  brought  about,  there  nevertheless  remained 
a  remnant  of  "Neutrahsts"  who,  encouraged  as  much 
by  the  Vatican  as  from  independent  sources,  prevented 
Italy  from  putting  forth  a  strong  and  united  effort 
during  the  first  year  of  the  war. 

The  declaration  of  war  against  Austria,  and  the 
consequent  departure  of  the  diplomatic  representatives 


180  GREATER  ITALY 

of  the  Central  Empires,  accredited  to  the  Holy  See, 
in  May,  1915,  gave  the  Vatican  the  opportunity  again 
to  voice  through  the  Papal  Press  its  protest  against 
the  intolerable  position  in  which  the  Papacy  found 
itself,  in  that  it  "would  henceforth  be  able  to  com- 
municate only  with  one  group  of  belligerents,  and 
thus  would  not  be  in  a  position  to  obtain  all  the  in- 
formation which  is  necessary  for  an  exact  under- 
standing of  the  international  situation."  This  as- 
sertion is  not  borne  out  by  facts.  In  an  official  ut- 
terance the  Italian  authorities  stated,  ''The  Pope 
continues  to  exercise  his  apostolic  office  with  all  pos- 
sible liberty.  The  Law  of  Guarantees  remains  in 
force  in  its  entirety,  and  the  Pontiff  despatches  to- 
day, as  he  did  before  the  war,  his  communications  in 
cipher,  while  his  diplomatic  couriers  travel  with 
sealed  despatches,  which  are  not  subject  to  any  cen- 
sorship." The  establishment  of  the  Austrian  and 
German  Embassies  to  the  Papacy,  at  Lugano  in  Swit- 
zerland, bears  out  the  truth  of  this  statement. 

During  the  first  year  of  the  Italian  participation 
in  the  war,  the  Vatican  was  able  to  exercise  great 
influence  on  its  conduct.  The  lack  of  cohesion  of 
public  opinion  regarding  the  war,  the  efforts  made 
to  prevent  Italy  from  putting  forth  her  full  strength, 
and  above  all  the  undisguised  sympathy  which  num- 
bers of  Italians,  belonging  to  ''Black"  circles  at  Rome, 
professed  for  the  Central  Empires,  were  a  direct  out- 
come of  Vatican  influences.  However,  the  patriotism 
of  the  Italian  Catholics  finally  triumphed,  and  in  the 
"National  Ministry,"  which  was  formed  in  June, 
1916,  we  find  the  leader  of  the  CathoHc  party  as  Min- 
ister of  Finance.     The  attitude  of  neutraUty  of  the 


THE  VATICAN  AND  THE  QUIRINAL    181 

Italian-born  Pontiff  is  deemed  unpatriotic.  Had  the 
Pope  confined  his  efforts  to  playing  a  purely  spiritual 
part,  had  he  remained  aloof  from  the  conflict,  his 
poUcy  might,  if  not  understood,  at  least  have  been 
condoned.  But  the  patent  efforts  of  the  Papacy  to 
frustrate  the  plans  of  the  Quirinal,  to  obstruct  the 
fulfilment  of  the  obvious  destiny  of  national  expansion 
of  the  Kingdom  of  Italy,  has  wounded  the  sensibilities 
of  the  majority  of  Italians,  while  even  loyal  Catholics 
cannot  forgive  the  Pope  the  fact  that  in  the  face  of 
the  grave  moral  crisis,  brought  about  by  the  outbreak 
of  the  war,  the  head  of  the  Catholic  Church,  when  sum- 
moned to  speak,  remained  silent,  purposely  avoided 
to  commit  himself,  and  preferred  the  cautious,  hollow 
phraseology  of  the  diplomatist  to  that  of  a  shepherd 
of  the  people. 

In  considering  the  relation  of  the  Church  and  State 
in  Italy,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that,  for  more  than 
a  thousand  years  the  fortunes  of  the  CathoUc  Church 
have  been  intimately  bound  up  with  those  of  the 
Itahan  peninsula.  For  the  past  five  centuries  the 
direction  of  the  CathoHc  Church  has  been  in  the 
hands  of  Itahans.  Roman  Cathohcism,  the  most 
complete  theocracy  that  man  has  ever  created,  is 
the  handiwork  of  Italians.  The  presence  of  the  Papal 
Court  at  Rome  has,  dm*ing  the  past  forty-five  years, 
been  the  cause  of  much  anxiety  to  the  Italian  Govern- 
ment. However,  both  parties  seemed  to  have  grown 
accustomed  to  the  anomahes  of  their  relationship. 
The  efforts  of  Benedict  XV  to  revive  the  Roman 
Question  at  such  a  critical  period  in  the  history  of  the 
Kingdom  would  seem  to  indicate  that  under  the  gui- 
dance of  the  ''poUtical"  Pontiff  elected  at   the  last 


182  GREATER  ITALY 

Conclave,  the  Papacy  in  endeavouring  to  embarrass 
the  Italian  Government,  by  playing  into  the  hands 
of  her  enemies,  has  sacrificed  its  moral  and  religious 
ascendency  for  the  attainment  of  chimerical,  temporal 
gains.  For  it  is  not  alone  the  Italians  whom  the  Pope 
has  alienated.  At  a  time  when  a  religious  renascence 
is  unmistakably  manifesting  itself,  there  are  many 
signs  that  would  lead  one  to  conclude  that  French 
and  Belgian  Catholics  may  wish  to  emancipate  them- 
selves from  the  control  of  the  Vatican.  While  the 
Papacy  has  made  indirect  overtures,  soliciting  the 
renewal  of  diplomatic  intercourse  between  France  and 
the  Vatican,  which  have  been  coldly  received,  the 
French  clergy,  whether  cardinal  or  village  priest, 
maintaining  a  lofty  spirit  of  patriotism,  are  letting 
France  know  that  "God  is  not  neutral"  whatever 
may  be  the  attitude  of  '^ glacial  serenity"  of  the  Holy 
Father,  as  the  neutrality  of  the  Pope  is  stigmatised. 

Notwithstanding  the  opposition  which  has  arisen 
against  the  Vatican,  the  Italians  do  not  forget  that 
the  Catholic  Church  is  greater  than  its  Popes:  ''a 
huge,  slumbering  giant  whose  head  rests  in  the  lap 
of  Italy,  and  whose  body  spreads  over  the  world." 
This  great  mass,  long  inert,  may  some  day  awaken. 
The  World  War,  with  its  far-reaching  results,  may  be 
the  cause  of  such  a  resurrection. 

The  days  have  passed  when  the  Quirinal  trembled 
at  a  threat  of  the  Vatican  to  reassert  its  temporal 
rights.  As  a  result  of  a  victorious  war,  with  the  econ- 
omic and  political  strength  of  the  Kingdom  greatly 
increased,  and  with  the  stability  of  Italy  as  a  World 
Power  thereby  assured,  the  temporal  pretensions  of 
the  Papacy  must  inevitably  vanish.     Though  the  oft- 


THE  VATICAN  AND  THE   QUIRINAL   183 

repeated  menace  of  the  Papacy  to  abandon  Rome  may 
again  be  made,  and  all  Italians  recognise  that  such  a 
step  would  be  a  severe  blow  to  Italian  prestige,  it  is 
well-known  that  the  Papacy  cannot  leave  the  Eternal 
City  without  losing  the  influence  and  moral  ascen- 
dency which  San  Pietro  presso  Roma  alone  can  confer. 
The  delicate  problem  of  internationahsing  the  Law 
of  Guarantees  is  of  difficult  solution.  The  great  ma- 
jority of  the  people  of  Italy  are  actively  opposed  to 
any  such  programme,  and  as  long  as  the  Papacy  re- 
mains at  Rome  Italians  would  consider  it  an  infringe- 
ment of  their  sovereign  rights  for  any  foreign  Powers 
to  concern  themselves  with,  what  they  hold  to  be,  an 
internal  problem.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  not  im- 
probable that,  in  view  of  the  difficulties  which  the 
secular  sovereign  rights,  conferred  on  the  Pope  by  the 
Law  of  Guarantees,  have  created,  the  Italian  Govern- 
ment may  impose  further  restrictions  on  Papal  sover- 
eignty, and,  by  depriving  the  Papacy  of  all  vestige 
and  semblance  of  temporal  power,  settle  for  all  time, 
by  drastic  measures,  the  vexed  Roman  Question. 


CHAPTER  IX 

ITALY  AND  GERMANY 

Geeman  Peaceful  Penetration.     Industrial  Servitude. 
The  Breaking  from  Bondage 

When  Italy,  only  a  decade  after  the  achievement 
of  national  independence,  badgered  by  Austria,  dis- 
dained by  Great  Britain,  and  fearing  an  assault  on 
the  part  of  France  which  threatened  her  national 
existence,  was  isolated  in  Europe,  she  besought  the 
friendship  of  Germany  and  sought  to  place  herself 
under  German  protection.  In  order  to  secure  this 
protection,  Italy,  at  the  behest  of  BerUn,  even  went 
to  the  length  of  becoming  an  ally  of  Austria,  as  Ital- 
ian statesmen  beheved  that  by  their  alHance  with 
Germany  they  were  pursuing  the  only  course  open  to 
them  which  would  guarantee  the  integrity  of  the  new 
Kingdom. 

Though  by  courtesy  admitted  into  the  comity  of 
the  Great  Powers,  Italy  was  at  the  time  in  no  posi- 
tion to  assert  her  rights.  In  the  twelve  years  which 
had  elapsed  since  the  House  of  Savoy  had  united  the 
disjointed  patchwork  of  Italian  States,  many  of  them 
the  most  backward  and  misgoverned  in  Europe,  into 
a  nation,  much  progress  had  been  made  in  develop- 
ing the  national  strength  of  the  Italian  people.  Yet 
Italy  remained  the  poorest  and  weakest  of  the  Powers, 
seemingly  unquaUfied,  either  practically  or  potentially, 
to  aspire  to  great  expansion. 

184 


ITALY  AND  GERMANY  185 

With  the  help  of  France,  Magenta  and  Solferino 
had  won  the  first  steps  of  ItaUan  unity.  Sadowa 
and  Sedan  had  been  German  victories,  which  had 
made  it  possible  to  incorporate  Venice  and  Rome  in 
the  ICingdom.  Thus  Italy  had  been  created  with  the 
aid  of  both  France  and  Germany,  and  now  had  to 
make  a  choice  between  the  two.  Owing  to  the  antag- 
onistic attitude  of  France  at  this  time,  it  was  not 
surprising  that  the  Italians  chose  the  alliance  with 
Germany.  During  the  first  years  of  the  Triple  Al- 
liance, Germany,  as  the  result  of  her  victorious  wars, 
ruled  as  absolute  master  in  Continental  Europe.  Italy 
had  to  content  herself  with  playing  a  very  secondary 
role.  Yet  these  years  were  not  without  their  benefit 
to  her.  Germany  was  the  model  and  pattern.  Quick 
to  learn,  eager  to  improve,  the  Italian  people  were 
laying  the  foundation  of  the  future  economic  power 
of  the  State. 

When,  after  1890  and  the  subsequent  Franco- 
Russian  alUance,  a  semblance  of  the  balance  of  power 
was  re-estabUshed  in  Europe,  Italy  breathed  more 
freely.  Her  importance  as  an  ally  increased,  and  she 
began  to  play  a  more  independent  and  personal  part 
in  European  affairs.  The  danger  of  a  foreign  in- 
vasion had  passed.  Italy  was  now  entering  upon  a 
period  of  colonial  expansion.  She  was,  however, 
still  not  merely  poor  financially  and  industrially,  but 
ignorant  of  the  ways  and  means  of  increasing  her 
worldly  wealth.  She  understood  little  of  the  methods 
of  industrial  exploitation,  so  astonishingly  perfected 
by  the  Germans.  Germany  was  rapidly  rising  to 
the  industrial  leadership  of  the  world  and  had  become 
the  master  of  modern  efficiency  in  all  forms  of  organ- 


186  GREATER  ITALY 

isation  of  industrial  and  commercial  enterprise,  which 
was  the  foundation  of  economic  expansion.  Italy 
had  allied  herself  with  Germany  for  the  protection  of 
her  national  boundaries;  when  this  protection  was 
no  longer  needed,  when  no  enemies  threatened  her, 
and  the  political  aspects  of  her  treaty  with  Germany 
assured  her  few  advantages,  Italy  deliberately  turned 
to  Germany  and  prayed  to  be  instructed  in  the 
methods  and  secrets  of  this  modern  alchemy. 

It  was  Crispi,  in  his  sincere  desire  to  foster  the 
greatness  and  increase  the  wealth  and  power  of  Italy, 
who  openly  sought  German  economic  aid.  The  op- 
portunity was  propitious  for  the  German  industrial 
invasion  of  Italy.  France,  after  carrying  on  a  pro- 
longed conmiercial  warfare  against  Italy,  suddenly  in  a 
moment  of  childlike  anger  dumped  all  the  Italian  se- 
curities that  she  held  on  the  market.^  Italy  was  help- 
less and  found  herself  in  an  embarrassed  position.  To 
assist  Italian  finances  there  was  formed  in  the  year 
1895,  by  certain  German  financiers,  chief  among  them 
Herr  Schwabach,  the  head  of  the  banking-house  of 
Bleichroder  of  Berlin,  an  Italian  bank,  with  its  head- 
quarters at  Milan,  known  as  the  ''Banca  Commerciale." 

Ever  since  the  first  visit  of  Wilham  II  to  Italy  a 
few  months  after  his  accession  to  the  throne  in  1888, 
the  possibility  of  the  industrial  exploitations  of  Italy 
had  formed  a  cherished  part  of  his  programme  of  world 
expansion.  The  story  of  German  peaceful  penetra- 
tion throughout  the  world  is  one  of  the  most  amazing 
chapters  in  contemporary  history.  While  the  Govern- 
ments of  other  nations  were  content  to  permit  their 
nationals  to  trade  abroad,  and  open  up  markets  for 

iSee  p.  60. 


ITALY  AND  GERMANY  187 

their  products,  giving  them  no  encouragement  and 
little  protection,  Germany,  from  the  earliest  days 
of  her  existence  as  an  Empire,  realised  that  financial, 
industrial,  and  commercial  enterprise  are  essential, 
determining  factors  in  world  politics.  While  other 
Governments  still  clung  to  the  antiquated  notion  of 
a  wide  guK  between  economics  and  politics,  Germany 
closely  co-ordinated  and  allied  the  two  branches  of 
this  same  science. 

It  was  thus  that  BerUn  became  the  headquarters 
of  the  Great  General  Staff  of  ''Peaceful  Penetration." 
Plans  were  here  devised  to  achieve  the  economic 
servitude  of  the  world.  With  methodical,  plod- 
ding patience  and  scientific  zeal,  alHed  with  a  bold- 
ness of  conception  and  brilliancy  in  execution  worthy 
of  the  greatest  miHtary  genius,  the  invaders  prepared 
the  outlines  of  the  plans  of  their  campaigns,  devised 
the  strategy,  studied  the  tactics  to  be  pursued.  Just 
as  at  the  War  College  across  the  Spree  the  weekly 
Kriegsspiel  (war  game)  took  place,  which  initiated 
the  more  brilHant  younger  officers  in  the  plans  for 
the  military  conquest  of  Europe,  so  within  the  silent, 
double-doored  rooms  of  the  Deutsche  Bank,  of  the 
Dresdener  Bank,  of  the  A.  E.  G.,  and  other  great  Ger- 
man concerns,  the  programmes  for  the  industrial 
conquest  of  Europe  and  the  world  were  matured. 
Italy,  Belgium,  Holland,  Spain,  Turkey,  Bulgaria, 
Chile,  Brazil,  France,  and  even  Great  Britain  were 
the  subject  of  careful  study. 

The  methods  of  procedure  adopted  to  achieve  the 
desired  results  were  manifold.  The  Church,  Parlia- 
ments, the  Press  were  influenced,  bribed,  subsidised, 
and,  if  need  be,  coerced.     The  natural  cupidity  and 


1S8  GREATER  ITALY 

the  ignorance  of  international  politics  of  the  average 
business  man  were  preyed  upon.  The  almost  uni- 
versal desire  for  material  well-being,  which  was  daily 
becoming  more  wide-spread  among  all  classes,  was 
exploited.  To  gain  secret  information  regarding 
markets,  trade  spies,  both  German  and  native,  were 
widely  made  use  of.  The  well-trained  German  chemist 
or  engineer  was  subventioned,  and  thus  willing  to 
work  abroad  for  a  trifling  stipend,  until  he  had  learned 
the  secrets  of  competitors'  processes.  By  German 
methods  of  factory  efficiency,  superior  organisation 
and  preferential  transportation  rates  accorded  by  the 
home  railways,  the  German  manufacturer  was  soon 
able  to  drive  the  native  products  out  of  the  market 
with  a  cheaper  German  substitute.  German  capital 
was  often  judiciously  invested  with  native  capital 
abroad,  and  later,  when  prosperity  had  crowned  the 
enterprise,  withdrawn.  Yet  the  management  almost 
invariably  remained  in  German  hands,  as  the  average 
stockholder  was  more  interested  in  regular  dividends 
than  in  questions  of  international  influence.  In  each 
and  every  case  the  peculiarities  and  particular  needs 
of  a  given  situation  were  maturely  investigated  and 
studied,  and  then  when  the  field  had  been  prepared, 
the  German  was  ready  to  reap  the  fruits  of  his  labour. 
For  it  must  be  recalled  that  every  German  thus  en- 
gaged felt  himself  an  essential  unit  of  the  Empire,  and 
the  Government  saw  to  it  that  this  spirit  was  kept 
aUve.  Thus  the  mighty  tide  of  German  penetration 
spread  irresistibly.  As  the  years  passed,  on  the  maps 
and  charts  of  Europe  and  the  world,  which  hung  in 
the  halls  of  the  great  banks  of  Berlin,  the  black,  white, 
and  red  flags  of  Germany,  marking  the  deep  inroads 


ITALY  AND  GERMANY  189 

of  German  trade  abroad,  spread  their  network  ever 
more  broadly  and  thickly.  The  grandiose  plan  of  the 
Pan-Germans  for  world  domination  had  found,  in  the 
material  greed  of  the  peoples  of  all  nations,  the  pawns 
of  their  policy.  The  international  character  of  world 
trade  and  commerce  made  it  easy  for  the  Germans 
to  wear  the  cloak  of  a  given  nationahty,  which  could 
be  cast  off  at  the  opportune  moment. 

German  peaceful  penetration,  advocated  and  en- 
couraged by  the  Emperor  himself,  seconded  by  the 
united  strength  of  the  German  Empire,  having  at 
its  immediate  disposal  not  merely  the  channels  of 
diplomacy  and  the  full  support  of  the  Government, 
but  also  the  most  powerful  army  in  the  world,  ready 
to  intimidate  any  presumptuous  competitor,  found 
opposed  to  it  only  the  weak,  individual  initiative  of 
a  few  groups,  divided  by  internal  dissensions.  In 
many  cases  the  Germans  readily  found  influential 
personages  abroad,  who,  in  order  to  secure  the  co- 
operation of  foreign  capital,  were  willing  to  assist 
the  invaders.  In  no  country  was  this  more  true  than 
in  Italy. 

Bound  by  the  ties  of  their  alHance  with  Germany, 
the  ItaUans  readily  welcomed  the  Germans.  Anxious 
to  learn  the  methods  and  means  of  acquiring  an  in- 
crease in  their  material  well-being,  they  guilelessly 
placed  their  resources  at  the  disposal  of  their  aUies 
for  exploitation  along  German  lines.  The  country 
was  new,  the  people,  inspired  by  their  successful 
struggle  for  national  unity  to  attempt  greater  things, 
were  ready  to  follow  the  German  lead.  A  certain 
aflSnity  of  spirit,  and  the  similarity  of  the  recent  his- 
torical development  of  the  two  nations,  led  the  more 


190  GREATER  ITALY 

intellectual  classes  in  Italy,  who  were  coming  more 
and  more  under  Germanic  influence,  to  look  favourably 
on  the  increasing  number  of  Germans,  who  now  flocked 
to  Italy  to  take  up  positions  of  trust,  as  directors, 
managers,  and  superintendents  in  the  newly  estab- 
lished factories  which  were  everywhere  springing  up. 
The  Germans  brought  with  them  to  Italy  a  feehng 
of  contempt  for  the  Italian  people,  and,  while  exploit- 
ing the  excellent  and  cheap  labour  which  everywhere 
abounded,  in  the  successful  development  of  their 
enterprises,  they  remained  faithful  to  their  German 
allegiance.  It  cannot  be  gainsaid  that,  during  the 
early  years  of  German  penetration  in  Italy,  their 
presence  was  of  immense  material  benefit  to  the  coun- 
try. Initiated  into  the  secrets  of  German  methods  of 
industry,  trade,  and  commerce,  the  country  flourished. 
It  was  not,  however,  until  after  the  estabhshment 
of  the  Banca  Commerciale,  in  1895,  that  the  German 
plan  for  the  economic  conquest  of  Italy  was  seriously 
undertaken.  The  moment  was  opportune.  The 
bold  colonial  enterprise,  which  Italy  had  so  enthu- 
siastically begun,  had  collapsed;  a  period  of  strikes 
and  internal  dissensions  was  beginning.  Pubhc  credit 
was  at  a  low  ebb;  the  confidence  of  the  people  in  their 
financial  institutions  and  government  was  shaken; 
the  antagonism  of  France  was  more  virulent  than  it 
had  been  for  some  years  past.  It  was  at  this  juncture 
that  the  Pan-Germans  turned  their  attention  to 
Italy.  They  now  realised  that  Italy,  notwithstand- 
ing recent  failures,  had  the  possibility  of  developing 
into  a  great  industrial  State.  Though  still  largely 
given  to  agriculture,  Italy,  with  her  abundant  supply 
of  labour,  the  cheapest  in  Western  Europe,  and  at  the 


ITALY  AND  GERMANY  191 

same  time  the  most  frugal,  hard-working,  and  adapt- 
able, might,  if  not  held  in  check,  at  no  distant  date 
rival  Germany  herself  in  the  markets  of  the  world. 
It  thus  came  about  that  when  Crispi  called  upon 
Germany  for  financial  assistance,  the  Germans, 
officially  encouraged  by  their  Government,  founded 
a  bank  in  co-operation  with  Italian  capital,  at  Milan, 
with  a  capital  stock  of  only  5,000,000  Hre  (£200,000). 
Here,  ready  to  hand,  the  Germans  were  soon  to  have 
the  means  of  directing  and  dominating  not  merely 
the  economic,  but  even  the  pohtical  hfe  of  Italy,  in 
the  interests  of  Germany.  Such  was  the  Banca  Com- 
merciale,  which  by  degrees  increased  its  capital  until 
it  reached  the  total  of  150,000,000  lire  (£6,000,000), 
and  had  an  annual  overturn  of  800,000,000  lire  (£32,- 
000,000).  Throughout  the  years  of  its  growth  this 
banking  institution  was  ruled  over  by  three  Ger- 
mans.^ It  is  furthermore  astonishing  to  note  that, 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  this  bank,  which  soon 
became  the  leading  financial  institution  in  Italy 
and  was  in  a  position  to  control  the  economic  life  of 
the  country,  though  it  had  long  since  passed  from 
German  ownership,  so  that  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
European  War  only  3,000,000  Ure  (£120,000)  of  the 
capital  stock  remained  in  German  hands,  its  policy 
was  directed  from  Berlin  and  its  power  made  use  of 
in  Pan-German  interests. 

It  was  not  long  after  the  establishment  of  this  bank 
that  it  succeeded  in  gaining  control  of  the  chief  in- 
dustrial and    commercial  enterprises   in  Italy.     The 

^  C/.  G.  Preziosi:  "La  Germania  alia  Conquista  dell'Italia,"  Firenze, 
1916,  p.  62.  This  volume  sheds  an  interesting  Ught  on  the  question  of 
German  penetration  in  Italy. 


192  GREATER  ITALY 

number  of  the  joint  stock  companies  in  Italy  is  stated 
to  be  793,  with  a  capital  of  3,898,174,049  hre^  (£155,- 
926,961).  By  skilful  manipulation,  the  Commerciale 
has  been  able  to  control  this  vast  capital,  and  thus 
the  economic  life  of  Italy.  The  favourite  device  to 
secure  voting  control  was  to  offer  a  small  sum  for 
the  privilege  of  representing  the  stock  of  individual 
holders  in  the  directors'  meetings.  The  shares  were 
deposited  with  the  bank  for  the  time  being,  and  the 
bank  was  authorised  to  represent  its  owners.  By 
this  simple  method,  year  in  and  year  out,  the  bank 
was  able  at  very  trifling  cost,  to  dominate  secretly 
the  economic  hfe  of  the  country.  The  enormous 
power  which  was  at  the  disposal  of  this  bank  was 
made  use  of  to  favour  by  all  possible  means  the  sale 
of  German  products,  with  a  twofold  object  of  keep- 
ing out  of  Itahan  markets  products  coming  from 
other  countries  and  of  preventing  any  serious  expan- 
sion of  Italian  industries. ^  It  thus  came  about  that 
great  credit  faciUties  were  offered  through  the  bank, 
both  to  German  firms  and  to  the  Italian  customers 
of  German  firms.  Furthermore,  when  an  Itahan  firm 
was  in  the  need  of  new  machinery  or  other  materials, 
should  it  dare  seek  to  obtain  them  in  the  open  market, 
a  strong  "recommendation"  from  the  bank  would 
almost  invariably  be  received,  urging  it  to  choose  a 
German  product,  purchased  from  a  German  firm  or 
one  bound  up  with  German  interests,  otherwise  it 
would  find  its  credit  cut  off,  and  would  soon  be  ruined. 
By  means  of  a  slowly  and  carefully  woven  web  of  in- 
terests, within  comparatively  few  years,  the  Commer- 
ciale gained  control  of  the  chief  industries  of  Italy; 

1  Op.  cil.,  p.  75.  ^  Ibidem,  p.  77. 


ITALY  AND  GERMANY  193 

steel  plants,  machine-shops,  ship-building  yards,  ship- 
ping companies,  power  plants,  armament  firms,  all 
passed  under  German  control  and  were  exploited  in 
German  interests.  The  steel  plants  at  Terni,  the 
Vickers  Arms  factory  at  Spezia,  the  smelters  at  Savona 
and  at  Elba,  the  Italian  Lloyd,  the  General  Naviga- 
tion Company,  as  well  as  many  of  the  other  more  im- 
portant industries  of  Italy,  it  is  alleged  came  under 
German  domination.  Slowly  the  grip  tightened  until, 
towards  the  end  of  the  first  decade  of  the  presant 
century,  Germany  had  succeeded  in  gaining  a  strangle- 
hold at  the  throat  of  Italy. 

The  German  invasion  was  so  insidiously  carried 
on  that  the  majority  of  the  Itahans  did  not  even 
realise  its  existence.  Its  growth  was  facihtated  by 
the  fact  that  the  leading  men  of  Italy,  both  in  poht- 
ical  and  commercial  spheres,  had  been  brought  up  to 
admire  Germany  and  all  things  German.  The  great 
and  ever-increasing  prosperity  of  the  country  was 
ascribed  to  German  co-operation,  and  few  were  in  a 
position  to  know  the  full  extent  of  German  penetra- 
tion. Few  knew  that  the  greater  part  of  the  Itahan 
merchant  marine  was  in  German  hands.  Though  the 
Itahan  flag  flew  over  the  ships,  the  pohcy  of  the  com- 
panies was  controlled  by  the  Banca  Commerciale, 
and  the  bank  saw  to  it  that  its  numberless  employees 
and  agents  pursued  a  policy  which  was  distinctly 
Germanophil.  And  so  it  was  with  the  steel  and  iron 
industries,  which  the  bank  dominated.  More  dan- 
gerous to  the  vital  strength  of  Italy  was  the  German 
control  exercised  over  the  electric-power  plants.  Re- 
cent development  of  electrical  energy  in  Italy  has 
been  very  marked.    Those  controlhng  its  supply  and 


194  GREATER  ITALY 

distribution  have  in  their  hands  a  source  whence 
they  can  derive  secret  information  concerning  the 
most  intimate  particulars  of  any  given  district.  The 
engineers  and  employees  of  electric  light  and  power 
companies  must,  in  the  course  of  their  business,  be 
admitted  everywhere.  Arsenals  and  factories,  private 
homes  and  ministries,  staff  colleges  and  fortresses, 
all  are  thrown  open  to  the  electrician.  The  ease  with 
which  intelligent  espionage  can  thus  be  carried  out, 
unobserved,  can  be  readily  understood.  Yet,  not- 
withstanding the  peril  of  intrusting  the  control  of 
this  most  vital  interest  to  foreigners,  in  Italy  in  the 
province  of  Venetia,  bordering  along  the  Austrian 
frontier,  99  per  cent  of  the  electrical  horse-power 
was  in  German  hands.  ^ 

The  hold  exerted  by  Germany  over  the  economic 
life  of  Italy  soon  led  to  active  interference  in  the  polit- 
ical life  of  the  country.  In  carrying  on  its  campaign 
of  penetration,  the  Press  was  from  the  outset  the  most 
essential  means  used  to  influence  public  opinion. 
Thus  certain  important  Italian  daily  newspapers 
were  subventioned  to  act  in  the  interests  of  the  Com- 
merciale  and  to  proclaim  the  superiority  of  German 
methods  and  German  goods. 

"The  method  of  the  Commerciale  is  in  the  main 
always  the  same;  each  one  of  the  corporations  con- 
trolled by  the  bank  is  compelled  to  subscribe  to  a 
definite  share  of  the  capital  stock  of  a  given  news- 
paper or  periodical.  The  journals,  moreover,  are  in 
receipt  of  subsidies  of  various  kinds,  generally  in  the 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  118.  Out  of  a  total  of  74,800,000  lire  (£2,992,000)  in- 
vested in  electrical  enterprises  in  Venetia,  72,000,000  lire  (£2,880,000) 
was  in  German  hands. 


ITALY  AND  GERMANY  195 

form  of  advertising  contracts  and  advertisements  of 
the  industries  which  are  established  in  the  region 
where  they  are  pubHshed  and  circulated.  .  .  .  Cer- 
tain industries  have  their  own  journals.  It  is  beyond 
doubt  that  a  goodly  part  of  the  daily  and  periodical 
Press,  technical  as  well  as  political,  whether  of  large 
or  small  circulation,  without  distinction  as  regards 
political  affiliation,  obeys  the  mandates  of  the  Cora- 
merciale,  which  are  those  of  German  policy.  It  is 
thus  that  a  great  share  of  the  Italian  Press,  by  means 
of  biased  leaders,  or  news  articles,  by  reports  or  ac- 
counts apparently  dealing  with  technical  matters, 
by  telegrams,  sensational  despatches,  parliamentary 
reports,  and  local  comments,  in  brief  by  means  of  all 
those  elements  which  constitute  the  spirit  and  pohcy 
of  a  newspaper,  is  enhsted  in  the  service  of  this  non- 
Italian  Bank,  to  create  pubHc  opinion,  propagate 
its  ideas,  and  mould  the  thoughts  of  the  people." 
("La  Germania  alia  Conquista  dellTtalia,"  p.  130.) 
Further  than  this,  with  multifarious  ramifications 
stretching  in  every  corner  of  the  peninsula,  the  in- 
fluence of  the  bank  could  make  itself  potently  felt. 
It  was  no  very  difficult  matter  to  materially  assist 
the  candidacy  of  a  Deputy  who  was  favourable  to  the 
German  interests  of  the  Commerciale  in  Italy. 

Not  content  with  taking  an  active  part  in  internal 
poHtics,  the  bank  now  interfered  in  Italy's  foreign 
relations.  It  would  not  seem  doubtful  that,  acting 
on  instructions  received  from  BerHn,  the  bank  exerted 
every  influence  to  prevent  the  Italo-Turkish  War, 
and  when  this  was  no  longer  possible,  pressure  was 
brought  to  bear  to  bring  the  campaign  to  a  speedy 
conclusion,  and  save  Turkish  susceptibilities.    Unable 


196  GREATER  ITALY 

to  prevent  the  war,  the  German  "interests"  were, 
however,  able  to  negotiate  the  terms  of  peace.  Two 
of  the  three  delegates  who  negotiated  the  Treaty  of 
Lausanne  were  closely  identified  with  the  bank. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  the  dictatorship  of  Gio- 
litti  was  alone  made  possible  by  the  fact  that  he  was 
supported  by  this  Pan-German  institution.  What- 
ever the  truth  of  the  matter  may  be,  it  would  seem 
that  during  the  latter  years  of  his  administration 
GioUtti  entered  into  close  relations  with  the  bank. 
The  concession  of  AdaUa  in  Asia  Minor,  granted  to 
Italy  in  19L3,  was  turned  over  to  the  Commerciale. 
The  establishment  of  the  Bank  of  Albania  was,  in 
so  far  as  it  concerned  its  Italian  share,  intrusted  to 
this  same  institution.  Several  men,  closely  alhed  to 
the  bank,  were  appointed  Senators  by  Giolitti,^  and 
other  proofs  have  been  brought  forward  to  show  that 
Giolitti  and  the  Banca  Commerciale  held  Italy  in 
subjection  bordering  on  political  and  economic  slavery. 
Writing  of  the  condition  of  Italy  as  the  result  of  the 
manoeuvres  of  this  Pan-German  institution,  M.  Preziosi 
declares: 

''The  great  calamity  of  Italy  is  that  this  bank  not 
only  controls  the  navigation  companies,  the  metal- 
lurgical and  manufactm'ing  industries,  but  likewise 
the  greater  part,  if  not  all,  the  industrial  enterprises 
which  specialise  in  the  manufacture  of  armaments. 
This  explains  not  only  the  power  of  the  bank,  but  also 
its  policy.  The  Commerciale,  controlling  such  an 
enormous  and  formidable  mass  of  interests,  exercises 
an  almost  overpowering  influence  on  our  political  life 
and  public  opinion.  Many  of  our  so-called  leading 
lawyers,   numberless  engineers,   manufacturers,   sena- 

1  Od.  cit..  p.  145. 


ITALY  AND  GERMANY  197 

tors,  deputies,  statesmen,  officers  of  the  army  and  of 
the  navy,  members  of  the  clergy,  etc.,  obey  its  com- 
mands. The  Banca  Commerciale  had  its  candidate 
for  the  premiership  ''in  reserve,"  and  there  was  a 
moment  in  which  this  candidacy  nearly  triumphed. 
The  influence  which  the  bank  exercises  is  vast,  and  is 
increasing  continuously.  Newspapers  great  and  small 
in  the  capitals  and  in  the  provinces,  smaller  banks, 
stock  companies  held  in  leash — these  are  means  by 
which  the  Commerciale  dominates  and  directs  the 
Hfe  of  Italy."! 

It  is  one  of  the  most  curious  phenomena  of  Ger- 
man penetration  in  Italy  that  it  rallied  to  its  sup- 
port many  sincere  and  ardent  partisans  among  the 
upper  and  more  intelhgent  classes  of  the  country, 
unsoUcited.  The  causes  of  this  trend  must  be  sought 
in  the  temper  of  our  times.  For  the  past  sixty  years, 
economic  development  has  been  the  sole  objective 
of  Western  civilisation.  The  unbridled  exploitation 
which  would  turn  man  into  an  automaton,  and 
make  him  an  adjunct  of  a  machine,  has  been  the 
result  of  the  frenzy  for  efficiency  and  organisation, 
inaugurated  by  Germany.  The  megalomania  of 
Germany,  the  triumphant  struggle  for  commercial 
and  industrial  expansion,  for  the  conquest  of  world 
markets,  the  dreams  of  world  dominion,  the  Pan- 
German  programmes  of  world  hegemony  awakened 
in  the  minds  of  the  Italians  profound  and  unbounded 
admiration.  Whether  they  saw  mirrored  in  German 
aims  and  German  ambitions  their  own  longings  is 
not  easily  determined;  whether  by  an  atavism  which 
hearkened  back  through  the  ages  to  the  times  of 
Imperial  Rome,  they  sought  to  conceive  a  future  Im- 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  86. 


198  GREATER  ITALY 

perial  Italy,  ruling  again  both  shores  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean, the  sober  fact  remains  that  the  bond  which 
united  Italy  with  Germany  was  the  source  of  exulta- 
tion and  pride.  It  was  not  the  men  who  concluded 
the  Triple  AlUance,  but  their  successors  twenty  or  even 
thirty  years  later,  the  Itahans  of  to-day,  who,  before 
the  European  War  broke  out,  were  the  most  enthusi- 
astic Germanophiles.  During  the  present  century  Ger- 
many, in  the  eyes  of  the  people  of  Italy,  has  stood  forth 
as  the  embodiment  of  all  the  essential  characteristics 
by  which  world  power  is  achieved.  BUnded  by  the 
glare  of  the  shining  armour  of  Germany,  by  the  dis- 
cipHne  of  her  regiments,  the  efl&ciency  of  her  military 
organisation,  by  the  amazing  piles  of  statistical  tables 
which  computed  by  hundreds  of  thousands  and  mil- 
Hons  the  increase  in  her  population,  the  expansion  of 
her  commerce,  the  production  of  her  industries,  the 
accumulation  of  her  wealth,  Italy  stood  bewildered 
at  the  thought  that  she  would  perhaps  share  this 
power,  enjoy  this  wealth  and  prosperity.  So  that 
•within  recent  years  all  Italy,  save  a  few  isolated  groups, 
had  become  frankly  Germanophil.  Socialists,  con- 
servatives and  nationahsts,  freethinkers  and  clericals, 
university  professors,  scientists  and  philosophers,  art- 
ists and  musicians,  the  nobility  and  the  middle 
classes,  all  joined  in  a  public  profession  of  faith,  in  a 
hymn  of  praise  to  this  new  deity,  "Germany."  Hand 
in  hand  with  this  untrammelled  "Germanism"  there 
was  a  growing,  contemptuous  disregard  for  France, 
owing  in  part  to  the  German  trumpetings  of  French 
decadence,  which  resounded  broadcast  throughout 
Italy;  while  the  conviction  that  Great  Britain  was 
being  rapidly  driven  out  of  the  world's  markets,  and 


ITALY  AND  GERMANY  199 

was  no  longer  in  a  position  to  compete  with  Germany, 
was  daily  gaining  headway. 

It  is  interesting  in  looking  for  the  immediate  pal- 
pable causes  of  this  astonishing  ''GermanophiUsm" 
to  note  the  part  played  by  the  German  Emperor, 
Wilham  II.  We  are  still  in  too  close  propinquity  to 
the  conditions  under  discussion  to  gain  a  clear-cut 
perspective  of  events,  but  it  would  seem  beyond  ques- 
tion that  the  influence  of  WiUiam  II  was  preponderant 
in  bringing  about  this  pro-German  intoxication.  Not 
a  year  passed  without  repeated  visits  of  the  Hohen- 
zoUern  Emperor  to  Italy.  Now  it  was  Venice,  then 
Brindisi,  now  Rome  or  Naples,  or  Palermo  which 
caught  a  ghmpse  of  the  Imperial  presence,  in  ghtter- 
ing  state  and  glory.  Not  once  or  twice,  but  again 
and  again  WiUiam  II  came  on  one  pretext  or  another. 
Now,  he  appeared  in  Rome,  and  presented  to  the 
Imperial  City  a  statue  of  Goethe,  which  was  unveiled 
with  much  ceremony  in  the  gardens  of  the  Villa  Bor- 
ghese.  Then  in  the  company  of  the  King  of  Italy  he 
visited  the  Abbey  of  Montecassino,  a  German  monas- 
tery which  was  the  centre  of  much  valuable  German 
propaganda;  or  again  the  Imperial  yacht  Hohenzollern 
cruised  in  SiciUan  waters,  or  appeared  suddenly  amid 
the  lagoons  of  Venice,  and  cast  anchor  close  to  St. 
Mark's.  Whether  these  repeated  visits  to  Italy  were 
pure  poUcy  or  predilection,  is  difficult  to  infer.  In  all 
probabihty  it  was  a  combination  of  both.  Thus  during 
recent  years  while  insidiously  the  chains  of  ItaUan 
servitude  were  being  forged,  on  the  surface  the  cordial- 
ity, consideration,  and  friendship  of  the  most  power- 
ful monarch  in  the  world,  won  for  Germany  many 
stanch  and  faithful  adherents  throughout  Italy.    It 


200  GREATER  ITALY 

was  not  only  the  Emperor,  but  his  most  able  and 
brilliant  Chancellor,  Prince  Biilow,  who  sought  to 
weave  the  Prussian  spell  over  Italy.  Retiring  from 
the  Chancellorship,  he  took  up  his  residence  in  Rome, 
and  soon  succeeded  in  forming  a  pro-German  coterie, 
which  was  made  up  of  ItaUans  more  devoted  to  Ger- 
man than  to  Italian  interests.  And  in  the  wake  of 
the  Emperor  and  the  former  Chancellor  each  year 
saw  a  more  numerous  tide  of  invasion  of  Germans  of 
all  classes.  Italy  has  always  been  the  land  of  promise 
for  the  peoples  of  the  North.  The  Germans  now  came 
in  droves  as  tourists.  Many  remained  to  take  up 
their  residence.  They  built  hotels  along  the  coast  of 
Liguria;  their  villas  dotted  the  hillsides  of  Rapallo 
and  Capri,  the  Lido  and  Taormina.  They  opened 
small  shops  and  large  bazaars.  German  doctors 
established  their  sanatoria,  and  in  their  train  came 
German  patients,  nurses,  and  chemists.  In  the  region 
of  the  Lake  of  Garda,  the  Germans  almost  drove  out 
the  natives.  In  recent  years  German  signs  were 
everywhere  to  be  seen  along  the  lake  side,  and  at  the 
small  stations  around  the  lake  the  names  of  the  towns 
were  called  out  in  the  German  language.  German 
commercial  travellers  crossed  Italy  from  one  end  of 
the  country  to  the  other,  selling  German  wares.  Ac- 
cording to  statistics  gathered  in  1914,  there  were 
80,000  Germans  permanently  or  semi-permanently 
resident  in  Italy,  of  whom  40,000  Hved  in  Lombardy 
and  Venetia.  These  same  statistics  showed  only 
3,000  British  and  4,000  French  residents.  To  hasten 
the  Germanisation  of  Italy,  which  was  already  making 
such  rapid  strides,  other  mediums  were  now  openly 
made  use  of.    The  Prussian  Historical  Institute,  which 


ITALY  AND  GERMANY  201 

had  been  founded  in  1888  for  the  purpose  of  permit- 
ting German  scholars  to  pursue  their  studies  in  the 
Vatican  Archives,  the  German  Archaeological  Society 
{Istituto  Germanico  in  Campidoglio  a  Roma),  where  the 
study  of  art,  science,  and  the  humanities  had  hitherto 
been  pursued  in  cloistered  seclusion,  now  became  focal 
centres,  directing  and  propagating  Pan-German  doc- 
trines of  Germanic  world  superiority  and  racial  su- 
premacy. 

While  the  web  of  Pan-Germanism  was  thus  being 
woven  ever  more  intricately,  and  the  upper  classes 
in  Italy  had  become  thoroughly  saturated  with  Ger- 
man ideas  and  ideals,  the  masses  had  remained  rela- 
tively untouched  by  the  alien  taint.  The  prosperity 
which  Italy  was  enjoying,  the  relatively  high  wages, 
and  solid  benefits  which  the  people  were  receiving, 
were  their  sole  immediate  interest.  But  when,  after 
the  outbreak  of  the  European  War,  the  Italian  people 
became  convinced  that  Germany  was  responsible  for 
the  war,  when  the  stories  of  the  violation  of  Belgium 
came  to  be  known,  the  century-old  hatred  for  the 
Germans,  which  had  slumbered  in  the  hearts  of  the 
masses  since  the  days  of  the  Guelphs  and  the  Ghib- 
belines,  burst  forth. 

Italy,  during  the  early  weeks  of  the  European  War 
passed  through  long  days  of  careful  searching  of  heart, 
and  awoke  to  the  full  realisation  of  her  plight.  She 
was  no  longer  the  master  in  her  own  home.  The  Ger- 
mans and  the  pro-Germans  held  the  country  bound 
and  gagged.  Though  Germany  was  unable  to  force 
Italy  into  a  war  against  her  best  interests — ^it  has  even 
been  suggested  that  up  to  the  last  minute  Berlin  had 
assigned  to  Italy  a  role  of  most  friendly  and  useful 


202  GREATER  ITALY 

"neutrality,"  as  best  suited  to  Pan-German  aims — 
she  was  able  to  confuse  public  opinion  and  scatter 
the  seeds  of  distrust  and  perplexity  tliroughout  the 
peninsula.  Among  a  small  section  of  the  upper  classes 
the  significance  of  the  enormity  of  the  situation  dawned 
slowly.  They  soon  became  convinced  that  only  a  war 
could  shake  off  the  shackles  of  bondage,  could  arouse 
the  national  spirit  of  the  people.  But  the  masses 
were  unanimously  in  favour  of  peace,  and  a  ma- 
jority of  the  upper  classes  were  still  openly  pro-Ger- 
man in  their  sympathies.  Italy  had  been  friendly 
to  Germany  ever  since  the  days  of  the  founding  of 
the  Kingdom;  the  Italians  had  trusted  the  Germans 
blindly;  many  still  trusted,  and  the  remainder  feared 
Germany.  The  Italians  had  learned  thoroughly  from 
their  German  masters  the  lessons  of  ruthless  reaUsm 
in  politics.  The  most  enthusiastic  pro-Germans  in 
Italy  could  not  consistently  oppose  the  putting  into 
practice  at  this  opportune  moment  of  those  principles 
and  methods  of  world  pohtics  which  Germany  had 
taught  so  forcefully. 

Though  Italy  was  bound  by  ties  of  alUance  with 
Austria,  the  alHance  was  regarded  openly  by  the 
most  fervid  "Triphsts"  as  merely  as  an  opportunist 
arrangement.  It  had  been  imposed  on  Italy  in  the 
days  of  Italy's  weakness.  The  European  War  had 
suddenly  placed  Italy  in  a  position  of  mastery  towards 
Austria.  The  national  aspirations  of  the  Itahan  people 
had  long  been  held  in  check,  and  these  must  now  be 
reaUsed.  Applying  the  German  lessons  of  Realpolitik 
to  her  own  case,  Italy  must  seize  this  opportunity  to 
satisfy  her  vital  interests.  With  the  bulk  of  the  Aus- 
trian forces  engaged  in  a  life-and-death  struggle  against 


ITALY  AND  GERMANY  203 

Russia,  the  moment  had  arrived  for  Italy  to  strike. 
Here  was  a  stepping-stone  to  world  power.  And  so 
the  weapons  which  Germany  had  placed  in  Itahan 
hands  were  to  be  turned  against  her.  The  economic 
development  of  the  country,  which  had  been  of  Ger- 
man origin  and  had  been  carried  on  in  German  in- 
terests, had  rendered  the  Italians  strong  and  confident; 
now  the  Pan-German  doctrines  of  ruthless  aggression 
which  had  been  so  assertively  reiterated,  were  to  be 
made  use  of  to  stab  Germany  to  the  heart.  Such 
was  the  tragedy  wliich  was  to  be  enacted. 

But  Germany  still  felt  confident  in  her  ability  to 
hold  Italy  pinioned  to  the  ground.  Italy  grew  more 
restive  as  the  months  passed,  and  the  speedy  con- 
clusion of  a  victorious  war,  so  often  proclaimed  by 
Germany,  was  again  and  again  postponed.  The  moral 
forces  of  the  Itahan  people  began  to  gather  strength. 
Defections  from  the  pro-German  ranks,  among  the 
younger,  more  intelligent  and  aggressive  Italians,  grew 
daily  more  numerous. 

The  conduct  of  foreign  affairs  had  been  intrusted 
to  Baron  Sonnino,  a  man  imbued  with  German  doc- 
trines and  a  chief  protagonist  of  the  Triple  Alhance, 
who  now  saw  clearly  that  the  best  interests  of  Italy 
demanded  that  the  chains  of  this  alhance  be  severed. 
Wilham  II  thereupon  sent  his  most  skilled  emissary. 
Prince  Biilow,  to  Rome.  On  his  arrival  he  conducted 
himself  in  the  manner  of  a  Proconsul  in  conquered 
territory.  He  mobihsed  the  Pan-German  organisa- 
tion, so  patiently  perfected  in  times  of  peace.  The 
mission  of  Prince  Biilow  was  to  impose  upon  Italy  a 
policy  of  continued  neutraUty.  The  Banca  Com- 
merciale,  the  Vatican,  and  Giolitti  became  the  chief 


204  GREATER  ITALY 

auxiliaries  of  his  efforts.  His  obstruction  was  for  a 
time  successful.  Italy,  bewildered  by  the  strength 
and  resource  of  the  Germans,  hesitated  to  pursue  an 
independent  policy.  German  gold  and  German  threats 
for  a  time  held  the  country  in  leash.  To  appease  the 
more  aggressive  elements,  the  German  envoy  offered 
Italy  territorial  compensations  at  the  expense  of  Aus- 
tria, and  endeavoured  to  direct  Italian  attention 
towards  Tunis,  Corsica,  and  Malta.  But  the  Italians 
were  not  to  be  deceived  by  these  machinations.  They 
had  been  thoroughly  initiated  into  the  secrets  of 
German  methods.  They  understood  fully  German 
deductive  processes  and  the  mechanism  of  Pan- 
Germanic  procedure.  They  knew  that  the  liberty 
and  independence  of  Italy  could  only  be  regained  by 
the  defeat  of  Germany.  They  now  understood  clearly 
that  it  would  be  of  no  value  to  Italy  to  have  her  flag 
float  over  the  Trentino  and  Trieste,  if  the  German 
flag  flew  at  Tangier,  or  the  Austrian  over  Salonika. 

Nevertheless,  Italy  proceeded  with  caution.  The 
bitter  lessons  of  '^isolation"  had  taught  her  to  weigh 
her  pohcy  step  by  step.  A  storm  of  moral  conversion 
was  sweeping  over  the  land.  Dull  rumbhngs,  like 
those  of  some  great  volcano  ready  to  erupt,  shook 
the  peninsula.  The  Germans  redoubled  their  zeal. 
The  pressure  of  Prince  Billow's  "diplomacy"  in- 
creased in  violence  and  brutality.  Then  when  he  per- 
ceived that  his  efforts  were  doomed  to  failure,  the 
Germans  made  frantic  efforts  to  retain  for  them- 
selves at  least  a  portion  of  their  former  dominance. 
In  this  they  were  in  part  successful.  The  rupture  of 
diplomatic  relations  between  Italy  and  Germany  at 
the  outbreak  of  the  Austro-Italian  War  was  preceded 


ITALY  AND  GERMANY  205 

by  the  negotiation  of  a  treaty  which  was  to  safeguard 
German  economic  interests  in  Italy.  In  return  for 
certain  privileges  granted  to  Itahans  who  had  long 
been  resident  in  Germany,  more  especially  by  an  ar- 
rangement by  which  Germany  agreed  to  pay  the 
pensions  due  to  Italian  workmen  who  were  Hving  or 
had  lived  in  Germany,  Italy  consented  not  to  sequester 
property  belonging  to  Germans  in  the  peninsula.  By 
this  agreement  Germany  had  protected  over  £150,- 
000,000  worth  of  property,  owned  by  Germans  in 
Italy,  and  in  return  was  to  continue  the  payments  to 
Italians,  amounting  to  about  £200,000  annually. 

This  arrangement  was  at  the  time  interpreted  in 
the  nature  of  a  '' reinsurance"  treaty.  Whether 
Itahan  politicians,  uncertain  of  the  temper  of  the 
Italian  people,  washed  to  safeguard  themselves  in  so 
far  as  possible,  or  whether  as  seems  more  Ukely,  the 
Italian  Ambassador  at  BerHn  who  was  known  to  be 
distinctly  pro-German,  was  able  to  influence  his 
Government  to  accede  to  the  German  proposal,  the 
treaty  was  hailed  by  the  Germans  as  a  sign  that  their 
hold  over  Italy  had  not  been  broken.  It  would  be 
useless  to  contend  that  in  a  few  months  the  work  of 
three  decades  can  be  wiped  out.  The  roots  of  Pan- 
Germanism  have  struck  deep  in  Italy.  The  process 
of  uprooting  must  of  necessity  be  slow  if  it  is  to  be 
thorough.  Thus  Italy  waged  war  on  the  ally  of  Ger- 
many for  over  a  year,  before  the  pressure  of  events 
from  abroad  forced  her  to  declare  war  on  Germany. 
But  during  that  time  the  process  of  purification  had 
continued.  The  majority  of  the  pro-Germans  have 
been  weaned  from  their  former  allegiance,  and  the 
work  of  national  redemption  continues. 


206  GREATER  ITALY 

What  the  relations  of  Italy  and  Germany  will  be 
in  the  future  can  only  be  surmised.  The  Italians, 
whether  they  willed  it  or  not,  have  accepted  many 
German  poUtical  precepts.  The  political  and  econ- 
omic hfe  of  Italy  during  the  past  twenty  years  has 
not  been  conducive  to  bringing  forth  the  ty^e  of 
statesman  or  financier  who  could  lead  the  country 
boldly  into  the  safe  channels  of  national  emancipa- 
tion. Whatever  the  course  of  the  relations  between 
Italy  and  Germany  may  be  in  the  f  utiire,  the  legend  of 
German  superiority  and  invincibility  has  been  shat- 
tered. If  cordial  intercourse  with  Germany  is  re- 
sumed by  Italy  more  rapidly  than  by  the  other  Powers, 
it  will  be  on  the  terms  of  perfect  equality,  in  pur- 
suance of  a  policy  of  self-interest.  Italy  would  seem 
to  have  taken  firmly  into  her  own  hands  the  conduct 
of  her  affairs.  The  German  has  been  driven  out  of 
Italy;  the  vigilance  of  the  Italian  people  can  be  re- 
lied upon  to  see  to  it  that  he  will  not  be  permitted  to 
return. 


CHAPTER  X 
THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  ADRIATIC 

Relations  with  Austria.    The  Need  of  Hegemony. 
Italians  and  Slavs 

Italy,  on  entering  the  Triple  Alliance,  had  ar- 
bitrarily sacrificed  her  interests  in  the  Adriatic  in 
order  to  safeguard  what  she  beheved  to  be  her  more 
vital  interests  in  the  Mediterranean.  When,  by  her 
increased  strength  and  subsequent  agreements  with 
Great  Britain,  these  interests  were  protected,  the 
Itahans  felt  themselves  at  Uberty  to  again  turn  their 
eyes  eastward  and  take  up  the  threads  of  their  plans 
to  secure  the  control  of  the  Adriatic. 

Among  the  varied  imperialist  ambitions  which 
have  been  fanned  to  flame  by  the  growth  of  na- 
tionaUsm  during  recent  years,  the  one  most  hkely 
to  cause  imending  difficulties  to  those  upon  whom  it 
will  be  incumbent  to  rearrange  the  map  of  Europe, 
will  be  the  allotment  of  the  lands  bordering  the  East- 
ern Adriatic.  Whereas  in  other  fields  the  issues  are 
relatively  well  defined,  and  since  the  outbreak  of  the 
European  War  the  struggle  may  be  qualified  as 
German  vs.  French,  German  vs.  British,  German  vs. 
Russian,  none  of  the  conflicts  impinging  but  correla- 
tive; in  the  Adriatic  a  threefold  struggle  to  the  death 
is  going  on,  which  would  appear  likely  to  continue 
as  a  menace  to  the  peace  of  Europe.     Leaving  out- 

207 


208  GREATER  ITALY 

side  of  immediate  consideration  Germany's  interest  in 
the  affairs  of  the  Adriatic,  which  is  chiefly  an  out- 
growth of  the  Pan-Germanic  movement,  and  as  such 
essentially  alien  to  the  Adriatic,  the  grave  danger 
hes  in  the  fact  that  the  confhct  here  is  one  of  ethnic 
imperiaHsm — ItaHan  and  Slav.  The  Adriatic  has 
become  the  scene  of  a  struggle  where  these  opposing 
influences,  both  equally  strong  and  equally  deter- 
mined to  resist  a  outrance  any  intrusion  of  the  other, 
stand  face  to  face.  The  ItaUans  are  striving  to  re- 
gain their  ancient  prestige  in  the  Adriatic,  to  redeem 
their  irredente  provinces,  and  once  again  extend  the 
sway  of  Rome  eastward.  The  Jugo-Slavs,  after 
centuries  of  oppression  in  turn  by  the  Turks  and  the 
Austrians,  when  finally  they  shall  have  thrown  off 
the  yoke  of  the  latter,  are  eager  to  realise  their  na- 
tional independence. 

Looking  at  a  map  of  the  Adriatic,  it  would  appear 
at  first  sight  as  though  Italy  and  the  Dual  Monarchy 
held  respectively  an  equal  share  of  the  littoral.  But 
a  brief  study  of  the  topographical  configuration  of 
these  regions  will  at  once  reveal  the  inferiority  of 
Italy's  share.  The  Italian  coast-Une  is,  from  one  end 
of  Italy  to  the  other,  a  slow-sloping,  sandy  beach  land, 
affording  few  harbours,  none  of  which  are  of  strategic 
value,  whereas  the  opposite  shore,  held  by  Austria- 
Hungary,  is  a  rocky  coastland,  dotted  with  over  600 
islands,  containing  some  of  the  finest  natural  har- 
bours in  the  world,  such  as  Cattaro  and  Sebenico, 
affording  a  preponderant  strategic  advantage  to  the 
country  possessing  them.  With  the  Austrian  navy- 
able  to  protect  itself  behind  these  natural  ramparts, 
leaving  the  ItaHan  coast-line  exposed  and  vulnerable, 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  ADRIATIC    209 

it  can  readily  be  understood  that  Italy  felt  herself 
threatened  as  long  as  Austria  should  remain,  or  any 
other  power  succeeding  to  the  Austrian  heritage 
should  be  permitted  to  become  estabHshed  along  the 
Adriatic.  This  geograpliical  inferiority  of  Italy  was 
further  emphasised  by  the  fact  that  by  the  Con- 
gress of  Berhn  in  1878,  Austria  was  intrusted  with 
the  police  duties  of  the  Montenegrin  waters,  which 
indirectly  gave  her  commercial  fleet  a  great  impetus, 
so  that  within  recent  years  Austrian  sliips  (17,230) 
in  the  Adriatic  outnumbered  the  Italian  ten  to  one, 
while  their  total  tonnage  (605,551)  was  nearly  twenty 
times  as  great. 

However,  the  Italians  to-day  hold  the  Adriatic 
to  be  an  indivisible  unit,  whose  domination  must 
eventually  again  rest  with  Italy,  if  Italy  is  to  survive 
as  a  great  Power.  According  to  a  favourite  ItaHan 
interpretation,  and  it  cannot  be  denied  that  it  is  not 
altogether  unjustified,  geographically  speaking,  the  nat- 
ural boundary  of  Italy  Hes  beyond  the  shore-Hne  of 
the  Eastern  Adriatic.  Since  earliest  historic  times  this 
region  has,  with  brief  interregnums,  been  indissolubly 
linked  with,  the  West  by  the  ties  of  Rome.  A  study  of 
the  map,  so  they  claim,  will  indicate  that  it  is  not  the 
Adriatic  but  the  JuUan  Alps,  the  Velebit  ^Mountains, 
and  the  Dinaric  Alps,  towering  along  the  coastal  fringe 
of  the  Northern  and  Eastern  Adriatic,  which  form  the 
bulwark,  which,  according  to  the  Italian  thesis,  is  the 
natural  boundary  of  Italy.  Already  as  early  as  177 
B.  C.  the  Romans  reaUsed  the  necessity  of  acquiring 
the  control  of  the  lands  beyond  the  Adriatic  in  order 
to  insure  the  safety  of  the  Italian  peninsula,  when  in 
that  year  they  conquered  the  territory  of  the  North- 


210  GREATER  ITALY 

eastern  Adriatic,  which  is  present-day  Istria,  and 
formed  the  province  of  Illyricum.  Two  centuries  later 
under  Augustus,  Dalmatia  was  annexed  to  lUyria, 
and  for  centuries  continued  a  flourishing  Roman  do- 
minion whose  former  splendour  is  testified  to  by  the 
Palace  of  Diocletian  at  Spalato,  and  ruins  at  Zara 
and  elsewhere.  The  Gothic  invasions  followed,  and 
during  the  era  of  darkness  of  the  Middle  Ages,  the 
lands  of  the  Eastern  Adriatic  sank  to  a  level  of  quasi- 
barbarism  under  Slavic  dominion,  from  the  sixth  to 
the  eleventh  century.  Then  once  again  these  regions 
passed  into  the  hands  of  the  Italians  under  the  pro- 
tection of  the  Venetian  Republic,  to  continue  Italian 
with  varying  fortunes  for  eight  centuries. 

In  the  heyday  of  the  power  of  Venice,  the  Adriatic 
was  a  mare  clausum);  both  its  shores  from  Bari  to 
Venice  in  the  west,  and  from  Trieste  to  Ragusa  and 
Corfu  in  the  east,  were  lined  with  thriving,  wealthy 
cities,  where  Itahan  culture,  language,  and  customs 
held  undisputed  sway.  A  people  of  more  ancient  and 
unquestionably  superior  culture,  the  Itahans  who 
settled  in  the  cities  along  the  shores  of  the  Eastern 
Adriatic  concerned  themselves  little  with  the  rural 
inhabitants,  whether  Croat,  Slovene,  Serb,  or  Albanian. 
Satisfied  with  a  thin  strip  of  coastland,  they  made 
no  attempt  to  penetrate  into  the  interior,  nor  to  colonise 
in  any  real  sense  of  the  word,  content  with  the  trade 
and  commerce  of  the  littoral  and  the  wealth  gained 
thereby.  As  long  as  no  competitor  appeared  in  the 
field,  the  ^'Itahanism"  of  the  Eastern  Adriatic  re- 
tained its  hold,  long  after  the  power  of  Venice  had 
passed  away  and  Austria  had  succeeded  to  the  Vene- 
tian domain.    When,  in  1866,  Venice  was  united  with 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  ADRIATIC    211 

the  Kingdom  of  Italy,  Austria  still  retained  the  an- 
cient Venetian  possessions  of  the  Eastern  Adriatic. 

Then  out  of  the  East,  as  an  indirect  result  of  the 
Russo-Turkish  War  of  1877,  the  ever-rising  tide  of 
Pan-Slavism  rolled  across  the  Balkans.  The  Arch- 
duke Francis  Ferdinand,  the  heir  to  the  Hapsburg 
throne,  seconded  by  his  morganatic  wife,  the  Countess 
Chotek,  herself  a  Slav,  who  was  devoted  to  the  Slav 
cause  in  so  far  as  it  coincided  with  her  personal  ambi- 
tions, conceived  a  plan  of  uniting  all  the  Jugo-Slav 
elements  of  southeastern  Europe  with  the  Czechs  and 
Poles  of  the  north,  and  making  the  Slavs  the  dom- 
inant factor  in  the  Dual  jMonarchy.  The  increased 
strength  of  the  Slavs  thus  channelled  would,  so  the 
Archduke  beHeved,  rejuvenate  the  senile  Hapsburg 
realm.  Excluded  by  Prussia  from  participation  in 
the  affairs  of  Germany  in  1866,  and  by  Italy  from 
those  of  the  ItaUan  peninsula  in  the  same  year,  Aus- 
tria turned  her  eyes  on  the  Balkans  and  fixed  upon 
Salonika  as  the  goal  of  her  ambitions  in  the  south, 
while  all  the  intervening  territory  of  the  Balkans 
to  the  shores  of  the  Adriatic,  acquired  by  '^  penetra- 
tion" or  conquest,  was  to  round  out  this  new  pre- 
ponderately  Slav-Hapsburg  Empire.  This  programme 
had  two  chief  antagonists — the  free  Serbs  and  the 
Itahans.  The  ehmination  of  Serbia  was  required  to 
reach  Salonika,  while  that  of  the  irredente  ItaUans 
was  necessary  to  secure  the  hegemony  of  the  Adriatic. 
To  this  latter  task  the  Austrians  first  turned  their 
attention.  By  favouring  the  Slav  elements  of  the 
populations  of  the  Adriatic,  by  encouraging  them  to 
persecute  the  Italians  of  their  districts,  at  the  same 
time   placing   every   sort   of  hardsliip   and   difficulty 


212  GREATER  ITALY 

in  the  path  of  these  Italians,  by  arousing  in  the  basest 
manner  the  race  prejudice  and  hatred  of  the  Jugo- 
slavs against  the  Italians,  the  future  ruler  of  the 
Dual  Monarchy  hoped  to  accomplish  his  designs. 
He  was  zealously  assisted  in  the  undertaking  by  the 
Slav  clergy,  which  has  always  lent  itself  willingly  to 
any  political  design  of  the  Hapsburgs. 

Up  to  the  opening  years  of  the  present  century 
Italy  was  too  weak  to  give  any  material  support  to 
her  nationals  abroad,  and  Austria,  under  the  tutelage 
of  the  Heir  Apparent,  with  unabated  fury  strove  to 
crush  and  extirpate  the  Italian  population  and  in- 
fluence along  the  Eastern  Adriatic.  When,  by  1903, 
Italy  had  strengthened  her  position  as  a  World  Power, 
and  was  able  to  lend  a  hand  to  her  compatriots  across 
the  Adriatic,  she  set  to  work  with  great  skill  and  en- 
ergy, not  only  to  keep  ahve  the  Italianism  of  such  lo- 
calities as  were  of  Italian  character,  but  eager  to  gain 
a  position  of  preponderant  influence  across  the  water 
and  forestall  the  aims  of  Hapsburg  expansion,  she  con- 
cerned herself  with  the  affairs  of  Montenegro.  This 
small  Slav  State,  the  outpost  of  Slav  independence  in 
the  west,  was  bound  to  Italy  by  family  ties,  as  Italy's 
Queen  is  the  daughter  of  King  Nicholas,  at  that  time 
the  ruling  prince  of  Montenegro.  The  Italians  had 
little  difficulty  in  gaining  a  secure  economic  foothold 
here.  Encouraged  by  this  success,  Italian  agents 
became  active  in  Albania.  This  country,  then  a  semi- 
independent  Turkish  province,  soon  became  a  profit- 
able field  for  the  extension  of  Italian  influence.  As 
the  Albanians  lived  in  a  state  of  semi-mediseval  feu- 
dalism— each  man  an  arsenal,  each  village  a  fortress, 
without  any  real  government — ^it  was  not  difficult  for 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  ADRIATIC    213 

Italy  to  find  frequent  pretexts  for  interfering  in  Al- 
banian affairs.  Tiie  Italians  established  schools, 
newspapers,  banks,  etc.,  and  carried  on  an  extensive 
propaganda.  It  soon  became  evident  that  Italy  would 
not  tolerate  that  any  other  Power  should  become  es- 
tablished in  Albania  at  the  dissolution  of  the  Turkish 
Empire  in  Europe,  which  could  not  be  long  delayed. 
For,  aside  from  the  fact  that  Albania  was  a  region 
which  offered  promising  prospects  of  future  develop- 
ment, the  port  of  Avlona,  situated  opposite  Brindisi 
across  the  narrow  straits  of  Otranto,  would,  if  held 
by  a  foreign  Power,  bottle  Italy  up  in  the  Adriatic. 
As  it  had  long  been  foreseen  that  Albania  might  be- 
come a  casus  belli  between  Austria  and  Italy,  as  early 
as  1897  a  verbal  agreement  had  been  entered  into 
between  the  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
Count  Goluchowski,  and  the  King  of  Italy,  by  which 
both  parties  agreed  to  refrain  from  acquiring  any 
portion  of  Albania,  though  both  agreed  to  favour  the 
establishment  of  an  autonomous  Albania,  in  case 
Turkey  should  disappear  from  the  Balkans.  This 
agreement  was  in  1899  set  down  in  "writing  and  sub- 
sequently reaffirmed  in  1905.  However,  Austria  did 
not  remain  inactive  in  Albanian  affairs.  She  feignedly 
espoused  the  cause  of  Albania  independence,  fostered 
the  expansion  of  the  Albanian  language,  combated 
Italian  propaganda  as  well  as  Turkish  suzerainty, 
and  with  the  help  of  the  Vatican,  as  the  protector  of 
the  220,000  Albanian  Roman  Catholics,  succeeded  in 
gaining  a  dominant  position  in  the  country. 

In  1906  the  Austrian  Imperialists,  who  were  in  the 
confidence  of  the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand,  be- 
came impatient.    They  were  anxious  to  make  a  trial 


214  GREATER  ITALY 

of  the  new  strength  of  the  Hapsburg  realm.  The 
combined  Grand  Manoeuvres  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  army  and  navy  were  in  that  year  held  in  Dal- 
matia,  which  was  intended  as  a  threat  towards  Italy. 
This  was  followed  by  the  appointment  of  General 
Conrad  von  Hotzendorf  to  the  position  of  Chief  of  the 
Austrian  General  Staff.  The  appointment  could  not 
fail  to  arouse  the  apprehension  of  Italy,  as  General 
Conrad  was  known  to  have  gained  the  confidence  of 
Francis  Ferdinand  chiefly  because  of  his  violent  hatred 
of  Italy,  and  his  reiterated  memorials  of  the  necessity 
of  declaring  war  against  Italy  at  the  first  opportunity. 
He  even  went  so  far  as  to  outline  in  detail  the  plan 
of  campaign. 

In  October  of  the  same  year  Baron  von  Aehrenthal 
was  appointed  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
He  was  known  to  be  a  man  of  action  who  would  push 
forward  the  plans  of  Hapsburg  aggrandisement  with 
utmost  vigour.  The  era  of  Austrian  expansion  was 
thus  inaugurated.  The  ensuing  two  years  were  busily 
employed  by  the  new  Foreign  Minister,  on  the  one  hand 
in  putting  to  sleep  Italian  suspicions  regarding  Aus- 
trian expansion  along  the  Adriatic,  which  had  been 
aroused  by  the  acts  above  mentioned,  and  at  the  same 
time  in  paving  the  way  for  the  realisation  of  the  Arch- 
duke's plans. 

In  how  far  Austria  was  directly  responsible  for  the 
''Young  Turk"  revolution  which  broke  out  in  July, 
1908,  lies  beyond  the  scope  of  this  work,  but  it  was 
the  spark  which  lighted  the  trail  of  powder  which 
crossed  the  Balkans  from  one  end  to  the  other.  Three 
months  afterwards,  on  October  5,  came  Count  Aehren- 
thal's  grand  coup;   the  proclamation  of  the  definitive 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  ADRIATIC    215 

annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzogovina  to  the  Dual 
Monarchy.  By  this  bold  stroke  1,800,000  Slavs 
were  added  to  the  ranks  of  Hapsburg  subjects.  For 
a  moment  the  peace  of  Europe  hung  in  the  balance. 
But  the  promise  of  German  support  to  Austria  im- 
mobiUsed  whatever  desire  Russia  may  have  had  to 
protect  the  Jugo-Slavs. 

Italy  viewed  with  misgivings  the  reviving  strength 
of  the  Dual  Monarchy,  and  she  felt  her  interests  in 
the  Adriatic  now  seriously  endangered.  Under  the 
fostering  hand  of  the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand 
the  Slavs  of  the  Adriatic  had  prospered.  They  had 
already  gained  an  overwhelming  numerical  superior- 
ity along  the  whole  eastern  httoral.  In  Dalmatia, 
out  of  a  population  of  645,000  inhabitants  in  1910, 
96  per  cent  were  Slavs  (Serbo-Croats)  and  only  3  per 
cent  Italians.  Along  the  Croatian  littoral  the  popu- 
lation is  wholly  Slav,  with  the  exception  of  the  city 
of  Fiume  with  a  population  of  49,822,  of  whom  ap- 
proximately one-half  are  Italians.  In  Istria  of  403,- 
566  inhabitants  two-thirds  are  Slavs,  the  remainder 
are  ItaHan.  Trieste  itself,  the  chief  centre  of  the 
Italianism  of  the  Eastern  Adriatic,  was  slowly  giving 
way  under  the  repeated  onslaughts  of  the  Slavs,  and 
though  in  the  city  itself  they  maintained  a  majority 
(118,959  Italians,  60,074  Slavs),  yet  the  Slavic  pop- 
ulations were  daily  encroaching  on  the  surrounding 
territory  so  that  within  two  miles  of  the  city  only 
Slav  villages  and  towns  are  to  be  found.  In  the  prov- 
ince of  Gorizia  the  Slavs  have  already  gained  com- 
plete numerical  control  with  155,275  Slovenes  as 
against  90,119  Italians. 

While  the  Archduke  was  busily  engaged  with  his 


216  GREATER  ITALY 

plans  of  eventually  bringing  all  the  Jugo-Slavs  under 
Hapsburg  hegemony,  forces  were  at  work  which  gave 
a  new  trend  to  events  in  the  Eastern  Adriatic.  This 
is  the  Pan-Serb  movement  which,  with  independent 
Serbia  as  its  kernel,  supported  and  protected  by  Rus- 
sia and  having  enHsted  the  open  sympathy  of  leading 
pubhcists  and  statesmen  in  France  and  Great  Britain, 
was  to  rally  the  entire  Jugo-Slav  world  to  its  standard. 
By  arousing  the  latent  nationalism  among  the  Southern 
Slavs,  Serbia  hoped  to  unite  these  diverse  elements 
of  kindred  race  under  her  national  leadership,  as 
Prussia  and  Piedmont  within  their  respective  lands 
had  done  a  half  century  before.  The  most  active 
supporters  of  this  movement  were  the  Slavs  of  the 
Adriatic,  chiefly  Dalmatians  who  had  tasted  the 
first-fruits  of  liberty  under  the  protecting  hand  of 
the  Austrian  Heir  Apparent,  and  now  wished  to  turn 
to  their  own  advantage  their  acquired  strength;  while 
Russia  saw  in  this  new  State  the  possibility  of  dominat- 
ing the  Balkans,  and  France  and  England  a  tangible 
safeguard  against  the  Austro-German  Drang  nach 
Osten. 

After  the  Pan-Serb  Congress  held  in  1909  at  Laibach, 
the  capital  of  Carniola,  the  political  ambitions  of  the 
Jugo-Slavs  became  a  living  factor  in  the  affairs  of  the 
Adriatic.  The  creation  of  a  great  Slav  State,  under 
the  hegemony  of  Serbia,  stretching  from  the  confines 
of  Bulgaria  to  the  eastern  boundary  of  Venetia,  in- 
cluding Serbia,  Montenegro,  Croatia,  Slavonia,  Is- 
tria,  Dalmatia,  and  Carniola  and  possibly  Albania, 
with  a  population  of  over  12,000,000  people,  kindred 
in  race,  language,  and  tradition;  this  is  the  programme 
which  the  Jugo-Slavs  set  for  themselves.     Of  these, 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  ADRIATIC    217 

8,100,000  were  under  Hapsburg  rule.  This  new  State, 
if  it  should  become  a  fait  accompli,  controlUng,  as 
planned,  the  great  ports  of  Trieste,  Cattaro,  Avlona, 
and  Salonika,  was  held  by  the  ItaHans  to  be  a  grave 
menace  to  their  vital  interests  and  its  establishment 
must  at  all  cost  be  combated. 

Though  fact  and  fiction  regarding  the  aims  and 
plans  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  are  so  closely  inter- 
mingled, and  the  events  of  so  recent  origin  as  to 
preclude  a  thorough  and  dispassionate  examination 
of  the  conflicting  factors,  it  nevertheless  is  evident 
that  as  soon  as  the  Pan-Serb  programme  above  men- 
tioned was  clearly  formulated,  as  soon  as  the  Aus- 
trians  realised  the  potential  strength  of  this  new  Slav 
movement,  which  they  believed  could  count  almost 
unreservedly  on  the  full  support  of  the  Russian  Em- 
pire, they  threw  themselves  into  the  arms  of  their 
German  allies,  and  the  reins  of  independent  leader- 
ship in  foreign  affairs  virtually  passed  from  Vienna 
to  the  Berlin  Government. 

The  position  of  Italy,  bound  by  the  Triple  Al- 
liance, was  perplexing.  Though  the  leading  Italian 
statesmen  were  all  loyal  supporters  of  the  Triple  Al- 
hance,  they  began  to  realise  that  Italy  would,  sooner 
or  later,  be  confronted  by  a  coalition  of  Austro-Ger- 
man  interests  in  the  Adriatic,  bent  on  destroying 
Itahan  prestige  and  influence  along  its  eastern  ht- 
toral,  while  on  the  other  hand,  the  peril  of  a  Slav  em- 
pire, confronting  them  across  the  narrow  waters,  was 
an  altogether  unpleasant  alternative. 

Inspired  by  confidence  in  Austria's  new,  closely 
knit  relations  with  Germany  which  materially  weak- 
ened  the  Russian  menace,  the  Archduke   continued 


218  GREATER  ITALY 

with  redoubled  zeal  his  policy  of  favouring  the  Slavs 
and  persecuting  the  Italians.  The  most  influential 
Viennese  personages  made  no  secret  of  the  fact  that 
they  believed  that  in  the  Adriatic,  Austria,  as  in- 
heritor of  the  domains  of  Venice,  alone  had  the  right 
to  dominate  this  body  of  water,  and  that  at  the  first 
favourable  opportunity  Austria  would  assert  her  in- 
aUenable  rights.  To  be  in  a  position  to  do  so  she  in- 
creased the  size  and  efficiency  of  her  navy.  Two  of 
the  most  faithful  servants  of  the  Archduke  Francis 
Ferdinand  were  despatched  to  the  Adriatic  littoral  to 
stamp  out  the  last  embers  of  Itahan  national  spirit 
which  still  lingered  there — the  Prince  Hohenlohe  as 
Governor  of  Trieste  and  the  Count  Wickenburg  to 
Fiume.  They  rivalled  one  another  in  their  zeal  in 
crushing  the  Italian  elements  of  their  respective  dis- 
tricts, and  made  no  attempt  to  disguise  their  efforts, 
while  they  fostered  the  loyalty  of  the  Slavs  for  the 
Hapsburgs,  which  was  still  strong,  by  ever  more  blat- 
ant cajolery  and  favoritism. 

The  problem  of  the  Adriatic  now  entered  upon  a  new 
phase.  Under  the  stress  of  the  anger  aroused  in  Italy 
by  these  events,  the  irredentist  movement  there, 
which  had  long  been  dormant,  or  at  least  had  taken 
on  the  form  of  a  literary,  rather  than  a  pohtical,  move- 
ment, again  burst  forth.  Early  in  1909  Gabriel  d'An- 
nunzio,  entering  for  the  first  time  the  arena  of  national 
political  discussion  in  which  he  was  to  play  so  de- 
cisive a  part  later  on,  published  his  poem  ''La  Nave," 
and  referred  therein  to  the  ''most  bitter  waters  of  the 
Adriatic,"  hinting  clearly  that  the  time  had  come  for 
Italy  to  assert  herself  in  the  Adriatic  if  the  eastern 
shorelands  were  not  to  be  irretrievably  lost.    Though 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  ADRIATIC    219 

in  popular  opinion  the  sufferings  of  the  unredeemed 
Italians  aroused  the  ire  of  the  people  of  Italy,  and 
revived  acutely  the  vexed  irredente  question,  yet 
many  of  the  more  intelligent  Italians  foresaw  that 
the  orientation  of  events  portended  a  clash  of  forces 
in  the  Adriatic  and  the  Near  East,  which  would  in- 
volve all  the  nations  of  Europe  and  that  Italy,  owing 
to  her  peculiar  position,  must  be  strong  enough  to 
defend  her  vital  interests. 

The  Slav  ambitions  in  the  Adriatic  must  hence- 
forth be  considered  independently  from  the  Austrian, 
while  the  Pan-German  aims  now  demand  brief  at- 
tention. 

If  one  should  attempt  to  trace  back  to  its  source 
the  interference  of  Prussia  in  the  affairs  of  the  Adriatic, 
no  more  significant  document  could  be  produced  than 
the  copy  of  a  letter  from  the  Prussian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  which  Count  Brassier  de  St.  Simon,  the 
Prussian  Minister  at  Turin,  left  with  Count  Cavour 
in  December,  1860.  It  throws  an  illuminating  light 
on  Prussian  sentiment  at  this  early  date.  Though 
conditions  have  altered  materially,  and  Trieste  is  no 
longer  within  the  boundaries  of  the  ''Germanic  Con- 
federation," Prussian  and  Pan-German  sentiments 
have  in  nowise  changed. 

"To  Count  Brassier  de  Saint-Simon,  Turin. 

''BerUn,  24/12,  1860. 
"My  Dear  Count: 

''It  is  only  a  few  days  since  we  have  knowledge  of 
a  decree,  dated  November  8,  and  pubhshed  in  the 
official  gazette,  II  Corriere  delle  Marche,  according 
to  which  the  Commissioner  Extraordinary  of  H.  M. 
the  King  of  Sardinia  in  the  Marches,   M.   Lorenzo 


220  GREATER  ITALY 

Valerio,  confirms  in  the  name  of  his  Sovereign  all  the 
privileges  which  the  Papal  Government  has  granted 
to  the  Austrian  Lloyd.  If  we  had  not  been  unaware 
of  the  existence  of  this  document  up  to  the  present 
time  we  would  not  have  failed  to  call  the  attention 
of  Count  Cavour  sooner  to  two  passages  which  it 
contains,  and  which  were  for  us  the  cause  of  acute 
and  painful  surprise.  M.  Lorenzo  Valerio  in  the 
preamble  of  his  above  mentioned  decree  asserts  among 
other  things  that  the  company  known  under  the 
name  of  Austrian  Lloyd,  does  not  belong  to  the  Power 
whose  name  it  bears.  I  must  confess  that  it  has 
been  impossible  for  me  to  follow  the  arguments  on 
the  strength  of  which  M.  Lorenzo  Valerio  arrived  at 
the  conclusion  of  his  strange  assertion,  though  I  do 
not  hesitate  to  declare  that  in  our  eyes  the  Austrian 
Lloyd,  a  company  whose  head  offices  are  located  in 
the  German  city  of  Trieste  (la  ville  allemande  de 
Trieste),  is  in  truth  an  Austrian  company.  M.  Valerio 
furthermore  expresses  the  opinion  that  Trieste  is 
not  a  German  city,  and  that  it  is  only  by  duress  that 
the  treaties  have  incorporated  it  in  Germany.  He 
also  affirms  that  the  city  of  Trieste  has  given  unequiv- 
ocal proofs  that  she  considers  herself  as  belonging  to 
Italy  and  not  to  Germany.  I  do  not  know  on  what 
facts  M.  Valerio  rehes  for  accusing  the  city  of  Trieste 
of  manifestations  which,  from  our  point  of  view, 
would  have  to  be  quaUfied  as  treason  against  our 
common  country.  However,  we  must  vigorously 
protest  against  the  conclusion  which  M.  Valerio  has 
evidently  drawn  based  on  facts  to  which  he  refers 
without  knowing  them.  Prussia  has  refrained  from 
interfering  up  to  the  present  in  all  the  disturbances 
which  have  arisen  in  the  Peninsula  recently.  But 
she  has  always  reserved  for  herself  the  right  to  object 
in  case  the  Itahan  movement  developed  so  as  to  no 
longer  respect  the  German  frontiers,  as  delineated  by 
treaties,  which  frontiers  by  virtue  of  these  same  treaties 
Prussia  is  obhged  to  defend.     But  it  is  evident  that 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  ADRIATIC    221 

the  decree  of  M.  Lorenzo  Valerio  raises  pretensions 
altogether  incompatible  with  the  rights  of  the  Ger- 
manic Confederation.  I  do  not  doubt  that  Count 
Cavour  disapproves  wholly  of  the  language  of  M. 
Valerio.  But  inasmuch  as  this  official  has  spoken  in 
the  name  of  His  Majesty  King  Victor  Emmanuel,  we 
would  fail  to  fulfil  our  duty  if  we  passed  over  in  silence 
an  incident  which  must  necessarily  worry  Germany 
regarding  the  ultimate  aim  of  the  Italian  movement. 
By  order  of  His  Royal  Highness,  the  Prince  Regent,  I 
request  you  to  ask  the  President  of  the  Council:  (1) 
Whether  the  Commissioner  Extraordinary  in  the 
Marches  really  spoke  in  the  name  of  his  Sovereign 
as  the  text  of  the  decree  announces,  and  if  he  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  of  his  Government  regarding  the 
Austrian  Lloyd  and  the  city  of  Trieste.  (2)  Whether 
if  this  is  not  the  case,  M.  Valerio  has  been  admonished. 
Requesting  you  to  advise  me  as  soon  as  possible  of 
the  answer  of  Count  Cavour,  I  authorise  you  to  leave 
with  him,  if  he  so  desires,  a  copy  of  the  present 
despatch.^ 

''Kindly  accept,  etc.,  etc. 

"SCHLEINITZ." 

After  the  creation  of  the  German  Empire,  Bismarck 
never  failed  to  impress  upon  Italy  that  Germany 
would  not  tolerate  that  Trieste  should  fall  into  the 
hands  of  the  Italians.  Repeated  efforts  were  made 
to  encourage  and  increase  German  prestige  in  Trieste 
and  other  cities  of  the  northern  Adriatic.  For  two 
decades  every  effort  was  made  by  the  German  ele- 
ments of  Vienna,  at  the  instigation  of  the  Germans 
of  Germany,  to  establish  a  flourishing  German  colony 
in  these  regions.  But  the  attempts  were  only  par- 
tially successful.     Many  of  the  descendants  of  these 

1  Chiala:  "Lettere  edite  e  inedite  di  Camillo  Cavour,"  Vol.  TV. 


222  GREATER  ITALY 

German  "colonists"  became  assimilated  with  the 
Italian  elements  of  the  community,  and  soon  joined 
the  ranks  of  the  most  ardent  irredentists.  Those  few 
who  remained  steadfast  to  their  German  allegiance 
formed  the  nucleus  of  a  group  of  wealthy  industrial 
and  commercial  firms  whose  affiliations  with  Germany 
rendered  them  influential,  though  numerically  insig- 
nificant.^ 

When,  early  in  the  present  century,  Germany  had 
created  for  herself  a  dominant  position  in  Asia  Minor, 
and,  by  the  so-called  ''trust  of  thrones"  had  woven 
a  web  of  Germanophil  sovereigns  over  all  the  Balkan 
States,  with  the  exception  of  Serbia,  and  was  thus 
artfully  paving  the  way  for  the  realisation  of  Hohen- 
zollern  hegemony  from  Berlin  to  Bagdad,  it  became 
evident  that  Trieste  had  been  selected  as  the  south- 
western outlet  of  the  great  Central  European  State 
which  the  Pan-German  Imperialists  had  set  about  to 
create.  The  Adriatic  was  the  shortest  water  route 
from  the  German  hinterland  to  the  Mediterranean, 
while  the  domination  of  the  shores  of  the  Eastern 
Adriatic,  as  well  as  the  road  to  Salonika,  by  the  docile 
Hapsburgs,  seemed  from  the  German  point  of  view  the 
best  solution  of  the  difficult  problem  of  ruling  the 
Jugo -Slavs.  These  plans  were  being  matured  with 
all  the  patience  and  skill  with  which  the  Germans 
enter  upon  any  enterprise,  and,  with  the  puissant 
resources  that  they  were  able  to  command,  would,  if 
realised,  not  only  destroy  the  prosperity  of  the  in- 

^  Wickham  Steed,  in  his  brilliant  study  of  the  "Hapsburg  Monarchy" 
(p.  275),  remarks  that  the  German,  "  Drang  nach  Triest  has  always  been 
and  remains  a  much  more  positive  and  practical  factor  of  European 
poHtics  than  the  Austro-Hungarian  Drang  nach  Osten,  or  the  dream 
of  a  '  March  to  Salonika.'  " 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  ADRIATIC    223 

dustrial  and  economic  life  which  the  ItaUans  were 
laboriously  building  up,  as  well  as  their  markets  in 
the  Mediterranean,  but  would  thwart  for  all  time 
Italian  ambitions  across  the  Adriatic. 

In  order  to  protect  herself  against  this  imminent 
Austro-German  peril,  Italy  now  chose  to  pursue  a 
policy  of  rapprochement  with  Russia,  and  indirectly 
with  the  Jugo-Slavs.  The  visit  of  the  Tsar  to  the 
King  of  Italy  at  Racconigi  in  October,  1909,  had 
inaugurated  an  era  of  friendliness  between  Rome 
and  Petrograd  which  it  was  easy  to  cultivate.  Though 
this  pohcy  must  be  judged  as  purely  opportunist, 
yet  it  served  its  purpose  in  that  it  acted  as  a  timely 
warning  to  Austria  of  the  possibility  of  a  joint  action 
on  the  part  of  the  Serbs  and  their  Russian  protectors, 
together  with  the  ItaUans.  This  eventuality  alone, 
it  is  believed,  prevented  the  Austrians  from  attacking 
Italy  when  the  latter  was  engaged  in  her  TripoUtan 
campaign  against  Turkey  (1911).  Though  the  Arch- 
duke Francis  Ferdinand  paraded  his  bellicose  inten- 
tions by  a  showy  inspection  of  the  Austrian  fortifica- 
tions in  the  Trentino,  he  became  convinced  that  the 
settling  of  accounts  with  Serbia  was  a  more  urgent 
problem,  which  must  be  carried  through  before  at- 
tacking Italy.  For  the  programme  of  a  ''Greater 
Serbia"  was  now  assuming  in  Austrian  eyes  alarming 
proportions.  Russian  interest  in  Balkan  alTau's  had 
become  insistently  active.  A  recrudescence  of  na- 
tionalist enthusiasm  incited  by  Russia  began  to  assert 
itself.  The  Balkan  peoples,  in  their  eagerness  to  oust 
the  Turk  from  the  peninsula,  forgot,  for  the  time 
being,  their  differences  and  united  in  a  common  ac- 
tion.    Then  came  the  first  Balkan  War  in  the  autumn 


224  GREATER  ITALY 

of  1912.  Through  the  machinations  of  Vienna,  the 
Serbs,  who  had  borne  the  brunt  of  the  conflict,  were 
deprived  of  the  fruits  of  their  victorious  campaign. 
Their  moral  prestige,  however,  had  grown  in  stature, 
so  as  to  become  a  real  rather  than  a  fancied  menace 
to  Hapsburg  interests  within  the  boundaries  of  the 
monarchy.  The  second  Balkan  War  (1913),  when 
Bulgaria  fell  upon  her  former  allies,  unleashed  in  all 
probabihty  as  the  result  of  intrigues  to  which  the  en- 
tourage of  the  Austrian  Heir  Apparent  was  not  alien, 
was  to  crush  the  growing  power  of  the  Serbs.  Serbia, 
however,  was  again  victorious,  though  she  achieved 
no  tangible  benefits,  and  still  found  herself  without 
an  outlet  to  the  sea. 

The  repercussion  of  these  events  along  the  Eastern 
Adriatic  was  violent.  The  epic  campaigns  of  the  Serbs 
had  fired  the  imagination  of  the  Pan-Serbs,  who  be- 
lieved that  their  deliverance  was  at  hand.  Albania, 
freed  from  the  Turkish  yoke,  was  erected  into  an  in- 
dependent kingdom  by  the  London  Conference  in 
December,  1912.  Italy  sanctioned  the  candidature 
of  Prince  William  of  Wied  as  the  ruler  of  the  new  king- 
dom, beheving  it  to  be  to  her  best  interests  to  create 
an  independent  Albania,  even  though  weakly  gov- 
erned, and  thus  remove  this  vital  segment  of  the 
Adriatic  coastland  from  the  field  of  expansion  of  either 
Hapsburg  or  Serb. 

Events  now  matured  rapidly.  The  Jugo-Slav 
populations  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  had  become  in- 
creasingly restive,  and  the  Pan-Serb  propaganda 
was  daily  gaining  in  strength.  In  order  to  forestall 
a  Jugo-Slav  revolution,  which  many  Austrians  feared 
would  break  out  within  the  boundaries  of  the  Mon- 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  ADRIATIC    225 

archy,  the  Vienna  Government,  at  the  instigation  of 
the  Archduke,  determined  to  strike  a  blow  at  the  root 
of  the  Serb  agitation,  and  by  subjugating  Serbia  put 
an  end  to  the  dreams  of  the  Pan-Serbs.  The  stage- 
setting  for  this  coup  de  main  was  similar  to  that  in 
the  episode  of  the  annexation  of  Bosnia.  The  meeting 
of  the  German  Emperor  and  the  Archduke  Francis 
Ferdinand  at  Konopischt,^  in  early  June,  1914,  seems 
to  indicate  that  the  Austrian  Heir  Apparent  there  laid 
his  plans  before  his  powerful  ally.  These  consisted, 
after  a  suitable  pretext  had  been  found,  of  an  Aus- 
trian punitive  expedition  against  Serbia,  the  over- 
throw of  the  Karageorgevich  dynasty,  and  the 
substitution  of  a  servile  sovereign  who  would  work 
in  the  best  interests  of  the  Hapsburgs  and  Hohen- 
zollerns,  as  did  the  rulers  of  Rumania,  Bulgaria, 
and  Greece,  at  that  time.  The  question  of  more 
drastic  measures  was  left  open. 

Judging  from  the  confused  state  of  public  opinion 
and  from  the  internal  dissensions  rife  in  France  and 
Great  Britain  in  the  early  summer  of  1914,  it  seemed 
more  than  likely  that  this  plan  could  be  carried  out 
without  European  interference.  Though  Italy,  as 
an  ally  of  Austria  and  Germany,  had  every  right  to 
be  informed  of  these  plans,  the  more  so  as  Article 
VII  of  the  treaty  of  the  alliance  definitely  stipulated 
that  ''the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  is  obliged 
in  exchange  for  the  occupation  of  territory,  even  tem- 

^Konopischt  is  an  old  ch&teau  which  belonged  to  the  Archduke, 
situated  in  central  Bohemia  about  thirty  miles  south  of  Prague.  Here 
William  II,  accompanied  by  Grand  Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  arrived  on 
June  11.  The  object  of  the  Imperial  visit  was  solemnly  stated  to  be 
that  "the  Emperor  desired  to  see  the  gardens  of  his  friend,  the  Arch- 
duke, in  full  bloom." 


226  GREATER  ITALY 

porarily,  to  make  a  preventive  agreement,  and  offer 
compensations,"  Rome  was  kept  completely  in  the 
dark  regarding  Austro-German  intentions,  as  it  was 
evident  that  Italy  could  not  be  made  a  party  to  a 
bargain  which  was  to  increase  the  power  and  pos- 
sibly the  dominions  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  without 
any  regard  for  Italian  interests  in  the  Adriatic,  where 
the  Archduke  was  more  unwiUing  than  ever  to  make 
any  concessions. 

Francis  Ferdinand  then  visited  Bosnia  for  the  pur- 
pose of  mihtary  inspection.  The  expedition  against 
Serbia,  if  it  should  take  place,  was  to  be  launched 
along  this  lateral  frontier.  To  disarm  suspicion  he 
was  accompanied  by  his  wife,  now  raised  to  the  rank 
of  a  Highness  and  known  as  the  Duchess  of  Hohen- 
berg,  who  looked  forward  confidently  to  the  reaUsa- 
tion  of  her  long-cherished  desire  of  placing  her  son 
MaximiUan,  who  was  debarred  by  his  morganatic 
birth  from  occupying  the  throne  of  the  Hapsburgs, 
on  another  throne.  The  Sarajevo  tragedy  followed. 
The  assassination  of  the  Archduke  and  the  Duchess 
cannot  from  the  most  reliable  evidence  as  yet  available 
be  linked  with  a  prearranged  poUtical  plot.  It  seems 
not  unreasonable  to  suppose  that  this  deed,  like  so 
many  of  the  tragedies  which  have  dogged  the  steps 
of  the  Hapsburgs  in  recent  years,  had  no  immediate 
relation  whatever  with  impending  events,  and  as 
such  was  merely  fortuitous.  Its  causes  must  be  sought 
outside  the  reahn  of  poUtics,  in  all  probability  in 
court  intrigues  and  designs  of  personal  ambition. 
The  murder  of  the  Duchess  of  Hohenberg  would 
appear  to  confirm  this  opinion. 

The  removal  of  the  Archduke  from  the  scene  came 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  ADRIATIC    227 

too  late  to  change  the  course  of  events.  Half  measures 
would  no  longer  suffice.  The  survival  of  the  Haps- 
burg  Empire  demanded  that  the  Serbian  undertaking 
be  pushed  to  its  logical  conclusion.  The  ultimatum 
and  declaration  of  war  against  Serbia  found  Russia, 
France,  and  Great  Britain  ready  to  act  in  concert 
against  the  Austro-German  combination.  Italy  alone 
remained  outside  the  conflict.  No  treaty  obligations 
bound  her  to  assist  her  allies  in  a  war  of  aggres- 
sion. 

After  the  first  days  of  upheaval  Italy  began  to 
realise  the  inherent  strength  of  her  position  as  a  neu- 
tral. Those  in  authority  in  Vienna  were  now  aware 
of  the  mistake  which  the  late  Archduke  had  made  in 
encouraging  the  Jugo-Slavs  of  the  Adriatic  to  the 
detriment  of  the  Italian  populations  and  endeavoured 
to  remedy  matters  by  a  pohcy  of  favoritism  towards 
the  Italians.  The  Prince  Hohenlohe  was  removed 
from  the  governorship  of  Trieste  and  other  concihatory 
measures  were  hastily  introduced.  But  the  Italians 
were  in  nowise  deceived  by  these  belated  concessions. 
The  opportunity  was  at  last  at  hand  for  Italy  to  carry 
out  her  plans  for  the  undisputed  domination  of  the 
Adriatic.  No  longer  content  to  lay  claim  only  to  the 
irredente  coast  towTis,  Italy  foresaw  the  possibihty  of 
reaUsing  her  ambition  to  become  sole  arbiter  of  all 
the  lands  bordering  the  Adriatic.  By  November, 
1914,  Itahan  pretensions  as  voiced  in  a  section  of  the 
Italian  Press  were  formulated:  the  whole  Eastern 
Adriatic  from  Trieste  to  Avlona,  \\nth  the  exception 
of  a  small  strip  of  territory  which  would  give  Serbia 
an  outlet  to  the  sea,  must  become  Italian.  Eager  to 
be   avenged   for   the   humihations   imposed   on   their 


228  GREATER  ITALY 

Italian  brethren  by  Austria  in  recent  years,  and  for 
the  torture  which  Venetia  and  Lombardy  had  suf- 
fered at  the  hands  of  Austria  before  Itahan  unity 
was  achieved,  it  was  the  ambition  of  Italy  to  exclude 
Austria  from  any  participation  in  the  affairs  of  the 
Adriatic. 

Feeling  secure  in  her  armed  neutrality,  Italy  took 
the  first  step  to  carry  out  her  designs.  On  Christmas 
Day,  1914,  the  Italian  Admiral  Patris  landed  a  body 
of  marines  at  Avlona,  where  the  preceding  day  a 
disturbance  had  occurred  which  caused  the  Italian 
Consul  to  demand  protection.  Avlona,  it  will  be  re- 
called, commands  the  entrance  to  the  Adriatic.  A 
magnificent  natural  harbour  protected  by  steep  cliffs, 
rising  mountain  high  with  only  one  narrow  navigable 
channel  of  access,  easily  fortified,  it  could  speedily 
be  transformed  into  one  of  the  strongest  naval  centres 
in  the  world.  To  place  it  outside  the  realm  of  Austro- 
Italian  ambitions,  Avlona  had  by  the  London  Con- 
ference been  incorporated  in  the  Kingdom  of  Albania. 
Albania,  owing  to  the  weakness  of  its  ruler,  had  not 
long  survived  its  birth,  and  the  ''King"  having  fled, 
the  kingdom  was  held  to  be  a  defunct  State.  With 
Avlona  in  her  possession,  Italy  now  held  securely  the 
keys  to  the  Adriatic.  Even  Russia,  the  protagonist 
of  Jugo-Slav  interests,  appeared  to  approve  of  Italian 
occupation  of  Avlona.  M.  Sazonoff ,  the  Russian  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs,  on  congratulating  Italy  on 
her  bold  step,  declared: 

''Albania  no  longer  exists  as  an  independent  state; 
but  Russia  wishes  that  other  peoples,  the  Serbs  and 
Montenegrins,  should  be  permitted  to  live,  and  their 
imprescriptible   rights    respected,"   wishing  to   affirm 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  ADRIATIC    229 

thereby  the  right  of  the  future  Serbia  to  the  north- 
ern portion  of  the  late  Albanian  State. 

Italy  immediately  set  about  to  estabhsh  herself 
firmly  at  Avlona.  She  extended  the  hmits  of  the 
territory  acquired  until  the  city  was  safe  from  attack 
by  land  and  sea.  In  the  meantime  Italy,  while  con- 
tinuing her  attitude  of  friendly  neutrality  towards 
her  ally  Germany,  did  not  lend  a  deaf  ear  to  the  pro- 
posals of  the  Allies  to  take  up  arms  against  Austria. 
As  long  as  the  Russian  armies  were  victorious,  Italy 
found  the  Allies  unwilling  to  negotiate  regarding  such 
concessions  in  the  Adriatic  as  the  Italians  believed 
essential  to  their  \dtal  interests.  On  the  other  hand, 
Germany  was  eager  to  secure  the  guarantee  of  Italy's 
permanent  neutrality  and  urged  the  Italian  Govern- 
ment to  initiate  negotiations  with  Vienna  to  this  end. 
After  various  preliminary  discussions,  on  April  8,  1915, 
Italy  formally  presented  her  claims  to  Austria-Hun- 
gary regarding  the  territorial  concessions  she  re- 
quired in  return  for  continued  neutrality.  The  clauses 
which  more  particularly  concern  the  Eastern  Adriatic 
littoral  are: 

"I.  The  cession  of  the  Trentino,  according  to  the 
frontiers  of  1911. 

"II.  A  rectification  of  Italy's  eastern  frontier  in  her 
(Italy's)  favour,  comprising  in  the  ceded  territory 
the  cities  of  Gradisca  and  Gorizia.  The  hne  to  run 
from  Trogkofel  eastward  to  Osternig;  then  \da  Saifnitz 
between  the  valley  of  the  Seisera  and  the  Schlitza 
to  the  Wischberg;  from  here  along  the  existing 
frontier  to  the  Nevea  Saddle,  and  thence  to  the  Isonzo 
east  of  Plezzo;  continuing  along  the  Isonzo  to  Tol- 
mino,  whence  it  runs  via  Chiaporano  and  Comen  to 
the  sea,  which  it  reaches  at  a  point  east  of  Nabresina, 
between  Monfalcone  and  Trieste. 


230  GREATER  ITALY 

"III.  The  city  of  Trieste  and  its  neighbourhood, 
including  Nabresina  up  to  the  new  ItaHan  frontier, 
and  extending  to  the  south  to  inckide  the  judicial 
districts  of  Capo  dTstria  and  Pirano,  to  be  constituted 
into  an  autonomous  State,  independent  in  all  respects 
regarding  international  relations,  military,  legislative, 
financial  and  administrative  affairs;  Austria-Hungary 
renouncing  all  rights  of  sovereignty  over  the  new- 
State.  Trieste  to  remain  a  free  port.  No  troops, 
either  Austro-Hungarian  or  ItaHan  shall  be  permitted 
to  enter.  The  new  State  to  assume  its  share  of  the 
Austrian  public  debt,  in  proportion  to  its  population. 

"IV.  Austria-Hungary  shall  cede  to  Italy  the  Cur- 
zolari  Islands  of  the  Dalmatian  coast,  including  Lissa, 
Lesina,  Curzola,  Sagosta,  etc. 

"V.  Italy  shall  occupy  immediately  the  ceded  ter- 
ritory, and  Trieste  and  its  territory  shall  be  imme- 
diately evacuated  by  Austro-Hungarian  troops  and 
civil  authorities. 

"VI.  The  recognition  of  Italian  sovereignty  over 
Avlona,  its  bay  including  Sasseno,  and  hinterland 
necessary  to  their  defense. 

"VII.  Austria-Hungary  renounces  all  claims  to  Al- 
bania."^ 

In  return  Italy  pledged  herself  to  remain  neutral 
throughout  the  duration  of  the  war  and,  furthermore, 
to  pay  an  indemnification  to  Austria  for  Government 
property,  debts,  etc.,  amounting  to  £8,000,000.  This 
programme,  though  moderate,  nevertheless  included 
the  annexation  of  certain  territory  exclusively  Slav. 

Towards  the  middle  of  April,  1915,  or  about  a  week 
after  the  above  proposals  were  made  by  Italy,  the 
Russian  offensive  had  spent  itself.  The  Germano- 
Austro-Hungarian  forces  were  already  initiating  the 
movement  that  was  to  clear  Galicia  and  break  the 

iThe  "ItaUan  Official  Green  Book,  May,  1915,"  Document  No.  64. 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  ADRIATIC    231 

Russian  advance.  The  necessity  of  Italian  inter- 
vention on  the  side  of  the  Allies  became  urgent.  Rus- 
sia, after  conceding  to  Italy  the  principle  that  no 
"Greater  Serbia,"  as  outlined  by  the  Jugo-Slav  pro- 
gramme, would  be  permitted  to  be  created — but  in- 
stead two  Jugo-Slav  States — made  the  following  offer 
to  Italy  in  return  for  her  co-operation  in  the  war  on 
the  side  of  the  Allies.  In  the  event  of  the  success  of 
the  Allied  arms,  which  with  ItaUan  assistance  seemed 
assured,  Italy  was  to  receive: 

"I.  Aside  from  the  Trentino,  all  of  Friuli,  Trieste, 
and  the  western  shores  of  Istria,  including  Pirano, 
Capo  dTstria,  and  the  great  naval  base,  Pola. 

"II.  The  eastern  shore  of  Istria  and  all  territory 
as  far  south  as  the  river  Narenta  was  to  belong  to  the 
new  independent  Croatian  state,  which  was  to  be 
made  up  of  Croatia,  Slavonia,  Carniola,  and  the  greater 
part  of  Dalmatia;  a  State  of  some  4,000,000  inhab- 
itants, almost  exclusively  Slav,  with  Fiume,  Zara, 
and  Sebenico  as  its  ports. 

"III.  The  remainder  of  the  Dalmatian  coast  to 
be  ceded  to  Serbia  and  Montenegro;  Serbia  was  to 
receive  also  all  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina." 

It  will  be  seen  that  this  Russian  proposal,  while 
abandoning  some  of  the  chief  Jugo-Slav  preten- 
sions, ceded  to  Italy  nearly  all  the  territory  which, 
before  the  war,  had  been  claimed  by  Italian  irre- 
dentists, and  is  far  more  comprehensive  in  scope 
than  the  demands  made  by  Italy  to  Austria  only  a 
few  days  previous.  Italy,  however,  rejected  the 
Russian  offer.  The  cause  thereof  may  be  sought  in 
the  fact  that  rumours  had  reached  Rome,  that  in 
Russia  there  was  a  shortage  of  arms  and  munitions, 


232  GREATER  ITALY 

that  the  AlHes  were  in  a  more  difficult  position  than 
they  had  been  in  since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  and 
that  Italian  co-operation  was  more  valuable  than 
could  be  estimated  in  mere  terms  of  territorial  con- 
cessions. 

Italy  here  had  the  opportunity  she  had  long  been 
waiting  for,  to  secure  the  acquiescence  of  Great  Britain, 
France,  and  Russia  to  the  absolute  Itahan  domina- 
tion in  the  Adriatic.  Austria-Hungary,  feeHng  more 
secure  as  the  result  of  the  recent  successes  of  her  arms 
under  German  leadership,  rejected  the  Italian  pro- 
posals, and  Germany  was  content  to  threaten  Italy 
with  the  well-known  German  '^f rightfulness,"  should 
she  dare  to  take  up  arms  against  her  former  ally. 
Whatever  Russian  or  other  opposition  there  may  have 
been  to  abandoning  the  pretensions  of  the  Jugo-Slavs 
to  the  right  of  united  independence,  in  accordance 
with  the  principle  of  nationality,  were  silenced  by 
the  military  necessity  of  the  moment  and  the  urgent 
need  of  securing  active  Italian  co-operation.  Italy 
thereupon  presented  her  counter-proposals  to  the  Al- 
lies, which  were  reported  to  be  as  follows: 

*'I.     The  Trentino  up  to  the  Brenner,  to  be  Italian. 

"II.  All  of  Friuli  and  Istria,  including  Gorizia  and 
Gradisca  and  the  ports  of  Trieste,  Pola,  and  Fiume, 
to  be  ceded  unconditionally  to  Italy. 

''III.  To  the  new  Croat  state,  the  sea-coast  begin- 
ning just  east  of  Fiume,  and  extending  as  far  south  as 
the  river  Zermagna  was  to  be  given.  However,  all  the 
islands  conmianding  the  coast  were  to  be  handed  over 
to  Italy. 

"IV.  From  the  Zermagna  River,  as  far  south  as  the 
Narenta  the  Dalmatian  coast,  as  well  as  the  Dalmatian 
Islands,  to  be  ceded  to  Italy. 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  ADRIATIC     233 

"V.  The  remaining  coast  land,  as  far  as  Durazzo, 
was  to  belong  to  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  while  the 
Italian  possession  of  Avlona  and  surrounding  terri- 
tory had  already  been  agreed  upon." 

These  are,  in  outUne,  the  territorial  demands  which 
Italy  made  to  the  Allies.  The  territory  includes  a 
population  of  over  1,500,000  Slavs,  and  gives  Italy 
dominant  control  of  the  Adriatic,  both  strategically 
and  commercially.  These  demands  were  in  principle 
accepted  by  the  AlHes,^  and  definite  financial  assistance 
guaranteed  to  Italy  on  April  24,  1915,  with  a  proviso 
that,  within  one  month  from  date,  Italy  should  de- 
clare war  on  Austria.  Italy's  declaration  of  war 
against  Austria  on  May  24,  automatically  ratified 
the  agreement  entered  into  ■\;\ith  France,  Great  Brit- 
ain, and  Russia,  guaranteeing  Itahan  hegemony  of 
the  Adriatic.  The  difficult  problem  of  the  Adriatic 
is  thus  tending  towards  a  solution. 

According  to  those  in  sympathy  with  the  broader 
Jugo-Slav  nationalism,  Slav  aspirations  in  the  Eastern 
Adriatic  have  been  trampled  under  foot.  They  already 
point    to   a   Slav   ''irredentist"    movement,    directed 

^  Though  the  exact  terms  of  the  compact  entered  into  have  been  kept 
secret,  according  to  an  authoritative  statement  the  following  outlines  the 
agreement  reached  between  Italy  and  the  Allies  regarding  the  distribu- 
tion of  the  lands  of  the  Eastern  Adriatic,  and  the  irredenie  territory  guar- 
anteed to  Italy: 

1.  The  Trentino  up  to  the  Brenner  to  be  Itahan. 

2.  Friuh  and  Istria  to  be  handed  over  to  Italy.  The  eastern  bound- 
ary to  run  through  Adelsberg  to  a  point  a  httle  west  of  Fiume. 

3.  Fiume  and  the  coast,  as  far  as  the  Zermagna  River  to  be  given 
to  Croatia. 

4.  From  the  Zermagna  to  a  point  three  miles  northwest  of  Spalato 
to  be  Itahan,  as  well  as  certain  of  the  Dalmatian  Islands,  including 
Lissa. 

5.  Remaining  coastlands  as  far  as  Durazzo  (?)  to  be  Serb. 

6.  Italy  to  be  confirmed  in  possession  of  Avlona. 


234  GREATER  ITALY 

against  Italy,  if  Italian  pretensions  as  stipulated  are 
realised  in  full,  more  threatening  and  dangerous  to 
the  peace  of  Europe  in  the  future  than  any  other 
factor  in  the  international  situation.  A  representative 
Jugo-Slav  committee  in  London  issued  a  manifesto 
in  May,  1915,  from  which  the  following  significant 
passages  are  quoted: 

"The  Serbs,  Croats,  and  Slovenes  pray  for  the 
victory  of  the  Triple  Entente  and  confidently  await 
from  it  the  salvation  of  the  Jugo-Slav  nation.  The 
conviction  that  the  Triple  Entente  is  fighting  for  the 
triumph  of  the  principle  of  Nationality,  inspired  the 
moral  energy  and  superhuman  efforts  of  Serbia  and 
Montenegro  and  prevented  their  kinsmen  across  the 
frontier  from  utterly  losing  heart. 

''For  Serbia  and  Montenegro  this  war  is  one  of  self- 
defense  and  liberation,  not  of  conquest;  they  are 
fighting  to  emancipate  our  people  from  a  foreign  yoke 
and  to  unite  them  as  a  single  free  nation.  The  mili- 
tary and  political  overthrow  of  Austria-Hungary  will 
forever  put  an  end  to  that  system  of  Divide  et  Impera 
by  which  our  people  has  for  centuries  been  governed. 
The  Jugo-Slavs  form  a  single  nation,  alike  by  identity 
of  language,  by  the  unanswerable  laws  of  geography, 
and  by  national  consciousness.  Only  if  united  will 
they  possess  the  resources  necessary  for  an  independent 
existence. 

"The  Jugo-Slavs  (Serbs,  Croats,  and  Slovenes)  in- 
habit the  following  countries:  the  Kingdoms  of  Serbia 
and  Montenegro;  the  Triune  Kingdom  of  Croatia- 
Slavonia-Dalmatia  (with  Fiume  and  district);  the 
provinces  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina  and  Carniola;  con- 
siderable portions  of  the  provinces  of  Istria,  Trieste, 
Gorizia-Gradisca,  Carinthia,  and  Styria;  and  finally 
the  Jugo-Slav  zone  of  Hungary  proper. 

"To  perpetuate  the  disunion  of  these  territories  by 
leaving  so  many  under  Austro-Hungarian  rule,  or  to 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  ADRIATIC    235 

transfer  even  portions  of  them  to  another  alien  rule, 
would  be  a  flagrant  violation  of  our  ethnographical, 
geographical,  and  economic  unity,  and  to  this  our 
people  would  unquestionably  oppose  an  energetic  and 
justifiable  resistance. 

"The  Southern  Slav  people  aspires  to  unite  its  terri- 
tories in  a  single  independent  state.  The  internal 
arrangements  of  the  new  state  will  be  determined  by 
the  nation  itself,  in  accordance  with  its  own  wishes 
and  needs." 

This  proclamation,  issued  in  the  name  of  12,000,000 
Jugo-Slavs,  voices  their  determined  opposition  to  Ital- 
ian plans  of  aggrandisement. 

Though  a  small  minority  of  Italian  Nationalists 
may  wish  to  push  to  extreme  limits  ItaUan  expansion 
along  the  Eastern  Adriatic,  the  more  reasonable  and 
influential  sections  of  public  opinion  in  Italy  are  in 
favour  of  a  more  moderate  programme,  which  will  give 
the  Jugo-Slavs  full  liberty  for  their  economic,  social, 
and  national  development.  It  is  evident  that  Italy 
sought  to  secure  wide  territorial  guarantees  in  the  East- 
ern Adriatic  in  order  to  be  able  to  use  these  as  pawns 
in  the  general  exchange  of  territory  which  will  inevi- 
tably follow  upon  the  remaking  of  the  map  of  the  world. 
Recent  developments  would  tend  to  indicate  clearly 
that  Italy  expects,  in  the  event  of  the  partition  of 
Asia  Minor,  to  receive  a  large  share  of  the  rich  terri- 
tory in  southern  and  western  Anatolia.  The  vilayets 
of  Smyrna  and  Konia  have  been  suggested  as  possible 
future  spheres  of  ItaUan  development,  while  a  vic- 
torious campaign  in  Europe  will  no  doubt  assure 
Italy  a  large  share  of  the  Ethiopian  Empire  of  Abys- 
sinia, which  now  stands  on  the  threshold  of  disrup- 
tion.   It  is  not  unlikely,  therefore,  that  Italy  will  be 


236  GREATER  ITALY 

willing  to  forego  certain  territories  in  the  Eastern 
Adriatic  guaranteed  to  her  by  France,  Great  Britain, 
and  Russia  for  adequate  compensation  elsewhere. 
Nevertheless,  it  cannot  be  contested  that  Italy  would 
seem  destined  to  become  the  chief  Power  in  the  Adri- 
atic. Through  long  centuries  Italians  have  dominated 
its  waters,  and  under  their  domination  busy,  populous 
cities  sprang  up,  where  the  arts,  industry,  and  commerce 
flourished.  The  memory  of  the  glories  of  Venice,  the 
Queen  of  the  Adriatic,  still  lives  in  the  hearts  of  all 
Italians.  It  would  seem  unreasonable  to  wish  to  ex- 
clude the  new  and  greater  Italy  from  the  right  of  in- 
heriting this  Venetian  hegemony.  The  Adriatic  through 
two  thousand  years  of  its  known  history  has  always 
after  brief  periods  of  estrangements  returned  under 
Italian  protection.  It  is  not  to  be  believed  that  for 
many  decades  to  come  the  Jugo-Slavic  peoples,  even 
if  their  territorial  aspirations  were  realised,  could 
contest  Italian  supremacy.  Many  years  must  elapse 
before  the  educational,  social,  and  economic  standard 
of  the  Jugo-Slavs  could  reach  a  stage  of  development 
to  be  able  to  cope,  even  feebly,  with  the  ancient  and 
vigorous  Italian  culture. 

As  long  as  Italy  was  linked  with  Austria  and  Ger- 
many by  the  bonds  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  France 
and  Great  Britain,  looked  askance  at  Italian  aspira- 
tions in  the  Adriatic,  which  they  believed  to  be  a  part 
of  a  broader  Central  European  scheme.  Italian  par- 
ticipation in  the  European  War  on  the  side  of  the 
Allies  conclusively  proves  that  these  fears  were  un- 
founded. When  Napoleon,  after  his  triumphant  cam- 
paign in  Italy,  had  wrested  the  lands  of  the  Eastern 
Adriatic  from  Venice,  the  Italian  envoy.  Count  Rocco 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  ADRIATIC    237 

Sanfermo,  endeavoured  to  persuade  the  French  Direc- 
tory of  the  advisability  of  ceding  Istria  and  Dahnatia  to 
Italy,  "so  that  it  could  defend  its  coast  and  protect 
its  commerce,  as  Italy  united  in  a  single  body,  governed 
according  to  the  principles  of  liberty,  would  become 
an  efficacious  factor  for  stability  and,  joined  with 
France,  offer  a  strong  defense  against  Austria."  Since 
that  time  the  history  of  the  Italian  people  has  been 
one  long  struggle  to  attain  their  confini  naturali,  their 
natm-al  boundaries,  to  redeem  the  irredente  provinces, 
to  incorporate  in  one  compact  and  great  State  all 
Italians.  Italy  is  to-day  by  the  force  of  her  arms  as- 
serting what  she  believes  to  be  her  inalienable  right 
to  the  domination  of  the  Adriatic. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  DAYS  OF  NEUTRALITY 

The  Trend  of  Policy.     Neutralists   and  Interventionists. 
The  May  Revolution 

In  March,  1914,  Giolitti  relinquished  office,  and 
the  Government  was  intrusted  to  M.  Salandra.  As 
the  weeks  passed  the  malaise  of  Europe  became  more 
pronounced.  In  Italy  the  restlessness  of  the  people 
showed  itself  in  mild  revolutionary  outbreaks  in 
Romagna;  though  soon  suppressed,  they  indicated  a 
pervading  discontent,  which  was  current  throughout 
Europe. 

On  June  28,  came  the  report  of  the  assassination 
of  the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand.  Italy  received 
the  news  with  undisguised  relief.  It  seemed  to  por- 
tend an  era  of  more  amicable  relations  with  Austria. 
These  hopes  were  soon  shattered  by  the  announce- 
ment of  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Serbia,  followed 
by  the  declaration  of  war.  These  events  came  as  a 
complete  surprise  to  Italy.  How  carefully  the  plan  of 
aggression  against  Serbia  at  this  time  had  been  con- 
cealed by  the  Berlin  and  Vienna  Cabinets  from  their 
Italian  ally  is  difficult  to  ascertain.  Italian  official 
documents  proclaim  that  Italy  was  in  nowise  ap- 
prised of  the  course  of  action  which  the  Vienna  Govern- 
ment proposed  to  pursue.  It  would  seem  reasonable, 
in  the  light  of  events,  to  place  fullest  confidence  in 
this  official  version. 

238 


THE  DAYS  OF  NEUTRALITY  239 

Berlin  and  Vienna  both  believed  that,  owing  to  the 
disturbed  state  of  Italy,  the  depletion  of  her  mihtary 
resources  of  which  they  had  very  definite  informa- 
tion, and  the  financial  weakness  of  the  country  result- 
ing from  the  vast  expenditures  of  the  Tripolitan  cam- 
paign, Austria  would  be  unmolested  by  Italy  in  her 
proposed  punitive  expedition  against  Serbia.  When 
the  conflict  between  Vienna  and  Belgrade,  contrary 
to  the  expectations  at  least  of  Vienna  if  not  of  Berlin, 
no  longer  locaHsed,  became  a  world  conflagration  which 
soon  was  to  involve  all  Europe,  when  Russia,  and 
then  France,  espoused  the  cause  of  Serbia,  Austria 
endeavoured  at  the  last  moment  to  summon  Italy  to 
her  side.  The  famous  despatch  casus  foederis  was 
hurriedly  sent  to  Rome.  General  Cadorna,  the  Chief 
of  the  ItaHan  General  Staff,  was  convoked  to  confer 
with  General  Conrad  respecting  the  measures  to  be 
taken  jointly  to  defend  the  Dual  Monarchy  against 
the  threatened  Russian  invasion.  Italy's  reply  was 
the  prompt  declaration  of  her  neutraUty  on  August  3. 

This  declaration  must  be  regarded  as  one  of  the 
most  important  factors  of  the  first  phase  of  the  Eu- 
ropean War.  It  is  incontestable  that  Italy's  straight- 
forward declaration  of  neutrality  radically  changed 
the  course  of  world  history.  By  merely  mobilising  her 
armies  along  the  French  frontier,  from  the  ]Mediter- 
ranean  to  the  Rhone,  Italy  would  have  kept  400,000 
French  troops  in  this  area,  and  would  thus  have  pre- 
vented France  from  throwing  her  whole  strength  into 
the  balance  against  the  German  invaders  from  the 
north.  The  battle  of  the  ]\Iarne  instead  of  a  brilHant 
French  victory  would,  in  all  probability,  have  had  an- 
other issue,  and  the  triumphant  German  advance  would 


240  GREATER  ITALY 

have  swept  across  France  instead  of  being  stemmed 
in  Picardy,  Champagne,  and  the  Argonne.  Further- 
more, the  mobihsation  of  the  Italian  fleet  in  the  Med- 
iterranean could  not  fail  to  have  dislocated  French 
plans  for  the  transport  of  troops  from  northern  Africa, 
which  rendered  such  great  assistance  from  the  very 
first  days  of  the  war;  while  it  is  not  generally  ap- 
preciated that  during  those  first  weeks,  which  found 
England  wholly  unprepared,  British  lines  of  com- 
munication with  India  would  have  been  at  the  mercy 
of  the  ItaHan  torpedo  flotilla,  whose  conveniently 
situated  base  in  Eritrea  along  the  western  shores  of 
the  Red  Sea  would  have  made  it  no  very  difficult  task 
to  cut  British  communications  with  the  East,  leaving 
Egypt  open  to  invasion. 

Italy,  however,  spontaneously  and  clearly  showed 
what  her  intentions  were  by  withdrawing  her  gar- 
risons some  distance  from  the  French  frontier  and  by 
concentrating  her  fleet  at  the  entrance  of  the  Adriatic. 

The  ItaUans  now  began  to  feel  the  strength  of  their 
new  position.  Italy's  declaration  of  neutrality  was  in 
reality  to  prove  a  declaration  of  independence.  Dur- 
ing the  half  century  which  had  elapsed  since  Itahan 
unity  had  been  achieved,  Italy  had  felt  herself  obliged 
by  the  weakness  of  her  international  position  to  play 
a  part  of  minor  importance  in  world  politics,  incom- 
patible with  her  population,  resources,  and  national 
dignity,  while  the  best  interests  of  the  Kingdom  had 
often  been  sacrificed.  Italy  had  never  been  free  from 
foreign  influences:  first,  that  of  Napoleon  III  and  the 
French,  during  the  formative  days  of  the  new  Italy; 
later  that  of  Bismarck  and  Germany.  Repeatedly, 
during  the  long  years  of  Italy's  servitude,  she  had 


THE  DAYS  OF  NEUTRALITY  241 

sacrificed  her  legitimate  ambitions  for  the  sake  of 
national  security.  Now,  suddenly  she  found  herself 
the  mistress  of  her  destiny.  By  her  declaration  of 
neutrality  she  had  cut  loose  from  the  moorings  to 
which,  for  more  than  thirty  years,  the  ship  of  state 
had  been  anchored.  Italy  was  thus  confronted  by  a 
new  set  of  problems,  which  for  the  first  time  in  her 
history  she  was  called  upon  to  solve  for  herself;  she 
was  now  free  to  consult  only  her  own  interests.  From 
a  position  of  minority  and  dependence  in  world  affairs, 
the  Italians  had  reached  man's  estate,  and  on  the 
decisions  wliich  they  were  now  called  upon  to  make, 
the  future  of  the  country  rested. 

As  the  only  great  Power  in  Europe  which  had  re- 
mained outside  the  war,  Italy  became  at  the  same 
time  the  object  of  suspicion  and  sohcitude  on  the 
part  of  both  belligerents.  On  the  one  hand,  Germany 
and  the  Dual  Monarchy,  while  privately  considering 
the  conduct  of  Italy  as  traitorous  in  not  coming  to 
the  assistance  of  her  alHes  in  a  war  of  such  magnitude 
no  matter  what  its  causes  might  have  been,  were 
nevertheless  eager  that  Italy  should  continue  in  her 
attitude  of  friendly  neutrahty,  as  the  ItaUans  were 
at  that  time  rendering  great  assistance  by  securing 
suppUes  from  abroad.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Allied 
Powers  though  by  habit  of  mind  they  classed  Italy 
with  their  enemies,  yet,  eager  to  enlist  whatever  arms 
they  might  find  in  their  cause,  and  appreciating  the 
great  strength  Italian  armies  would  add  to  their 
forces,  soon  began  a  campaign  of  propaganda  in  Italy 
to  arouse  the  sympathy  and  active  support  of  the 
Italian  people. 

The  Itahans  themselves  were  divided  in  their  con- 


242  GREATER  ITALY 

victions.  The  Triplist  tradition  had  for  a  generation 
moulded  the  pubUc  opinion  of  the  country.  The  lead- 
ing statesmen,  politicians,  professors,  and  the  more 
intelligent  classes  were  confirmed  believers  in  the 
advantages  which  Italy  had  derived  from  the  Triple 
Alliance.  The  nation  had  been  tutored  in  a  faith 
in  Germanic  ideals  of  statecraft.  German  RealpoUtik 
had  in  Italy  many  influential  advocates,  while  the 
ascendency  of  Germans  in  the  affairs  of  the  peninsula 
has  never  been  doubted  or  denied  by  the  Italians 
themselves. 

Italy  soon  found  herself  divided  into  two  distinct 
camps  or  parties — the  Neutralists  and  the  Interven- 
tionists. The  first  were  in  favour  of  continuing 
the  policy  of  neutrality  and  of  deriving  whatever 
advantages  possible  from  this  attitude,  both  in  in- 
creased wealth  and  in  territorial  concessions;  the 
second,  in  favour  of  seizing  the  opportunity  offered 
to  vindicate  Italy's  national  aspirations  by  the  force 
of  arms.  But  whatever  policy  was  to  be  pursued,  both 
parties  were  agreed  that  it  was  to  be  a  purely  Italian 
poHcy.  Though  the  cause  of  the  Allies  aroused  re- 
sponsive sympathy  throughout  Italy,  all  Italians  were 
convinced  that  in  this  crisis  the  best  interests  of  Italy 
alone  must  be  consulted.  While  the  Neutralists 
appeared  to  be  playing  the  part  of  defenders  of  the 
Central  Powers,  such'  groups  as  the  Nationalists, 
that  is,  those  who  had  hitherto  urged  violently  the 
need  of  a  war  against  Austria  to  regain  the  mastery 
of  the  Adriatic,  were  the  first  to  declare:  ''Let  us  have 
no  stupid  Austrophobe  policy."  Italy,  wide-awake  to 
the  opportunities  of  her  position  was  to  choose  a  course 
of  action  most  suited  to  her  national  needs. 


/ 


THE   DAYS  OF  NEUTRALITY  243 

The  problem  resolved  itself  at  once  into  whether 
Italy  should  remain  neutral  or  take  up  arms  on  the 
side  of  the  Allies.  The  few,  who  in  the  first  days  of 
the  war  may  have  been  in  favour  of  actively  support- 
ing the  Central  Empires,  soon  became  silent  or  joined 
the  ranks  of  the  Neutralists.  Italy  was  now  in  the 
throes  of  a  moral  and  political  conflict,  the  like  of 
which  has  never  hitherto  been  witnessed  in  a  great 
State.  On  behalf  of  the  Neutralists  Giolitti,  whose 
following  was  wide-spread  and  whose  voice  was  lis- 
tened to  with  attention,  sounded  the  key-note  of  their 
convictions  when  he  exclaimed: 

"It  would  not  seem  improbable  that,  owing  to  the 
present  condition  of  Europe,  much  can  be  obtained 
without  going  to  war." 

The  Neutralists  further  had  enlisted  the  sympathy 
and  support  of  such  divergent  elements  as  the  Papacy 
and  the  Socialists.  The  Roman  Catholics,  who  by 
tradition  and  principle  were  hostile  to  any  policy 
which  might  increase  the  strength  and  popularity  of 
the  House  of  Savoy,  opposed  Italian  participation  in 
the  war  on  the  side  of  the  Allies,  on  the  grounds  of 
a  natural  distrust  of  France,  and  jealousy  and  fear 
of  any  further  expansion  of  Russia,  the  great  Or- 
thodox Catholic  State.  Moreover,  the  Roman  Curia 
was  bound  by  many  ties  of  sympathy  to  Austria, 
now  the  "eldest  and  most  faithful  daughter  of  the 
Church."  The  Papal  entourage  knew  that  in  the 
event  of  a  war  with  Austria,  the  diplomatic  rela- 
tions between  the  Pope  and  the  representatives  of 
the  Central  European  Sovereigns  would  be  broken 
off,  and  that  the  Papacy  would  be  greatly  hampered 


244  GREATER  ITALY 

in  playing  the  part  to  which  it  aspired  of  moral  arbi- 
trator and  pacificator  in  a  world  where  all  law  and  order 
had  been  violated.  The  elevation  of  Benedict  XV  to 
the  Papacy  showed  that  the  Catholic  Church  had  not 
altogether  abandoned  its  aspirations  to  regain  its 
temporal  powers.  Both  Berlin  and  Vienna  let  it  be 
known  clearly  that  should  Italy  pursue  a  course  of 
action  prejudicial  to  their  interests,  the  Pope  could 
expect  every  assistance  from  them  towards  the  real- 
isation of  these  temporal  desires;  while  the  efforts 
of  the  Catholics  to  maintain  Italian  neutrality  would 
not  go  without  recompense. 

The  Socialist  members  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies, 
though  not  unanimously  (several  groups  soon  joined 
the  Interventionists),  basing  their  arguments  on  the 
grounds  of  pacifism  and  international  brotherhood, 
maintained  that  it  was  in  the  best  interests  of  Italy 
that  the  country  should  continue  its  policy  of  strict 
and  stringent  neutrality. 

But  the  most  important  and  numerous  group  of 
Neutralists  were  not  those  directly  affiliated  with  any 
political  or  religious  party,  but  were  what  might  be 
called  '^  debtors  of  Germany."  As  has  been  pointed 
out  in  a  previous  chapter,  German  penetration  had  so 
thoroughly  permeated  Italian  industrial  and  economic 
life  that  it  was  difficult  to  find  even  an  unimportant 
branch  of  industry  or  commerce  which  was  not  de- 
pendent in  a  measure  on  German  capital  and  sup- 
port. The  whole  Italian  economic  structure  had  been 
built  up  on  German  foundations.  To  break  with 
Germany  meant,  so  they  feared,  the  collapse  and  ruin 
of  their  hard-won  prosperity.  Further  than  this, 
during  the  thirty-three  years  of  a  close  alliance  with 


THE   DAYS  OF  NEUTRALITY  245 

Germany,  a  very  considerable  number  of  Italians 
had  intermarried  with  Germans,  and  were  now  bound 
to  Germany  by  these  ties  of  marriage  and  blood  re- 
lationship, while  others,  trained  at  the  German  tech- 
nical schools  and  universities,  had  retained  a  very 
deep  respect  for  their  German  masters.  The  great 
majority  of  the  working  and  peasant  classes  were 
also  opposed  to  war,  chiefly  on  the  ground  that  it 
would  upset  their  economic  well-being.  At  the  other 
end  of  the  social  scale,  many  members  of  the  higher 
aristocracy,  enriched  bourgeoisie,  and  university  pro- 
fessors of  the  older  and  more  rigid  type  who  had  ab- 
sorbed the  German  point  of  view,  rallied  to  the  cause 
of  the  Neutralists. 

The  opinions  of  the  Italians  varied  widely  in  the 
different  parts  of  the  country.  In  Venetia,  the  prov- 
ince closest  to  the  frontier,  though  the  district  hkely 
to  suffer  the  most  from  the  consequences  of  a  war, 
the  people  were  enthusiastically  Interventionist,  as 
they  were  also  in  Romagna.  The  Piedmontese,  how- 
ever, mindful  of  their  historical  affinity  with  Prussia, 
were  actively  opposed  to  the  idea  of  a  war  against 
the  Central  Empires.  In  Lombardy,  the  industrial 
heart  of  Italy,  opinions  were  divided,  though  the 
Neutralists  were  in  a  majority.  In  Liguria,  Genoa 
was  enjoying  a  period  of  unwonted  prosperity  on  ac- 
count of  her  traffic  of  imports,  ultimately  destined 
for  Germany,  and  was  thus  not  eager  for  any  change 
in  the  status  quo;  while  Rome  and  Naples  and  the 
remainder  of  Italy  were  undecided  or  indifferent  re- 
garding the  war  with  Austria  which  the  Interven- 
tionists now  demanded. 

With  Germany  few  ItaHans  found  any  cause  for 


246  GREATER  ITALY, 

quarrel,  nor  were  there  many  who  wished  to  seek  far 
afield  for  such  a  pretext.  With  Austria  the  century- 
long  feud  subsisted,  and  the  violence  of  the  hatred 
of  the  ItaUans  of  Northern  Italy  was  soon  aflame. 
But  Germany  had  espoused  the  cause  of  the  Dual 
Monarchy  so  completely  that  it  did  not  seem  pos- 
sible for  Italy  to  declare  war  against  Austria  without 
German  interference,  and  the  legend  of  German  in- 
vincibiUty  was  deeply  rooted  in  Italy. 

The  Interventionists  had  a  difficult  task  before 
them.  At  first  composed  only  of  an  unimportant 
minority  of  young  men,  army  officers,  professional 
men,  writers,  journalists,  and  teachers,  they  believed 
that  Italy  could  obtain  her  legitimate  ends  only  by 
participation  in  the  war  on  the  side  of  the  AlHes.  But 
for  years  past  Italians  had  been  temperamentally 
hostile  to  France.  They  could  not  forget  the  con- 
duct of  Napoleon  III  in  regard  to  Nice,  the  Tunisian 
episode,  and  the  many  vexatious  incidents  which  had 
clouded  Franco-Italian  relations  within  very  recent 
years.  Even  more  unpalatable  to  the  Itahans  was 
the  idea  of  fighting  hand  in  hand  with  Russia,  the 
protector  of  the  Jugo-Slavs,  and  a  possible  antagonist 
in  the  Adriatic. 

Those  in  favour  of  intervention  were  materially 
assisted  in  their  projjaganda,  by  the  campaign  of 
ruthless  terrorism  which  the  Germans  had  pursued 
in  France  and  Belgium.  The  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality  had  a  less  concrete  influence  than  the  de- 
struction of  the  Cloth  Hall  at  Ypres  and  the  Cathedral 
at  Rheims.  The  Italian  people,  whose  aesthetic  sense 
is  more  highly  developed  than  that  of  any  other  modern 
European  nation,  could  understand  and  gauge  minutely 


THE  DAYS  OF  NEUTRALITY  247 

the  sacrilege  of  the  German  invaders  against  the 
monuments  and  rich  treasure  stores  of  the  past,  and 
they  were  aroused  to  anger  by  the  vandalism  which 
was  vividly  pictured  to  them  by  distinguished  Bel- 
gians who  soon  flocked  to  Italy. 

However,  the  Italians  were  not  to  be  persuaded  by 
sentimental  arguments.  Though  they  deplored  the 
loss  of  the  historic  monuments,  they  deemed  that  the 
war,  if  declared,  must  be  an  Italian  war,  definitely 
outlined  as  pursuant  of  a  definite  plan  of  action. 

By  degrees  the  Interventionists  rallied  to  their 
support  the  leading  journahsts  and  publicists  of  Italy; 
in  poUtics,  Liberals,  Radicals,  and  Conservatives 
soon  ranged  themselves  on  their  side.  In  the  uni- 
versities many  of  the  younger  professors  and  the 
whole  student  body  joined  the  party  which  now 
clamoured  loudly  for  war — war  against  Austria. 
For  throughout  this  campaign  of  persuasion  there 
was  little  or  no  mention  of  war  against  Germany. 
Austria  was  the  enemy  and  Austria  alone  was  to  be 
assaulted.  In  every  city  in  Italy  the  propaganda  for 
and  against  intervention  was  carried  on.  The  man 
in  the  street  was  called  upon  to  decide  for  himself  in 
advance  a  problem  which  would  eventually  confront 
the  Government.  For  all  Italians  felt  that  Italy  could 
not  long  remain  a  neutral  spectator.  The  future  of 
the  nation  was  at  stake.  Italy  must  sooner  or  later 
play  an  active  part  in  the  war  which  was  to  settle 
the  destiny  of  Europe. 

While  in  the  public  forum  of  the  newspaper,  street, 
and  theatre  the  question  of  participation  or  non- 
participation  in  the  war  was  being  hotly  debated, 
and  the  various  opinions  argued  in  pamphlet,  leaflet, 


248  GREATER  ITALY 

and  viva  voce,  the  Government  found  itself  assailed 
by  the  two  belligerent  groups. 

On  the  death  of  the  Marchese  di  San  GuiUano,  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  in  October,  1914,  this 
office  was  assumed  by  Baron  Sonnino;  a  clear-headed, 
silent  man,  who,  though  in  the  past  a  confirmed  sup- 
porter of  the  Triple  Alliance,  was  nevertheless  admira- 
bly fitted  by  his  realist  training  and  temperament  to 
guide  Italy  through  the  intricate  negotiations  which 
were  to  follow. 

Early  in  December,  Italy  took  the  first  official 
action  when  Austrian  forces  crossed  the  Danube  and 
began  the  invasion  of  Serbia.  The  Italian  Govern- 
ment at  once  made  inquiries  in  Vienna  regarding 
Austrian  plans  in  the  Balkans,  and  what  compensa- 
tion the  Vienna  Government  was  ready  to  make  to 
Italy  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  their  treaty  of 
alliance,  which  demanded  reciprocal  compensation 
in  the  event  of  either  party  acquiring  further  terri- 
tory in  the  Balkans.  At  the  same  time  Baron  Sonnino 
communicated  with  Berlin,  and  added  these  significant 
words:  "The  current  which  manifests  itself  in  a  sec- 
tion of  public  opinion  in  favour  of  neutrality,  does 
not  mean  that  it  abandons  Italian  interests  in  the 
Balkans  and  the  Adriatic,  nor  the  national  aspirations, 
but  rather  it  is  persuaded  of  the  possibility  of  pro- 
tecting these  interests  and  realising  these  aspirations, 
at  the  same  time  remaining  faithful  to  neutrality."  ^ 

While  the  Vienna  Government  endeavoured  to  turn 
a  deaf  ear  to  Italian  demands  and  let  matters  drift, 
Germany  soon  discovered   that    the   party  in    Italy 

^  Despatch  to  Italian  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  dated  December  9, 
1914.     "Italian  Oflacial  Green  Book,"  Document  No.  2. 


THE  DAYS  OF  NEUTRALITY  249 

favouring  Italian  intervention  was  daily  gaining 
ground.  William  II,  who  took  a  very  personal 
interest  in  Italian  affairs,  despatched  the  former  Im- 
perial Chancellor,  Prince  Billow,  to  Rome  as  Am- 
bassador Extraordinary  to  open  negotiations  with 
the  Itahan  Government  with  a  view  to  securing 
Italy's  permanent  neutrality  for  the  duration  of  the 
war.  If  any  man  was  fitted  to  succeed  in  this  difficult 
task  it  was  Prince  Biilow.  His  residence  at  Rome, 
the  Villa  Malta,  was  still  the  centre  of  a  wide  and  in- 
fluential circle  of  important  personages  in  Italian 
public  Hfe.  Confident  in  his  ability  to  accomplish 
his  mission.  Prince  Biilow  arrived  in  Rome.  On 
December  19  he  was  received  by  the  Italian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs.  During  this  interview.  Baron 
Sonnino  frankly  told  Prince  Biilow  that,  though  the 
majority  of  the  population  was  still  willing  to  support 
the  Government's  policy  of  neutrality,  their  support 
was  based  on  the  belief  that  the  Government  would 
secure  adequate  compensation — in  other  words,  the 
realisation  of  Italy's  national  aspirations — and  that 
he  felt  himself  quite  in  accord  with  this  point  of 
view.  For  the  next  three  months  the  Italian  Govern- 
ment, cliiefly  through  the  medium  of  the  German 
Envoy,  was  engaged  in  negotiations  with  the  Vienna 
Government,  respecting  the  territorial  concessions  to 
be  made  to  Italy  in  return  for  her  continued  and 
friendly  neutrality. 

In  the  meantime  the  war  had  developed  into  a  new 
phase.  The  German  invasion  in  the  West  had  been 
permanently  checked,  and  the  Russian  armies  were 
advancing  victoriously  through  Galicia  and  stood 
on  the  heights  of  the  Carpathians,  ready  to  invade 


250  GREATER  ITALY 

the  Hungarian  plain.  At  the  same  time  the  Serbs 
had  achieved  an  overwhelming  victory  over  their 
enemies,  and  after  a  brief  and  brilliant  campaign  had 
driven  the  Austrians  completely  out  of  Serbia  and 
captured  many  thousand  prisoners  and  great  booty. 

The  Italians  looked  with  no  little  concern  at  this 
sudden  triumph  of  the  Slavs.  They  beheved  that 
their  plans  for  the  domination  of  the  Adriatic  were 
definitely  imperilled.  The  news  of  further  Russian 
successes  continued  to  reach  Rome.  Negotiations 
with  Vienna  were  dragging  on  slowly.  The  Austrians, 
after  much  bickering,  had  finally  conceded  the  prin- 
ciple of  territorial  compensation.  The  Italian  Govern- 
ment had  been  persuaded  to  forego  some  of  its  chief 
pretensions  in  order  that  a  settlement  might  be  reached. 
Italy,  thereupon,  on  April  8,  1915,  presented  a  definite 
proposal  to  Austria,  regarding  what  she  deemed  the 
minimum  compensations  in  the  form  of  territorial 
concessions^  by  Austria,  in  the  Trentino  and  the  Adri- 
atic; in  the  words  of  M.  Sonnino,  ^'indispensable  for 
the  purpose  of  creating  between  the  two  States  a 
normal  and  stable  status  of  reciprocal  cordiality  and 
possible  co-operation  in  the  future." 

The  representatives  of  the  Allied  Powers  at  Rome 
were  watching  closely  the  changing  attitude  of  the 
Italian  Government.  For  the  Allies  were,  notwith- 
standing the  Russian  victories,  fully  aware  of  their 
intrinsic  military  inferiority  vis  a  vis  the  Central  Em- 
pires. When  it  seemed  that  Italy  was  about  to  con- 
clude negotiations  with  Vienna,  and  Prince  Billow 
was  already  congratulating  himself  on  the  success  of 
his  efforts,  the  AUies  decided  to  make  a  bold  offer  for 
1  Cf.  Chap.  X,  p.  229. 


THE  DAYS  OF  NEUTRALITY  251 

Italian  assistance.  Though  for  long  months  the  cam- 
paign of  preparing  ItaUan  public  opinion  for  armed 
intervention  had  been  going  on,  the  Alhed  Govern- 
ments had  hitherto  been  unable  to  agree  as  to  the 
terms  to  be  offered  to  Italy.  "WTien  it  became  known 
that  the  Russian  advance  had  been  checked,  and  that 
Russia  had  so  taxed  her  resources  as  to  be  unable  to 
cope  effectively  with  the  enemy,  even  on  the  defen- 
sive, the  Allied  Governments  felt  that  the  moment 
had  arrived  to  secure  Italy's  active  co-operation  at  all 
costs. 

Then  followed  the  series  of  Russian  reverses.  The 
Austrians  again  victorious,  through  the  assistance  of 
their  German  aUies,  were  not  anxious  to  accept  Italy's 
proposals,  while  the  Alhes,  who  were  passing  through 
the  most  critical  phase  of  the  war,  were  willing  to  make 
almost  any  concessions  demanded  to  secure  Italian 
aid. 

It  is  chiefly  owdng  to  the  skill  and  tact  of  the  French 
Ambassador  at  Rome,  IM.  Barrere,  that  the  negotia- 
tions which  actually  led  to  Itahan  intervention  were 
brought  to  a  successful  issue  in  a  very  brief  space  of 
time.  By  April  24,  1915,  the  Italian  Government 
had  pledged  itself  under  certain  contingencies,  and  in 
return  for  guarantees  given  by  the  Alhes,  ^  to  declare 
war  on  Austria.  The  Govermnent  in  contracting  this 
engagement  had  kept  in  close  touch  with  the  will 
and  temper  of  the  Italian  people.  During  the  months 
which  had  elapsed  since  the  outbreak  of  the  European 
War,  the  campaign  of  the  Interventionists  in  Italy 
had  progressed  from  day  to  day  with  increasing  vio- 
lence. The  phght  of  the  irredente  provinces  had  again 
1  Cf.  Chap.  X,  pp.  232-233. 


252  GREATER  ITALY 

aroused  the  sympathy  of  all  Itahans.  The  day  of  their 
redemption  was  at  hand.  The  opportunity  must  not 
be  missed  to  complete  the  unification  of  Italy.  The 
European  War  lost  its  significance  and  interest  in 
comparison  with  the  war  which  Italy  was  to  declare 
on  Austria.  Italians  concerned  themselves  little  with 
the  other  struggle;  their  whole  interest  centred  on 
Italian  affairs.  It  is  not  unnatural  that  observers  in 
France  and  Great  Britain  should  have  misinterpreted 
the  Italian  attitude,  and  the  numerous  delays  which 
arose.  ''Italy  wdll  fly  to  the  rescue  of  the  victors," 
was  a  hon  mot  which  plainly  voiced  their  impatience 
and  their  mistrust  of  Italian  pohcy. 

But  Italy  had  good  reason  for  delay  in  declaring 
herself  openly.  Few  foreigners  could  rightly  ap- 
preciate how  disorganised  and  unprepared  for  war 
the  Italian  armies  were  in  the  late  summer  of  1914. 
The  Italian  military  authorities  at  once  foresaw  that 
sooner  or  later  they  would  be  called  upon  to  take  up 
a  quarrel  wliich  was  being  fanned  to  flame  by  the 
national  will  of  the  Italian  people.  They  must  be 
ready  to  assume  the  responsibiUty  when  that  mo- 
ment should  come.  Under  the  leadersliip  of  that 
brilUant  and  methodical  officer,  General  Count  Ca- 
dorna,  the  Italian  armies  were  being  put  into  shape 
to  be  prepared  for  every  eventuality.  The  task  was 
arduous.  The  lessons  of  the  first  months  of  the  war 
had  to  be  learned;  the  methods  of  the  new  warfare 
assimilated.  Slowly  the  armies  were  making  ready. 
By  the  end  of  April,  1915,  it  was  evident  that  the 
great  gaps  in  the  cadres  had  been  filled;  the  empty 
caissons  replenished;  stores  and  munitions  accumu- 
lated. 


THE  DAYS  OF  NEUTRALITY  253 

On  May  3,  Baron  Sonnino  transmitted  to  the  Ital- 
ian Ambassador  at  Vienna  instructions  to  denounce 
the  treaty  of  aUiance  with  Austria.  This  document, 
so  lucid  and  concise,  sets  forth  in  a  succinct  manner 
the  justifications  of  the  Italian  Government  in  tak- 
ing tliis  step: 

The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 

TO 

The  Royal  Ambassador  at  Vienna 

"  (Telegram)  Rome,  May  3, 1915. 

*'  I  pray  your  Excellency  to  communicate  the  follow- 
ing to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  leave  with 
him  a  written  copy: 

"'The  aUiance  between  Italy  and  Austria-Hungary 
proclaimed  itself  since  its  beginning  as  an  element 
and  a  guarantee  of  peace,  and  aimed  first  as  its  prin- 
cipal object  at  mutual  defense.  In  the  presence  of 
subsequent  events,  and  of  the  new  situation  which 
arose  therefrom,  the  Governments  of  the  two  coun- 
tries were  obliged  to  propose  another  object  no  less 
essential,  and  in  the  course  of  the  successive  renewals 
of  the  treaty,  endeavoured  to  safeguard  the  continuity 
of  their  alliance  by  stipulating  the  principle  of  prelim- 
inary agreements  regarding  the  Balkans,  with  a  view 
to  conciliating  the  interests  and  the  divergent  ten- 
dencies of  the  two  Powers. 

''  *  It  is  plainly  evident  that  these  stipulations,  loyally 
fulfilled,  would  have  sufficed  to  furnish  a  solid  basis 
for  common  and  fruitful  action.  On  the  contrary 
Austria-Hungary  during  the  summer  of  1914,  without 
making  any  agreement  with  Italy,  without  even  giv- 
ing her  the  least  notice,  and  paying  no  attention  to 
the  counsels  of  moderation  which  were  addressed  to 
her  (Austria-Hungary)  by  the  Royal  Government, 
handed  to  Serbia  the  ultimatum  of  July  23,  which 
was  the  cause  and  the  beginning  of  the  present  Euro- 
pean conflagration. 


254  GREATER  ITALY 

"'Austria-Hungary  in  neglecting  the  obligations  of 
the  treaty,  disturbed  profoundly  the  status  quo  in 
the  Balkans,  and  brought  about  a  situation  by  which 
she  alone  would  be  called  upon  to  profit  to  the  great 
detriment  of  the  interests  of  greatest  importance,  which 
her  ally  had  so  often  affirmed  and  proclaimed. 

"'A  violation  so  flagrant  of  the  letter  as  well  as  the 
spirit  of  the  treaty,  not  only  justified  the  refusal  of 
Italy  to  range  herself  on  the  side  of  her  allies  in  a  war 
brought  about  without  her  advice,  but  at  the  same  time 
it  took  away  from  the  alliance  its  essential  factors  as 
well  as  its  raison  d'etre. 

"'Even  the  clause  concerning  benevolent  neutrality 
provided  for  by  the  treaty,  was  compromised  by  this 
violation.  Reason  as  well  as  opinion  agree  in  pre- 
cluding that  benevolent  neutrality  can  be  maintained 
when  one  of  the  allies  takes  up  arms  to  realise  a  pro- 
gramme diametrically  opposed  to  the  vital  interests 
of  the  other  ally,  interests  the  safeguarding  of  which 
constituted  the  principal  reason  for  the  alhance  it- 
self. 

" '  Notwithstanding  this,  Italy  during  several  months, 
endeavoured  to  create  a  favourable  situation  for  the 
re-establishment  between  the  two  States  of  those 
friendly  relations  which  constitute  the  essential  foun- 
dation of  all  co-operation  in  the  realm  of  general 
politics. 

"'  With  this  object  in  view,  and  with  this  hope,  the 
Royal  Government  declared  itself  disposed  to  lend  it- 
self to  an  arrangement  having  for  its  object  the  satis- 
faction, in  an  equitable  manner,  of  the  legitimate 
national  aspirations  of  Italy,  and  which  at  the  same 
time  would  have  served  to  reduce  the  existing  dis- 
parity between  the  two  States  in  the  Adriatic. 

'"These  negotiations,  however,  arrived  at  no  ap- 
parent result. 

"'All  the  efforts  of  the  Royal  Government  met  with 
resistance  on  the  part  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Gov- 
ernment, which  after  several  months  has  only  made 


THE  DAYS  OF  NEUTRALITY  255 

up  its  mind  to  admit  the  claim  of  the  special  interests 
of  Italy  at  Avlona,  and  to  promise  an  insufficient 
concession  of  territory  in  the  Trentino;  a  concession 
which  provides  in  no  way  for  a  normal  adjustment 
of  the  situation,  either  from  an  ethnic,  political,  or 
military  point  of  view. 

"'This  concession  furthermore  was  not  to  be  car- 
ried out  until  some  undetermined  date;  that  is  to  say 
only  at  the  end  of  the  war. 

"'In  this  state  of  affairs,  the  Italian  Government 
must  renounce  all  hope  of  arriving  at  an  arrangement, 
and  sees  itself  obliged  to  withdraw  all  its  proposals 
of  agreement. 

"'It  is  likewise  useless  to  give  to  the  alliance  an 
outward  form,  which  would  only  be  destined  to  dis- 
simulate the  reality  of  continual  suspicion  and  daily 
differences. 

"'Therefore,  Italy  confident  in  her  good  right,  af- 
firms and  proclaims  that  she  resumes  henceforth  her 
full  liberty  of  action  and  declares  her  treaty  of  al- 
fiance  with  Austria-Hungary  annulled  and  without 
effect.'! 

"SONNINO." 

Thus  the  Government  had  executed  the  mandate 
which  it  believed  intrusted  to  it  by  the  people  of  Italy. 
For  in  this  Italian  war  it  was  the  voice  of  the  people 
that  dominated.  Italy  alone  of  all  the  belligerent 
Powers  was  to  enter  into  the  conflict  with  her  eyes  wide 
open.  The  first  decisive  step  had  been  taken.  The 
treaty  of  alliance  with  Austria-Hungary  had  been  de- 
clared null  and  void,  yet  the  Neutralists  did  not  give  up 
hope  that  war  might  be  averted.  They  had  worked 
with  great  skill  and  much  tenacity  to  spread  abroad 
their  views.      They  had  proclaimed  their  admiration 

1"  Italian  Official  Green  Book,"  Document  No.  76. 


256  GREATER  ITALY 

for  the  genius  of  the  German  people,  its  strength  and 
virility.  The  historical  associations  and  similarity  of 
the  rise  to  nationhood  of  Italy  and  Germany  had 
been  evoked.  The  necessity  of  Italy's  remaining 
faithful  to  her  treaty  obligations  was  emphasised; 
the  threat  of  a  Slav  peril  in  the  Adriatic  was  reiterated. 
But  the  most  trenchant  argument  of  the  Neutralists 
was  that  of  the  added  burden  in  the  form  of  increased 
taxation  and  disturbed  industrial  conditions  which 
would  be  brought  upon  Italy  in  the  event  of  war, 
to  say  nothing  of  the  thousands  of  useful  lives  that 
would  be  sacrificed  on  the  field  of  battle;  while  by 
negotiations  much  might  be  obtained  without  going 
to  war. 

To  these  arguments  the  Interventionists  had  op- 
posed others  equally  strong.  First  and  foremost  was 
the  problem  of  the  irredente  provinces,  which  they 
were  now  prepared  to  solve.  As  a  result  of  unforeseen 
circumstances,  Austria  found  herself  embarrassed  and 
in  a  difficult  position.  Italy  must  not  refrain  from 
seizing  this  opportunity  of  rescuing  the  um-edeemed 
Italians,  whose  survival  under  the  pressure  of  the 
Germans  of  Tyrol  and  the  Slavs  of  the  Adriatic  was 
daily  more  threatened.  Secondly,  military  considera- 
tions demanded  that  Italy's  northern  frontier  should 
be  rearranged  so  as  to  secure  Venetia  from  invasion, 
which,  under  existing  conditions,  could  be  launched 
without  difiiculty,  and  with  every  chance  of  success 
by  the  Austrians.  The  gates  of  Italy  were  in  the 
hands  of  a  potential  enemy.  The  time  had  come  for 
Italy  to  act  as  her  own  gatekeeper.  A  third,  more 
cogent  argument  was  that  Italy  could  not  afford  to 
remain  outside  the  conflict.      Isolated  in  the  midst  of 


THE  DAYS  OF  NEUTRALITY  257 

the  combatants,  no  matter  which  group  of  belligerents 
won,  Italy  would  find  herself  unable  to  vindicate  her 
position  as  a  World  Power,  and  would  inevitably  sink 
to  the  position  of  a  State  of  the  second  rank.  Italian 
aspirations  in  the  Adriatic  would  be  definitively 
thwarted.  Should  the  Austro-German  Powers  be 
victorious,  Italy  would  be  forced  to  accept  a  sub- 
servient part  in  their  scheme  of  a  great  Central  Eu- 
ropean Empire,  and  would  become  another  Bavaria. 
Should  the  AlHes  win  without  Italian  co-operation, 
they  would  have  no  time  nor  desire  to  consider  Ital- 
ian needs  or  ambitions. 

Notwithstanding  the  apparent  gains  of  the  Inter- 
ventionist cause,  the  Neutralists  were  still  confident 
in  their  strength.  The  ferment  of  the  Italians  had 
already  reached  such  a  height  that  any  sHght  inci- 
dent might  at  the  last  moment  determine  the  course 
of  action  which  the  nation  was  to  pm-sue. 

On  the  very  day,  May  4,  that  the  Italian  Ambas- 
sador at  Vienna  delivered  the  Note  denouncing  the 
Austro-ItaHan  alliance,  there  arrived  in  Italy,  coming 
from  France,  a  man  whose  voice  was  to  carry  the  day; 
a  man  who  seemed  by  temper  and  character,  as  well 
as  by  his  past  record,  wholly  unsuited  for  the  part 
that  was  to  be  allotted  to  him  in  the  great  Italian 
drama.  It  was  Gabriel  d'Annunzio.  Known  abroad 
chiefly  through  his  novels,  wherein  the  vision  of  the 
poet  is  often  obscured  by  a  sordid,  egotistical  mate- 
riahsm,  d'Annunzio  in  his  own  country  was  hailed  as 
a  poet  whose  knowledge  and  flexible  use  of  the  Italian 
language,  as  well  as  his  unerring  poetical  instinct, 
rank  him  with  the  greatest  in  the  Italian  tongue. 
Many  of  his  later  poems  breathe  a  lofty  spirit  of  pa- 


258  GREATER  ITALY 

triotism  and  devotion  to  the  cause  of  a  Greater  Italy. 
Of  aesthetic  temperament,  he  had  hitherto  kept  him- 
self aloof  from  crowds,  and  seemed  wholly  unfit  to 
become  the  leader  of  the  people  and  to  force  a  Par- 
liament and  a  Government  to  obey  his  mandate.  It 
is  more  than  probable  that  d'Annunzio  had  only  a 
very  vague  notion  of  the  part  that  he  was  to  be  called 
upon  to  play.  His  chief  object  in  coming  to  Italy, 
after  an  absence  of  nearly  five  years,  was  to  deliver  an 
address  at  the  unveiling  of  a  monument  at  Quarto, 
near  Genoa,  where,  on  May  5,  fifty-five  years  before, 
"the  Thousand"  under  Garibaldi  had  set  sail,  to 
undertake  the  first  step  to  bring  about  the  unifica- 
tion of  Southern  Italy.  Though  d'Annunzio  had  never 
before  played  an  important  political  role,  he  never- 
theless appreciated  the  psychological  possibilities  of 
his  position  and  the  influence  he  could  exert  on  his 
fellow  countrymen  in  this  crisis.  From  time  to  time 
during  the  past  months,  he  had,  since  the  war  began, 
by  his  articles  in  the  Press  set  forth  his  convictions  as 
to  the  necessity  of  Italian  intervention. 

On  his  arrival  at  Bardonnechia,  the  first  small 
station  on  Italian  soil,  d'Annunzio  was  greeted  with 
enthusiasm  by  a  group  of  officers  and  soldiers  who 
had  assembled  on  the  railway  quay.  At  every  station 
where  the  train  stopped  he  was  the  object  of  a  bois- 
terous ovation.  At  Turin,  the  chief  centre  of  the 
Neutralists,  a  great  crowd  of  students  gathered  to 
welcome  the  return  to  Italy  of  the  poet.  By  the  time 
he  had  reached  Genoa  all  Italy  was  aflame  with  the 
news.  The  poet  had  become  the  vates,  the  seer  of 
the  new  Italy.  The  Italians  were  ready  to  be  led, 
eager  to  find  a  hero.    D'Annunzio,  by  his  stirring  ad- 


THE  DAYS  OF  NEUTRALITY  259 

dresses  to  the  people,  by  the  appeal  that  he  made  to 
the  grandeur  and  splendour  of  the  past  glory  of  Italy, 
aroused  his  listeners  to  an  enthusiasm  which  bor- 
dered on  frenzy. 

At  the  fetes  at  Quarto  d'Annunzio  was  to  be  the 
principal  speaker.  The  King  of  Italy  had  signified  his 
intention  of  being  present.  At  the  last  moment, 
however,  the  King,  not  wishing  to  show  his  sympathies 
for  one  party  or  the  other,  before  the  people  had 
through  the  Government  proclaimed  their  will,  cancelled 
the  engagement.  D'Annunzio  thus  became  the  chief 
figure  of  the  celebration.  His  oration,  couched  in 
high-flowing,  allegorical  language,  did  not  arouse  more 
acclaim  than  his  mere  presence.  He  became  the  ob- 
ject of  an  ovation  the  hke  of  which  has  rarely  been 
given  to  any  ci\dlian.  His  carriage  was  surrounded 
by  excited  admirers;  he  was  showered  wdth  flowers, 
and  with  difficulty  escaped  from  the  hands  of  his 
well-wishers.  Everywhere  he  was  called  upon  again 
and  again  to  harangue  the  assembled  crowds.  His 
words,  inspired  by  an  intense  sincerity,  carried  with 
them  a  conviction  and  authority  which  increased 
hourly.  D'Annunzio's  reception  at  Genoa  and  Quarto 
was  merely  a  precursor  of  other  and  greater  triumphs. 
He  became  the  embodiment  of  the  idea  which  he 
preached.  To  an  audience  of  university  students 
who  had  presented  him  with  a  gold  medalUon  of 
homage,  d'Annunzio  exclaimed: 

"If  it  is  true,  as  I  swear  it  is,  that  the  Italians  have 
lighted  again  the  flame  on  the  altar  of  Italy,  take 
torches  lighted  in  its  fires  in  your  hands,  and  fan  them 
to  flame !  Hold  them  in  your  clenched  fists,  brandish 
them  aloft  wherever  you  may  go !     Sow  the  warlike 


260  GREATER  ITALY 

fire,  my  young  companions!  Be  ye  the  intrepid  in- 
cendiaries of  your  great  country.  '  Begone  !  Obey ! 
said  the  priest  of  Mars  to  the  consecrated  youth.' 
You  are  the  seeds  of  a  new  world.  Begone !  Make 
ready !  Obey !  I  can  command  you  to  do  this  be- 
cause you  have  made  me  worthy  to  consecrate  you 
since  you  are  the  sparks  of  the  divine  fire.  Sow  broad- 
cast this  fire !  to-morrow  let  the  souls  of  all  be  aflame ! 
Let  the  voice  of  all  arise  in  one  single  flaming  clamour, 
ataly!    Italy!'" 

Thus  d'Annunzio  exhorted  others  to  carry  on  the 
task  which  he  had  assumed  for  himself.  His  mission 
was  to  inflame  the  hearts  of  all  Italians  for  war. 

After  a  triumphant  progress  through  various  Italian 
cities,  on  the  evening  of  May  12  d'Annunzio  was  to  ar- 
rive at  Rome.  The  city  was  in  a  turmoil.  Giolitti,  at 
the  head  of  a  group  of  influential  Neutralists,  who  were 
apparently  working  in  close  co-operation  with  Prince 
Billow,  had  arrived  in  Rome  on  May  9.  Though  no 
longer  in  office,  Giolitti  was  omnipotent  in  Italian 
political  circles.  He  still  controlled  a  majority  in  the 
Chamber.  It  was  said  that  he  had  come  to  the  capital 
for  the  purpose  of  overthrowing  the  Government,  and 
of  forming  a  new  Cabinet  under  his  own  leadership; 
he  would  then  repudiate  the  Sonnino-Salandra  agree- 
ment of  April  24  with  the  Allies,  reopen  negotiations 
with  Austria,  and  secure  in  return  for  Italy's  neu- 
trality wider  and  more  extensive  concessions  from  the 
Dual  Monarchy,  which  the  latter  at  this  eleventh 
hour  would  be  compelled  to  grant.  The  fact  that 
Giolitti  on  his  arrival  had  been  received  by  the  King 
as  well  as  by  M.  Salandra,  seemed  to  confirm  these 
rumours,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  Giolitti  em- 
phatically denied  the  allegations,  and  stated  that  he 


THE  DAYS  OF  NEUTRALITY  261 

had  come  to  Rome  at  the  invitation  of  the  King  to 
confer  on  the  situation  in  general.  For  a  moment  it 
seemed  as  though  the  Giohttian  plot  was  about  to  suc- 
ceed, and  that  Parliament,  in  face  of  a  strong  though 
disjointed  and  incoherent  public  opinion,  would  readily 
veto  the  arrangement  entered  into  by  the  Salandra 
Cabinet  in  favour  of  intervention.  It  is  at  this  junc- 
ture that  d'Annunzio  arrived  at  Rome. 

In  the  square  in  front  of  the  railway-station  in  the 
vast  Piazza  delle  Terme,  with  the  imposing  back- 
ground of  the  massive  brick  arches  of  the  Baths  of 
Diocletian  rising  against  the  deep  blue  of  the  evening 
sky,  150,000  Romans  had  assembled  to  welcome  the 
arrival  of  the  modern  Tribune,  for  such  d'Annunzio 
had  now  become  in  the  eyes  of  the  Italians.  To  the 
people  of  Rome  d'Annunzio  came  in  the  guise  of  a 
dehverer.  By  some  strange  whim  of  fate,  d'Annunzio 
the  poet,  the  artist,  the  maker  of  elegant  verses,  had 
been  clad  by  popular  fancy  with  the  virtues  of  a  hero 
of  ancient  Rome.  The  Romans,  ever  ready  to  ap- 
plaud, to  be  led,  willing  to  be  admonished,  exhorted, 
inflamed  to  action,  greeted  their  new  idol  with  scenes 
of  wild  and  exultant  tumult.  D'Annunzio  was  borne 
aloft  on  the  shoulders  of  the  people.  Finally  he  was 
able  to  reach  his  automobile;  the  car  was  compelled 
to  proceed  at  a  snail's  pace,  halting  at  almost  every 
yard,  cutting  as  it  advanced  a  lane  through  the  dense 
throng  which  lined  the  streets  from  side  to  side.  Es- 
corted by  torch-bearers,  the  car  made  a  slow  progress 
through  the  city.  The  multitudes  formed  in  procession 
in  the  rear,  and  with  banners  and  flags  unfurled, 
among  which  those  of  Trent  and  Trieste  were  con- 
spicuous,   bearing    thousands    of    torches    and    vari- 


262  GREATER  ITALY 

coloured  lanterns,  the  procession  wound  its  way- 
through  the  streets  of  the  capital,  up  the  Pincian 
hill  to  the  Hotel  Regina,  opposite  the  palace  of  the 
Queen-Mother.  Queen  Margherita,  surrounded  by  her 
ladies-in-waiting,  stood  at  the  window  of  the  palace, 
and  added  her  applause  to  that  of  the  multitude. 

The  next  day  Rome  awoke  to  learn  important 
tidings.  The  Salandra  Cabinet,  not  feeling  itself 
strong  enough  to  confront  Parliament  at  its  opening 
on  May  20,  intended,  so  it  was  reported,  in  view  of 
the  uncompromising  attitude  assumed  by  the  Neu- 
tralists, who  controlled  a  majority  in  the  Chamber, 
to  tender  its  resignation  to  the  King.  The  situation 
was  critical.  The  honour  of  Italy  was  at  stake.  The 
Salandra  Government  had  pledged  itself  to  foreign 
Powers  on  behalf  of  intervention;  the  accession  of 
Giolitti  to  office  would  mean  that  the  Italian  Govern- 
ment would  repudiate  these  pledges.  It  appeared  as 
though  Giolitti  and  the  Neutralists,  working  in  con- 
cert with  Prince  Biilow,  were  about  to  frustrate  the 
aims  and  manifest  will  of  the  Italian  people. 

It  was  then  that  d'Annunzio,  in  an  improvised 
speech  during  a  performance  at  the  Costanzi  Theatre, 
voiced  a  direct  accusation  against  the  '' traitors," 
and  bade  the  Romans  fight  against  this  enemy  with- 
in their  gates : 

"Giolitti  knew  the  terms  of  our  treaty  with  Aus- 
tria and  Germany;  knew  that  on  May  4,  we  had 
denounced  it — at  least  so  far  as  Austria  is  concerned. 
He  also  knew  the  terms  of  our  recent  agreement  with 
the  Triple  Entente,  and  the  engagements  entered  into 
by  us  with  France,  England,  and  Russia.  Never- 
theless, he  is  making  every  effort  to  compel  us  to  break 


THE  DAYS  OF  NEUTRALITY  263 

our  given  word.  ...  He  is  betraying  the  King  and 
the  country.  .  .  .  He  is  guilty  of  treason.  This  is 
not  merely  a  manner  of  speaking,  a  simple  phrase. 
Giolitti  is  a  traitor  according  to  the  usual  interpre- 
tation of  the  word.  ...  If  the  Italian  Parliament  re- 
opens on  May  20,  we  must  by  every  manner  and  means 
forbid  the  entrance  of  the  lackeys  of  the  Villa  Malta 
and  send  them  back  one  by  one  to  their  master.  .  .  . 
At  the  Italian  Parliament  on  May  20,  the  sacred  Gari- 
baldian  anniversary,  the  liberation  of  the  country  and 
the  realisation  of  its  ambitions  must  alone  be  pro- 
claimed."^ 

Rome,  on  learning  the  confirmation  of  the  news 
of  the  resignation  of  the  Salandra  Government,  was 
in  an  uproar.  "War  or  revolution,"  was  the  ugly 
cry  that  now  spread  through  the  remotest  corners  of 
the  Eternal  City.  Insurrection  committees  were 
formed,  and  a  barricade  was  even  erected  in  one  of 
the  streets.  The  outburst  was  not  directed  against 
the  King,  but  against  Giolitti  and  the  Neutralists, 
against  the  "lackeys  of  the  Villa  Malta,"  as  d'An- 
nunzio  had  branded  the  pro-Germans.  The  violence 
of  the  mob  grew.  In  the  streets  well-known  Neutralists, 
who  dared  to  venture  abroad,  were  openly  maltreated. 
The  pohce  authorities  were  forced  in  the  interests  of 
public  safety  to  advise  Giolitti  to  leave  Rome. 

In  the  meantime  the  King  was  called  upon  to  find 
a  solution  of  the  crisis.  Victor  Emmanuel  III,  though 
a  constitutional  monarch  in  the  most  exact  mean- 
ing of  the  word,  could  not  fail  to  take  into  account 
the  will  of  the  majority  of  his  people.  One  after  an- 
other, the  most  important  oflicials  were  called  in  con- 
sultation by  the  King.  This  constitutional  formality 
*  Corriere  della  Sera,  May  15,  19 15. 


264  GREATER  ITALY 

having  been  gone  through  with,  the  King  requested 
M.  Salandra  to  reassume  oflS.ce  as  Premier  and  recon- 
stitute his  Ministry.  Thus  assured  of  the  support  of 
his  sovereign,  as  well  as  of  that  of  the  people,  Salandra 
on  May  16  accepted  the  mandate  of  the  King,  and 
was  ready  to  lay  before  Parliament  at  its  opening 
the  project  of  Italian  intervention  on  the  side  of  the 
Allies.  King  Victor  Emmanuel  had  by  his  firm  con- 
duct in  this  crisis  averted  an  armed  outbreak  which 
might  have  menaced  the  existence  of  the  dynasty. 
Had  the  King  chosen  to  dissolve  Parhament,  or  taken 
any  other  course  than  the  one  followed,  grave  dis- 
orders would  have  undoubtedly  arisen.  The  more 
active  elements  of  the  population  had  been  aroused 
and  incited  to  action  by  the  impassioned  speeches  of 
d'Annunzio,  and  had  been  led  to  expect  an  affirmative 
outcome,  a  declaration  of  war. 

On  May  20,  Parhament  reassembled.  The  historic 
session  opened.  D'Annunzio's  commands  had  been 
obeyed.  Giolitti,  fearing  for  his  fife,  had  fled  to  Pied- 
mont. The  Neutrahst  Deputies,  hooted  and  threatened 
by  the  crowd,  had  been  compelled  to  take  refuge  in 
a  hotel  adjoining  the  Chamber  the  day  before  the 
session.  Here,  protected  by  a  strong  guard,  they 
remained  in  order  to  be  able  to  attend  the  meetings 
unmolested. 

The  newly  constituted  Ministry  under  M.  Salandra, 
having  received  a  vote  of  confidence,  was  granted 
full  powers.  Even  the  Neutralists,  cowed  into  sub- 
mission, voted  for  war.  D'Annunzio  thereupon  ar- 
rived at  the  Chamber.  The  Deputies  rose  to  their 
feet,  and  with  prolonged  cheers  acclaimed  the  poet: 
"Long  live  d'Annunzio!     Long  five  Italy!"     Three 


THE  DAYS  OF  NEUTRALITY  265 

days  later  Italy  declared  war  against  Austria-Hun- 
gary. 

What  course  Italy  would  have  followed  had  d'An- 
nunzio  not  appeared  on  the  scene  is  difficult  to  deter- 
mine. Before  his  arrival  the  work  of  preparing  pubhc 
opinion  had  been  zealously  carried  on  by  the  Inter- 
ventionists. D'Annunzio  did  not  create  the  current 
of  opinion  which  brought  Italy  into  the  war.  He 
merely  aroused  popular  imagination,  and  by  the 
vivid  imagery  of  his  speeches,  by  the  searching 
sincerity  of  his  words,  made  the  people  visualise  the 
passions,  hopes,  and  desires  which  slumbered  in  their 
hearts.  But  it  cannot  be  gainsaid  that  had  not  some 
such  a  dynamic  force  awakened  the  patriotism  of  the 
more  alert  elements  of  the  population,  the  GioUttian 
NeutraUsts,  who  controlled  a  majority  of  the  Chamber, 
would  have  been  able  to  force  the  country  to  accept 
the  role  of  neutrahty  and  would  have  prevented 
Itahan  intervention.  To  d'Annunzio  must  be  al- 
lotted a  great  share  of  the  responsibiUty  for  Italy's 
declaration  of  war. 

Thus  the  days  of  neutrahty  had  come  to  an  end. 
Italy  during  the  ten  months  which  had  elapsed  since 
the  outbreak  of  the  European  War  had  undergone 
a  radical  national  metamorphosis.  She  had  abandoned 
her  pohcy  of  alliance  with  the  Central  Empires;  had 
emancipated  herself  from  foreign  control.  She  had 
weighed  carefully  the  advantages  and  disadvantages 
which  she  might  expect  to  reap  from  her  continued 
neutrality,  and  then  calmly  faced  the  alternative  of 
war.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  European  War,  the 
great  majority  of  Italians  had  been  strongly  in  favour 
of  neutrahty.    Even  after  the  campaign  of  the  Inter- 


266  GREATER  ITALY 

ventionists  had  been  carried  on  for  many  months, 
the  great  mass  of  the  people  still  favom-ed  non-inter- 
vention. The  Neutralist  arguments  were  subtle  and 
feasible.  The  "much  can  be  obtained  without  war," 
enunciated  by  Giolitti,  and  summed  up  by  him  in 
the  Piedmontese  term  of  parecchio,  which  was  inter- 
preted to  mean  "sl  good  deal"  when  referring  to 
territorial  compensations  offered  by  Austria  in  return 
for  Italy's  continued  neutrality,  had  captivated  the 
steadier  elements  of  the  population.  It  was  then 
that  the  Salandra  Government,  making  itself  the  in- 
terpreter of  the  more  virile  elements  of  the  country, 
showed  signs  that  it  deemed  war  with  the  Dual  Mon- 
archy inevitable,  if  Italy  were  to  realise  her  greater 
territorial  ambitions,  i  maggiori  destini  d^ Italia. 

The  nation  was  quick  to  respond  to  the  cue  given 
it.  But  there  arose  the  figure  of  Giohtti,  who  for 
twelve  years  had  cast  his  shadow  over  the  pubhc 
life  of  Italy.  He  held  the  reins  of  power  firmly  in  his 
hands.  He  had  behind  him  a  docile  parliamentary 
majority.  The  Salandra  Government  knew  itself  to 
be  helpless. 

Who  bade  d'Annunzio  to  return  to  Italy?  Who 
intrusted  him  with  the  task  he  so  successfully  carried 
out  ?  Was  it  the  Nationalists,  or  a  Francophil  coterie 
at  Rome?  Or  was  it  the  private  invitation  of  the 
Salandra  Government?  Future  historians  will  tell 
us.  An  account  of  the  struggle  of  those  two  mid-May 
weeks  has  been  briefly  related.  It  is  the  story  of  a 
nation  coming  into  its  own  heritage,  and  forms  one 
of  the  most  brilliant  pages  in  the  history  of  the  Ital- 
ian people. 

When  the  effervescent  enthusiasm  had  died  down, 


THE   DAYS  OF  NEUTRALITY  267 

and  the  Italians  took  up  the  business  of  waging  war 
in  earnest,  M,  Salandra,  rising  to  address  the  vast 
crowds  who  had  assembled  on  the  Capitoline  Hill 
(June  3,  1915),  eloquently  interpreted  the  feelings  of 
the  Italian  people  when  he  exclaimed: 

"As  destiny  has  allotted  to  our  generation  the 
terrible  though  sublime  task  of  realising  the  ideal 
of  a  Greater  Italy,  which  our  heroes  of  the  Risor- 
gimento  did  not  live  to  see,  let  us  undertake  this  task 
with  an  invincible  courage,  ready  to  give  ourselves 
wholly  to  our  country,  to  give  what  we  are  and  what 
we  have." 


CHAPTER  XII 

ITALY  AT  WAR 

Period  of  Aloofness.    Military  and  Political  Crises. 

Unity 

Italy  had  entered  into  the  war  with  her  eyes  wide 
open,  in  pursuance  of  a  carefully  matured  programme 
of  poHcy.  She  had  ranged  herself  on  the  side  of  the 
AlUes  not  only  to  safeguard  her  vital  interests,  but 
with  the  clear  intention  of  increasing  not  merely  her 
prestige  and  power,  but  her  territory.  The  scenes  of 
enthusiasm  for  the  war  against  Austria,  witnessed  in 
Rome,  Milan,  and  elsewhere,  were  effervescent  out- 
bursts of  long  pent-up  feeUngs;  they  soon  died  down, 
and  the  people  of  Italy  prepared  themselves  calmly 
to  face  the  trials  and  hardships  of  war. 

Italy  had  chosen  her  own  time  to  open  hostilities. 
Though  the  actual  declaration  of  war  was  postponed 
for  some  days,  owing  to  the  Giolittian  coup  d'etat, 
which  gave  the  Austrians  more  time  to  bring  up  rein- 
forcements and  fortify  their  positions,  yet  they  were 
unable  to  carry  out  their  long  and  carefully  prepared 
plan,  drawn  up  personally  by  the  Austrian  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff,  General  Conrad  von  Hotzendorf, 
of  a  smashing  offensive  into  the  Italian  plain.  Never- 
theless, Austria's  strategic  superiority  was  not  with- 
out its  dangers  to  the  Italians.  Italy  had  to  close 
securely  her  Trentino  gates,  and  see  to  it  that  they 
remained  tightly  shut,  for  only  then  would  she  have 

268 


ITALY  AT  WAR  269 

a  free  hand  to  conduct  an  offensive  in  the  east.  Both 
plans  required  superhuman  efforts  on  the  part  of  the 
ItaHan  troops,  owing  to  the  geographical  configura- 
tion of  the  boundary-line.  In  the  north  the  high 
Alpine  passes,  leading  straight  down  into  the  Italian 
plain,  were  in  the  hands  of  the  Austrians.  In  the  east 
the  Isonzo  River  and  the  rock-ribbed  Carso  plateau  pre- 
sented formidable  barriers  to  any  advancing  armies. 

The  Itahan  General  Staff  reahsed  fully  the  dif- 
ficulties of  the  task  which  was  to  be  intrusted  to 
them.  The  war  which  had  been  raging  for  nine  months 
throughout  Europe  had  taught  them  many  valuable 
lessons.  They  had  learned  the  advantages  to  be  de- 
rived from  a  body-blow  delivered  at  the  very  outset 
of  the  campaign.  If  this  was  an  advantage  in  other 
zones  of  operations,  it  was  an  absolute  necessity  along 
the  Italian  battle-line,  otherwise  Italy  would  find 
herself  in  a  difficult  position;  therefore,  she  prepared 
to  wage  an  offensive  campaign. 

Throughout  the  winter  and  spring  the  Italian 
armies  had  been  moulded  into  shape;  the  cadres 
brought  up  to  full  strength;  the  transport  perfected; 
munition  and  supply  depots  arranged  for.  By  the 
end  of  April  everything  was  in  readiness;  the  "armed 
neutraHty"  declared  by  Salandra,  which  the  Vienna 
Government  had  long  believed  to  be  a  "bluff,"  was 
to  prove  itself  an  important  factor  in  the  early  days 
of  the  war.  For  when  the  declaration  of  war  came, 
there  was  no  stoppage  of  the  ordinary  Ufe  of  the  coun- 
try; there  was  none  of  the  chaos  and  confusion  such 
as  was  witnessed  in  France  when  mobilisation  was 
ordered  there.  In  Italy  on  May  22  the  general  mobil- 
isation orders  were  issued.    Except  for  the  dehmita- 


270  GREATER  ITALY 

tion  of  the  Zona  di  Guerra  (war  zone) — ^which  included 
virtually  only  Venetia  and  a  very  small  sector  of 
Lombardy — a  slight  delay  of  some  trains,  and  the 
movement  of  troop  trains,  there  was  little  to  indicate 
that  Italy  had  entered  into  the  conflict.  On  May 
25,  the  King  left  Rome  for  General  Headquarters, 
where  he  personally  assumed  the  duties  of  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  all  the  Italian  armies,  after  appointing  his 
uncle,  the  Duke  of  Genoa,  "Lieutenant-General"  of 
the  Kingdom  during  his  absence. 

The  actual  control  of  the  conduct  of  the  war  was 
intrusted  to  General  Count  Luigi  Cadorna,  the  son 
of  the  General  Cadorna  who  had  played  such  an  im- 
portant part  in  the  wars  of  hberation  and  had  directed 
the  operation  which  resulted  in  the  taking  of  Rome. 
To  the  father  had  been  intrusted  the  task  of  setting 
the  seal  of  consummation  on  the  plan  of  ItaHan  unity; 
to  the  son  was  to  be  intrusted  the  task  of  bringing 
about  the  redemption  of  the  Italians  who  lived  be- 
yond the  boundaries  and  the  creation  of  Greater  Italy. 
No  man  knew  better  than  General  Cadorna  the  dif- 
ficulties which  would  confront  his  troops.  No  man 
knew  better  than  he  did  the  regions  of  the  Trentino 
and  Trieste.  Though  he  had  never  commanded  an 
army  in  the  field,  his  skill  as  a  commander  had  been 
brilhantly  displayed  during  several  Grand  Manoeu- 
vres. Furthermore,  by  his  writings  on  military  sub- 
jects he  had  won  for  himself  a  high  reputation.  His 
''Frontal  Attack,"  first  published  in  1898,  set  forth 
lucidly  the  advantages  to  be  gained  by  a  well-executed 
offensive.  The  temper  of  the  man  is  well  given  in 
his  own  words,  when  in  the  preface  of  his  book  he 
remarks:  "It  is  impossible  to  achieve  success  in  war, 


ITALY  AT  WAR  271 

if  the  stanch  discipline  of  the  men  is  not  joined  to  a 
stern  discipline  of  the  leaders.  The  first  makes  the 
body  of  troops  docile  in  the  hands  of  their  chiefs,  the 
second  makes  these  capable  of  guiding  the  operations 
with  that  unity  of  opinion  and  conception  which  is 
indispensable  to  victory."  He  himself  superintended, 
even  down  to  the  most  minute  details,  the  reorganisa- 
tion of  the  Itahan  armies  during  the  days  of  neutrality. 
Though  hampered  by  the  lack  of  funds,  he  was  able 
to  bring  his  armies  up  to  a  high  standard  of  efficiency. 
His  organising  faculties  are  remarkable,  so  that  it 
became  a  byword  throughout  Italy,  soon  after  the 
outbreak  of  the  war,  that  "General  Cadorna  has 
organised  his  armies  too  well  not  to  be  able  to  organ- 
ise victory."  Possessing  in  a  superior  degree  calm- 
ness in  the  face  of  danger,  yet  deprecating  individual 
bravery  as  detrimental  to  the  smooth  working  of  the 
military  machine;  brilUant  in  his  method,  though 
consistently,  almost  ploddingly  methodical,  he  was 
to  lead  Italy  into  war  as  coolly  and  calmly  as  though 
it  were  merely  the  usual  Grand  Manoeuvres.  The 
sobriety  of  his  communiques  won  the  confidence  not 
merely  of  his  troops,  but  of  the  civiHan  population. 
Trusted  impUcitly  by  all  Italy,  from  the  King  down 
to  the  humblest  peasant,  he  was  to  be  able  to  carry 
out  his  plans  of  campaign,  even  at  the  most  crucial 
moments,  undisturbed. 

It  is  believed  that  General  Cadorna  had  planned 
to  begin  his  campaign  on  May  15,  and,  thus  taking 
the  enemy  by  surprise,  to  carry  the  warfare  by  swift, 
bold  strokes  deep  into  the  enemy  country.  The 
machinations  of  Prince  Billow  and  Giolitti  prevented 
this  plan  from  being  reahsed,  and  the  enemy  had  ten 


272  GREATER  ITALY 

days  at  his  disposal  to  reinforce  his  positions  as  soon 
as  he  saw  that  war  was  inevitable.  Yet  General 
Cadorna  kept  to  the  main  outline  of  his  plan.  In  one 
mighty  bound,  along  Italy's  four-hundred-mile  Aus- 
trian frontier,  from  the  Stelvio  at  nine  thousand  feet 
above  sea-level,  to  the  shores  of  the  Adriatic,  the 
Italian  troops  sprang  forward.  During  the  first  days 
of  the  campaign  the  ItaHans  secured  the  keys  to  the 
passes  leading  into  Italy,  while  the  Austrians  retired 
all  along  the  line  to  well-fortified  positions.  The  war 
had  been  everywhere  carried  into  enemy  territory. 
The  Austrians  offered  little  resistance.  It  was  obvious 
that  General  Cadorna  planned  to  carry  on  his  offen- 
sive in  the  east,  at  the  same  time  exerting  an  ever- 
increasing  pressure  in  the  north. 

The  operations  along  the  Isonzo  were,  however, 
hampered.  Mistakes  and  delays  occurred  during  those 
first  days  which,  though  perhaps  inevitable,  cost  the 
Italian  armies  many  valuable  lives.  The  crossing  of 
the  Isonzo,  which  it  was  hoped  to  carry  out  in  a  few 
days,  was  delayed  three  weeks,  and  it  was  not  until 
June  18,  that  a  general  forward  movement  was  made. 
But  the  Austrian  guns,  posted  on  the  Carso  heights, 
still  dominated  the  river,  which  is  here  nearly  a  mile 
wide.  The  Italians  worked  with  dauntless  courage 
to  repair  the  broken  bridges,  to  build  new  ones,  to 
get  across  the  river  by  boats.  It  was  at  Sagrado  that 
the  most  determined  attacks  were  made.  By  dint 
of  persistent  efforts  and  dogged  courage,  the  Italians 
crossed  the  river,  established  themselves  firmly  at 
Sagrado,  and  pushed  up  the  flank  of  the  Carso  to 
Castello  Nuovo.  By  June  27,  the  Italians  held  the 
bridge-head,  which  now  made  it  possible  to  carry  on 


ITALY  AT  WAR  273 

a  general  attack  on  the  Carso.  Soon  a  general  ad- 
vance began,  so  that  early  in  July  the  Italians  had 
everywhere  crossed  the  lower  Isonzo  and  securely 
held  its  left  bank.  Only  in  one  sector  the  two  almost 
impregnable  positions  of  the  Monte  Sabotino  and  the 
Podgora,  defending  the  town  of  Gorizia,  the  former 
rising  two  thousand  feet  and  the  latter  eight  hundred 
above  the  plain  and  fortified  with  great  skill  by  the 
Austrians,  remained  in  Austrian  hands  on  the  right 
bank.  Though  the  Italians  made  repeated  assaults, 
one  of  which  at  least  almost  succeeded,  the  fire  of  the 
enemy  batteries,  posted  on  even  higher  peaks  beyond 
the  river,  drove  ofif  the  assailants,  and  the  fighting 
soon  settled  down  to  trench-warfare.  In  the  region 
of  the  upper  Isonzo  minor  successes  were  gained  by 
the  Italians. 

In  the  Alpine  regions  the  Alpini  battalions,  the  most 
daring  mountain  troops  in  the  world,  had  achieved 
astonishing  successes.  They  climbed  over  seemingly 
impassable  rock  ledges;  they  clambered  up  perpen- 
dicular cliffs  and  drove  out  the  Austrians.  As  they 
advanced  the  resistance  of  the  enemy  stiffened.  By 
the  end  of  June  the  impetuous  onslaught  of  the  Ital- 
ian mountain  regiments  had  slackened.  The  Alpini 
dug  themselves  in,  and  here  as  elsewhere  trench  fight- 
ing began. 

It  was  soon  found  that  the  enemy  had  been  able 
to  spare  more  troops  from  his  Galician  front  than  had 
been  expected,  and  that  he  was  equipped  with  a  more 
numerous  artillery  than  the  Italians.  Above  all,  his 
skilful  and  flexible  use  of  his  heavy  gims  had  rendered 
the  task  of  assault  difficult.  Though  the  Italians 
had  settled  down  to  trench-warfare,  this  did  not  mean 


274  GREATER  ITALY 

that  they  had  abandoned  their  offensive  tactics. 
Along  the  Isonzo  they  pushed  their  trenches  forward 
and  kept  the  enemy  constantly  engaged.  Steadily 
the  pressure  along  the  whole  Carso  line  continued. 
The  Italians  took  many  prisoners,  and  were  daily 
consohdating  their  positions  more  strongly.  Suddenly, 
during  the  last  week  in  July,  the  Austrians  began  a 
furious  offensive.  The  attack  was  well  conducted,  but 
the  Italians  by  bringing  up  reserves  soon  counter- 
attacked with  increased  vigour.  For  nearly  a  fortnight 
the  battle  raged  violently  with  varying  fortunes.  The 
crest  of  the  Carso  was  won  and  again  lost  by  the 
Italians,  and  when  the  fighting  ceased  at  the  beginning 
of  the  second  week  in  August  the  Italians  found  them- 
selves established  in  strong  positions  close  to  the  top 
of  the  plateau. 

Throughout  the  summer  the  fighting  in  the  high 
Alps  continued.  It  was  more  in  the  nature  of  skir- 
mishes and  brushes  with  the  enemy,  than  well-defined 
warfare.  The  Austrians  frequently  held  niches  above 
ravines  commanding  an  important  fine  of  communi- 
cations, where  a  corporal's  squad  with  a  machine-gun 
or  two  and  plenty  of  ammunition  could  do  an  im- 
mense amount  of  damage  to  transport  columns  and 
passing  troops,  until  destroyed  by  a  bold  assault  on 
the  part  of  a  few  intrepid  volunteers.  The  Italians 
were  slowly  gaining  the  summits.  The  fighting  was 
now  carried  on  from  at  seven  to  nine  thousand  feet 
above  sea-level.  The  Austrians  under  the  protection  of 
their  heavy-calibre  guns,  which  jutted  out  from  thick 
armoured,  revolving  turrets  on  the  mountain  tops, 
were  able  to  maintain  themselves  in  relative  security. 
The  task,  of  destroying  these  gun  emplacements  was 


ITALY  AT  WAR  275 

stupendous.  The  Italian  forces  had  to  bring  up  their 
big  guns.  There  were  no  roads.  Roads  were  built. 
Then  by  hand,  by  harnessing  a  company,  even  a 
battalion  to  one  gun,  the  guns  were  hauled  slowly 
and  laboriously  to  the  mountain  tops.  Artillery 
duels  followed,  while  the  infantry  remained  inactive 
until  the  enemy  guns  were  silenced  and  the  infantry 
could  then  move  forward. 

Winter  set  in  early,  but  the  Alpini  did  not  abandon 
their  positions.  By  the  end  of  September  deep  snow 
had  made  the  high  Alps  almost  impenetrable.  Yet 
these  mountain  troops  stuck  to  their  posts.  The 
silence  of  the  Alpine  valleys  was  suddenly  and  unex- 
pectedly'" disturbed  by  the  crash  of  exploding  shells 
or  a  dull  hiss  as  the  hot  metal  buried  itself  deep  in 
the  new-banked  snow.  Thus  the  heights  above  the 
valley  of  Cortina  d'Ampezzo  were  mastered.  The 
Monte  Baldo,  and  the  mountains  dominating  the  Val 
Sugana  and  the  Val  Lagarina  and  all  the  other  valleys 
which  converge  on  Trent,  one  by  one  fell  into  ItaUan 
hands.  But  the  work  was  slow,  and  throughout  the 
winter  and  early  spring  the  positions  maintained  were 
relatively  unchanged. 

On  the  Isonzo  the  campaign  was  active,  even  if 
no  great  progress  was  recorded.  During  October 
and  November  the  fighting  continued.  The  Italians 
attacked  furiously,  hoping  to  gain  the  Monte  Sabo- 
tino.  They  advanced  their  trench  Unes,  and  once, 
early  in  November,  actually  held  the  heights,  but 
were  obliged  to  evacuate  the  position.  Nor  was  the 
enemy  inactive.  He  fought  doggedly  and  never  gave 
ground  until  it  had  been  dearly  paid  for.  The  morale 
of  the   Italian  troops  was  excellent.     Though   their 


276  GREATER  ITALY 

offensive  had  not  progressed  as  rapidly  as  they  had 
desired,  they  were  everywhere  fighting  on  enemy 
territory.  Two  thousand  square  miles  of  the  cherished 
Italia  irredente  had  been  redeemed,  including  125 
villages  and  townships,  with  a  normal  population 
of  nearly  100,000  inhabitants. 

While  General  Cadorna  was  vigorously  prosecut- 
ing his  campaign,  the  attitude  of  Italy  at  large  re- 
mained perplexing.  The  country  had  entered  into 
the  war  in  the  face  of  a  Parliament  whose  majority 
was  distinctly  Neutralist.  After  the  "week  of  Pas- 
sion," as  d'Annunzio  so  strikingly  characterised  those 
eventful  May  days,  which  culminated  in  the  historic 
session  of  May  20  and  the  declaration  of  war,  the 
country  regained  its  normal  aspect  with  astonishing 
rapidity.  Not  two  weeks  elapsed  before  the  Germans 
(for  though  Rome  had  broken  off  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  Berhn,  numerous  partisans  remained  to 
take  up  their  cause)  were  again  at  work.  Italy  had 
declared  war  against  Austria.  There  were  few  who 
were  in  favour  of  declaring  war  on  Germany.  The 
most  active  Interventionists  had  hoped  that  the 
declaration  of  war  would  come  from  Berlin.  But 
when  the  weeks  passed,  and  Germany  maintained 
an  attitude  of  stolid  silence,  it  became  evident  that 
the  Germans  had  other  plans. 

The  position  of  M.  Salandra  was  one  beset  with 
difficulties.  He  had  skilfully  guided  Italy  into  the 
war,  and  was  a  sincere  Interventionist,  yet  he  realised 
that  the  Chamber  was  still  controlled  by  Giolitti; 
that  the  majority  was  still  secretly  Neutralist  while  he 
himself  commanded  only  a  small  following.    Further- 


ITALY  AT  WAR  277 

more  M.  Salandra's  part  in  Italian  public  affairs  had 
been  local  in  character.  "A  modest  burgher  of  Apulia," 
as  he  was  wont  to  characterise  himself,  he  was  not  in 
the  habit  of  thinking  nationally;  he  displayed  few  of 
those  qualities  of  statesmanship,  the  breadth  of  view 
or  the  bold  initiative  needed  in  such  a  crisis.  He  had 
led  the  country  into  war,  and  having  thereby  won  the 
high  esteem  of  the  majority  of  the  Italian  people,  it 
seemed  as  though  he  felt  that  his  task  had  been  ac- 
complished. A  warm  friend  and  admirer  of  Baron 
Sonnino,  whose  faithful  heutenant  he  had  been  until 
he  had  rallied  to  the  Giolittian  majority  in  1913,  Sa- 
landra  had  called  Baron  Sonnino  to  the  Foreign  Office, 
and  together  they  had  laboured  in  the  cause  of  war. 
However,  neither  possessed  the  gift  of  magnetic  leader- 
ship necessary  to  inspire  the  country  with  buoyant 
confidence.  As  was  to  be  expected,  it  was  soon  evi- 
dent that  the  Government  had  lost  touch  with  Par- 
liament and  the  people. 

Though  Italy  had  entered  the  war  on  the  side  of 
the  Allies,  during  the  first  months  she  seemed  to  wish 
to  let  it  be  known  that  she  was  fighting  her  own  war 
independently;  that  Italy's  war  against  Austria  was 
only  indirectly  connected  with  the  war  being  waged 
along  the  other  fronts.  Italy  maintained  an  attitude 
of  aloofness  towards  the  AlHed  Powers.  They,  in  turn, 
regarded  Italy  wath  some  misgivings.  The  fact  that 
Italy  had  not  altogether  broken  off  indirect  commer- 
cial intercourse  with  Germany,  and  that  goods  from 
Italy  were  still  reaching  Germany,  rankled  in  their 
minds.  The  behef  that  some  secret  arrangement  be- 
tween Rome  and  Berlin  existed,  readily  gained  wide 
credence  in  both  France  and  England.    Though  there 


278  GREATER  ITALY 

was  no  truth  in  these  rumours  as  circulated,  the  com- 
mercial agreement/  entered  into  by  Italy  before  the 
rupture  of  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany,  was  dis- 
torted to  fit  the  circumstances.  The  Salandra  Govern- 
ment did  not  exert  itself  to  dispel  the  false  impression 
which  had  gained  currency,  so  that  it  was  not  sur- 
prising that  Italy  was  regarded  with  increasing  sus- 
picion abroad. 

In  Italy  itself  there  was  a  party  with  German 
affiUations,  who  soon  after  the  declaration  of  war 
began  a  campaign  in  favour  of  what  came  to  be  known 
as  la  piccola  guerra  or  ''small  war,"  which  meant 
that  Italy  should  only  put  forth  a  half-hearted  effort, 
instead  of  energetically  prosecuting  the  war.  It  can- 
not be  denied  that  during  the  early  months  many 
obstacles  were  placed  in  the  way  of  mobihsing  Itahan 
resources  to  the  fullest  for  war  purposes.  The  pecuUar 
timidity  of  Governments,  which  manifested  itself  in 
all  the  Allied  States,  in  London  as  well  as  in  Paris  and 
Petrograd,  where  the  several  Cabinets,  fearing  pop- 
ular discontent,  were  afraid  to  ask  their  countries  to 
bear  burdens  which  were  subsequently  looked  upon 
as  trifling,  was  a  contributing  factor  in  preventing  the 
Salandra  Ministry  from  pursuing  a  vigorous  pohcy, 
though  the  nation  at  large  was  ready  and  eager  to 
bear  manfully  its  share. 

On  August  21,  Italy  declared  war  on  Turkey.  This 
action  was  taken  in  view  of  Italy's  increasing  interests 
in  ^Egean  affairs,  more  particularly  in  Asia  Minor, 
rather  than  from  any  probabiUty  of  direct  conflict, 
though  the  Turks  had  stirred  up  some  trouble  in 
Libya.  The  declaration  of  war  against  Germany  was, 
1  See  page  205. 


ITALY  AT  WAR  279 

however,  still  deferred.  The  active  Interventionists 
became  restive.  Parliament  was  not  to  reopen  be- 
fore December  1.  It  soon  became  known  that  the 
ItaUan  forces  in  the  field  did  not  possess  the  neces- 
sary munitions  to  carry  on  an  aggressive  campaign, 
and  that  this  was  the  main  cause  of  the  slow  prog- 
ress on  the  Isonzo.  Machine-guns  and  heavy-calibre 
artillery  were  also  lacking.  To  this  was  added  the 
report  of  a  shortage  of  coal,  due  to  insufficient  trans- 
portation facihties.  Other  disquieting  rumours  soon 
gathered  strength,  yet  the  Government  vouchsafed 
no  explanations,  and  the  country  was  left  in  the  dart 
as  to  the  true  circumstances. 

It  is  doubtless  true  that  the  discontent  rife  in  Italy 
was  increased  by  the  fact  that  the  war  was  going 
against  the  Allies.  In  October  Italy  declared  war  on 
Bulgaria,  and  still  the  long-expected  declaration  of 
war  against  Germany  was  once  again  postponed. 
The  position  of  Italy  had  grown  increasingly  dif- 
jficult.  In  France  and  Great  Britain  it  was  not  easily 
forgotten  that  for  thirty-three  years  Italy  had  been 
alHed  to  the  Central  Empires,  and  that  the  treaty 
of  alhance  with  Germany  had  not  been  denounced. 
In  Paris  and  London  it  could  not  be  understood 
why  Italy  had  not  declared  war  on  Germany.  No 
temporising  excuses  were  accepted.  At  home  there 
was  an  increasing  number  of  Italians  who  were  strongly 
dissatisfied  with  Italy's  ambiguous  position.  At  this 
time  the  cry  arose  for  greater  solidarity  among  the 
AlHes.  Italy  must  co-operate  more  closely  with  the 
AUies,  both  mihtarily  and  pohtically. 

On  December  1,  the  day  of  the  opening  of  the 
Chamber,  Baron  Sonnino,  in  the  course  of  a  speech 


280  GREATER  ITALY 

on  Italy's  foreign  relations,  announced  that  Italy 
had  formally  adhered  to  the  Pact  of  London,  pledging 
herself  not  to  sign  a  separate  peace.  This  was  a  first 
step  in  the  right  direction.  About  this  time  Italy 
arranged  to  make  use  of  the  German  ships  interned 
in  Italian  ports,  'Ho  be  paid  for  after  the  war,"  in 
order  to  relieve  the  shortage  of  tonnage  which  was 
daily  growing  more  acute. 

The  year  1915  closed  with  the  country  in  a  state  of 
restless  uneasiness.  The  Government  had  failed  to 
come  forward  with  a  clear-cut  statement  of  the  situ- 
ation. Though  the  integrity  of  Sonnino  and  Salan- 
dra  was  above  reproach,  their  methods  had  done 
much  to  leave  doubts  in  men's  minds  as  to  Italy's 
aims  and  intentions. 

The  military  situation  in  the  Near  East  was  caus- 
ing serious  concern  to  the  Allies.  The  Austro-German 
armies  imder  von  Mackensen  had  swept  across  the 
Balkans;  Serbia  had  been  crushed  and  the  Austrian 
forces  were  now  directing  their  energies  to  the  con- 
quering of  Montenegro  and  Albania.  Their  advance 
was  not  long  delayed.  On  January  12  (1916)  the 
news  reached  Rome  that  Cettinje  had  fallen  in  the 
hands  of  the  Austrians,  and  that  the  Montenegrins 
were  retreating  towards  the  Albanian  coast.  On 
January  28,  the  Italian  forces  occupied  Durazzo.  It 
was  now  decided  to  rescue  the  Serbian  army,  which 
had  retreated  through  Albania  to  the  coast,  as  well 
as  the  scattered  forces  of  the  Montenegrins,  together 
with  the  civilian  population  which  had  fled  before 
the  invaders.  This  task  was  intrusted  to  the  ItaUan 
navy.  The  work  was  beset  with  great  peril.  Enemy 
submarines  infested  the  Adriatic,  yet  the  undertaking 


ITALY  AT  WAR  281 

was  successfully  carried  out.  The  Serbian  armies, 
estimated  at  over  50,000  men,  were  transported  to 
Corfu.  The  sick  and  wounded,  as  well  as  the  civilian 
population,  were  taken  to  Italy;  stores  and  supplies 
were  taken  over  to  Albania;  Italian  troops  were 
transported;  in  all  250,000  men  and  10,000  horses, 
with  supplies,  etc.,  were  safely  carried.  Italy  had 
fulfilled  the  task  intrusted  to  her  with  remarkable 
abihty.  Her  forces  held  on  at  Durazzo  until  the 
town  was  completely  evacuated,  and  then  only  retired 
on  Avlona,  which  they  continued  to  hold.  Notwith- 
standing Italy's  admirable  work  of  rescue  in  Albania, 
the  rumour  soon  spread  that  Italy  was  in  part  to 
blame  for  the  defeats  of  the  Allies  in  the  Balkans,  as 
she  had  refused  to  send  a  force  to  Salonika  to  co- 
operate with  the  French  and  British.  No  consider- 
ation was  taken  of  the  fact  that  Italy  had  first  to 
protect  her  own  battle-Une,  and  that  she  could  spare 
no  men  or  guns  for  a  far-distant  expedition. 

But  the  effort  to  secure  close  co-operation  among 
the  Allies  was  now  being  systematically  carried  out. 
In  February  M.  Briand,  the  French  Premier,  came 
to  Rome  to  pave  the  way  for  the  politico-mihtary 
conference  of  the  Allies  which  was  to  take  place  the 
followdng  month  in  Paris.  Here,  on  March  27,  M. 
Salandra,  Baron  Sonnino,  and  General  Cadorna  for 
the  first  time  came  in  personal,  official  contact  with 
the  representatives  of  the  Alfied  Governments.  Hence- 
forth Italy  was  to  act  in  close  co-operation  with  her 
AUies  in  aU  matters,  whether  diplomatic,  mihtarj'',  or 
economic.  The  effect  of  this  conference  was  of  great 
value  in  co-ordinating  closely  the  joint  efforts  of  the 
AUies.    Exchanges  of  official  visits  also  took  place  be- 


282  GREATER  ITALY 

tween  Great  Britain  and  Italy.  General  Cadoma 
visited  London;  Mr.  Asquith  came  to  Rome  and  paid 
his  respects  to  King  Victor  Emmanuel  at  the  Italian 
front.  The  relations  between  Italy  and  her  AlUes 
now  entered  upon  a  new  phase  of  friendliness  and 
mutual  confidence.  Italy  no  longer  was  isolated  in 
the  war,  fighting  her  own  battles  unaided;  she  had 
Hnked  her  fortunes  wdth  those  of  the  Alhes,  yet  re- 
tained her  liberty  of  action.  In  the  words  of  Baron 
Sonnino,  who,  speaking  in  the  Chamber  on  April  16, 
declared : 

"Our  aim  is  simple:  to  fight  with  all  our  strength 
in  the  common  cause,  at  the  same  time  protecting  the 
supreme,  vital  interests  of  the  nation." 

The  steps  towards  a  closer  co-operation  with  the 
Allies  had  greatly  strengthened  the  Government, 
but  the  question  of  declaring  war  against  Germany 
still  hung  like  a  dark  cloud  over  the  horizon.  It  has 
often  been  suggested  that  Italian  statesmen  are  fond 
of  dallying  with  equivocal  situations,  and  that  in 
their  desire  to  appear  crafty,  their  diplomacy  often 
becomes  entangled  in  the  woof  of  their  own  weaving. 
It  is  impossible  as  yet  to  determine  whether  the  Sa- 
landra  Government  aimed  purposely  to  continue  its 
semi-friendly  relations  with  Germany  or  whether  it 
was  afraid  to  break  off  entirely  with  Germany,  in 
view  of  the  strong  pro-German  sentiments  which 
still  existed  in  Italy.  The  disasters  which  had  be- 
fallen Allied  arms  in  the  eastern  theatre  of  war — the 
conquest  of  Poland  and  much  Russian  territory,  of 
Serbia,  Montenegro,  and  Albania — the  Titan  blows 
which  the  German  armies  were  striking  at  Verdun 


ITALY  AT  WAR  283 

made  it  appear  desirable  to  many  Italians  not  to  pro- 
voke a  war  with  Germany,  who  still  loomed  all-power- 
ful. The  Government  at  all  events  continued  its 
course  unchanged.  The  Interventionist  members  of 
the  Chamber  were  now  consolidated  into  a  bloc  of 
140  members  under  the  leadership  of  M.  Bissolati, 
the  brilliant  Socialist  Deputy  who  at  the  outbreak  of 
the  war  had  volunteered  for  active  services,  and  was  a 
sergeant  in  an  Alpini  battalion.  They  had  hoped  for 
a  reconstruction  of  the  Cabinet  which  would  lead  to 
a  more  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war.  But  M. 
Bissolati  was  unwilling  to  precipitate  a  crisis.  He 
counselled  patience  and  prudence,  and  urged  his 
followers  not  to  upset  the  Government,  even  though 
he  himself  would  have  been  the  first  to  welcome  the 
declaration  of  an  energetic  policy  in  the  prosecution 
of  the  war.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Official  SociaUsts, 
who  numbered  36  members  of  the  Chamber,  were  still 
solidly  opposed  to  the  war,  and  daily  voiced  embit- 
tered criticisms  of  the  Government  for  ha^dng  dragged 
Italy  into  the  conflict.  At  the  same  time  the  impor- 
tant group  of  Germanophiles,  who  had  numerous  sup- 
porters throughout  Italy,  frankly  stated  that  though 
Italy's  declaration  of  war  against  Austria  was  justi- 
fied and  justifiable,  to  declare  war  on  Germany  would 
be  an  act  of  wholly  unwarranted  aggression. 

On  the  battle-fields  of  the  Isonzo,  with  the  return 
of  spring,  activity  was  being  renewed.  The  German 
onslaught  at  Verdun,  which  the  French  were  heroically 
withstanding,  had  brought  to  the  fore  more  insistently 
than  ever  the  cry  for  unity  of  action  on  all  the  fronts. 
Some  even  went  so  far  as  to  suggest  that  Italy  should 


284  GREATER  ITALY 

send  an  expeditionary  force  to  France.  But  the  Ital- 
ian Higher  Command  knew  that  in  the  near  future  it 
would  need  all  its  available  strength.  However,  a 
heavy  bombardment  was  opened  along  the  Isonzo, 
and  though  no  general  assault  took  place,  this  diver- 
sion had  a  salutary  effect,  and  stopped  the  Austrians 
from  transporting  artillery  to  France. 

The  reason  why  the  Italians  were  unable  to  assist  the 
French  at  this  time  soon  was  made  known.  Dur- 
ing the  winter  months  the  Austrians  had  been  slowly 
concentrating  a  considerable  force  in  the  Trentino. 
Spurred  on  by  Austria's  recent  successes  in  the  Bal- 
kans, General  Conrad  could  not  resist  the  temptation 
of  putting  into  execution  his  long-matured  plan  for 
the  invasion  of  Italy.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  it 
seemed  certain  that  with  due  caution,  adequate  prepara- 
tion, and  sufficient  effectives  both  in  men  and  guns, 
the  project  would  succeed.  The  prospect  was  allur- 
ing. Russia  was,  at  this  time,  so  it  was  believed 
within  the  Central  Empires,  wholly  hors  de  combat, 
and  before  she  could  take  the  field  again  it  was  pro- 
posed to  break  through  the  Italian  defenses  in  the 
Trentino,  pour  into  the  Italian  plain,  and  thus  getting 
in  behind  General  Cadorna's  main  forces  operating 
on  the  Isonzo,  crush  the  armies  of  Italy  by  one  swift 
stroke.  Once  the  Austrians  were  in  the  Venetian 
plain,  they  were  confident  that  Italy  would  be  ready 
to  sue  for  peace. 

A  glance  at  the  map  will  readily  show  that  this 
"Napoleonic"  plan  of  campaign  offered  many  chances 
of  success.  The  Italian  forces  had  pushed  northward, 
up  through  the  chaotic  valley  systems  which  converge 
on   Trent,    without   much   regard   for   the   defensive 


ITALY  AT  WAR  285 

strength  of  their  positions.  They  held  a  hne,  in  the 
sector  which  was  to  be  the  scene  of  the  great  battle, 
running  roughly  from  a  point  a  little  south  of  Rovereto, 
north  of  the  Col  Santo,  supported  by  the  Pasubio, 
which  has  an  altitude  of  7,353  feet,  then  following 
the  old  Italian  frontier  line  across  the  Valle  Maggie 
and  the  Val  Sugana  to  the  Monte  Collo,  northwest 
of  Borgo.  For  nearly  a  year  the  Italians  had  been 
carrying  on  an  offensive  campaign,  and  as  the  enemy 
had  never  counter-attacked  in  force,  the  result  was 
that  in  certain  sectors  the  Italians  had  neglected  to 
strengthen  their  positions  as  adequately  as  would  have 
been  desirable.  The  rumours  of  an  impending  Aus- 
trian offensive  were  current  as  early  as  March,  but  as 
time  wore  on  and  the  enemy  made  no  move,  whatever 
apprehensions  there  may  have  been  were  quieted, 
more  particularly  so  as  the  Italian  General  Staff  had 
learned  of  the  great  offensive  preparations  of  the 
Russians,  in  their  southern  sector,  and  they  could 
not  believe  that  Austria  would  dare  to  weaken  her 
Eastern  front. 

The  young  Archduke  Charles  Francis  Joseph,  the 
Heir  Apparent  of  the  Hapsburg  throne,^  arrived  in 
Trent  to  take  command  in  person  of  the  invading 
forces;  while  General  Conrad  hovered  in  the  back- 
ground, retouching  his  strategy  and  amending  his  tac- 
tics. Fifteen  divisions,  totaUing  350,000  men,  the 
picked  troops  of  the  Dual  Monarchy,  were  gathered 
here  for  this  great  undertaking.  The  most  powerful 
big  guns  which  Austria  possessed  had  been  brought 
from  remote  confines  of  the  Empire  and  beyond,  and 
were  now  concentrated  along  the  short  sector  of  the 

1  The  present  Emperor  Charles  I. 


286  GREATER  ITALY 

battle-line,  stretching  from  the  Val  Sugana  to  the  Val 
Lagarina.  Here  forty-five  great  12-inch  howitzers  from 
the  Skodawerke,  which  had  reduced  Liege,  Antwerp, 
and  Laon  in  the  West,  Novo  Georgievsk,  Ivangorod, 
and  Brest  Litovsk  in  the  East,  the  most  powerful, 
easily  handled  heavy-calibre  guns  that  have  been 
used  in  this  war,  were  disposed  along  the  Alpine  pla- 
teaux, ready  to  move  forward  and  batter  down  all 
resistance.  There  were,  furthermore,  at  least  six  of 
the  monster  German  420-mm.  guns,  and  as  many  more 
long-range  15-inch  naval  guns,  to  say  nothing  of  the 
smaller  calibres.  It  is  estimated  that  over  2,000  pieces 
of  artillery  were  miassed  along  a  short  front,  extending 
not  much  over  22  miles — that  is  to  say  nearly  100 
guns  to  the  mile,  or  one  gun  every  20  yards.  Great 
reserves  of  munitions  were  piled  up,  and  it  was  soon 
evident  that  the  Sirafexpedition  or  ^'punitive  ex- 
pedition," as  the  Austrians  termed  their  proposed 
offensive,  was  to  be  cariied  out  on  a  formidable  scale. 
Everything  was  done  to  arouse  the  enthusiasm  of 
the  polyglot  divisions  of  the  Hapsburg  realm.  The 
beauties  of  the  rich  Venetian  plain  were  extolled, 
and  it  w^as  noisily  proclaimed  that  this  was  to  be  the 
final  offensive,  and  that  the  crushing  of  the  Italians 
would  bring  about  the  end  of  the  war. 

During  the  last  w^eek  in  April,  General  Cadorna, 
after  making  a  tour  of  inspection  of  the  Trentino 
defenses,  took  up  his  headcparters  with  the  First 
Army,  comm.anded  by  General  Brusati,^  which  held 
what  was  to  be  the  centre  of  the  battle-line;  as  it  was 

^  General  Brusati  was  removed  from  his  command  of  the  First  Army 
at  the  opening  of  the  Austrian  offensive  and  was  retired  from  the  army  a 
few  weeks  later. 


ITALY  AT  WAR  287 

evident  that  the  General  commanding  here  had  made 
insufficient  provision  in  the  event  of  a  strong  attack, 
the  Commander-in-Chief  set  about  to  remedy  the 
defective  defenses.  The  Itahan  lines  in  the  Trentino 
were  at  best  ill-suited  to  hold  up  an  assault  pushed 
home  with  the  vigour  wliich  modern  artillery  has 
made  possible.  The  valleys  leading  into  the  Itahan 
plain  radiate,  fan-hke,  from  Trent  as  a  centre.  The 
Austrians  could  choose  any  of  these  six  valleys  as  a 
channel  to  pour  into  the  plain.  The  Italian  lines  of 
defense  were  isolated  and  only  poorly  provided  with 
lateral  communications.  General  Cadorna  expected 
a  violent  attack,  but  had  not  counted  on  the  tremen- 
dous battering  ram  of  shells  which  crumpled  the  Ital- 
ian advance  positions  when  the  bombardment  opened 
on  May  14.  The  attack  began  with  a  general  bom- 
bardment along  the  whole  front  from  the  Val  Guidi- 
caria  to  the  Adriatic,  and  was  of  peculiar  violence  at 
Monfalcone.  But  it  was  soon  evident  that  the  Aus- 
trian Command  was  well  informed  as  to  the  weakest 
link  in  the  Italian  trench  line,  and  concentrated  its 
greatest  efforts  there.  It  was  along  the  sector  between 
the  Val  Lagarina  and  the  Val  Sugana  that  the  main 
attack  developed.  Prolonged  bombardments  of  un- 
precedented violence  were  followed  up  by  massed  in- 
fantry attacks,  driven  home  with  great  skill.  The 
co-ordination  of  the  Austrian  artillery  fire  was  ad- 
mirable, and  in  no  battle  of  the  European  War  had 
artillery  been  used  more  efficaciously,  and  at  the 
same  time  more  flexibly  in  dehvering  its  full  force 
where  most  effective. 

The  Austrian  blow  was  well  aimed,  and  it  would 
be  useless  to  deny  that  Italy  reeled  under  the  on- 


288  GREATER  ITALY 

slaught.  The  Italian  troops  were  forced  slowly  but 
continuously  backward.  Step  by  step  the  Austrian 
armies  advanced  under  the  cover  of  their  big  guns, 
which  were  moved  forward  with  unusual  celerity. 
The  Italians  were  compelled  to  evacuate  their  advance 
positions.  Their  lines  of  communication  were  seriously 
disturbed  by  the  Austrian  long-distance  fire.  Aus- 
trian shells  were  now  dropping  ten  miles  behind  the 
Italian  first-line  trenches.  Italian  towns  and  villages, 
which  had  hitherto  been  immune  from  the  destruction 
of  war,  were  razed  to  the  ground  by  the  great  Austrian 
shells  which  fell  thickly  on  the  Asiago  and  Asiero 
plateaux.  A  great  stream  of  refugees,  with  their  goods 
and  chattels  and  flocks  of  goats  and  cattle,  hurried 
to  safety  in  the  plain,  as  the  highlands  of  the  fertile 
Sette  Communi  now  came  within  the  range  of  battle. 
The  Italians  fought  everywhere  with  unusual  courage 
and  determination,  but  it  was  impossible  to  withstand 
the  deadly  enemy  shell  fire.  Along  this  sector  there 
were  few  bomb-proof  dugouts,  few  shelters,  and  to 
hold  out  beyond  a  certain  limit  meant  an  unnecessary 
and  needless  sacrifice  of  life.  The  task  of  checking 
the  advance  was  further  hampered  by  the  lack  of  an 
adequate  number  of  guns.  The  Austrians  continued 
to  advance.  Thereupon  General  Cadorna  decided 
to  withdraw  his  centre,  to  the  south  of  the  Posina 
torrent,  in  order  to  consolidate  his  position.  This 
manoeuvre  meant  the  abandonment  of  much  valuable 
territory,  but  there  was  no  alternative,  as  the  Italians 
were  still  outnumbered  four  to  one  both  in  men  and 
guns.  The  Austrians  were  now  pouring  down  from  the 
heights,  and  the  Italians  had  no  time  to  dig  them- 
selves   in.     Trench-warfare    was    abandoned.     Great 


ITALY  AT  WAR  289 

masses  of  troops  were  manoeuvring  in  the  open.  The 
battle  raged  on  the  mountain  tops  and  in  the  valleys. 
On  the  heights  the  contending  armies  were  fighting 
in  the  snow;  in  the  valleys  the  heat  and  dust  of  the 
Italian  mid-May  days  was  suffocating. 

The  operations  of  withdrawal,  which  now  brought 
the  battle-line  several  miles  beyond  the  old  ItaUan 
boundary  into  Italy,  were  successfully  carried  out  by 
May  22.  The  Austrian  attack  had  now  slackened,  but 
it  was  only  a  temporary  lull  in  the  battle,  which  was 
to  be  resumed  with  renewed  fury  within  a  very  few 
days.  In  fact  by  the  24th,  the  Austrians'  onslaught  on 
the  left  centre  was  renewed  with  increasing  violence. 
There  seemed  to  be  no  shortage  in  the  Austrian  supply 
of  shells,  of  which  the  expenditure  had  been  prodigious. 
The  Italian  resistance  was  now  beginning  to  stiffen, 
yet  the  situation  was  still  precarious.  On  the  right 
centre  the  enemy  was  pressing  steadily  onward;  he  had 
crossed  the  Posina  and  was  pushing  southward.  To 
the  east  in  the  Altipiano  dei  Sette  Communi,  the 
Italians  were  compelled  to  evacuate  its  chief  centre, 
Asiago.  The  fighting  continued  desperately.  Only 
three  miles  of  highland  country  lay  between  the  Aus- 
trians and  the  Itahan  plain.  Already  General  Cadorna 
had  made  provision  for  the  constitution  of  a  new  army 
for  the  defense  of  Venetia.  The  organising  capacity 
of  the  Italian  General  Staff  was  here  put  to  a  supreme 
test.  Notwithstanding  the  great  battle  that  was 
being  fought  in  the  highlands,  in  less  than  ten  days, 
centring  around  Vicenza,  a  complete  army  of  500,000 
men  with  mule  and  motor  transport  columns,  field 
kitchens,  sanitary  corps,  as  well  as  its  full  comple- 
ment both  of  men  and  guns  was  assembled  ready  for 


290  GREATER  ITALY 

action,  and  during  all  this  time  a  steady  stream  of 
reinforcements,  munitions,  and  supplies  was  being 
despatched  to  the  troops  in  action. 

On  the  evening  of  June  1,  it  seemed  as  though  the 
Austrian  invasion  of  Italy  had  succeeded.  Only  two 
short  miles  lay  between  the  Austrians  and  the  plain. 
In  massed  formation  the  enemy  came  on  resolutely, 
to  break  down  the  last  remaining  barrier.  Blow  upon 
blow,  well  aimed  and  carried  out  with  astonishing 
valour  and  great  courage,  was  directed  at  these  last 
Italian  defenses,  but  General  Cadorna's  men  had 
been  ordered  to  die  in  their  positions,  rather  than  give 
ground.  The  hour  had  struck  for  Italy  to  show  her 
mettle,  and  it  found  the  Itahans  ready.  The  at- 
tacks of  the  Austrians  had  not  slackened;  they  had 
the  advantage  of  terrain  as  well  as  a  superiority  in 
artillery,  yet  the  Italians  held  on.  It  would  be  im- 
possible to  recount  even  fragmentarily  the  heroic 
fighting  of  those  early  June  days.  It  was  not  one 
battle  but  a  hundred  battles  fused  into  one  terrible 
struggle.  The  Austrians  stood  on  the  heights  looking 
down  into  the  Itahan  plain.  Before  them  lay  the  rich 
cities  of  Venetia:  Vicenza,  Bassano,  Padua;  even 
Venice  and  the  Adriatic  could  be  faintly  discerned 
through  the  haze.  Sixty-six  invasions  have  been 
launched  into  Italy  since  the  days  of  Rome,  and  of 
these  only  nine  had  failed.  Would  this  invasion, 
the  most  carefully  planned  and  executed,  as  well  as 
the  greatest  of  them  all,  succeed?  For  a  week  the 
decision  hung  in  the  balance.  Again  and  again,  with 
sledge-hammer  blows,  the  massed  columns  of  the  Aus- 
trian infantry  advanced  to  the  attack  and  broke 
against  the  Italian  lines.    The  ItaUans  were  still  com- 


ITALY  AT  WAR  291 

pelled  to  give  ground,  but  at  no  point  were  they 
obliged  to  surrender  an  important  position. 

By  June  3  General  Cadorna,  who  throughout  the 
fortnight  of  fighting  had  not  sought  to  deceive  the 
country  as  to  the  gravity  of  the  situation,  was  able 
to  announce  that  the  imminent  danger  of  invasion 
had  passed.  The  fighting  still  continued  with  un- 
abated fury.  The  Austrians  renewed  their  onslaught, 
and  the  Italians  now  fought  with  increased  stubborn- 
ness. The  great  army  which  had  been  mobilised  for 
the  defense  of  the  plain  was  now  sent  forward  to 
take  part  in  the  battle  in  the  highlands.  The  Aus- 
trians, seeing  their  prize  eluding  them,  fought  with 
desperation.  The  Itahans  throughout  the  second  and 
third  weeks  in  June  had  to  meet  repeated  assaults, 
executed  with  great  gallantry  and  skill.  But  the 
tide  had  begun  to  turn.  The  mastery  of  battle  now 
lay  with  the  Itahans,  but  the  Austrians  would  not 
concede  defeat.  They  poured  an  unending  stream  of 
shells  on  the  Italian  Hues;  their  attacks  were  still 
pushed  home  with  vigour.  The  Italians  suffered  ter- 
rible losses.  In  some  brigades  as  high  as  60  per  cent 
of  the  cadres,  including  officers,  were  wiped  out. 

The  Itahans  from  all  over  the  peninsula  had  vied 
with  each  other  in  indomitable  courage  to  turn  the 
tide  of  invasion.  The  early  onslaughts  were  stayed 
by  the  Sicihans;  the  Ligurians,  the  Calabrians,  the 
Sardinian  troops,  all  had  a  part  in  the  fierce  fighting. 
But  the  greatest  share  of  the  terrific  struggle  fell  to 
the  Alpini  battahons.  They  won  immortal  glory  in 
the  defense  of  the  last  fines  of  trenches  against  which 
the  invading  armies  stormed  in  vain,  and  when  the 
current  of  battle  turned  and  the  ItaUans,  on  June  25, 


292  GREATER  ITALY 

began  to  drive  the  Austrians  before  them  the  Alpini 
were  in  the  vanguard  of  every  assault  and  blasted 
open  the  road  which  made  possible  the  advance  of 
General  Cadorna's  main  forces. 

Diu-ing  the  last  week  in  June  the  Austrians  began  to 
retire.  The  Itahans  were  now  in  a  position  to  move 
forward.  The  fighting  was  difficult.  The  Austrians 
withdrew  slowly,  destroying  the  towns  and  villages 
in  their  path,  but  they  held  on  stubbornly  to  the 
heights,  and  were  only  driven  out  after  hot  fighting. 
The  Italians  were  now  taking  numbers  of  prisoners, 
and  gathering  in  many  guns,  stores,  and  other  booty 
abandoned  by  the  enemy. 

By  the  first  week  in  July  the  great  battle  of  the 
Trentino  had  come  to  an  end.  The  Austrians  still 
held  a  Une,  roughly  from  about  three  to  seven  miles 
in  advance  of  their  former  positions  before  the  be- 
ginning of  the  offensive,  and  they  dug  themselves  in 
firmly  in  their  new  positions,  but  the  great  objective 
of  the  offensive  had  failed  miserably.  Italy  was  saved 
from  invasion,  but,  more  than  this,  the  great  battle 
had  given  the  Italian  troops  a  renewed  and  greater 
confidence  in  themselves,  and  the  world  at  large  who 
were  informed  of  the  prowess  of  the  Italians  could 
not  fail  to  be  impressed  by  the  greatness  of  this  achieve- 
ment. No  other  battle  of  the  European  War,  with 
the  possible  exception  of  the  assault  on  the  fortress 
of  Verdun,  brought  forth  a  more  potently  concentrated 
mass  of  artillery  on  so  short  a  frontal  sector.  Even 
the  defense  of  Verdun  presented  no  such  difficult 
problem  as  that  which  faced  the  defending  armies  in 
the  Trentino  when  the  Austrian  attack  was  once 
launched. 


ITALY  AT  WAR  293 

It  has  been  suggested  that  had  not  General  Bru- 
silof  early  in  June  initiated  his  great  drive  in  the  East, 
which  was  to  sweep  the  Russians  rapidly  through  the 
Bukowina,  and  thus  prevented  new  forces  from  being 
despatched  to  the  Trentino,  the  Austrian  attack  here 
would  have  succeeded.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  the 
Russian  thrust  in  the  East  was  of  timely  assistance, 
but  this  can  in  no  way  detract  from  the  greatness  of 
the  Italian  exploit.  General  Cadorna  had  won  a  great 
victory,  the  significance  of  which  is  not  even  to-day 
fully  appreciated.  He  did  more  than  merely  to  stem 
an  invasion;  he  proclaimed  Italian  unity  on  the  battle- 
field. Here  for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the 
Italian  people,  Italians  from  all  parts  of  the  peninsula, 
from  the  North,  the  South,  the  mountains,  and  the 
plain,  had  a  share  in  the  fighting,  and  acquitted 
themselves  in  a  manner  worthy  of  the  highest  admi- 
ration. 

While  Italy  was  in  the  throes  of  the  greatest  battle 
of  her  war,  with  the  Austrians  pushing  onward,  another 
crisis  arose  wdthin  her  boundaries  which  was  precip- 
itated by  this  event.  The  discontent  with  the  Salan- 
dra  Government  had  steadily  grown  during  the  spring 
months,  though  it  was  kept  in  check  by  a  desire  not  to 
appear  disunited  in  face  of  the  enemy.  WTien  the 
Chamber  reopened  on  June  6,  it  was  evident  that 
unless  M.  Salandra  departed  radically  from  his  atti- 
tude of  aloofness  he  would  soon  be  in  open  conflict 
with  the  Chamber,  which  would  lead  to  his  down- 
fall. The  Chamber  was  in  a  restless  frame  of  mind. 
The  Government  had  maintained  absolute  silence  re- 
garding the  military  situation  in  the  Trentino,  and 
insisted  on  piu'suing  routine  business.    The  Chamber 


294  GREATER  ITALY 

bowed  to  the  demand  and  passed  financial  bills  in 
rapid  succession  without  discussion.  Thereupon  M. 
Salandra,  in  demanding  a  vote  of  confidence  on  June 
10,  made  a  reference  to  the  war  which  may  have  been 
the  truth,  but  which,  under  the  circumstances,  was 
decidedly  tactless.  In  speaking  of  the  defensive  posi- 
tions of  the  Trentino  and  the  Austrian  offensive,  he 
remarked : 

''We  must  manfully  recognise  that  had  the  posi- 
tions been  better  prepared  and  better  defended,  these 
positions  would  have  at  least  held  out  longer." 

Here  was  an  open  criticism  of  the  Italian  Higher 
Command  which,  though  it  was  not  directed  against 
General  Cadorna  personally,  but  rather  against  Gen- 
eral Brusati,  spoken  by  the  head  of  the  Government 
in  so  grave  a  moment,  could  only  be  interpreted  as 
an  accusation.  It  was  evident  that  M.  Salandra  was 
sincere  when  he  spoke,  and  that  he  did  not  wish  to 
give  the  country  mere  sentimental  bombast,  but  it 
was  also  patent  that  he  was  tired  of  the  struggle  with 
a  recalcitrant  Parliament,  and  that  if  he  had  to  fall 
it  would  be  by  his  own  hand  rather  than  by  that  of 
another.  As  was  inevitable,  the  Government  motion 
for  a  vote  of  confidence  was  defeated;  two  days  later 
M.  Salandra  announced  his  resignation.  The  men 
who  had  compassed  his  overthrow  did  so  actuated  by 
the  most  diverse  motives;  the  Official  SociaHsts  and 
Giohttians  because  he  had  led  the  country  into  war; 
the  Interventionists  because  he  had  not  prosecuted  the 
war  with  sufficient  vigour. 

The  King,  who  for  a  year  had  been  living  unin- 
terruptedly at  the  front  and  had  personally  visited 


ITALY  AT  WAR  295 

all  the  zones  and  sectors  of  his  long  and  varied  battle- 
line,  was  obliged  to  return  to  select  a  new  Premier. 
Though  M.  Salandra  had  by  his  lack  of  souplesse 
alienated  the  sympathy  of  many,  he,  nevertheless, 
was  still  strong  in  the  country,  and  the  King  was 
unwilling  that  he  should  not  remain  at  his  post  at  the 
head  of  a  larger,  more  representative  Ministry.  But 
apparently  M.  Salandra  wished  to  retire.  The  In- 
terventionists loudly  clamoured  for  a  National  Min- 
istry which  would  take  firm  hold  of  the  business  of 
waging  war  wdth  greater  zeal  and  energy.  After  due 
consultations  M.  BoselH,  the  dean  of  Italian  Deputies, 
was  intrusted  with  the  formation  of  a  "National 
Cabinet."  It  was  a  difficult  task.  It  was  held  desir- 
able to  have  Baron  Sonnino  remain  at  the  Foreign 
Office,  but  he  was  unwilling  to  do  so  unless  M.  Sa- 
landra also  remained  in  the  Cabinet.  Baron  Sonnino's 
objections  were  finally  overcome,  and  after  some  de- 
lays, on  June  18,  the  composition  of  the  National 
Ministry  was  announced. 

The  new  Ministry  had  been  increased  in  size  from 
13  to  19  members,  in  order  to  include  in  so  far  as  pos- 
sible the  representatives  of  all  ParUamentary  groups. 
Here  for  the  first  time  we  find  a  Catholic  and  a  Re- 
publican with  a  portfolio  in  the  same  Cabinet,  which 
also  included  a  Socialist,  M.  Bissolati,  the  leader  of 
the  Interventionists.  The  Salandra  Ministry  thus 
came  to  an  end,  and  the  new  National  Ministry  took 
up  the  reins  of  power.  M.  Salandra's  name,  however, 
stands  in  high  honour  in  his  country;  he  played  a 
leading  part  in  the  work  of  constructing  the  new 
Cabinet.  For  the  first  time  in  many  years  the  name 
of  Giolitti  was  not  openly  mentioned,  though  he  re- 


296  GREATER  ITALY 

turned  to  Rome  from  his  home  in  Piedmont  about 
this  time,  for  the  first  time  in  nearly  a  year. 

M.  BoseUi,  though  seventy-eight  years  of  age, 
with  an  unquenchable  optimism  assumed  the  respon- 
sibilities of  government,  and  was  soon  to  give  proof 
that  the  National  Ministry  was  to  keep  its  pledge  to 
prosecute  the  war  with  full  energy. 

While  the  ministerial  crisis  may  be  regarded  as  an 
affair  of  internal  politics,  the  attention  of  the  world 
was  soon  to  be  centred  on  Italy's  battle-Une.  General 
Cadorna,  though  busy  parrying  the  Austrian  blow  in 
the  Trentino  with  his  left  hand,  when  the  danger  of 
invasion  had  passed  set  to  work  immediately  to  pre- 
pare for  his  own  advance  in  the  East.  With  the  guns 
still  thundering  in  the  Trentino,  and  with  the  ItaHans 
still  keeping  the  enemy  busily  engaged  there,  the 
great  final  assault  against  the  Podgora  and  the  Monte 
Sabotino  was  launched.  The  onslaught  was  irresis- 
tible. The  Italians  drove  the  enemy  before  them, 
cleared  the  heights  which  dominated  Gorizia,  crossed 
the  Isonzo,  captured  the  city,  and  by  August  14,  ten 
days  after  this  great  offensive  thrust  had  begun,  they 
had  pushed  their  line  forward  along  the  Carso  and 
firmly  held  Gorizia.  These  operations  netted  the 
ItaHans  not  only  a  great  gain  of  territory,  including 
the  city  of  Gorizia,  which  next  to  Trieste  is  the  largest 
city  of  Italia  irredenta,  but  18,758  Austrian  prisoners, 
including  393  officers,  and  32  large-cahbre  guns,  be- 
sides great  quantities  of  munitions,  machine-guns, 
rifles,  etc. 

This  was  but  the  first  of  a  series  of  vigorous  offen- 
sives which  General  Cadorna  was  to  carry  out  on  the 
Carso  front,  extending  from  Gorizia  southward.  To- 
wards the  middle  of  September  another  movement  was 


ITALY  AT  WAR  297 

initiated  here,  which  gained  for  the  Itahans  several 
important  positions,  including  San  Grado  and  some 
4,000  prisoners.  This  was  quickly  followed  by  a  third 
and  even  more  powerful  blow,  which  straightened 
out  the  Italian  lines  which  had  by  this  time  eaten  deep 
into  the  Carso  plateau.  In  a  furious  surprise  attack, 
developed  October  10,  the  Italians  were  able  to  take 
nearly  8,000  prisoners.  But  General  Cadorna  would 
give  the  enemy  no  respite,  and  three  weeks  later,  dur- 
ing the  first  days  of  November,  he  launched  another 
assault  along  this  same  front,  which,  though  tena- 
ciously opposed,  left  8,982  prisoners  in  his  hands,  be- 
sides guns  and  war  materiel  of  all  sorts,  making  in  all 
over  40,000  Austrian  prisoners,  including  1,008  officers 
taken  by  the  Italians  during  three  months'  fighting  on 
the  Carso  front. 

Everywhere  along  the  whole  Italian  front  the  enemy 
is  on  the  defensive.  Though  the  Austrians  still  hold 
a  small  segment  of  Italian  territory  along  the  Tren- 
tino  front,  and  make  occasional  offensive  saUies,  they 
are  being  each  day  more  closely  invested,  and  with 
the  return  of  spring  may  be  expected  to  be  driven 
out.  But  the  eyes  of  all  Italy  are  turned  towards 
the  Carso  front.  Here  by  a  series  of  hard,  well-directed 
blows,  the  Italians  have  forged  ahead  and  will  con- 
tinue to  do  so.  Trieste  at  the  present  writing  Hes  not 
much  more  than  twelve  miles  beyond  the  Itahan  ad- 
vance positions.  The  enveloping  movement  which 
General  Cadorna  is  executing  it  is  hoped  will  spare 
Trieste  from  destruction,  at  the  same  time  placing 
it  safely  within  Italian  hands,  as  the  troops  push  ahead 
towards  Istria  to  complete  the  task  of  ''redemption" 
of  the  northeastern  Adriatic. 

In  the  Balkan  war  zone  Italy  is  pursuing  consis- 


298  GREATER  ITALY 

tently  her  new  plan  of  an  energetic  prosecution  of  the 
war,  not  merely  by  sending  a  strong  force  to  co-operate 
with  the  Allied  armies  assembled  at  Salonika,  but 
has  undertaken  the  task  of  opening  a  road  across 
Epirus  to  form  a  junction  with  the  AlUed  armies, 
pushing  northward  into  Serbia.  During  the  first  week 
in  October  (1916),  it  was  announced  that  a  consider- 
able ItaUan  force  had  landed  at  Santi  Quaranta, 
north  of  the  island  of  Corfu,  and  was  proceeding 
rapidly  northward  towards  the  lake  of  Prespa  across 
the  Albanian  frontier  where  it  had  come  in  contact 
with  the  Alhed  forces. 

The  unity  of  front  is  now  becoming  a  reahty.  Italy 
is  closely  co-operating  with  the  Alhes  in  the  conduct 
of  the  campaign,  and  though  great  obstacles  still 
remain  to  be  surmounted,  the  Itahan  people  look 
forward  with  fuU  confidence  in  their  armies  to  attain 
the  principal  object  of  their  participation  in  the  w^ar; 
the  redemption  of  the  Trentino  and  the  Itahan  lands 
of  the  Eastern  Adriatic. 

It  would  be  too  dogmatic  an  explanation  of  the 
decisive  step  the  new  National  Ministry  was  to  take 
in  regard  to  its  relations  with  Germany  to  state  that 
it  spontaneously  declared  war  on  Germany.  The 
preparation  for  this  event  had  been  slowly  and  cov- 
ertly proceeding  under  the  Salandra  Government. 
One  by  one  the  bonds  which  bound  Italy  to  Germany 
had  been  severed.  The  process  was  perhaps  over- 
cautious, and  during  many  months  kept  Italy  in  a 
false  position.  It  must,  however,  be  recalled  that  it 
was  a  current  behef  among  many  ItaUans,  during  the 
greater  part  of  the  first  year  of  their  war,  that  inasmuch 
as  the  entire  Itahan  economic  structure  rested  on  Ger- 


ITALY  AT  WAR  299 

man  foundations,  a  drastic  severing  of  all  connection 
with  Germany  would  inevitably  lead  to  a  catastrophe. 
But  when  the  ItaUans  realised  that  they  could  carry 
on  their  industrial  and  commercial  life  as  well,  if  not 
better,  alone  than  under  German  tutelage,  they  pro- 
ceeded patiently  and  thoroughly  to  ehminate  German 
influence  and  control. 

Italy  throughout  her  conduct  of  foreign  affairs 
since  August,  1914,  had  shown  a  marked  capacity  for 
safeguarding  her  paramount  interests  and  for  visual- 
ising clearly  her  national  needs.  Her  poHcy  has  been 
strikingly  free  from  rash  and  inamature  decisions. 
When  Italy  was  ready,  and  not  before,  she  followed 
to  its  logical  end  the  other  great  object  for  her  entry 
into  the  war — the  emancipation  of  Italy  from  Ger- 
man control. 

Therefore  the  declaration  of  war  against  Germany 
on  August  28,  1916,  came  as  no  great  surprise  in  Italy. 
The  justifications  for  the  step  were  not  lacking.  Ger- 
many had  from  the  outset  of  hostiUties  furnished 
great  assistance  to  her  Austrian  ally  in  the  campaign 
against  Italy.  During  the  recent  offensive  in  the 
Trentino  German  guns  and  German  shells  contributed 
largely  to  the  success  which  the  Austrians  were  able 
to  obtain.  But  further  than  this,  Germany  had  broken 
her  agreement  entered  into  with  Italy  in  May,  1915, 
and  had  stopped  the  payment  of  pensions  due  to 
Italian  workmen.  But  these  excuses  were  a  mere 
formahty  embodied  in  the  oflEicial  declaration  of  war. 
The  real  cause  lay  deeper.  Italy  had  thrown  in  her 
lot  -wdth  the  nations  who  were  opposing  the  spread  of 
Pan-Germanism.  Italy  had  for  twenty  years  hved 
under  its  influence,  and  knows  more  thoroughly  than 


300  GREATER  ITALY 

any  of  the  other  belHgerents  the  dangers  to  national 
independence  to  which  this  vassalage  may  lead.  To 
emancipate  herself  from  German  influence,  to  become 
a  free  and  powerful  agent  in  the  affairs  of  the  world, 
is  one  of  the  chief  underlying  causes  for  the  ItaUan 
declaration  of  war  on  Germany. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  motives  of  the  Gov- 
ermnent  in  openly  breaking  ofT  all  connections  with 
Germany,  the  declaration  of  war  was  to  prove  an 
important  step  towards  the  increase  of  Itahan  prestige 
and  independence.  Italy  was  now  to  be  received  on 
terms  of  intimacy,  confidence,  and  equality  by  the 
AlHed  Powers.  The  Quadruple  Alliance  was  a  fait 
accompli.  The  last  ties  which  bound  Italy  formally 
to  Germany  were  severed.  Henceforth  no  loyal  Italian 
could  maintain  friendly  relations  with  Germany  with- 
out being  a  traitor  to  his  country. 

For  the  people  of  Italy  the  future  has  much  in  store. 
The  pathway  to  a  Greater  Italy  lies  open.  By  pur- 
suing the  cautious,  clear-sighted,  constructive  policy 
which  Baron  Sonnino  has  so  consistently  followed 
it  would  appear  probable  that  the  "greater  destinies" 
of  Italy  are  on  the  eve  of  fulfilment.  The  apparent 
elimination  of  Greece  from  the  participation  in  the 
affairs  of  the  ^gean  and  the  Adriatic  has  greatly 
simplified  a  problem  the  solution  of  which  would 
have  caused  much  vexation.  Italy  may  now  assert 
openly,  without  undue  clandestine  bickering,  her 
claims  to  a  share  of  dominance  in  the  eastern  ^Egean. 
Serbia,  for  the  time  being,  no  longer  exists  as  an  in- 
dependent State.  It  would  be  premature  to  predict 
an  immediate  and  vigorous  revival  of  Pan-Serb  as- 


ITALY  AT  WAR  301 

pirations.  The  drain  of  the  present  struggle  will  have 
been  too  great  for  the  Serbs  to  reassert  any  unreason- 
able claims  to  national  expansion,  in  the  immediate 
future.  Italy  at  all  events  can  afford  to  be  magnan- 
imous towards  her  stricken  neighbour  in  the  Eastern 
Adriatic. 

Is  it  too  soon  to  speak  of  victory  ? 

Whatever  may  be  the  decision  arrived  at  on  the 
field  of  battle,  whatever  may  be  the  fate  that  befalls 
Italian  arms,  Italy  has  already  won  a  great  victory. 
For  she  is  fighting  not  solely  for  the  aggrandisement 
of  her  territory  nor  the  increase  of  her  wealth:  she 
is  fighting  for  the  greatness  of  her  national  soul;  not 
exalted  by  any  chimerical  ideahsm,  not  in  pursuit 
of  some  high-sounding  phrasemaker's  catchword  such 
as  ** humanity"  or  ''civilisation,"  but  as  an  upholder 
of  the  right  of  nationhood  she  is  helping  to  bring  once 
again  peace,  security,  and  hberty  to  Europe. 


INDEX 


Abruzzi,  Duke  of  the,  Italian  Ad- 
miral, 125. 

Abyssinia,  40,  235;  "Green  Book"  on 
War  with,  72 ;  Military  strength  of, 
64;  War  with.  63-66,  70. 

Adalia  Railway,  Concession  of,  137, 
196,  235. 

Adis  Ababa.  Treaty  of,  70-71. 

Adriatic.  Geographical  survey  of, 
208-209;  Italianism  of.  210;  The 
Slavs  of,  27,  211,  215;  Italian  policy 
of  expansion  in,  227.  231,  233;  Rus- 
sian proposal  of  territorial  distri- 
bution in  Ecistem.  231;  Gabriel 
d'Annunzio,  regarding,  218;  see  also 
under  Francis  Ferdinand  and  Irre- 
dentism. 

Aehrenthal.  Baron  von  flater  Count), 
Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs.  Annexation  of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  by.  214-215; 
Railway  concession  through  Sanjak 
of  Novl  Bazar.  102;  Meeting  of. 
with  di  San  Guliano,  109;  Attitude 
of,  dxiring  Italo-Turkish  War,  125- 
126. 

Mgean  Islands,  see  Rhodes. 

Agadir  (1911).  110.  117. 

Agriculture.  145. 

Albania,  Inviolability  of,  136;  Es- 
tablishment of  Kingdom  of,  157; 
Bank  of.  196;  Defunct  state,  228. 

Alexandra.  Queen  of  England.  106. 

Algeciras  Conference  (1906).  100-101. 
110.  117. 

AUegemeiner  Deutscher  Schulverein, 
28. 

Alpini.  154.  273.  275. 

Amadeus  VIII.  Duke  of  Savoy, 
elected  Pope  (1439),  87. 


Andrfisay,  Count,  11. 

Annuario  Statistico  Italiano,  quoted, 
144. 

Annunzio,  Gabriel  d',  218;  Character 
of.  257-258;  Italian  intervention  in 
European  War  championed  by, 
258;  Speech  of,  at  Quarto,  258;  Re- 
ception of,  at  Rome,  261;  Accuses 
Giolitti  and  Pro-Germans,  362-363; 
Triumph  of,  264-266.  276. 

Argentine  Republic,  Italian  emigra- 
tion to,  144. 

Army,  Constitution  of,  154;  Credits 
for,  50;  Increase  of,  39;  Service  in, 
155;  Condition  of.  at  outbreak  of 
European  War.  250,  269;  Shortage 
of  supplies  and  munitions  of.  279. 

Asinari  di  Bemezzo.  Italian  General, 
107. 

Asquith,  Mr.,  British  Prime  Minister; 
282. 

Augustus  Caesar,  210. 

Austria.  Attitude  of,  towards  Pied- 
mont (1859),  2;  Relations  with, 
15. 

Austria-Himgary.  Army  manoeuvres 
of.  101.214;  Attitude  of  at  Algeciras. 
100-101;  Unfriendly  attitude  of, 
101-103,  107;  Annexation  of  Bosnia 
by,  compensations  therefor  to  Italy, 
105 ;  Amelioration  of  relations  with, 
109,  136;  Policy  of,  during  Italo- 
Turkish  War,  125-126:  Policy  of, 
re  Albania,  135-136.  213;  In  Adri- 
atic, see  under  Francis  Ferdinand; 
German  ascendency  in.  217.  260; 
War  declared  by  Italy  against.  265; 
see  also  under  European  War,  Cen- 
tral Powers, 

Avlona,  213,  228.  229,  230. 


303 


304 


INDEX 


Bagdad  Railway,  137. 

Baldissera,  General,  65,  68-70. 

Balkans,  Violation  of  status  quo  in,  by 
Austria,  102-103;  Austro-Italian 
agreement  regarding,  109,  125-126 
and  note,  253;  War  in,  130-132, 138, 
224;  Austrian  plans  in,  211-212;  see 
under  European  "War,  Balkans. 

Banca  Commerciale,  Establistunent  of, 
186;  German  control  of,  190;  Con- 
trol over  Italian  joint  stock  com- 
panies gained  by,  192;  Favours 
German  firms  and  products,  192; 
Increase  in  affairs  of,  191;  Influ- 
ence of,  over  press,  194;  Interfer- 
ence of,  in  laome  and  foreign  poli- 
tics, 195-196.  203. 

Baratieri,  General,  62-65. 

BarrSre,  French  Ambassador,  251. 

Bava-Beccaris,  General,  80. 

Belgiimi,  Relations  of,  witli  Papacy, 
163,  177;  Influence  of,  on  Italian 
public  opinion  in  1915,  246. 

Benedict  XV,'Pope,  Election  of,  171- 
173;  Biography  and  qualifications 
of,  173-175;  First  encyclical  of,  176; 
Policy  of,  during  European  War, 
176-179;  Conflict  of,  with  Quir- 
inal,  179-183. 

Benghazi,  Battle  for,  121. 

Berchtold,  Coimt,  Austrian  Foreign 
Minister,  138. 

Berlin,  Congress  of,  11,  25,  130; 
Right  conferred  on  Austria  to 
police  Montenegrin  waters,  by, 
rescinded,  209. 

Berlin,  Treaty  of,  105. 

Bersaglieri,  see  under  Army. 

Bertolini,  M.,  Italian  delegate.  Treaty 
of  Lausanne,  131. 

Beyrout,  Bombardment  of,  129. 

Bismarck,  Count  Herbert,  49. 

Bismarck,  Prince,  6;  Crispi's  first 
visit  to  (1877),  10;  Attitude  of.  to- 
wards Italy  in  Triple  Alliance,  15, 
41,  42.  44;  Crispi's  second  visit  to 
(1887),  46-48;  Relations  of.  with 


Leo    XIII,    165-166;    Concerning 

Mediterranean  policy  of  Italy,  114; 

PoUcy  of,  re  Trieste,  221,  222  note. 

240. 
Bissolatl,  M.,  Socialist  Deputy,  283; 

Cabinet  Minister,  295. 
Borgia,  Lucrezia,  33. 
Boselli,  M.,   Italian  Premier   (1916), 

forms  National  Ministry,  295,  296; 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  11,  25. 

Annexation  of,  by  Austria  (1908), 

103,  105,  216. 
Boxer  Uprising,  82. 
Brassier,   de   St.   Simon,   Prussian 

Minister,  219. 
Briand,   M.,  French  Premier,  visits 

Rome.  281. 
Brusati,  General.  286  and  note,  294. 
Brusilof,  Russian  General,  293. 
BUlow,  Prince  von.  German  Imperial 

Chancellor,  Mission  of,  to  Rome, 

249-250;  Residence  of,  at  Rome, 

200,  203;  Pressure  exerted  in  Italy 

by,  204,  260,  262,  271. 


Cadoma.  Count  Lulgi,  Chief  of  the 
Italian  General  Staff,  239,  252; 
Personality  and  work  of,  270-271 ; 
Plan  of  campaign  of,  272,  276;  In 
Paris  and  London,  281-282,  284; 
Takes  personal  command  in  Tren- 
tino,  286,  287-292;  Constitutes  new 
army,  287;  Defeat  of  Austrians  by, 
292,  293;  Criticism  of,  294;  Pre- 
pares Carso  offensive,  296;  Cap- 
tures Gorizia,  296-297. 

Cadoma,  Raffaele,  General,  Captures 
Rome,  159,  270. 

Ceesar,  33. 

Csetani  di  Sermoneta,  DiUce,  Italian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  73,  75. 

Canada,  Italian  emigration  to,  144. 

Caneva,  General,  132,  138. 

Canevaro.  Coimt,  Admiral  and  Ital- 
ian Foreign  Minister,  71,  82. 


INDEX 


305 


Caprivi,  Count,  German  Imperial 
Chancellor  (1890).  52. 

Camot,  M.,  President  of  French  Re- 
public, Assassination  of,  61. 

Carthage,  S.S.  Incident.  127-128  and 
note,  135. 

Caixx,  Peace  negotiations  at.  132. 

Cavallotti,  M.,  Italian  Radical  lead- 
er. 77. 

Cavour,  Coimt,  Meeting  of.  with 
Napoleon  III,  1;  Plans  for  ItaUan 
unity  of,  2,  87;  Character  of,  45; 
Policy,  re  Papacy.  163-164;  Letter 
to,  219. 

Cellini,  Benvenuto,  33. 

Central  Powers,  see  under  Aiistria- 
Hungary,  Geiiuany,  and  European 
War. 

Charles  Albert.  King  of  Piedmont, 
85.  88. 

Charles,  Francis  Joseph.  Archduke, 
285. 

Chemical  industries.  147. 

Chiala.  quoted.  73,  221. 

Chiesa,  Cardinal  della.  see  Benedict 
XV. 

Chotek,  Countess,  see  Duchess  of 
Hohenberg. 

Cicero,  33. 

Coatit,  62. 

Colombia.  Italy  secures  redress  from, 
82. 

Conrad  von  Hotzendorf,  Baron, 
Chief  of  the  Austrian  General 
Staff,  126,  138,  214,  239,  268;  Plan 
of  invading  Italy  of,  284-285. 

Co-operative  societies,  145. 

Corradini,  E.,  quoted.  111. 

Corti,  Count,  11. 

Crete,  Italian  participation  in  affairs 
of.  71.  76. 

Crime,  decrease  of,  152. 

Crispi,  Francesco,  Tour  of  Europe  of 
(1877),  10.  191;  First  Ministry  of 
(1887),  44;  Character  of,  45^6; 
Visit  of.  to  Bismarck  (1887),  46-47; 
At  Berlin,  51 ;  And  Triple  Alliance, 


46-47.  52,  56-57;  Colonial  poUcy 
of.  53-55.  62.  66-67.  70-71;  Re 
armaments.  50;  Relations  of  with 
France.  10,  50,  51;  Re  Tripoli,  55, 
115,  121;  Retires  from  office,  56; 
Second  Ministry  of,  (1893),  61; 
Suppression  of  irredentist  propa- 
ganda by,  52;  Re  Abyssinia,  54,  62- 
65;  Overthrow  of,  66-67,  134;  Per- 
secution of,  (72,  77,  Economic  pol- 
icy of.  186. 


Dante,  33. 

Dante  Allgheri  Society,  Objects  of, 
31. 

Dardanelles,  Closing  of,  129-130. 132. 

Delcasse,  M.,  French  Foreign  Min- 
ister, quoted,  116. 

Depretis,  M.,  Italian  Premier,  9,  23, 
59. 

Diocletian,  210,  261. 

Dodecanese,  see  under  Rhodes. 

Dogali.  Defeat  at  (1887),  40;  Influ- 
ence of.  on  Triple  AlUance,  43. 

Dual  Monarchy,  see  under  Austria- 
Hungary. 


Education,  153. 

Edward  VII,  King  of  England,  106. 

Electrical  Power,  Development  of, 
146,  194  and  note. 

Emigration,  Cause  of,  143;  Distribu- 
tion of,  144. 

Emilia,  United  to  Italy,  5. 

England,  Attitude  of,  towards  Italy, 
3,  8,  10,  11,  14,  163;  Re  EgjiJt,  17 
18;  Understanding  with,  re  Medi- 
terranean, 44,  74;  Tension  between 
Italy  and,  72;  Co-operation  in 
Greece  with,  76;  Policy  of,  re 
Morocco,  100,  110;  Attitude  of, 
during  Bosnian  crisis,  103;  Friendly 
relations  with,  106;  Attitude  of,  re 
Tripoli,   111,  115,  116,  120;  Atti- 


306 


INDEX 


tude  of,  towards  Italy,  re  Libyan 
War,  120,  129,  135;  Re  occupation 
of  Rhodes,  137;  Diplomatic  mis- 
sion of,  to  the  Vatican,  178;  see  also 
under  European  War,  The  Allies. 
Enver  Bey,  124. 

Eritrea,  Expedition  to,  39-40;  Bound- 
ary of,  71;  Population  of,  156; 
Trade  and  commerce  of,  156; 
Railways  of,  157,  see  under  Abys- 
sinia.'; 
European  War — 

Balkans:  Occupation  of  Avlona  by 
Italians,  228;  Territorial  de- 
mands of  Italians  in,  229-233; 
Protests  of  Jugo-Slavs,  234-235 ; 
Austrian  invasion  of  Serbia 
(1915),  248;  Austrians  driven 
from,  250;  Austro-German  in- 
vasion of  (1916),  280;  Fall  of 
Cettinje,  280;  Serbs  rescued  by 
Italians,  280-281 ;  allied  expedi- 
tion to  Salonika,  281;  Disasters 
to  Allied  arms  in,  and  effect  in 
Italy,  282-283 :  Italy  declares  war 
on  Bulgaria,  279;  Italian  Partic- 
ipation in  Campaign,  298. 
Central  Powers:  Failure  of,  to  no- 
tify Italy  of  proposed  attack  on 
Serbia,  238;  Summon  Italy  to 
give  aid,  239;  Italy  declares  neu- 
trality, 239;  Desire  of,  to  secure 
permanent  Italian  neutrality, 
241;  Vienna  and  Rome  take  up 
negotiations,  re  compensations, 
229,  248;  Rupture  of  Austro- 
Italian  alliance,  253;  War  de- 
clared by  Italy  against  Austria, 
265;  Rupture  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions by  Italy  with  Germany  and 
consequences  to,  276-277,  279, 
280;  Opposition  to  Italian  decla- 
ration of  war  against  Germany, 
282-283 ;  German  Attack  on  Ver- 
dun, 283 ;  Success  in  Balkans  of, 
284;  Austrian  preparations  for 
invasion   of  Italy    (1916),  282- 


286;  Battle  of  the  Trentino,  287- 
292;  Italian  declaration  of  war 
against  Germany  (August  28, 
1916),  299-300. 

The  Allies  (France,  Great  Britain, 
and  Russia):  Assistance  of  Italian 
neutrality  to,  239-240;  Russian 
victories  and  reverses,  250-251; 
Terms  proposed  by,  to  Italy, 
231-233;  Secure  participation  of 
Italy  [in  war,  251;  Distrust  of 
Italian  policy,  252,  277,  279; 
France  repulses  assault  at  Ver- 
dim,  283;  Russia,  284,  293;  Close 
co-operation  of  Italy  with,  298- 
300. 

Italy :  Not  notified  of  plans  of  her 
Allies,  238;  Declares  neutrality, 
239;  Negotiations  of,  with  Aus- 
tria, 229,  248;  Occupation  of 
Avlona  by,  228;  Rupture  of  AUi- 
ance  with  Austria  by,  253;  De- 
clares war  on  Austria  (May  24, 
1915),  265;  Plan  of  campaign, 
271,  first  phases,  272,  trench-war- 
fare, 273,  Alpine  warfare  of,  273, 
275,  Morale  of  armies  of,  275 ;  Ter- 
ritorial conquests  of,  during  first 
six  months,  276 ;  Declares  war  on 
Turkey  (August  21,  1915),  278; 
Shortage  of  mimJtions  in,  279; 
Declares  war  on  Bulgaria  (Octo- 
ber, 1915),  279;  Seizure  of  Ger- 
man ships  by,  280;  Adheres  to 
Pact  of  London,  280;  Occupation 
of  Durazzo  by,  280;  Rescue  of 
Serbs  by,  280-281 ;  Delegates  of, 
attend  Paris  Conference  (1916), 
281;  Attitude  of  Official  Social- 
ists in,  283;  Threatened  invasion 
of,  285;  Enemy  preparations 
against,  286 ;  Battle  of  the  Tren- 
tino, 287-292 ;  National  Ministry 
in,  290-291 ;  Campaign  of,  on  the 
Isonzo,  283-296,  Gorizia  cap- 
tured by,  296-298;  Declares  war 
on  Germany   (August  28,  1916) 


INDEX 


307 


299 ;  Participation  of,  in  Balkan 
campaign  (October,  1916),  298. 
Papacy:  Policy  of,  towards  bellig- 
erents, 175-176;  Favours  Cen- 
tral Powers,  177,  243;  England 
and,  178;  Re  Italy,  179-180; 
France  and,  182. 
Ex-diplomat,  quoted,  43  and  note. 


Fahreddin  Bey,  Turkish  Delegate, 
132. 

Felix  V,  Pope,  see  under  Amadeus 
VIII. 

Ferrero,  G.,  Italian  Historian,  quoted, 
96  note. 

Fortis,  M.,  Italian  Premier,  97. 

France,  Relations  of,  with  Piedmont, 
2-4;  African  policy  of,  12;  Acquisi- 
tion of  Tunis  by,  12-14,  75;  Italian 
difficulties  with,  44,  50-51,  59,  61; 
Russian  relations  with,  58;  Liqui- 
dates Itahan  securities,  60;  Co- 
operates with  Italy,  re  Crete,  71; 
Friendly  relations  with,  72,  74-75, 
99;  Re  Morocco,  100-101,  110-111. 
117;  Re  Tripoli  and  Libyan  War, 
111-114,  116-117,  120;  attitude  of, 
re  S.S.  Carthage  and  Manouba  inci- 
dent, 127-128  and  note;  Recogni- 
tion of  Italian  sovereignty  over 
Libya  by,  133.  Relations  of,  with 
Vatican,  160,  161-162;  Severs  dip- 
lomatic relations  with  Vatican,  170; 
Benedict  XV  and.  176-177,  182, 
see  also  under  European  War,  The 
Allies. 

Francis  Ferdinand,  Archduke,  Re 
temporal  power  of  Papacy,  101- 
102;  Slav  policy  of,  211,  215,  218; 
Anti-Italian  policy  of,  102,  212, 
214, 218,  223;  Meeting  of,  with  Ger- 
man Emperor  at  Konopischt,  225 
and  note;  Visit  to  Bosnia  of,  226; 
Assassination  of,  226,  228. 

Francis  Joseph,  Emperor  of  Austria, 
Meeting  of,  with  Napoleon  III  at 


ViUafranca,  4;  Visit  of,  to  Trieste 
(1882),  18;  At  Venice,  23;  In  Ty- 
rol, 101;  Receives  Italian  Foreign 
Minister,  109. 

Franco-Prussian  War  (1870),  6,  162. 

Frederick,  German  Emperor,  Death 
of,  47. 

Fusinato,  M.,  Italian  Delegate,  131. 

Futurism,  32  et  seq. 


Galileo,  33. 

Garibaldi,  Sails  from  Quarto,  5,  258; 
In  the  Trcntino,  23,  quoted,  25,  88; 
Attempts  to  capture  Rome,  160- 
162. 

Genoa,  Duke  of,  84. 

Genoa,  Port  of,  194;  British  Squadron 
at,  106. 

George,  Prince,  of  Greece,  72. 

Germans  of  Tyrol,  28. 

Germany,  60;  Relations  with,  73-751 
At  Algeciras  Conference,  100-101, 
117;  Re  TripoU,  117-118;  Attitude 
of,  during  Libyan  War,  126,  135; 
Commercial  relations  with,  148; 
And  the  Vatican,  177,  179;  Peace- 
ful penetration  by,  185,  187-189; 
And  Banca  Commerciale,  190-196; 
Ascendency  of,  in  Italy.  197;  At- 
tempts to  dominate  Italian  affairs, 
203;  Future  relations  with,  206,  see 
also  under  European  War.  Central 
Powers. 

Giolitti,  Giovanni,  Italian  Premier, 
Birth  and  early  years  of,  92-93; 
First  Ministry  of  (1892),  58;  Policy 
of.  51-61;  Second  Ministry  of.  94 
Control  over  Chamber  by.  95-96 
Retires  from  office  (1905).  97-98 
Third  Ministry  of.  99,  102,  106 
Again  retires  (1909),  108;  Fourth 
Ministry  of,  109;  Growing  opposi- 
tion to,  110;  Re  TripoU.  112-113; 
Quoted.  134;  Resigns  (1914).  139, 
238;  Survey  of  dictatorship  of.  138- 
139;  Relations  of  with  Banca  Com- 


308 


INDEX 


merciale,  196,  203;  Neutrality  ad- 
vocated by,  243;  Opposes  Italian 
participation  in  war,  260;  Resigna- 
tion of  Government  forced  by, 
262;  Accused  of  being  a  traitor, 
263;  Is  compelled  to  leave  Rome, 
263-264;  The  parecchio  of,  266, 
268;  Present  position  of,  295. 

Giotto,  33. 

Goethe,  199. 

Goltz,  von  der.  Pasha,  124. 

Goluchowski,  Count,  Austro-Him- 
garian  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, 74,  213. 

Gorizia,  Conquest  of  (1916),  296. 

Great  Britain,  see  under  England. 

Greece,  Cretan  difSculties  of,  132, 
137;  Elimination  of,  300. 

Grey,  Sir  Edward,  British  Foreign 
Secretary,  137. 


Hamburger  Nachrichten,  quoted,  41 
note. 

Helena,  Princess  of  Montenegro, 
Marriage  of,  to  Victor  Emmanuel, 
later  Khig  of  Italy  (1896),  75,  212. 

Henry,  Prince,  of  Prussia,  49. 

Hohenberg,  Duchess  of,  211;  death 
of,  226. 

Hohenlohe,  Prince,  Governor  of 
Trieste,  218,  227. 

Himibert,  The  Whitehanded,  Found- 
er of  the  House  of  Savoy,  86. 

Humbert  I,  King  of  Italy,  51,  59,  67, 
74;  Friendship  of,  for  Germany, 
76;' Death  of  (1900),  83;  Reign  of, 
83-85,  90. 


Irish  Revolution  (1916),  178. 

Iron  and  Steel,  147. 

Irredentism,  Growth  of,  24;  Active 
agitation  of,  25-26;  Change  in 
objective  of,  31-32;  Suppression  of, 
62;  Re\ival  of,  219,  256. 

Ischia,  Earthquake  at,  S3. 


Isvolsky,  M.,  Rxissian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  102;  Quoted,  228. 

Italia  irredenta,  definition  of,  21-24; 
Redemption  of,  279,  296. 

Italy,  Area,  population,  vital  statis- 
tics of,  141-143. 


Jagow,  von,  German  Ambassador,  106. 
Jugo-Slavs,  see  under  Pan-Serbs. 


Karageorgevich,  Ruling  dynasty  of 
Serbia,  Contemplated  overthrow 
of,  225. 

Karamanh,  Hassuna  Pasha,  Tripoli- 
tan  Sheik,  55,  115,  121. 

Kassala,  62,  70-71. 

liing,  Bolton,  Italy  To-day,  quoted, 
80  and  note. 

Kullurkampf,  165. 

Kimflda,  Naval  engagement  at,  129. 


Launay  dl,  M.,  Italian  Ambassador, 
42. 

Lausanne,  Treaty  of  (1912),  131-133, 
196. 

Law  of  Guarantees,  "^  provisions  of, 
162-163;  proposal  to  international- 
ise, 167-168;  Papacy  and,  169, 
171 ;  Present  status  of,  180,  183. 

Lega  Nazionale,  31. 

Leo  XIII,  Pope,  Election  of,  164;  At- 
titude towards  Italy,  ,..164,  166; 
Death  of  (1903),  168. 

Libya,  Annexation  of,  124;  Area,  etc., 
of,  156,  see  also  under  Tripoli. 

Lombardy,  Liberation  of,  3. 

Loubet,  President  of  French  Re- 
public, Visit  to  Rome  of,  99,  170. 

Luzzatti,  Italian  Premier,  108-109. 


MachiaveUi,  33;  Quoted,  19. 
Mackensen,  von,  German  Field-Mar- 
shal. 280. 


INDEX 


309 


Magenta.  Battle  of  (1859);  3,  106, 
185. 

Makallg,  Siege  of,  63. 

Malaria,  Prevalence  of,  143. 

Mangasha,  Ras,  62,  70. 

Manin,  at  Venice,  85. 

Manouba,  S.S.,  see  Carthage. 

Marches,  The,  United  to  Italy,  5. 

Margherita,  Queen  of  Italy,  Marriage 
of,  to  King  Humbert,  84;  Quoted, 
84;  Personality  of,  84,  262. 

Marinetti,  M.,  36. 

Maximilian,  Son  of  the  Duchess  of 
Hohcnberg,  226. 

Mazzini,  45,  84,  145;  Struggles  of, 
at  Rome,  160. 

McClure,  W.  K.,  Italy  in  North  Af- 
rica, quoted,  67,  120. 

Menelek,  Ascends  Abyssinian  throne, 
54 ;  Treaty  of  Uccialli  denounced  by, 
62;  Attacks  Italian  forces,  63;  De- 
feats Italians  at  Adua,  65-66; 
Peace  negotiations  of,  with  Italy, 
69-71. 

Mentana,  Battle  of  (1867),  161. 

Merchant  Marine,  148. 

Mercier,  Cardinal,  Primate  of  Bel- 
giimi,  177. 

Merry  del  Val,  Cardinal,  Papal  Sec- 
retarj-  of  State,  174. 

Messina,  Earthquake  at,  104. 

Milan,  Disturbances  at,  78-81. 

Mines  and  Minerals,  146. 

Modane,  Race  riots  at,  51. 

Modernism,  Suppression  of,  169,  176. 

Monte  Rotondo,  Battle  of  (1867), 
161. 

Montenegro,  132,  136,  137. 

Morocco,  see  under  France. 

Mulla,  Diamilla,  114  note. 


Naby  Bey,  Turkish  delegate,  132. 
Naples,  49;  United  to  Italy,  5;  first 

port  of  Italy,  148. 
Napoleon,  236. 
Napoleon  III,  at  Plombiferes,  1;  In- 


terest of,  in  Italian  unity,  2;  Cam- 
paign of,  in  co-operation  with 
Piedmont  against  Austria,  3-4,  88; 
Meeting  of,  with  Francis  Joseph  at 
Villafranca,  4;  Defeats  Italian  at- 
tempts to  take  Rome,  161-162;  In- 
fluence of,  in  Italy,  240,  246. 

National  Debt,  151;  Conversion  of, 
152. 

Nationalism,  20-21,  111-113. 

Navy,  155. 

Near  Eastern  Question,  see  Balkans. 

Nerazziui,  Doctor,  Italian  Envoy  to 
Abyssinia,  70. 

Nice,  ceded  to  France,  4. 

Nicholas,  Iving  of  Montenegro,  212. 

Nicholas  II,  Tsar  of  Russia,  Visit  of, 
to  Italy,  106-107,  223. 

Nigra,  Count,  Italian  Ambassador, 
quoted,  26. 

Nuova  Antologia,  quoted,  43  note. 


Oberdank,  W.,  18. 

Oddone,  Count  of  Savoy,  86. 

Otranto,  Channel  of,  Italian  policy, 

re,  137. 
Ottoman  Empire,  see  Turkey. 
Oudinot,  General,  160. 


Pan-Germanic  movement,  28,  99;  Re 
Adriatic,  208,  219-221 ;  Methods  of, 
186-189;  Italy  and,  190-205. 

Pan-Serbs,  Programme  of,  216-217; 
Disavowed  by  Russia,  231;  Proc- 
lamation of,  234. 

Panther,  at  Agadir,  110. 

Papacy,  Bismarck  and,  15;  Loss  of 
temporal  powers  of,  159-162; 
Struggle  of,  to  regain  temporal 
rights,  102,  160,  176;  Policy  of,  re 
Italy,  163.  165-167,  169,  176;  Pro- 
posal of,  to  remove  abroad,  165, 
179,  183;  Proposal  to  internation- 
alise jurisdiction  over,  167,  171; 
Suspends  non  expedit,  97,  169;  Re 


310 


INDEX 


Albania,  213,  see  also  under  Euro- 
pean War. 

Patris,  Italian  Admiral,  takes  pos- 
session of  Avlona  on  behalf  of 
Italy  (1914),  228. 

Pecci,  Cardinal,  see  Leo  XIII. 

Pellagra,  Prevalence  of,  143. 

Pelloux,  General,  Italian  Premier, 
80-82. 

Petrarch,  33. 

Piedmont,  Relations  of,  with  France, 
2^,  88;  With  Prussia,  5-7;  Kernel 
of  Italian  unity,  5;  Under  House  of 
Savoy,  87;  Loss  of  ascendency  of, 
9,  89;  Attitude  of,  re  Italian  inter- 
vention in  European  War,  245. 

Pius  IX,  Pope,  First  driven  from 
Rome,  160;  Refuses  to  renoimce 
temporal  power,  159;  Loss  of  sov- 
ereignty by,  162;  Prisoner  in  the 
Vatican  (1870),  160;  Ignores  Law 
of  Guarantees,  163;  Death  of,  164. 

Pius  X,  Pope,  Policy  of,  168-171. 

Poincar6,  M.,  French  Premier,  99. 

Pope,  see  Pius  IX,  Pius  X,  Leo  XIII, 
Benedict  XV. 

Postal  Service,  149. 

Preziosi,  G.,  La  Germania  alia  Con- 
quisla  deU'Italia,  191  note;  Quoted, 
196,  et  seq, 

Prinetti,  M.,  Italian  Foreign  Min- 
ister, quoted,  117. 

Prinzivalli,  L'ltalia  nella  sua  Vita 
Economica,  quoted,  150  note. 

Prussia,  Relations  with  Piedmont  of, 
5-7,  99,  245;  Re  Papacy,  163;  Be 
city  of  Trieste,  220-221. 


Quarto,  5,  258. 

Quirinal,  King  of  Italy  first  takes  up 
residence  at,  162. 


Railways,  Mileage  of,  149. 
BampoUa,    Cardinal,    Papal    Secre- 


tary of  State,  168.  173-174;  Friend 
of  France,  176. 

Re-Insurance  Treaty  (1884),  41  and 
note,  58. 

Reshld  Pasha,  signs  Treaty  of  Lau- 
sanne, 132. 

Rhodes,  Italian  occupation  of,  130, 
137;  Development  of,  by  Italy,  157. 

Ricci,  Borea,  Italian  Admiral,  121. 

Roberts,  Field  Marshal  Lord,  quoted, 
122. 

Robilant,  Count  di,  Italian  Foreign 
Minister,  Policy  of,  re  Triple  Al- 
liance, 42. 

Rocco  di  Sanfermo,  Coimt,  237. 

Roman  Question,  163,  167,  169,  177, 
180,  183;  See  Papacy. 

Rudini,  Marchese  di,  Italian  Premier. 
57-58;  Second  Ministry  of,  67; 
Policy  of,  re  Abyssinia,  68-71; 
Persecution  of  Crispi  by,  72,  77; 
Foreign  policy  of,  72-74,  76;  Weak- 
ness of,  in  home  affairs,  76-77; 
And  Milan  disturbances,  78-79 ;  Re- 
tirement of,  80. 

Rural  Credit  Banks,  145. 

Rvissia,  Rapprochement  of,  with 
Prance,  58;  Relations  with,  72,  74- 
75,  102,  133,  216,  223;  And  Vati- 
can, 177;  Terms  offered  by,  to  se- 
cure Italian  intervention,  231; 
See  also  under  European  War.  The 
Allies, 


Sadowa,  Battle  of  (1866),  6,  185. 

Said  Halun,  Prince,  131. 

St.  Francis  of  Assisi,  33. 

Salandra,  Italian  Premier,  238;  Resig- 
nation of,  260;  Forms  new  Min- 
istry, 264;  Speech  of,  on  the 
Capitoline,  quoted,  267;  Armed 
neutrality  of,  269;  Difficulties  of, 
with  Chamber,  276;  Character  of, 
277-278;  Attends  Paris  Conference, 
281;  Relations  of,  with  Germany, 


INDEX 


311 


282,  293;  Speech  of,  in  Chamber, 
294;  Second  resignation  of,  299. 

SaUsbury,  Lord,  76;  Re  Tripoli, 
quoted,  115,  118. 

Salonika,  43,  102-103,  126;  Italy 
sends  force  to,  298. 

Salsa,  Major,  69. 

Salvemini,  Professor,  43  note. 

San  Guiliano,  Marchese  di,  Italian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  109; 
Death  of,  248. 

Sanjak  of  Novi  Bazar,  102-103. 

San  Mun  Bay,  82. 

Saracco,  M.,  Ministrj-  of,  83. 

Sarto,  Cardinal,  see  Piiis  X. 

Savings-Banks,  150. 

Savoy,  House  of,  60;  Leaders  of 
Italian  unity,  5,  89,  184;  Histor- 
ical siirvey  of,  84-91. 

Sazonofl,  M.,  Russian  Foreign  Min- 
ister, quoted,  228. 

Schleinitz,  Prussian  Foreign  Minister, 
letter  of,  concerning  Trieste,  219- 
221. 

Schwabach,  Herr  von,  German  finan- 
cier, 186. 

Scutari,  136. 

Sedan,  Battle  of  (1870),  185. 

Serbia,  102,  103,  132,  137-138;  Re- 
lations of,  with  Austria,  2-3,  211; 
See  also  under  Pan-Serbs  and  Euro- 
pean War,  Balkans. 

Sicily,  Disturbances  in,  61;  Sul- 
phiu"  mines  in,  146. 

Solferino,  Battle  of  (1859),  3, 106,  185. 

SomaUland,  Occupation  of,  53;  Eco- 
nomic status  of,  157. 

Sonnino,  Baron  Sidney,  Character  of, 
98  and  note,  203,  248 ;  Premier,  98, 
108;  And  Triple  Alliance,  203,  248; 
Sets  forth  Itahan  position,  re  neu- 
traUty,  248;  Receives  Prince  Biilow, 
249 ;  Presents  terms  to  Vienna,  250. 
Despatches  note  annulling  Treaty 
of  Alliance  with  Austria,  253-255; 
Relations  of,  with  Salandra,  260, 
277.   295;   Attends   Paris   Confer- 


ence  (1916),    281;    Policy    of,  300; 

Quoted,  105,  248.  282. 
South  of  Italy,  Economic  conditions 

of,  145. 
Steed,  Wickham,  Hapsburg  Monarchy, 

quoted,  222  note. 
Siidmark,  28. 


Taxation,  152. 

Telephones,  telegraph,  and  wireless, 
Development  of,  149-150. 

Ticino,  Swiss  Canton,  21. 

Tientsin,  Itahan  concession  at,  82. 

Tirpitz,  Grand  Admiral  von,  225  note. 

Titian,  33. 

Tittoni,  Itahan  Foreign  Minister,  94» 
97;  Quoted,  103. 

Trentino,  Description  of,  22,  24; 
Austrian  persecution  of  ItaUans  In, 
27;  Battle  of,  see  under  European 
War. 

Trieste,  22,  138;  Historical  reference 
to,  22  note;  Encroachments  of 
Slavs  in,  29-30;  Population  of,  215; 
Ville  allemande,  219-221;  Efforts  to 
Germanise,  221-222. 

Triple  Alliance,  First  negotiations  of, 
14;  Italy's  share  in,  14-15,  18; 
Date  of  signature  of,  15;  Terms  of, 
16  and  note;  Renewal  of  (1887),  44, 
(1891),  57;  Crispi  and,  46-47,  52, 
56-57;  Prolongation  of  (1896),  74- 
75 :  King  Humbert,  supporter  of,  83 : 
GioUtti  and,  99,  138;  Prolongation 
of,  101;  Difficulties  of,  102-103; 
Italy  and,  105,  106,  185,  198;  Re 
Balkans,  109,  125  note;  And  Italian 
interests  in  the  Mediterranean,  117; 
Loosening  of  bonds  of,  by  Italy, 
135;  Renewal  of,  eighteen  months 
before  expiration  (1912),  136;  And 
Triple  Entente,  re  jEgean  Islands, 
137;  Baron  Sonnino  and,  203;  De- 
nounced by  Italy,  to  Austria,  252. 

TripoU,  Crispi's  interest  in,  55,  115; 
Italian  plans  concerning,  100,  112, 


312 


INDEX 


114;  Attitude  of  France  re,  116. 
127,  135;  German  interest  in  af- 
fairs of,  113,  121,  124,  126;  Nego- 
tiations with  England,  re,  115,  117; 
Italian  grievances  in  regard  to,  118; 
Ultimatum  to  Turkey,  re,  119; 
Opening  of  hostilities  in,  120; 
Campaign  in,  121;  Annexation  of, 
to  Italy,  124;  Treaty  of  Lausanne, 
re,  133. 

Txmis,  Italian  interest  in.  12-14; 
Franco-Italian  competition  in.  12; 
Acquisition  of.  by  France,  13,  115; 
Treaty,  re,  75;  And  Tripoli,  116. 

Turin,  International  exhibition  at, 
141. 

Turkey,  War  of,  with  Greece  (1897), 
76;  Relations  of,  with  Italy,  see 
under  TripoU  and  European  War. 

Tuscany,  United  to  Italy,  6. 


Uccialll.  Treaty 'of  (1889),  54-55;  De- 
nounced by  Menelek,  62;  Annul- 
ment of,  71. 

Umbria,  United  to  Italy,  5. 

United  States,  Italian  emigration  to," 
144. 


Valerio.  Lorenzo,  220. 

Vatican,  see  Papacy. 

Venetia.  Annexation  of,  to  Italy,  6; 

Attitude  of,  re  war  with  Austria, 

245. 
Verdun,  Battle  of  (1916),  292. 
Victor  Emmanuel  II,  Iving  of  United 

Italy,  2,  6,  86-88;  At  Vienna,  23; 

Government  removed  to  Rome  by, 

162;  Death  of,  25,  89;  Moniunent 

to,  141. 
Victor  Emmanuel  III,  King  of  Italy, 


Marriage  of,  75;  Early  life  and 
training  of,  84-85;  Liberal  policy 
of,  90;  Receives  Tsar,  106;  Atti- 
tude of,  during  crisis,  re  European 
War,  263-264;  With  his  armies, 
270,  295. 

Villafranca,  Armistice  of,  4. 

Virgil,  33. 

Visconti  Venosta,  Marchese,  Italian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  73,  76, 
82;  Negotiations  of,  with  France, 
re  Tunis,  115-116. 

Volpi,  M.,  131. 


Wickenberg,  Count,  218. 

Wied,  Prince  WiUiam  of.  King  of 
Albania,  224,  228. 

William  I,  German  Emperor,  Death 
of,  1888,  47. 

WiUiam  II,  German  Emperor,  First 
visit  of,  to  Italy  (1888),  47-49; 
Receives  King  Humbert,  at  Ber- 
lin, 51;  In  Italy,  62,  73;  At  Tangier 
and  consequences  of  visit  of,  99- 
100;  Personal  propaganda  of,  in 
Italy,  199,  203;  Encouragement  of 
German  peaceful  penetration  by, 
189;  Entertains  ItaUan  sovereigns 
at  Kiel  (1913),  136;  Interview  of, 
with  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand 
at  Konopischt  (1914),  225  and  nole; 
Personal  interest  of,  in  Italian  af- 
fairs (1914),  249. 


Yovmg  Turks,  118,  214. 


Zanardelli,  M.,  Italian  Premier,  94. 
Zanzur,  Battle  of  (1912),  131. 
Zurich,  Treaty  of,  4. 


I 


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